Risk,religiosity, and emerging adulthood: description of Christian,Jewish, and Muslim university students at entering the freshman year

American students transitioning to university are at an increased risk for behaviours such as binge drinking, depression and suicidality. Despite the proliferation of prevention and intervention programs, rates remain high. Although religiosity is known to confer a protective effect in this population, it remains largely untapped as a resource because, among other reasons, it is poorly understood, poses ethical challenges, and exposes areas of distrust between the religious and medical establishments. This report describes the findings of a survey that examined possible factors explaining the relationship between religiosity, risky behaviours and emotional extremes in students as they transitioned into their first year of university. This study accounted for the religious diversity of the US by surveying Christian, Jewish, Muslim and religiously unaffiliated students. Findings indicated that religiosity was consistently and negatively correlated to risky behaviours across all faith groups. Interestingly, unique patterns in levels of religiosity emerged among the various faith groups. Similarly, patterns of engagement in risky behaviours demonstrated variation among religious groups. Our findings add to the body of evidence that suggests university-based professionals take into consideration student religiosity when creating prevention intervention programs for students.     

Mental well-being in the religious and the non-religious: evidence for a curvilinear relationship

Previous studies demonstrating a positive relationship between religiosity and mental health have sampled from a highly religious general population with little differentiation between weak religiosity and non-religiosity. Church members are typically compared with non-religious unaffiliated individuals, thus confounding belief with group effects (e.g. social support). The present study examined mental well-being, utilising the full range of certainty of belief or non-belief in God. In the first study, we compared church and secular group members on measures of life satisfaction and emotional stability. The second study used a large survey of the non-religious. A curvilinear relationship was found such that those with higher belief certainty (both confidently religious and atheists) have greater well-being relative to those with low certainty (unsure and agnostics). Multiple regressions controlling for social and demographic variables reduced, but did not eliminate this curvilinear relationship. Mechanisms of well-being may involve a confident worldview rather than religious beliefs themselves.     

Christian Affiliation,Christian Practice,and Attitudes to Religious Diversity: A Quantitative Analysis among 13- to 15-year-old Female Students in the UK

Within the context of the “Young People’s Attitudes to Religious Diversity” project at the Warwick Religions and Education Research Unit, this study examines the association between self-assigned Christian affiliation, self-reported Christian practice, and attitudes towards religious diversity among a sample of 5,748 13- to 15-year-old female students attending schools in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. The two hypotheses being tested are that, among female students, nominal Christians do not differ in their attitudes towards religious diversity from unaffiliated students and that church attendance leads to less tolerance of other religious groups. The data partly support the first hypothesis but not the second. Churchgoing Christian female students are more interested in and more tolerant of other religious groups. The data also draw attention to the perceived importance of religious education in schools for shaping views on religion and on religious diversity among unaffiliated students, nominal Christians, and practising Christians. Both the Christian churches and religious education in school seem to have an important part to play in nurturing a tolerant and inclusive religiously diverse society in the UK.     

“Let the heavens be glad,and the earth rejoice”: religion and life satisfaction among emerging adults in the United States

Although previous research suggests that religion contributes to greater life satisfaction, there is still disagreement about what aspects of religion predict greater life satisfaction. Despite a growing body of theory and research on emerging adulthood as a life stage that is distinct from adolescence and young adulthood, there has also been limited research on the relationship between religion and life satisfaction among emerging adults. Based on the third wave of the National Study of Youth and Religion, our results suggest that two measures of private religiosity, private devotion and religious efficacy, are significantly related to greater life satisfaction among emerging adults. In contrast, other dimensions of private and public religiosity, such as participation in organised religion, religious salience, otherworldly beliefs, and number of religious friends, are not related to greater life satisfaction. Finally, among emerging adults, being spiritual but not religious is not significantly related to life satisfaction.     

The religion paradox: if religion makes people happy, why are so many dropping out?

As we estimate here, 68% of human beings--4.6 billion people--would say that religion is important in their daily lives. Past studies have found that the religious, on average, have higher subjective well-being (SWB). Yet, people are rapidly leaving organized religion in economically developed nations where religious freedom is high. Why would people leave religion if it enhances their happiness? After controlling for circumstances in both the United States and world samples, we found that religiosity is associated with slightly higher SWB, and similarly so across four major world religions. The associations of religiosity and SWB were mediated by social support, feeling respected, and purpose or meaning in life. However, there was an interaction underlying the general trend such that the association of religion and well-being is conditional on societal circumstances. Nations and states with more difficult life conditions (e.g., widespread hunger and low life expectancy) were much more likely to be highly religious. In these nations, religiosity was associated with greater social support, respect, purpose or meaning, and all three types of SWB. In societies with more favorable circumstances, religiosity is less prevalent and religious and nonreligious individuals experience similar levels of SWB. There was also a person-culture fit effect such that religious people had higher SWB in religious nations but not in nonreligious nations. Thus, it appears that the benefits of religion for social relationships and SWB depend on the characteristics of the society.     

Religion and Whites’ Attitudes Toward Interracial Marriage with African Americans,Asians, and Latinos

Religious factors have been shown to influence whites’ attitudes toward interracial marriage, but this relationship has yet to be studied in depth. This study examines how religious affiliation, beliefs, practices, and congregational composition affect whites’ attitudes toward interracial marriage with African Americans, Asians, and Latinos. Employing data from Wave 2 of the Baylor Religion Survey, I estimate ordered logit regression models to examine the influence of religious factors on whites’ attitudes toward racial exogamy, net of sociodemographic controls. Analyses reveal that, relative to evangelicals, religiously unaffiliated whites report greater support of intermarriage with all minority groups. Biblical literalists are less likely to support interracial marriage to Asians and Latinos. However, whites who frequently engage in devotional religious practices are more likely to support interracial marriage with all racial groups, as are whites who attend multiracial congregations. My findings suggest that the relationship between religion and whites’ attitudes toward racial exogamy is more complex than previously thought and that the influence of religious practices and congregational composition should not be overlooked.     

None Too Simple: Examining Issues of Religious Nonbelief and Nonbelonging in the United States

Prior research on those who are “not religious” in the traditional, organizational sense has focused on a broad category of people in the United States who do not identify with an established religious tradition. We distinguish three categories of people who are religiously nonbelieving or nonbelonging: atheists, agnostics, and unchurched believers. Examining issues of religious belief and identity, we compare private spiritual life, attitudes on political issues, and stance toward religion in the public sphere for these three categories of nonreligious respondents. Atheists are the most uniformly antireligious. Agnostics, by comparison, are less opposed to religion overall, while unchurched believers display higher levels of personal religiosity and spirituality than atheists or agnostics. While atheists, agnostics, and unchurched believers are similar in their political identification and attitudes related to religiously infused political topics, unchurched believers are as strongly opposed to religion in the public sphere as atheists.     

Intersections of Feminist Identification and Hostile Sexism

This research examines the relationship between religious identification and feminist identification. Additionally, it investigates the extent of hostile sexist attitudes among those who identify as religious feminists. Utilizing 2016 American National Election Survey data, I find that religious women are no more or less likely to identify as feminist than the religiously unaffiliated, while evangelical and black Protestant men are less likely to identify as feminist. Further, both black Protestant women and Catholic men who identify as feminist express hostile sexist sentiment to a higher degree than their feminist unaffiliated counterparts, along with Latinas and Asian‐identified men. This study offers quantitative insights into the relationship between feminist identification, religious affiliation, and hostile sexist attitudes. Additional implications for this study include conceptualizations of feminism and sexism more broadly in society.     

Attitudes of Muslim Physicians and Nurses Toward Religious Issues

There is a growing body of evidence that suggests a positive role for religious involvement in physical and mental health. Studies have shown that attitudes of physicians toward religion affect their relationship with patients and their medical decisions, and in this way may ultimately affect treatment outcomes. Attitudes of nurses toward religion could also influence whether or not they address patients’ unmet spiritual needs. To assess attitudes of physicians and nurses toward religion and how these attitudes vary by education level and demographic characteristics, a total of 800 physicians, medical students, and nurses from some of the largest hospitals in Tehran, Iran, were approached, of whom 720 completed questionnaires (148 nurses, 572 medical students and physicians). The survey questionnaire included the Duke University Religion Index (DUREL), Hoge Intrinsic Religiosity Scale, a brief measure of Negative Religious Coping (NRCOPE), and the brief Trust/Mistrust in God Scale. Religious attitudes and practices were compared between physicians (medical students and physicians) and nurses. Regression analysis revealed that except for intrinsic religiosity, physicians were not less religious than nurses on any other dimension of religiosity. Training level (year of training) was a predictor of religiosity, with those having less training being the most religious. The findings suggest that there are few religious differences between nurses and physicians in Iran. However, religiosity may become less as the training level increases. Lack of emphasis in training on the important role that religion plays in health care may result in a decrease in religious involvement and the development of negative attitudes toward religion over time (displaced by a focus on the technological aspects of health care).     

Religiosity,Prosocial Values,and Adjustment among Students in Catholic High Schools in Canada

The present study explored the facilitating function of religious commitment in the lives of adolescents. A total of 369 boys and 372 girls attending Catholic high schools in Canada completed measures of family religion, religiosity, prosocial values, social adjustment (school attitudes and family satisfaction), and personal adjustment (life satisfaction and self-esteem). There were no significant gender differences in family religion, religiosity, social adjustment or personal adjustment. However, girls endorsed prosocial values much more than did boys. Religiosity had strong positive correlations with prosocial values and lesser significant correlations with social adjustment. Religiosity had much higher correlations with prosocial values and social adjustment among boys than among girls. Structural-equation analyses of the total sample, of boys, and of girls supported a path model where family religion fosters adolescents's religiosity, religiosity fosters prosocial values, prosocial values promote social adjustment and social adjustment promotes personal adjustment.     

Subjective Religiosity and Depression in the Transition to Adulthood

Does being more religious make one less susceptible to depression? We consider the association between subjective religiosity (religious self‐perception and coping) and depression in the context of social support (from family and friends) and stress exposure (recent negative life events, chronic stress, lifetime trauma, and discrimination). Data come from a sample of 1,803 Miami‐Dade County young adults interviewed between 1997 and 2000. We find higher levels of depression among the moderately religious than among either very religious or nonreligious respondents. Interestingly, when observations are made within gender, this relationship applies only to females. Controlling for socioeconomic status and social support largely accounts for the link between religiosity and depression. However, controlling for stress exposure reveals a suppressor effect wherein religiosity once again emerges as significant. Our interpretation is that, while established patterns of religious coping can routinely mitigate distress, heightened stress exposure may elicit increased prayer among the less religious.     

Alternative Schooling Strategies and the Religious Lives of American Adolescents

I analyze the effects of Catholic schooling, Protestant schooling, and homeschooling on adolescents' religious lives and test three mechanisms through which these schooling strategies might influence religiosity: friendship networks, network closure, and adult mentors. Data from Wave 1 of the National Survey of Youth and Religion suggest that Catholic schoolers attend religious services more frequently and value their faith more highly than public schoolers, but attend religious education classes and youth group less often. Protestant schoolers' involvement in their local congregation is similar to public schoolers', but their faith plays a more salient role in their life and they are more active in private religious activities. Homeschoolers do not differ significantly from public schoolers on any outcome considered. Moreover, friendship networks, network closure, and adult mentors play a very limited role in mediating the relationships between schooling strategies and adolescent religiosity. Interpretations of these findings are presented and discussed.     

Trust in God: The COVID-19 Pandemic's Impact on Religiosity in China

Emerging research shows the COVID-19 pandemic has made substantial changes to the religious climate of several nations. Surprisingly, China, the outbreak center of the pandemic, has been scarcely researched. Our study investigates how the COVID-19 pandemic has evoked new religious disaster responses and provided psychological coping mechanisms during the pandemic. We also explore how the pandemic explains surprising rates of religiosity in China. Scholars have long proposed that religious resurgence in China has been a result of individuals seeking stability in turbulent times. We bridge parallel Literatures in these areas and treat the pandemic as a natural experiment for evaluating religious behavior over time as conditioned by heightened risk perception. Utilizing a difference-in-differences estimation strategy with panel data, our study reveals that the pandemic has led to a significant increase in religiosity in China, particularly in religious areas most affected by the pandemic. We propose that even in a highly regulative religious environment, with most of its population being religiously unaffiliated, religion is a significant resource for coping in China. We take an innovative approach to demonstrate this by utilizing online search data. Our research speaks to the sociology of religion, the social psychology of risk perception, and makes application to emerging research on the unfolding COVID-19 pandemic.     

Reflections on religious belief and prosociality: Comment on Galen (2012)

Luke Galen (2012) offers a timely analysis of associations between religiosity and prosocial and antisocial attitudes and behaviors. After identifying 10 points of agreement, I raise 8 questions for further reflection and research: (1) Is ingroup giving and volunteerism not prosocial? (2) Are religion-related prosocial norms part of the religious factor? (3) Is social support also appropriately considered part of the religious factor? (4) Are self-report data from more and less religious people invalid? (5) How should we disentangle gender and religiosity? (6) How might we resolve "the religious engagement paradox"? (7) Does religion serve an adaptive, evolutionary function? And (8) Might research further explore religiosity, in its varieties, and prosociality? (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

The Positives and Negatives of Higher Education: How the Religious Context in Adolescence Moderates the Effects of Education on Changes in Religiosity

Although longitudinal research suggests that declines in religiosity associated with higher education vary across religious traditions, it tells us little about variation in the effects of higher education on changes in religiosity more broadly. Higher education may promote increases in religiosity for some, particularly with many Americans now being raised in relatively secular homes. This research note uses multilevel growth curve models and four waves of longitudinal data to examine how the religious context in adolescence moderates the effects of higher education on changes in emerging adult religiosity, regardless of the direction of change. Religious tradition and parent religious service attendance assess the religious context in adolescence, and several religiosity scales and measures of religious behaviors assess dimensions of religiosity. Results show that higher education is particularly likely to lead to religious decline for mainline Protestants and those with religiously active parents, and to increases in religiosity for the religiously unaffiliated and those with parents who infrequently attend religious services. These findings demonstrate how the religious context in adolescence conditions the influence of education, thereby highlighting the variable nature of the influence of higher education on changes in religiosity.     

Homonegativity and its Relationship to Religiosity,Nationalism and Attachment Style

This study investigated the relationships between negative attitudes towards homosexuals and two traditional ideologies: religiosity and nationalism, and explored the link with attachment style. An Internet survey yielded 290 participants, of highly diverse ages, nationalities, and religious backgrounds. The participants provided demographic details, and completed measures of adult attachment, nationalism, religiosity, and both explicit and implicit measures of homonegativity. The results indicated that both nationalism and religiosity were highly significant predictors of homonegativity. In the religious group, homonegativity and religiosity were positively related. This finding was greater for less securely attached individuals. Avoidance moderated the relationship in religious females, while anxiety moderated the relationship in religious males. No significant attachment moderation was found between the nationalism–homonegativity relationships.     

Religion at the European Parliament: the Italian case

Italy is a predominantly Catholic country that developed historically on the basis of a strong, dominant religion and weak state institutions. Yet, openly clerical parties, direct advocates of the interests of the Catholic Church, have nowadays virtually disappeared and the relevance of the religious cleavage is decreasing, in favour of a more indirect support for these interests, mainly among moderate and conservative forces. Although the overall level of secularisation in Italy has increased, the degree of religiosity of Italian society remains one of the highest of the 27 member-states of the European Union (EU) and polarisation over religious issues in domestic politics remains high, particularly regarding moral values and family matters. In our study we explore the role of religion within the Italian political sphere with regard to the functioning of political representation, by taking into account the sub-national, national and European levels of government. We focus on the attitudes and behaviours of Italian political elites at the EU level. We hypothesise a strong influence of religion on the articulation between national and European politics. Our findings consistently show that the degree of religiosity of the Italian delegation to the European Parliament (EP) is high. However, the impact of such a high degree of religiosity among the members of the EP (MEPs) on their political activities appears less direct than one might predict, while the degree of political secularism is higher among Italian MEPs than among their national or regional counterparts. When we discuss a case study, namely the accession of Turkey to the EU, our data show that the religious attitudes of Italian MEPs play a crucial role in their stance on Turkish accession. The picture that emerges is thus nuanced. Religion significantly impacts on Italian MEPs’ ideological, political and moral attitudes, but plays a smaller role in their activities; while their left-right collocation emerges as the most relevant predictor, despite a number of exceptions.     

Survey Experiments on Candidate Religiosity,Political Attitudes,and Vote Choice

Because identification with and affect toward social groups is a primary heuristic for citizens, the social group profiles of candidates are important for electoral behavior. We focus on an increasingly important element of candidates’ social characteristics: their levels of religiosity and secularism. We argue that as religious groups and identities become structured less by what religion they are and more by how religious they are (or are not), candidate religiosity and secularism should condition the impact of political orientations such as partisanship and cultural policy attitudes on vote choice. Highly religious candidates should attract more support from Republicans and from cultural conservatives, while overtly secular candidates should appeal more to Democrats and cultural liberals. Using a survey experiment in which respondents evaluate a state legislative candidate with varying levels of religiosity and secularism, we find strong support for our argument.     

Are Religiosity and Spirituality Associated with Obesity Among African Americans in the Southeastern United States (the Jackson Heart Study)?

There are several lines of evidence that suggest religiosity and spirituality are protective factors for both physical and mental health, but the association with obesity is less clear. This study examined the associations between dimensions of religiosity and spirituality (religious attendance, daily spirituality, and private prayer), health behaviors and weight among African Americans in central Mississippi. Jackson Heart Study participants with complete data on religious attendance, private prayer, daily spirituality, caloric intake, physical activity, depression, and social support (n = 2,378) were included. Height, weight, and waist circumference were measured. We observed no significant association between religiosity, spirituality, and weight. The relationship between religiosity/spirituality and obesity was not moderated by demographic variables, psychosocial variables, or health behaviors. However, greater religiosity and spirituality were related to lower energy intake, less alcohol use, and less likelihood of lifetime smoking. Although religious participation and spirituality were not cross-sectionally related to weight among African Americans, religiosity and spirituality might promote certain health behaviors. The association between religion and spirituality and weight gain deserves further investigation in studies with a longitudinal study design.     

Changes in Politics and Religiosity Among Students at a Protestant University

College is a setting and time of profound change in the lives of emerging adults. This change can include shifts in identity related to politics and religion. Given widespread attention to the alignment of religious people with conservative politics and less religious people with liberal politics (i.e., the “God Gap”), we ask: do college students who become politically liberal lose their religion in the process? Using longitudinal panel data, this study examines changes in political identity and religiosity among students at a Protestant university. Findings reveal changes in students’ politics align with changes in public and private religious behaviors, certainty in belief, agreement with core tenets of the Christian faith, faith maturity, and closeness to God. Whereas students who become more politically conservative increase their religiosity, the inverse is true for those whose politics become more liberal in college.