The sad truth about depressive realism

In one form of a contingency judgement task individuals must judge the relationship between an action and an outcome. There are reports that depressed individuals are more accurate than are nondepressed individuals in this task. In particular, nondepressed individuals are influenced by manipulations that affect the salience of the outcome, especially outcome probability. They overestimate a contingency if the probability of an outcome is high—the “outcome-density effect”. In contrast, depressed individuals display little or no outcome-density effect. This apparent knack for depressives not to be misled by outcome density in their contingency judgements has been termed “depressive realism”, and the absence of an outcome-density effect has led to the characterization of depressives as “sadder but wiser”. We present a critical summary of the depressive realism literature and provide a novel interpretation of the phenomenon. We suggest that depressive realism may be understood from a psychophysical analysis of contingency judgements.*     

Judgement of control revisited: Are the depressed realistic or pessimistic?

The study, firstly, examined the depressive realism postulate in relation to control judgments. A group of depressed and nondepressed undergraduates were exposed to a total of six judgement of control tasks (from 0% control tio 100% control). Depressed and nondepressed subjects did not differ in their control judgements. Secondlym, an attempt is made to classify subjects on the basis of these six judgements of control tasks as optimisticm, realistic and pessimistic in perceived control judgements.It was found that pessimistic rather than realistic subjects, had higher depressive symptomatology. Lastly, pessimism about control predicted the depressive symptomatology as assessed three months later. The results are discussed in relation to the phenomenon of depressive realism and the hopelessness theory of depression.     

Judgements of a 2 × 2 contingency table: Sequential processing and the learning curve

Shanks (1985) has used a video game to investigate how subjects estimate the effect of their behaviour in a task defined by a 2×2 contingency table. The subjects were able to distinguish positive and negative contingencies from zero contingencies. In addition, they showed a learning curve and a bias to rate zero contingencies with a high outcome density higher than low-density zero contingencies. He interpreted these data as being consistent with associative models derived from animal learning. In Experiment 1 we replicated these results using a task and instructions similar to his. In a second experiment we showed that the subjects' tendency to overestimate high-density zero contingencies did not arise because the “game” was so difficult that it interfered with processing the events. In this experiment subjects were given tables of the outcome frequencies that had been determined by the earlier subjects. These subjects were, if anything, less accurate in rating the zero contingencies. We point out several logical problems with Shanks's initial task. The task did not represent a true 2×2 contingency, and aspects of it were physically impossible. In Experiment 3 we modified the task to represent a true 2×2 contingency. Using this task, we found a similar pattern of results, except that there was no evidence of the learning curve predicted by the associative models. We conclude that there is little in our data to rule out a “rule-based” analysis of contingency judgements.     

Depressive realism and clinical depression

Depressive realism suggests that depressed individuals make more accurate judgments of control than their nondepressed counterparts. However, most studies demonstrating this phenomenon were conducted in nonclinical samples. In this study, psychiatric patients who met criteria for major depressive disorder underestimated control in a contingent situation and were consistently more negative in their judgments than were nondepressed controls. Depressed patients were less likely than their nondepressed counterparts to overestimate control in a noncontingent situation, but largely because they perceived receiving less reinforcement. Depressed patients were no more likely to use the appropriate logical heuristic to generate their judgments of control than their nondepressed counterparts and each appeared to rely on different primitive heuristics. Depressed patients were consistently more negative than their nondepressed counterparts and when they did appear to be more “accurate” in their judgments of control (as in the noncontingent situation) it was largely because they applied the wrong heuristic to less accurate information. These findings do not support the notion of depressive realism and suggest that depressed patients distort their judgments in a characteristically negative fashion.     

Depression, self-focused attention, and expectancies for positive and negative future life events for self and others

In two studies, we examined depressed and nondepressed persons' judgments of the probability of future positive and negative life events occurring to themselves and to others. Study 1 demonstrated that depressed subjects were generally less optimistic than their nondepressed counterparts: Although nondepressed subjects rated positive events as more likely to happen to themselves than negative events, depressed subjects did not. In addition, relative to nondepressed subjects, depressed subjects rated positive events as less likely to occur to themselves and more likely to occur to others and negative events as more likely to occur to both self and others. Study 2 investigated the role that differential levels of self-focused attention might play in mediating these differences. On the basis of prior findings that depressed persons generally engage in higher levels of self-focus than nondepressed persons do and the notion that self-focus activates one's self-schema, we hypothesized that inducing depressed subjects to focus externally would attenuate their pessimistic tendencies. Data from Study 2 supported the hypothesis that high levels of self-focus partially mediate depressive pessimism: Whereas self-focused depressed subjects were more pessimistic than nondepressed subjects, externally focused depressed subjects were not. The role of attentional focus in maintaining these and other depressive pessimistic tendencies was discussed.     

Self-schemas,depression, and the processing of personal information in children

Recent research in information processing has yielded evidence supporting the self-as-schema model with adults. Further self-schema research with depressed and nondepressed persons has suggested the existence of negative self-schemas in depression, lending support to a content-specificity self-schema model. The present studies were designed to investigate the applicability of the self-as-schema model to children and to examine the extent of negative self-schemas in relatively depressed children. A depth-of-processing incidental recall memory paradigm was employed with two groups of normal third- to sixth-grade children. Results supported the self-as-schema model as applied to children, even the youngest group, by indicating superior recall for words encoded under self-reference instructions, compared to semantic or structural orienting instructions. The content-specificity hypotheses were tested with relatively depressed and nondepressed children, and were supported only for the nondepressed children, who recalled mostly positive content words. The relatively depressed children did not demonstrate content specificity in their recall, showing a more “confused” pattern, and the results were discussed in terms of a developmental model of acquisition of depression vulnerability requiring repeated depressive experiences over time. Although the results were consistent with a self-schema approach, current controversies over the implications of depth-of-processing methods require further research to clarify mechanisms of enhanced self-reference recall.     

Negative and positive cognition in depressed and nondepressed chronic-pain patients

Several studies have suggested that depressed pain patients evidence more cognitive distortion than nondepressed pain patients and healthy controls. Although these studies have generally supported notions relating cognitive distortion to depressive functioning, other aspects of dysfunctional cognition have not been assessed in the chronic-pain population. The present study examined negative and positive automatic thoughts and attributional style in depressed pain patients, nondepressed pain patients, and healthy controls. Depressed chronic-pain patients were found to exhibit significantly more negative automatic thoughts than nondepressed pain patients and healthy controls. Conversely, nondepressed chronic-pain patients reported significantly more positive automatic thoughts than did depressed patients and healthy controls. No significant differences were found for attributional style. These results suggest that different cognitive-behavioral interventions might be considered for depressed compared to nondepressed chronic-pain patients.     

Maternal depression: Effects on social cognition and behavior in parent-child interactions

The social interactions of depressed and nondepressed mothers and their preschool-age children were observed and mothers' perceptions of child behavior assessed. Depressed mothers, as a group, exhibited more negative behavior than controls; however, no differences were found for maternal positive behavior or contingent responding. There was a high degree of reciprocity between child and mother behavior in both groups and there was a trend for children of the depressed mothers to be more negative than the control children. The results with cognitive measures were consistent with depressive realism in perception of social interactions: Depressed mothers recalled more negative child behavior than nondepressed mothers; however, these perceptions paralleled the observed interactions. Overall, the results suggest that maternal depression is associated with negative parent-child interactions and more negative, albeit fairly accurate, perceptions of child behavior.This study is based on portions of a doctoral dissertation completed in the Department of Psychology at the University of Iowa. I appreciate the guidance of my advisors Michael O'Hara and Donald K. Routh and committee members Leonard Feldt, John Knutson, and Sue Rosner.     

Depression, realism, and the overconfidence effect: are the sadder wiser when predicting future actions and events?

Do depressed individuals make more realistic judgments than their nondepressed peers in real world settings? Depressed and nondepressed Ss in 2 studies were asked to make predictions about future actions and outcomes that might occur in their personal academic and social worlds. Both groups of Ss displayed overconfidence, that is, they overestimated the likelihood that their predictions would prove to be accurate. Of key importance, depressed Ss were less accurate in their predictions, and thus more overconfident, than their nondepressed counterparts. These differences arose because depressed Ss (a) were more likely to predict the occurrence of low base-rate events and (b) were less likely to be correct when they made optimistic predictions (i.e., stated that positive events would occur or that aversive outcomes would not). Discussion focuses on implications of these findings for the depressive realism hypothesis.     

When do auditory/visual differences in duration judgements occur?

Four experiments examined judgements of the duration of auditory and visual stimuli. Two used a bisection method, and two used verbal estimation. Auditory/visual differences were found when durations of auditory and visual stimuli were explicitly compared and when durations from both modalities were mixed in partition bisection. Differences in verbal estimation were also found both when people received a single modality and when they received both. In all cases, the auditory stimuli appeared longer than the visual stimuli, and the effect was greater at longer stimulus durations, consistent with a “pacemaker speed” interpretation of the effect. Results suggested that Penney, Gibbon, and Meck's (2000) “memory mixing” account of auditory/visual differences in duration judgements, while correct in some circumstances, was incomplete, and that in some cases people were basing their judgements on some preexisting temporal standard.     

Depressive Symptoms,Criticism, and Counter‐Criticism in Marital Interactions

Although people with depressive symptoms face criticism, hostility, and rejection in their close relationships, we do not know how they respond. Following interpersonal theories of depression, it might be expected that depressive symptoms would be associated with a tendency to receive and also to express criticism toward one's spouse, and that at least some of this criticism would be a contingent response to criticism received (i.e., “counter‐criticism”). However, other research has determined that depressive symptoms/behaviors suppress partner criticism, suggesting that depressed people might respond to partner criticism similarly, by subsequently expressing less criticism. In a sample of 112 married couples, partial correlations, regressions, and Actor‐Partner Interdependence Modeling indicated that lower criticism and counter‐criticism expression during a laboratory marital interaction task was associated with higher depressive symptoms, especially when such individuals were clinically depressed. Furthermore, during a separate and private Five‐Minute Speech Sample, lower criticism by partners was associated with higher depressive symptoms, especially when those who chose the interaction topic were also clinically depressed. All analyses controlled for relationship adjustment. These results suggest that spouses with higher depressive symptoms and clinical depression diagnoses may be suppressing otherwise ordinary criticism expression toward their nondepressed partners; furthermore, nondepressed partners of depressed people are especially likely to display less criticism toward their spouse in a private task.     

Processing of ambiguous and unambiguous feedback by depressed and nondepressed college students: schematic biases and their implications for depressive realism

Explored schematic processing as a mechanism for predicting (a) when depressed Ss would be negative relative to nondepressed Ss and (b) when depressed and nondepressed Ss would show biased or unbiased (i.e., "realistic") processing. Depressed and nondepressed Ss performed multiple trials of a task under conditions in which the two groups held either equivalent or different schemas regarding this task. Ss received either an unambiguous or objectively normed ambiguous feedback cue on each trial. In full support of schematic processing, depressed Ss showed negative encoding relative to nondepressed Ss only when their schemas were more negative, and both depressed and nondepressed Ss showed positively biased, negatively biased, and unbiased encoding depending on the relative feedback cue-to-schema match. Depressed and nondepressed Ss' response latencies to unambiguous feedback also supported the occurrence of schematic processing. We discuss the methodological, treatment, and "realism" implications of these findings and suggest a more precise formulation of Beck's schema theory of depression.     

Depressive Cognition: A Test of Depressive Realism Versus Negativity Using General Knowledge Questions

This research is an examination of whether cognition in depressed individuals incorporates a realistic view of the world or a general tendency toward negativity. Participants provided two types of probability judgments of the likelihood that they correctly answered general knowledge questions: the probability that they correctly answered each of the individual questions and an aggregate judgment, after completing the questionnaire, of the percentage of all the questions they thought they had correctly answered. These tasks generally elicit overconfidence and accuracy in nondepressives. In accord with theories of both depressive realism and general negativity, in their item-by-item assessments of their answers to the individual questions, depressed participants demonstrated less overconfidence than nondepressed participants. In accord with the theory of general negativity but not with the theory of depressive realism, however, depressed participants demonstrated underconfidence in their aggregate judgments. The implications of these findings on theories of depressive cognition are discussed.     

Depressive cognition: a test of depressive realism versus negativity using general knowledge questions

This research is an examination of whether cognition in depressed individuals incorporates a realistic view of the world or a general tendency toward negativity. Participants provided two types of probability judgments of the likelihood that they correctly answered general knowledge questions: the probability that they correctly answered each of the individual questions and an aggregate judgment, after completing the questionnaire, of the percentage of all the questions they thought they had correctly answered. These tasks generally elicit overconfidence and accuracy in nondepressives. In accord with theories of both depressive realism and general negativity, in their item-by-item assessments of their answers to the individual questions, depressed participants demonstrated less overconfidence than nondepressed participants. In accord with the theory of general negativity but not with the theory of depressive realism, however, depressed participants demonstrated underconfidence in their aggregate judgments. The implications of these findings on theories of depressive cognition are discussed.     

Negatively biased recall in children with self-reported symptoms of depression

This study investigated differences in depressed and nondepressed children's recall of positively and negatively reinforced behavior. Twenty-six children with self-reported symptoms of depression in the fourth through sixth grades were compared with a matched sample of 26 nondepressed children to determine if there was a negative bias in depressed children's recall. Subjects first generated guesses of the most common associations to each of a series of 40 words. Later, when compared with their nondepressed peers, the children with depressive symptomology were less accurate in recalling which words they had answered correctly and remembered fewer of their own correct responses. They also did more poorly when asked to recall the correct answers that had been provided by the investigator. The two groups did not differ, however, in their recall of which items had been answered incorrectly or in their recall of their previous wrong responses. These results suggest that children with self-reported depressive symptomology do not remember negative experiences more than do nondepressed children; rather, they recall positive experiences less well. Selective forgetting of positively reinforced behavior could be a serious handicap for depressed children in school. It could also play an important role in the maintenance and perhaps even the etiology of depressive symptomatology in children.We wish to thank Bruce Compas for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Depression in child psychiatric inpatients: Cognitive and attributional patterns

Cognitive and learned helplessness models of depression view maladaptive cognitive and attributional patterns as core features of depressive disorders. This study examined cognitive and attributional patterns in depressed children, nondepressed children, and a subgroup of remitting depressives who had histories of depression but were not reporting depressive symptoms when evaluated during the first 2 weeks of hospitalization. When compared with nondepressed controls, depressed children reported significantly more hopelessness, more negative self-perceptions, and negative self-perceptions across a wider variety of domains, and they displayed more dysfunctional attributional styles. While 55% of depressed children displayed pervasive maladaptive cognitive patterns, the other 45% of depressed children scored more similarly to nondepressed children, suggesting that childhood depressive disorders may be heterogeneous with respect to cognitive patterns. Contrary to the notion of traitlike depressive cognitive and attributional patterns that persist after the remission of depressive episodes, children with remitting depressions scored similarly to nondepressed children.Partial support for this project was provided by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation as part of their Network on Risk and Protective Factors in the Major Mental Disorders. I wish to thank Donald Guthrie for providing statistical consultation, Gwen Gordon for her computer assistance, and Niels Mueller and Jean Keller for their help with data collection.     

On the benefits of misery: self-serving biases in the depressive self-concept

Two survey studies suggested that depressed people react to their acute distress by engaging in self-serving biases and striving to develop positive self-views. Study 1 revealed that whereas most of the specific self-views of depressed persons were relatively negative, their best (most favorable) self-views were just as favorable as the best self-views of nondepressed persons. Moreover, depressed participants reported that they were highly confident of their best self-views and considered these beliefs extremely important. Analyses equating depressed and nondepressed persons for global self-esteem provided even stronger evidence of self-serving biases among the depressed. Specifically, such analyses revealed that depressed persons' best self-views were even more positive than the best self-views of the nondepressed. A 2nd study replicated these effects and provided tentative evidence that downward comparison processes play a role in the development of depressed persons' positive self-views. The theoretical and therapeutic implications of these findings are discussed.     

Priming and trial spacing in extinction: effects on extinction performance, spontaneous recovery, and reinstatement in appetitive conditioning

Previous research in this laboratory suggests that priming of the conditional stimulus (CS) in short-term memory may play a role in the trial-spacing effects in appetitive conditioning. For example, a nonreinforced presentation of a CS 60 s before a reinforced trial with the same CS produced slower acquisition than a CS presentation that occurred 240 s before the reinforced trial. The results were consistent with the self-generated priming mechanism proposed by Wagner (e.g., Wagner 1978, 1981). The present experiments extended the earlier work by examining the effects of trial spacing in extinction rather than acquisition. After conditioning with a mixture of intertrial intervals (ITIs), rats received extinction with ITIs of 60 or 240 s, longer or shorter values, or different ways of “chunking” extinction trials in time. Although trial spacing produced effects on extinction performance that were consistent with our previous research on acquisition, there were few long-term differences in spontaneous recovery or in reinstatement. Short ITIs in extinction appear to affect extinction performance more than they affect extinction learning. Mechanisms of trial spacing in conditioning and extinction are discussed.     

Regulation of Negative Affect During Mother–Child Problem-Solving Interactions: Adolescent Depressive Status and Family Processes

Despite recent suggestions that depression can be conceptualized as a disorder of affect regulation, relatively little research has focused on affect regulation skills in depressed individuals. This paper investigated whether depressed adolescents (N = 25) differ from nondepressed adolescents (N 25) on two indices of affect regulation (i.e., duration of negative affective states and reciprocity of maternal negative affect) as well as whether these indices are related to microsocial family interactional processes. Analyses revealed that depressed teens differed from their nondepressed peers with regard to duration of negative affective states but not in their likelihood of reciprocating negative affect. Additionally, indices of adolescent affect regulation were related to family interactional processes. Duration of depressive affect was positively associated with maternal display of facilitative behavior contingent on adolescent depressive behavior. Duration of aggressive behavior was inversely related to maternal problem-solving responses to aggressive behavior. Finally, adolescent reciprocity of maternal depressive and aggressive behaviors was strongly associated with mothers' reciprocity of adolescents' negative affective behavior.     

Interpersonal betrayal and cooperation: effects on self-evaluation in depression

Despite numerous studies demonstrating that depressed people are generally self-critical, little is known about interpersonal stressors that may activate or increase this negative self-evaluation. In this study, the effect of interpersonal betrayal and cooperative social interaction on self-evaluation processes in depressed and nondepressed women was assessed. Depressed subjects who experienced interpersonal betrayal were more critical of their performance on a subsequent task than were nondepressed subjects or depressed subjects who had experienced a cooperative interaction. Depressed subjects in the betrayal condition also behaved more aggressively toward their betraying partner than did nondepressed betrayed subjects. Depressed subjects were more critical of their own personality characteristics than were nondepressed subjects, regardless of condition. Results suggest that some negative cognitive schema among depressed persons may be altered by interpersonal factors, although it is not clear whether such effects are secondary to increases in self-criticism after conflict or to decreases in self-critical tendencies after positive interaction. Given the variability in results with different measures of self-evaluation, researchers are urged to use multiple, diverse measures of self-evaluation in future efforts to study variability in self-appraisal.