Some Reflections on the Meaning of Dīkṣā in Kerala According to Mātṛsadbhāvatantra

International Journal of Hindu Studies - One of the most important Hindu Tantric rites is known as dīk?ā, an initiation that grants access to mystical knowledge. This initiation...     

The Anugītā as a Gloss on the Bhagavadgītā—Part I: The Origin of Erroneous Exegetical Tradition of the Bhagavadgītā

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - The Anugītā has been considered as the first gloss known to us on the Bhagavadgītā. The Anugītā set erroneous...     

Evoking Rasa Through Stotra: Rūpa Gosvāmin’s Līlāmṛta,A List of Kṛṣṇa’s Names

International Journal of Hindu Studies -     

Duty and Sacrifice: A Logical Analysis of the Mīmāṃsā Theory of Vedic Injunctions

The Mīmā?sā school of Indian philosophy has for its main purpose the interpretation of injunctions that are found in a set of sacred texts, the Vedas. In their works, Mīmā?sā authors provide some of the most detailed and systematic examinations available anywhere of statements with a deontic force; however, their considerations have generally not been registered outside of Indological scholarship. In the present article we analyze the Mīmā?sā theory of Vedic injunctions from a logical and philosophical point of view. The theory at issue can be regarded as a system of reasoning based on certain fundamental principles, such as the distinction between strong and weak duties, and on a taxonomy of ritual actions. We start by reconstructing the conceptual framework of the theory and then move to a formalization of its core aspects. Our contribution represents a new perspective to study Mīmā?sā and outlines its relevance, in general, for deontic reasoning.     

On the Coherence of Dignāga’s Epistemology: Evaluating the Critiques of Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi

I discuss two critiques of Dignāga’s epistemology, one from Candrakīrti and another from Jayarā?i. I argue that they are two versions of what I call the core problem: if the content of Dignāga’s epistemology were correct, two fundamental beliefs within this epistemological theory could not be established or known to be true, as Dignāga claims they are. In response to objections found within the classical Indian tradition as well as several plausible contemporary objections, I then argue that the core problem remains a serious issue with which those sympathetic to Dignāga ought to contend.     

Theodicy in a Deterministic Universe: God and the Problem of Suffering in Vyāsatīrtha’s Tātparyacandrikā

International Journal of Hindu Studies - The classical traditions of Vedānta in India explored the problem of why an omnipotent being like God would permit sentient beings to suffer in His...     

Lourens Minnema: Tragic Views of the Human Condition: Cross-Cultural Comparisons Between Views of Human Nature in Greek and Shakespearean Tragedy and the Mahābhārata and Bhagavadgītā

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research -