Personalized and not general suggestion produces false autobiographical memories and suggestion-consistent behavior

Suggesting false childhood events produces false autobiographical beliefs, memories and suggestion-consistent behavior. The mechanisms by which suggestion affects behavior are not understood, and whether false beliefs and memories are necessary for suggestions to impact behavior remains unexplored. We examined the relative effects of providing a personalized suggestion (suggesting that an event occurred to the person in the past), and/or a general suggestion (suggesting that an event happened to others in the past). Participants (N=122) received a personalized suggestion, a general suggestion, both or neither, about childhood illness due to spoiled peach yogurt. The personalized suggestion resulted in false beliefs, false memories, and suggestion-consistent behavioral intentions immediately after the suggestion. One week or one month later participants completed a taste test that involved eating varieties of crackers and yogurts. The personalized suggestion led to reduced consumption of only peach yogurt, and those who reported a false memory showed the most eating suppression. This effect on behavior was equally strong after one week and one month, showing a long lived influence of the personalized suggestion. The general suggestion showed no effects. Suggestions that convey personal information about a past event produce false autobiographical memories, which in turn impact behavior.     

True photographs and false memories

Abstract— Some trauma-memory-oriented psychotherapists advise clients to review old family photo albums to cue suspected "repressed" memories of childhood sexual abuse. Old photos might cue long-forgotten memories, but when combined with other suggestive influences they might also contribute to false memories. We asked 45 undergraduates to work at remembering three school-related childhood events (two true events provided by parents and one pseudoevent). By random assignment, 23 subjects were also given their school classes' group photos from the years of the to-be-recalled events as memory cues. As predicted, the rate of false-memory reports was dramatically higher in the photo condition than in the no-photo condition. Indeed, the rate of false-memory reports in the photo condition was substantially higher than the rate in any previously published study.     

Children's emotional false memories

Eight- and 12-year-old children were presented with neutral and negative emotional Deese-Roediger-McDermott lists equated on familiarity and associative strength. Both recall and recognition (A') measures were obtained. Recall measures exhibited the usual age increments in true and false recollection. True neutral items were better recalled and recognized than true negative emotional items. Although the children showed more false recall for neutral than for negative emotional lists, false recognition was higher for negative emotional than for neutral items. A' analyses also showed that whereas true neutral information and false neutral information were easily discriminated by children regardless of age, the same was not the case for true and false negative emotional information. Together, these results suggest that although children may be able to censor negative emotional information at recall, such information promotes relational processing in children's memory, making true and false emotional information less discriminable overall.     

Test-induced priming of false memories

Of interest was whether prior testing of related words primes false memories in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. After studying lists of related words, subjects made old-new judgments about zero, three, or six related items before being tested on critical nonpresented lures. When the recognition test was self-paced, prior testing of list items led to faster false recognition judgments, but did not increase the rate of false alarms to lures from studied lists. Critically, this pattern changed when decision making at test was speeded. When forced to respond quickly—presumably precluding the use of monitoring processes—clear test-induced priming effects were observed in the rate of false memories. The results are consistent with an activation-monitoring explanation of false memories and support that retrieving veridical memories can be a source of memory error.     

Iatrogenic creation of false childhood sexual abuse memories: Controversy,dynamics, fantasy,and reality

This paper examines the phenomenon of False Memory Syndrome (FMS). In the last decade there has been an increase in the number of adult individuals who report childhood sexual abuse only to recant their allegations. Recanters and the falsely accused are specifying that therapeutic interventions by trusted and, at times, well intentioned therapists facilitated their false memories. The theory of repression, reliability of memory, recovery techniques, and characteristics of therapist and clients are explored. This paper also discusses a number of cases that have been filed, and some guidelines for therapists who work or plan to work in the recovery of repressed memories.     

Personality characteristics associated with susceptibility to false memories

This study examined whether certain personality characteristics are associated with susceptibility to false memories. Participants first answered questions from the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator in order to measure various personality characteristics. They then watched a video excerpt, the simulated eyewitness event. They were next encouraged to lie about the videotaped event during an interview. A week later, some participants recognized confabulated events as being from the video. Two personality characteristics in particular--the introversion-extroversion and thinking-feeling dimensions--were associated with susceptibility to false memories.     

Encoding context and false recognition memories

False recognition of an extralist word that is thematically related to all words of a study list may reflect internal activation of the theme word during encoding followed by impaired source monitoring at retrieval, that is, difficulty in determining whether the word had actually been experienced or merely thought of. To assist source monitoring, distinctive visual or verbal contexts were added to study words at input. Both types of context produced similar effects: False alarms to theme-word (critical) lures were reduced; remember judgements of critical lures called old were lower; and if contextual information had been added to lists, subjects indicated as much for list items and associated critical foils identified as old. The visual and verbal contexts used in the present studies were held to disrupt semantic categorisation of list words at input and to facilitate source monitoring at output.     

Encoding context and false recognition memories

False recognition of an extralist word that is thematically related to all words of a study list may reflect internal activation of the theme word during encoding followed by impaired source monitoring at retrieval, that is, difficulty in determining whether the word had actually been experienced or merely thought of. To assist source monitoring, distinctive visual or verbal contexts were added to study words at input. Both types of context produced similar effects: False alarms to theme‐word (critical) lures were reduced; remember judgements of critical lures called old were lower; and if contextual information had been added to lists, subjects indicated as much for list items and associated critical foils identified as old. The visual and verbal contexts used in the present studies were held to disrupt semantic categorisation of list words at input and to facilitate source monitoring at output.     

Building false memories without suggestions

People can come to remember doing things they have never done. The question we asked in this study is whether people can systematically come to remember performing actions they never really did, in the absence of any suggestion from the experimenter. People built LEGO vehicles, performing some steps but not others. For half the people, all the pieces needed to assemble each vehicle were laid out in order in front of them while they did the building; for the other half, the pieces were hidden from view. The next day, everyone returned for a surprise recognition test. People falsely and confidently remembered having carried out steps they did not; those who saw all the pieces while they built each vehicle were more likely to correctly remember performing steps they did perform but equally likely to falsely remember performing steps they did not. We explain our results using the source monitoring framework: People used the relationships between actions to internally generate the missing, related actions, later mistaking that information for genuine experience.     

Item-specific processing reduces false memories

We examined the effect of item-specific and relational encoding instructions on false recognition in two experiments in which the DRM paradigm was used (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Type of encoding (item-specific or relational) was manipulated between subjects in Experiment 1 and within subjects in Experiment 2. Decision-based explanations (e.g., the distinctiveness heuristic) predict reductions in false recognition in between-subjects designs, but not in within-subjects designs, because they are conceptualized as global shifts in decision criteria. Memory-based explanations predict reductions in false recognition in both designs, resulting from enhanced recollection of item-specific details. False recognition was reduced following item-specific encoding instructions in both experiments, favoring a memory-based explanation. These results suggest that providing unique cues for the retrieval of individual studied items results in enhanced discrimination between those studied items and critical lures. Conversely, enhancing the similarity of studied items results in poor discrimination among items within a particular list theme. These results are discussed in terms of the item-specific/ relational framework (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993).     

Emotional content of true and false memories

Many people believe that emotional memories (including those that arise in therapy) are particularly likely to represent true events because of their emotional content. But is emotional content a reliable indicator of memory accuracy? The current research assessed the emotional content of participants' pre-existing (true) and manipulated (false) memories for childhood events. False memories for one of three emotional childhood events were planted using a suggestive manipulation and then compared, along several subjective dimensions, with other participants' true memories. On most emotional dimensions (e.g., how emotional was this event for you?), true and false memories were indistinguishable. On a few measures (e.g., intensity of feelings at the time of the event), true memories were more emotional than false memories in the aggregate, yet true and false memories were equally likely to be rated as uniformly emotional. These results suggest that even substantial emotional content may not reliably indicate memory accuracy.     

Creating bizarre false memories through imagination

The present study explored memory for familiar or usual actions (e.g., flip the coin) and bizarre or unusual actions (e.g., sit on the dice). In Session 1, action statements were presented to 210 participants, who had to either perform or imagine those actions. In Session 2, 24 h later, participants imagined performing various actions, some presented in the first session and others totally new. Finally, in Session 3, 2 weeks later, participants were tested on their memory for the original actions. We found that as the number of imaginings increased in Session 2, so did the proportion of did responses to actions that were only imagined or not even presented. This pattern was present for both bizarre and familiar actions. These results demonstrate that bizarre actions may lose the item distinctiveness that is used to make accurate memory decisions after repeated imagination.     

Importing perceived features into false memories

False memories sometimes contain specific details, such as location or colour, about events that never occurred. Based on the source-monitoring framework, we investigated one process by which false memories acquire details: the reactivation and misattribution of feature information from memories of similar perceived events. In Experiments 1A and 1B, when imagined objects were falsely remembered as seen, participants often reported that the objects had appeared in locations where visually or conceptually similar objects, respectively, had actually appeared. Experiment 2 indicated that colour and shape features of seen objects were misattributed to false memories of imagined objects. Experiment 3 showed that perceived details were misattributed to false memories of objects that had not been explicitly imagined. False memories that imported perceived features, compared to those that presumably did not, were subjectively more like memories for perceived events. Thus, perception may be even more pernicious than imagination in contributing to false memories.     

Output monitoring tests reveal false memories of memories that never existed

Three experiments were conducted to assess participants' beliefs about potential false memories that might have occurred during free recall tests. An input-output monitoring test was administered that required participants to discriminate between items that were studied and recalled, studied and not recalled, or were entirely new. Critical lures from Roediger and McDermott's (1995) paradigm were inserted into this test. The results demonstrated that participants believed erroneously recalled items were both studied and recalled. The intriguing finding was that unrecalled items were believed to have been studied approximately 80% of the time, and half of those were also believed to have been recalled. This result represents a dual false memory effect in which items were believed to have been studied and also to have been recalled. The ramifications of this new procedure are discussed in terms of proposed experiments that might clarify the genesis of these false memories.     

Imagination can create false autobiographical memories

Previous studies have shown that imagining an event can alter autobiographical beliefs. The current study examined whether it can also create false memories. One group of participants imagined a relatively frequent event and received information about an event that never occurs. A second group imagined the nonoccurring event and received information about the frequent event. One week before and again 1 week immediately after the manipulation, participants rated the likelihood that they had experienced each of the two critical events and a series of noncritical events, using the Life Events Inventory. During the last phase, participants were also asked to describe any memories they had for the events. For both events, imagination increased the number of memories reported, as well as beliefs about experiencing the event. These results indicate that imagination can induce false autobiographical memories.     

Importing perceived features into false memories

False memories sometimes contain specific details, such as location or colour, about events that never occurred. Based on the source-monitoring framework, we investigated one process by which false memories acquire details: the reactivation and misattribution of feature information from memories of similar perceived events. In Experiments 1A and 1B, when imagined objects were falsely remembered as seen, participants often reported that the objects had appeared in locations where visually or conceptually similar objects, respectively, had actually appeared. Experiment 2 indicated that colour and shape features of seen objects were misattributed to false memories of imagined objects. Experiment 3 showed that perceived details were misattributed to false memories of objects that had not been explicitly imagined. False memories that imported perceived features, compared to those that presumably did not, were subjectively more like memories for perceived events. Thus, perception may be even more pernicious than imagination in contributing to false memories.     

Strategies for verifying false autobiographical memories

This study examined the types of strategies people use to verify putative childhood memories and the degree to which their preferred strategies are restricted in typical memory implantation studies. We asked subjects to describe a situation in which they recalled a false childhood experience and a hypothetical situation in which they pretended to have developed a false memory after taking part in a memory implantation study. We also asked them how they did (or would) determine the source of the event. We found that subjects relied primarily on other people and cognitive strategies to verify their experiences. These results suggest that laboratory situations cultivate false memories in part because they prevent people from talking to others about the false event, which causes them to rely on less optimal strategies.     

Transmitting false memories in social groups

In 2 experiments, subjects studied word lists drawn from Roediger and McDermott (1995) and then participated in perceived group recall (PGR) tests that were intended to lead each subject to believe that she or he was participating in collaborative recall in a 4-person group. Some of the lists were followed by PGR tests containing the nonpresented critical word, some lists were followed by PGR tests not containing the nonpresented critical word, and some lists were not followed by PGR tests. Subjects then completed individually administered recall tests and subsequent immediate or delayed recognition tests that required remember or know judgments. The major finding was that critical words contained within PGR tests were as likely to be falsely recalled, recognized, and consciously remembered as original list items. These findings show that false memories can be socially transmitted.     

Affective valence influences participant's susceptibility to false memories and illusory recollection

This study examined the influence of emotional valence on the production of DRM false memories (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Participants were presented with neutral, positive, or negative DRM lists for a later recognition (Experiment 1) or recall (Experiment 2) test. In both experiments, confidence and recollective experience (i.e., "Remember-Know" judgments; Tulving, 1985) were also assessed. Results consistently showed that, compared with neutral lists, affective lists induced more false recognition and recall of nonpresented critical lures. Moreover, although confidence ratings did not differ between the false remembering from the different kinds of lists, "Remember" responses were more often associated with negative than positive and neutral false remembering of the critical lures. In contrast, positive false remembering of the critical lures was more often associated with "Know" responses. These results are discussed in light of the Paradoxical Negative Emotion (PNE) hypothesis (Porter, Taylor, & ten Bricke, 2008).     

Evidence that nonconscious processes are sufficient to produce false memories

Are nonconscious processes sufficient to cause false memories of a nonstudied event? To investigate this issue, we controlled and measured conscious processing in the DRM task, in which studying associates (e.g., bed, rest, awake...) causes false memories of nonstudied associates (e.g., sleep). During the study phase, subjects studied visually masked associates at extremely rapid rates, followed by immediate recall. After this initial phase, nonstudied test words were rapidly presented for perceptual identification, followed by recognition memory judgments. On the perceptual identification task, we found significant priming of nonstudied associates, relative to control words. We also found significant false recognition of these nonstudied associates, even when subjects did not recall this word at study or identify it at test, indicating that nonconscious processes can cause false recognition. These recognition effects were found immediately after studying each list of associates, but not on a delayed test that occurred after the presentation of several intervening lists. Nonconscious processes are sufficient to cause this memory illusion on immediate tests, but may be insufficient for more vivid and lasting false memories.