Positive psychotherapy: A strength-based approach

Positive psychotherapy (PPT) is a therapeutic approach broadly based on the principles of positive psychology. Rooted in Chris Peterson’s groundbreaking work on character strengths, PPT integrates symptoms with strengths, resources with risks, weaknesses with values, and hopes with regrets in order to understand the inherent complexities of human experiences in a way that is more balanced than the traditional deficit-oriented approach to psychotherapy. This paper makes the case of an alternative approach to psychotherapy that pays equal attention and effort to negatives and positives. It discusses PPT’s assumptions and describes in detail how PPT exercises work in clinical settings. The paper summarizes results of pilot studies using this approach, discusses caveats in conducting PPT, and suggests potential directions.     

Identification of typographically transformed words: instance-based skill acquisition

Two hypotheses concerning the development of skill at identifying typographically transformed words were tested. One claim is that a general skill independent of specific training instances is involved, and the other is that skill is based on memory for the analysis of specific instances encountered during training. Contrary to the general skill view, a series of experiments demonstrated that transfer of word identification skill was highly specific and occurred only when training and test instances shared common letters printed in the same case (i.e., uppercase or lowercase). Transfer of skill also depended on the visual patterns formed by adjacent letters and word shape. Presentation of a word in training and test phases significantly improved test phase identification of that word even when a unique visual pattern was used. These results are compatible with an instance-based view of word identification skill in which it is assumed that subjects develop skilled analysis of the visual and conceptual characteristics of specific words, and that this skill can be used to identify repeatedly presented words as well as predictable sets of novel words.     

Aging and mechanisms of visual selective attention: Effects on word localization and identification

Abstract

The present study investigated age differences in attentional allocation in a word localization and identification task. Response times for valid and invalid spatial cue conditions were compared for each of two age groups under two SOA conditions: 500 msec and 1000 msec. Very high benefits for valid cues in terms of response time were found for both groups. Results indicated that attention was more important for words when compared with similar earlier studies using a simple shape identification task. A sensitive model-fitting technique was used to compare the cost and benefit of selective attention to words; it revealed that attention can be concentrated away from the fovea to benefit in word identification in much the same way for both age groups. The model-fit analysis also revealed that attention for word identification, and perhaps any more complex visual stimuli, is more diffuse than for simple shape identification. In addition, older adults are more likely to avoid the foveal area in order to distribute attentional resources to the periphery and are able to increase these effects of selection at the longer SOA. This suggests that older adults are using attention to offset visual processing deficits for peripheral information such as letter information in the reading process. The results support a two-process view of attention where attention consists both of selection and inhibition and provide evidence to support a theory of reduced inhibitory processeses as a cause for cognitive slowing associated with aging.     

Attention and automaticity: Toward a theoretical integration

We sketch an initial version of a theory intended to account for the role of attention in the acquisition and expression of automaticity, and we test some initial predictions. The theory combines Logan's instance theory of automaticity and Bundesen's theory of visual attention, with Bundesen's theory determining what Logan's theory learns. We report four experiments that test the assumption that subjects learn what they report explicitly do not learn what they do not report explicitly. The experiments provide partial support for the predictions and encourage further development of the combined theory. Received: 4 September 1997 / Accepted: 12 January 1998     

Simple arithmetic processing: the question of automaticity

In adult simple arithmetic performance, it is commonly held that retrieval of solutions occurs automatically from a network of stored facts in memory. However, such an account of performance necessarily predicts a uniform reaction time for solution retrieval and is therefore not consistent with the robust finding that reaction time increases with problem size and difficulty. Additionally, past research into arithmetic performance has relied on tasks that may have actually induced and measured attentional processing, thereby possibly confounding previous results and conclusions pertaining to automaticity. The present study therefore, attempted to more reliably assess the influence of automatic processing in arithmetic performance by utilizing a variant of the well-established semantic word-priming procedure with a target-naming task. The overall results revealed significant facilitation in naming times at SOAs of 240 and 1000 ms for congruent targets i.e., targets that represented the correct solutions to problems presented as primes (e.g., 6+8 and 14). Significant inhibition in comparison to a neutral condition (0+0 and 17) was also observed at 120 and 240 ms SOAs in naming incongruent targets (e.g., 6+8 and 17). Furthermore, response times were found to vary as a function of both arithmetic fluency and problem size. Differences in performance to addition and multiplication operations and implications for cognitive research and education are considered.     

Simple arithmetic processing: Individual differences in automaticity

This study investigated individual differences in the ability to automatically access simple addition and multiplication facts from memory. It employed a target-naming task and a priming procedure similar to that utilised in the single word semantic-priming paradigm. In each trial, participants were first presented with a single digit arithmetic problem (e.g., 6+8) and were then presented with a target that was either congruent (e.g., 14) or incongruent (e.g., 17) with this prime. Response times for congruent and incongruent conditions were then compared to a neutral condition (e.g., X+Y, with target 14). For the high skilled group, significant facilitation in naming congruent multiplication and addition targets was found at SOAs of 300 and 1000?ms. In contrast, for the low skilled group, facilitation in naming congruent targets was only observed at 1000?ms. Significant inhibition in naming incongruent multiplication and addition targets at 300?ms, and addition targets at 1000?ms, was found for the high skilled group alone. This advantage in access to simple facts for the high skilled group was then further supported in a problem size analysis that revealed individual differences in access to small and large problems that varied by operation. These findings support the notion that individual differences in arithmetic skill stem from automaticity in solution retrieval and additionally, that they also derive from strategic access to multiplication solutions.     

Flexibility over automaticity: Separable representations for colours and words

This study demonstrates that associations between colour words and the colours they denote are not mandatory. Experiments 1–3 used a go/no-go task in which participants responded to one print colour and one word and withheld response from another print colour and another word. In Experiment 1, the content of the words denoted noncolour entities. In Experiment 2 the two words denoted two colours that were different from the target print colours. In Experiment 3, the words denoted the same colours as the target print colours but each response set included incompatible print colour and word (e.g., one response to the print colour blue and the word “green” and another response to the print colour green and the word “blue”). Participants performed equally well in all the experiments. Experiment 4a used Arabic digits and words denoting numbers, two formats that are known to have shared representations. Here, participants had difficulties separating their responses to the digits and words. These results suggest that representations of words are distinct from the content that they represent, supporting the existence of distinct verbal and colour modules.     

Dental flossing and automaticity: a longitudinal moderated mediation analysis

We investigated the role of normative support, behavioural automaticity, and action control in predicting dental flossing behaviour. Between May and October 2015, 629 Australian young adults completed a questionnaire assessing constructs of normative support and automaticity, and a 2-week follow-up of dental flossing behaviour and action control, resulting in n = 241 persons for longitudinal analysis. Findings supported the hypotheses that the effect of normative support on behaviour would be mediated via automaticity, and the effect of automaticity would be moderated by action control. Current results extend previous research to elucidate the mechanisms that help to understand predictors of oral hygiene behaviours and contribute to the cumulative evidence concerning self-regulatory and automatic components of health behaviour.     

Training and Stroop-like interference: evidence for a continuum of automaticity

Three experiments varied the extent of practice in an analog of the Stroop color-work task. Each experiment involved four phases: (a) baseline naming of four familiar colors, (b) training in consistently naming four novel shapes by using the names of the same four colors, (c) naming the colors when they appeared in the form of the shapes, and (d) naming the shapes when they appeared in color. In Experiment 1, with up to 2 hr of training in shape naming, colors were named much faster than shapes. Interference was observed only in Phase 4. In Experiment 2, with 5 hr of training, shape naming sped up, but was still slower than color naming. Nevertheless, there was symmetrical interference in Phases 3 and 4, and this persisted 3 months later without further training. Experiment 3 replicated this pattern and then extended practice to 20 hr, by which time shape and color naming were equally rapid. After 20 hr, interference appeared only in Phase 3, reversing the original asymmetry. The overall pattern is inconsistent with a simple speed of processing account of interference. The alternative idea of a continuum of automaticity--a direct consequence of training--remains plausible, and the implications of this perspective are considered.     

The automaticity of emotion recognition

Evolutionary accounts of emotion typically assume that humans evolved to quickly and efficiently recognize emotion expressions because these expressions convey fitness-enhancing messages. The present research tested this assumption in 2 studies. Specifically, the authors examined (a) how quickly perceivers could recognize expressions of anger, contempt, disgust, embarrassment, fear, happiness, pride, sadness, shame, and surprise; (b) whether accuracy is improved when perceivers deliberate about each expression's meaning (vs. respond as quickly as possible); and (c) whether accurate recognition can occur under cognitive load. Across both studies, perceivers quickly and efficiently (i.e., under cognitive load) recognized most emotion expressions, including the self-conscious emotions of pride, embarrassment, and shame. Deliberation improved accuracy in some cases, but these improvements were relatively small. Discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for the cognitive processes underlying emotion recognition.     

Comparative judgment of numerosity and numerical magnitude: attention preempts automaticity

It is commonly believed that humans are unable to ignore the meanings of numerical symbols, even when these meanings are irrelevant to the task at hand. In 5 experiments, the authors tested the notion of automatic activation of numerical magnitude by asking participants to compare, while timed, pairs of numerical arrays on either numerosity or numerical value. Garner and Stroop effects were used to gauge the degree of interactive processing. The results showed that both effects were sensitive to the discriminability of values along the constituent dimensions, to the number of stimulus values used, and to practice and motivation. Notably, Stroop and Garner effects were eliminated under several conditions. These findings are incompatible with claims of obligatory activation of meaning in numerical processing, and they cast doubt on theories positing automatic processing of semantic information for alphanumerical symbols.     

Checklist procedures and the cost of automaticity

Automaticity is usually discussed in terms of its benefits. Automaticity has, however, a cost that manifests itself in procedures that are highly routinized but require close attention, such as verbal checklist procedures. In such procedures, errors occur because the routine leads to automaticity. In three paper-and-pen experiments, we tested this manifestation and investigated ways to decrease automaticity in verbal checklist procedures. In the experiments, subjects proofread sets of multiplication problems to detect erroneous operations, simulating the checklist procedure. In Experiments 1 and 2, two conditions were compared: a fixed-order condition (in which each set contained operations in the same order) and a varied-order condition (in which the operations were in a different order in each set). In Experiment 1, proofreading times were measured to establish the role of fixed sequential order as a consistent environment promoting the emergence of automaticity. In Experiment 2, we introduced errors into the material, and in Experiment 3 we introduced “alerting” conditions to interfere with the development of automaticity. The results indicated that the subjects in the varied-order and alert conditions detected significantly more errors than did those in the fixed-order condition. The implications of the findings for current theories of automaticity are discussed as well as those for the design of checklist procedures.     

Focus of attention and automaticity in handwriting

This study investigated the nature of automaticity in everyday tasks by testing handwriting performance under single and dual-task conditions. Item familiarity and hand dominance were also manipulated to understand both cognitive and motor components of the task. In line with previous literature, performance was superior in an extraneous focus of attention condition compared to two different skill focus conditions. This effect was found only when writing with the dominant hand. In addition, performance was superior for high familiarity compared to low familiarity items. These findings indicate that motor and cognitive familiarity are related to the degree of automaticity of motor skills and can be manipulated to produce different performance outcomes. The findings also imply that the progression of skill acquisition from novel to novice to expert levels can be traced using different dual-task conditions. The separation of motor and cognitive familiarity is a new approach in the handwriting domain, and provides insight into the nature of attentional demands during performance.     

Attention and automaticity in Stroop and priming tasks: Theory and data

Three major variables identified with attention and automaticity in the priming paradigm are shown to have parallel effects in the Stroop paradigm. A model is developed to explain the effects in both paradigms in terms of a single decision process that combines evidence from several sources (e.g., habitual associations and temporary contingencies between the prime and the target or between the unreported and reported dimensions). The model is applied to two Stroop experiments in which the faster two of three stimulus dimensions relate associatively and cue through a frequency manipulation the third, which must be reported. Depending on the direction of the cueing relation, attentional effects enhanced or counteracted automatic (associative) effects, and the attentional effects were stronger with the faster unreported dimension than with the slower one. These results corroborate findings in the priming paradigm and confirm the model. Implications of the results and the model for broader issues are discussed.     

Habits as knowledge structures: automaticity in goal-directed behavior

This study tested the idea of habits as a form of goal-directed automatic behavior. Expanding on the idea that habits are mentally represented as associations between goals and actions, it was proposed that goals are capable of activating the habitual action. More specific, when habits are established (e.g., frequent cycling to the university), the very activation of the goal to act (e.g., having to attend lectures at the university) automatically evokes the habitual response (e.g., bicycle). Indeed, it was tested and confirmed that, when behavior is habitual, behavioral responses are activated automatically. In addition, the results of 3 experiments indicated that (a) the automaticity in habits is conditional on the presence of an active goal (cf. goal-dependent automaticity; J. A. Bargh, 1989), supporting the idea that habits are mentally represented as goal-action links, and (b) the formation of implementation intentions (i.e., the creation of a strong mental link between a goal and action) may simulate goal-directed automaticity in habits.     

Beyond behaviorism: on the automaticity of higher mental processes

The first 100 years of experimental psychology were dominated by 2 major schools of thought: behaviorism and cognitive science. Here the authors consider the common philosophical commitment to determinism by both schools, and how the radical behaviorists' thesis of the determined nature of higher mental processes is being pursued today in social cognition research on automaticity. In harmony with "dual process" models in contemporary cognitive science, which equate determined processes with those that are automatic and which require no intervening conscious choice or guidance, as opposed to "controlled" processes which do, the social cognition research on the automaticity of higher mental processes provides compelling evidence for the determinism of those processes. This research has revealed that social interaction, evaluation and judgment, and the operation of internal goal structures can all proceed without the intervention of conscious acts of will and guidance of the process.