Assessing clinically significant religious impairment in clients: Applications from measures in the psychology of religion and spirituality

This article reviews measures in the psychological study of religion and spirituality (RS) in terms of Hathaway's (1999) conceptualization of clinically significant religious impairment (CSRI). It is maintained that RS can be regarded as an endogenous variable impaired by psychopathology. Specific RS measures are discussed in terms of how they may be used to assess RS impairment in clients in terms of performing RS activities, achieving RS goals, and experiencing desired RS states.     

The changing dynamics of religious authority on Pakistani religious television

This paper analyses the production, ownership and control of Pakistani religious talk shows, which have emerged as a popular genre of religious programming, subsequent to the liberalisation of Pakistani media in 2002. Much scholarship has implicated the nexus between Islam and televisual media in enabling the fragmentation of religious authority, by altering ‘lay’ engagements with Islam and thereby eliciting wider participation in religious discourse. In contrast, this paper focuses on the changing terms of asserting religious authority in the newly liberalised media context. Based on an analysis of the innovative formats and modes of editorial control characterising contemporary religious shows, I posit the significance of religious talk shows in both altering the nature of scholarly participation in religious public debate, and subjecting featured scholars to non-scholarly interests and agendas. I argue that the latter two insights into the nature of religious authority on television are only accessible from a production-based perspective, which is crucial for evaluating the wider implications of broadcast media for religious authority.     

Clinically significant and practical! Enhancing precision does make a difference. Reply to McGlinchey and Jacobson, Hsu, and Speer

Based on a secondary analysis of the Jacobson and Truax [Jacobson, N.S. & Truax, P. (1991). Clinical significance: a statistical approach to defining meaningful change in psychotherapy research. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 59, 12-19.] data using both their own traditional approach and the refined method advanced by Hageman and Arrindell [Hageman, W.J.J.M., & Arrindell, W.A. (1999). Establishing clinically significant change: increment of precision and the distinction between individual and group level of analysis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 1169-1193], McGlinchey and Jacobson [McGlinchey, J. B., & Jacobson, N. S. (1999). Clinically significant but impractical? A response to Hageman and Arrindell. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 1211-1217.] reported practically identical findings on reliable and clinically significant change across the two approaches. This led McGlinchey and Jacobson to conclude that there is little practical gain in utilizing the refined method over the traditional approach. Close inspection of the data used by McGlinchey and Jacobson however revealed a serious mistake with respect to the value of the standard error of measurement that was employed in their calculations. When the proper index value was utilised, further re-analysis by the present authors disclosed clear differences (i.e. different classifications of S's) across the two approaches. Importantly, these differences followed exactly the same pattern as depicted in Table 2 in Hageman and Arrindell (1999). The theoretical advantages of the refined method, i.e. enhanced precision, appropriate distinction between analysis at the individual and group levels, and maximal comparability of findings across studies, exceed those of the traditional method. Application of the refined method may be carried out within approximately half an hour, which not only supports its practical manageability, but also challenges the suggestion of McGlinchey and Jacobson (1999) that the relevant method would be too complex (impractical) for the average scientist. The reader is offered the opportunity of obtaining an SPSS setup in the form of an ASCII text file by means of which the relevant calculations can be carried out. The ways in which the valuable commentaries by Hsu [Hsu, L. M. (1999). A comparison of three methods of identifying reliable and clinically significant client changes: commentary on Hageman and Arrindell. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 1195-1202.] and Speer [Speer, D. C. (1999). What is the role of two-wave designs in clinical research? Comment on Hageman and Arrindell. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 1203-1210.) contribute to a better understanding of the technical/statistical backgrounds of the traditional and refined methods were also discussed.     

The religious physician

In order to understand what it means to be a physician, we must, according to Dr. Edmund Pellegrino, analyze four words that capture the essence of the medical enterprise: profession, patient, compassion, and consent. The resultant model provides a rational and secular basis upon which the Jewish or Christian physician can then build an understanding of medicine in its peculiarly religious form. This religious form is likewise characterized by four words: vocation, neighbor, love, and covenant. An analysis of these words provides a model of and for the religious physician.     

Understanding religious behavior

The attached (to mother) fetus-infant finds his religious expression in Buddhism. The attached (to group) juvenile finds his religious expression in Judaism and other tribalisms. The attached (to spouse) adult finds his religious expression in agnosticism and secularism. Attached phases are placid and of progressively decreasing emotional intensity. The three detaching phases are hurtful and hence soteriological, and are also of progressively decreasing emotional intensity. The toddler-young child finds his religious expression in Christianity, the adolescent in atheism and/or Marxism, and the aged, sick or dying plucks at any religious or secular aid.He has written numerous papers on aspects of child care, medical history, interrelations between medicine and religion, and between Judaism and Christianity.     

Authoritarianism and religious identification: Response to threats on religious beliefs

The present study illustrates the impact of threat and authoritarianism on individuals and their respective belief systems within a Christian framework. Participants completed Altemeyer's Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) Scale, the Religious Fundamentalism Scale, the Questions and Doubts about Religion Scale, and the Behavioral and Faith Scale. Participants also read a threat- or non-threat-inducing article concerning the crisis of the Catholic Church. Results showed that individuals with high RWA scores demonstrated a greater support for religious fundamentalist ideals, reported less doubts regarding their religious beliefs, and identified more strongly with their religion than did those with low RWA scores. Furthermore, participants who were exposed to threat, regardless of individual level of authoritarianism, scored higher on a measure of religious fundamentalist ideals and identified more strongly with their respective religions than those who were not exposed to a threat. Most importantly, individuals high in authoritarianism who were exposed to threat demonstrated greater support for religious fundamentalist ideals, reported fewer doubts, and more strongly identified with their religion than those individuals with high levels of authoritarianism who were in the non-threatening article condition.     

Wittgenstein and religious dogma

It is well understood that Wittgenstein defends religious faith against positivistic criticisms on the grounds of its logical independence. But exactly how are we to understand the nature of that independence? Most scholars take Wittgenstein to equate language-games with belief-systems, and thus to assert that religions are logical schemes founded on their own basic beliefs and principles of inference. By contrast, I argue that on Wittgenstein’s view, to have religious faith is to hold fast to a certain picture of the world according to which one orients one’s actions and attitudes, possibly even in dogmatic defiance of contrary evidence. Commitment to such a picture is grounded in passion, not intellection, and systematic coherence is largely irrelevant.