Seeing the unseen,hearing the unsaid: hallucinations,psychology and St Thomas Aquinas

Psychologists referring to St Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) in the context of hallucinations have neither accurately portrayed his conceptions of such experiences nor critically examined his alleged personal experience of them. This paper first examines Aquinas’ conception of what are termed “hallucinations.” It is shown that he allowed both natural and supernatural explanations for such experiences, with both accounts acknowledging an underlying physical cause. Contrasting explanations for his alleged personal experience of hallucinations are examined, including a new “Chestertonian” interpretation. Critiques of the use of his canonisation documents as factual evidence are also considered. It is concluded that Aquinas had a sophisticated understanding of hallucinations, and although it is fundamentally unknowable whether he actually experienced a hallucination, nevertheless, the approach we take to understanding his experience is of importance. The implications of Aquinas for interdisciplinary dialogue between theology and psychology in the field of hallucinations are then examined.     

The Ontological Roots of Human Science: the Message of Evolution—The Physics of Freedom (Choice)

The original proposal of H. H. Pattee (1971) Pattee, H. H. 1971. “Can life explain quantum mechanics?”. In Quantum theory and beyond, Edited by: Bastin, T. 307–319. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  [Google Scholar] of basing quantum theoretical measurement theory on the theory of the origin of life, and its far reaching consequences, is discussed in the light of a recently emerging biological paradigm of internal measurement. It is established that the “measurement problem” of quantum physics can, in principle, be traced back to the internal material constraints of the biological organisms, where choice is a fundamental attribute of the self-measurement of matter. In this light, which is shown to be a consequence of Pattee's original suggestion, it is proposed that biological evolution is a gradual liberation from the inert unity of “subject” and “object” of inanimate matter (as “natural law” and “initial conditions”), to a split biological existence of them and, as a consequence, the “message of evolution” is freedom, rather than complexity in itself. Some classical philosophical systems are brought into context to show that the epistemologies of several strictly philosophical systems of the social sciences are well acquainted with the problem and their solutions support our conclusions.     

Do phenomenal concepts misrepresent?

Many contemporary physicalists concede to dualists that conscious subjects have distinctive “phenomenal concepts” of the phenomenal qualities of their experiences. Indeed, they contend that idiosyncratic characteristics of these concepts facilitate responses to influential anti-physicalist arguments. Like some some other critics of this approach, James Tartaglia (2013 Tartaglia, J. (2013). Conceptualizing physical consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 26(6), 817–838.[Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) maintains that phenomenal concepts express contents that conflict with physicalism, but as a physicalist, the moral he distinctively draws from this is that phenomenal concepts misrepresent. He contends further that the contemporary physicalists’ account cannot accommodate this feature, and that in consequence, physicalists should abandon phenomenal concepts and return to the identity theory championed by Place and Smart in the 1950s. I respond to Tartaglia by identifying lacunae in his interpretation of contemporary physicalism and arguing that phenomenal concepts as conceived by the contemporary physicalists do not express contents that support either dualist or physicalist metaphysics: they are “metaphysically neutral.”     

The lived experiences of people diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in relation to exercise

The purpose of this study was to examine the lived experiences of people diagnosed with Multiple Sclerosis (MS). Seven active exercisers with MS participated in semi-structured interviews regarding their exercise experiences since diagnosis. Data were analysed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA; Smith?&?Osborn, 2003 Smith, JA and Osborn, M. 2003. “Interpretive phenomenological analysis”. In Qualitative psychology: A practical guide to research methods, Edited by: Smith, JA. 51–80. London: Sage.  [Google Scholar]). Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis. The results and interpretations of narratives revealed a number of functional limitations due to the severity of MS symptoms, which were found to have a major effect on the ability of the participants to exercise. Furthermore, psychological problems and the heightened behavioural adjustments to the progressive disability led to re-appraisal of ability to exercise. Previous, relevant exercise experience made participants more determined to continue to be able to exercise after diagnosis. The wider exercise experience narratives were related to concerns about safety, dependability on others to overcome the challenges, and potential environmental hazards. The loss of spontaneous opportunities to exercise because of these actual and perceived barriers was key to this population. This research highlighted the need to rethink the health and social service arrangements in relation to exercise provision for individuals with MS.     

Occupational Therapy Students' Development of Therapeutic Communication Skills During a Service-Learning Experience

This qualitative study examined the effect community-based service-learning experiences had upon occupational therapy students' therapeutic communication skills and their application of theoretical concepts. After their semester-long course was completed, six students de-identified and voluntarily submitted their weekly reflective journals for retrospective analysis in accordance with Giorgi's strategies (1985 Giorgi , A. ( 1985 ). Phenomenology and psychological research . Pittsburgh , PA : Duquesne University Press . [Google Scholar], 1997 Giorgi , A. ( 1997 ). The theory, practice, and evaluation of the phenomenological method as a qualitative research procedure . Journal of Phenomenological Psychology , 28 , 235 – 261 .[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). Two analysts identified eight themes: developing trust, establishing boundaries, communication, client-centered care, breakdown of preconceptions, increased self-awareness, power of pride, and power of occupation. Educators are urged to use service-learning experiences to facilitate student interpersonal skill development and integration of theoretical knowledge.     

Three decades of lay epistemics: The why,how, and who of knowledge formation

A conceptual integration and review are presented of three separate research programmes informed by the theory of lay epistemics (Kruglanski, 1989 Kruglanski, A. W. 1989. Lay epistemics and human knowledge: Cognitive and motivational bases, New York: Plenum. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). They respectively address the “why”, “how”, and “who” questions about human knowledge formation. The “why” question is treated in work on the need for cognitive closure that propels epistemic behaviour and affects individual, interpersonal, and group phenomena. The “how” question is addressed in work on the unimodel (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, Erb, & Chun, 2007 Kruglanski, A. W., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., Erb, H. P. and Chun, W. Y. 2007. “On the parameters of social judgement”. In Advances in experimental social psychology, Edited by: Zanna, M. P. Vol. 39, 255–296. New York: Academic Press.  [Google Scholar]) depicting the process of drawing conclusions from the “information given”. The “who” question is addressed in work on “epistemic authority” highlighting the centrality of source effects (including oneself as a source) in human epistemic behaviour. These separate research paradigms explore facets of epistemic behaviour that jointly produce human knowledge, of essential significance to people's’ individual and social functioning.     

On Tacit Knowledge for Philosophy of Education

This article offers a detailed reading Gascoigne and Thornton’s book Tacit Knowledge (2013), which aims to account for the tacitness of tacit knowledge (TK) while preserving its status as knowledge proper. I take issue with their characterization and rejection of the existential-phenomenological Background—which they presuppose even as they dismiss—and their claim that TK can be articulated “from within”—which betrays a residual Cartesianism, the result of their elision of conceptuality and propositionality. Knowledgeable acts instantiate capacities which we might know we have and of which we can be aware, but which are not propositionally structured at their “core”. Nevertheless, propositionality is necessary to what Robert Brandom calls, in Making It Explicit (1994) and Articulating Reasons (2000), “explicitation”, which notion also presupposes a tacit dimension, which is, simply, the embodied person (the knower), without which no conception of knowledge can get any purchase. On my view, there is no knowledgeable act that can be understood as such separately from the notion of skilled corporeal performance. The account I offer cannot make sense of so-called “knowledge-based” education, as opposed to systems and styles which supposedly privilege “contentless” skills over and above “knowledge”, because on the phenomenological and inferentialist lines I endorse, neither the concepts “knowledge” nor “skill” has any purchase or meaning without the other.     

Dysfunctional Personal Experiences and Existential Dilemmas

This article presents a theoretical discussion of the results from the research, “An Existential Understanding of Anxiety: An Integration of the Ideas of May, Yalom, and Schneider.” It focuses on the development of dysfunctional experiences according to the theoretical perspectives of Rollo May, Irvin Yalom, and Kirk Schneider. Dysfunctional experiences emerge when human beings experience (implicitly or consciously) different existential dilemmas and are unable to make consistent decisions and confront the experience of anxiety that results from such contact. In this sense, dysfunctional experiences are not developed simply from the consciousness of existential givens, as suggested by Yalom (1980 Yalom , I. ( 1980 ). Existential psychotherapy . New York , NY : Basic Books . [Google Scholar]), but by the dialectical and paradoxical relationship with the following human dilemmas: life versus death, freedom versus determinisms, isolation versus intersubjectivity, meaning versus insignificancy, individuation versus adaptation, and sense of power versus impotence. This idea implies that anxiety and dysfunctional experiences could emerge, in daily life, from the need to take concrete decisions when faced with several possibilities or dilemmas, and not only from the awareness of those possibilities.     

Feminist Relational Discourse Analysis: putting the personal in the political in feminist research

Discourse analysis is a useful and flexible method for exploring power and identity. While there are many forms of discourse analysis, all agree that discourse is the central site of identity construction. However, recent feminist concerns over power, agency, and resistance have drawn attention to the absence of participants’ first-hand experiences within broad discursive accounts (Lafrance &; McKenzie-Mohr 2014 Boonzaier, F 2014, ‘Talking against dominance: South African women resisting dominant discourse in narratives of violence’, in S McKenzie-Mohr &; MN Lafrance (eds.), Women voicing resistance: discursive and narrative explorations, Routledge, Hove, pp. 102–20.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; Saukko 2008 Saukko, P 2008, The anorexic self: a personal, political analysis of a diagnostic discourse, State University of New York Press, Albany. [Google Scholar]). For those with an interest in power relations, such as feminist researchers, this is a problematic silence which renders the personal functions of discourse invisible. In this article, we argue that the “personal” and “political” are inextricable, and we make a case for putting the “personal” into broader discursive frameworks of understanding. Further, we assert that feminist research seeking to account for identity must more explicitly aim to capture this interplay. To this end, we argue that voice is the key site of meaning where this interplay can be captured, but that no clear analytical framework currently exists for producing such an account. In response, we propose Feminist Relational Discourse Analysis (FRDA) as a voice-centered analytical approach for engaging with experience and discourse in talk. We then set out clear guidance on how to do FRDA, as applied in the context of women working in U.K. policing. Finally, we conclude that by prioritizing voice, FRDA invites new and politicized feminist readings of power, agency, and resistance, where the voices of participants remain central to the discursive accounts of researchers.     

Constructivism and the Inescapability of Moral Choices: A Response to Raskin and Debany

In their article on ethics, Raskin and Debany (this issue Raskin, J. D., &; Debany, A. E. (this issue). The inescapability of ethics and the impossibility of “anything goes”: A constructivist model of ethical meaning making. Journal of Constructivist Psychology. (Reprinted from Ethics in action: Dialogue between knowledge and practice (pp. 13–32), by S. Cipolletta &; E. Gius (Eds.), 2012, Milan, Italy: LED) [Google Scholar]) raise a number of important issues that merit discussion and have implications for a constructivist stance on ethics, an issue that has dogged constructivist and social constructionist theory and has, in the past, been the focus of a good deal of debate. In my response to their article, I focus on two issues before going on to consider what these imply for a constructivist ethics. The first is the status of “reality”; drawing on the work of French philosophers, discursive psychology, and symbolic interactionism, I argue that the constructivist conception of reality has been widely misunderstood and will outline what I regard as a defensible construction of reality. The second issue concerns the relationship between the individual and the social world; drawing again on earlier work in microsociology, I argue that the “constructed” individual must be understood as emerging from the social realm rather than preexisting it, and I argue for personal construct psychology as a candidate for filling the subjectivity “gap” in social constructionism. Finally, I use these conceptualizations of reality and the person to argue for an ethical stance of “radical doubt” for constructivism.     

Of particles and fields

In The Cosmic Blueprint,1 1 Paul Davies, The Cosmic Blueprint (Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2004). View all notes Paul Davies takes note of the unresolved philosophical issues involved in the use of “field” imagery within evolutionary biology and quantum physics. The author proposes that the metaphysical scheme of Alfred North Whitehead with its notion of “actual occasions” might be key to solving these mysteries, but only if Whiteheadian “societies” were reinterpreted as enduring structured fields of activity for the ongoing succession of their constituent actual occasions. For, implicit in this revised understanding of Whiteheadian societies is a new paradigm for the philosophical relation between the One and the Many, which would allow for genuine top-down as well as bottom-up causation in the emergence of new forms or structures within the evolutionary process.     

Exemplification as molecular function

Since the publication of Universals and Scientific Realism (Armstrong 1978a, b) until Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics (Armstrong 2010), via Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Armstrong 1989), a World of States of Affairs (Armstrong 1997), and Truth and Truthmakers (Armstrong 2004), David Armstrong has developed one of the most influential theories of instantiation in contemporary analytic metaphysics (see, for example, Lewis, in Aust J Phil 61(4), 343–377, 1983; Baxter in Aust J Phil, 79, 449–464, 2001; Forrest, in Aust J Phil, 83, 213–228, 2006). Instantiation has been advocated by Armstrong to give a solution to what he has called the “pressing problem” of “the multiple location of property universals” (Armstrong, in Universals: An opinionated introduction. University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 89–90). Here I argue that Armstrong’s theory of instantiation fails to solve the problem because it involves two kinds of instantiation to account for particulars “having” and “sharing” universals. As a viable alternative to Armstrong’s theory, I propose a theory of instantiation capable of accounting for both phenomena in a univocal way.     

Implications of Learning Style,Age Group,and Gender for Developing Online Learning Activities

ABSTRACT

This study explores the effects of learning style, age and gender on preferences for online educational activities. David Kolb's Experiential Learning Theory (Kolb, 1984 Kolb, D. A. 1984. Experiential learning: Experience as the source of learning and development, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.  [Google Scholar]) is used as a lens to examine the responses of online learners to five types of educational activities. Results indicate that learning style influences preference for learning activity. The relationship is stronger among adults than among children aged 10–13 (middle school). The four learning styles were not evenly distributed. “Practical” (likes to solve problems and find solutions) was the most frequent style among both children and adults (37%). “Creative” (enjoys brainstorming and open-ended exploration) was the least frequent (8%). These data have particular relevance to the development of educational activities, suggesting that open-ended exploration with “no right answers” may not be the most satisfying and appealing approach for many learners. The results of this study provide new insight into online audiences and can help developers of multimedia activities to create experiences that will appeal to all kinds of learners.     

From conscious experience to a conscious self

In his book The Opacity of Mind, Peter Carruthers (2011 Carruthers, P. (2011). The opacity of mind: An integrative theory of self-knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) presents the Interpretive Sensory Awareness theory (“ISA”), which holds that while we have direct access to our own sensory states, our access to “self-knowledge” is almost always interpretive. In presenting his view, Carruthers also claims that his account is the first of its kind; after a cursory examination of major theories of mind, he concludes that “transparent access” accounts of self-knowledge—the alternative to ISA—have been endorsed throughout history. This paper challenges this latter claim. Contrary to Carruthers’ view, the paper argues that Buddhist theories of mind are not “transparent access” accounts. Instead, they not only have an analysis of sensory processing and conscious experience similar to that of ISA, but also share what Carruthers sees as ISA’s central tenet: individuals lack transparent, conscious access to most of their propositional attitudes. Given this fundamental alignment, the Buddhist perspective can offer us fresh responses to ISA’s critics, as well as approaches to ethics and free will that are aligned with ISA’s conclusions.     

Eye movements reveal no immediate “WOW” (“which one's weird”) effect in autism spectrum disorder

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and typically developed (TD) adult participants viewed pairs of scenes for a simple “spot the difference” (STD) and a complex “which one's weird” (WOW) task. There were no group differences in the STD task. In the WOW task, the ASD group took longer to respond manually and to begin fixating the target “weird” region. Additionally, as indexed by the first-fixation duration into the target region, the ASD group failed to “pick up” immediately on what was “weird”. The findings are discussed with reference to the complex information processing theory of ASD (Minshew & Goldstein, 1998 Minshew, N. J. and Goldstein, G. 1998. Autism as a disorder or complex information processing. Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Research Reviews, 4: 129–136. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]).