Can we define mental disorder by using the criterion of mental dysfunction?

The concept of mental disorder is often defined by reference to the notion of mental dysfunction, which is in line with how the concept of disease in somatic medicine is often defined. However, the notions of mental function and dysfunction seem to suffer from some problems that do not affect models of physiological function. Functions in general have a teleological structure; they are effects of traits that are supposed to have a particular purpose, such that, for example, the heart serves the goal of pumping blood. But can we single out mental functions in the same way? Can we identify mental functions scientifically, for instance, by applying evolutionary theory? Or are models of mental functions necessarily value-laden? I want to identify several philosophical problems regarding the notion of mental function and dysfunction and point out some possible solutions. As long as these questions remain unanswered, definitions of mental disorder that rest upon the concept of mental dysfunction will lack a secure foundation.     

Reducing drivers’ mental workload by means of an adaptive man–machine interface

Modern in-vehicle information and communication devices are changing the nature of the driving task. Drivers take it for granted that they are able to divide their attention between the primary task of driving and secondary tasks like monitoring information displays or using mobile phones. While it is commonly accepted that driver information overload can compromise traffic safety, attempts to introduce attention management within the vehicle are nowadays limited to restrictive decisions by legislative bodies. In an increasing number of countries, the use of hands-free phones is enforced by law. In some countries, the use of phones while driving is prohibited altogether. We argue that there is a more intelligent solution to the information overload issue, namely an adaptive man–machine interface that filters information presentation according to situational requirements. We implemented such a filter as a projective real-time computational workload estimator which is based on the assessment of traffic situations detected from an on-board geographical database. Workload estimates are refined by data from sensors that monitor the traffic environment and variables of driving dynamics. The prototype system is operational in a demonstrator vehicle. Whenever the workload estimate exceeds a threshold value, incoming telephone calls are automatically redirected to the telephone mailbox without notifying the driver. An evaluation field experiment that employed objective and subjective methods of assessing workload yielded promising results in terms of the possibilities of reducing workload by means of the adaptive interface. The results are in favour of the idea of a futuristic, situation-aware vehicle which has the potential to enhance comfort and safety while driving.     

Identification of mental retardation by the system of multicultural pluralistic assessment: Nondiscriminatory or nonexistent?

The effects of applying the dual-criterion classification system for mental retardation in connection with the System of Multicultural Pluralistic Assessment (SOMPA) were investigated by using the SOMPA standardization sample as subjects. Average scaled scores on the Adaptive Behavior Inventory for Children (ABIC) were paired (a) with Full Scale IQ (FSIQ) Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised or (b) with the SOMPA-derived Estimated Learning Potential (ELP). The children performing below the third percentile on either combination of measures were thus classified as “mentally retarded.” By the FSIQ and ELP procedures, 0.6% and 0.2%, respectively, of the children were so classified; the overwhelming majority of the children were of minority background. The implications for the diagnostic category of mild mental retardation and the further use of the SOMPA are discussed.     

Does self-acceptance captured by life narratives and self-report predict mental health? A longitudinal multi-method approach

We aimed to investigate the validity of different self-acceptance measures to predict mental health. Self-acceptance and negative life events, assessed via self-report and rated from life narratives (N = 149), served as predictors of mental health at baseline (T1) and four years later (T2). Path models showed distinguishable, complementary effects of self-reports and other-ratings. A moderate congruence of self- and other-ratings of self-acceptance was observed. Exploratory analyses revealed an association of self-acceptance with emotional words in life narratives. Controlling for negative life events, a positive link and a moderating effect of self-acceptance on mental health at T1, but no prediction of mental health at T2, were found. The study connects research on personality and narratives from a methodological and health psychological perspective.     

Can we perceive mental states?

Synthese - In this paper, I defend Non-Inferentialism about mental states, the view that we can perceive some mental states in a direct, non-inferential way. First, I discuss how the question of...     

What is ‘mental action’?

There has been a resurgence of interest lately within the philosophy of mind and action in the category of mental action. Against this background, the present paper aims to question the very possibility, or at least the theoretical significance, of teasing apart mental and bodily acts. After raising some doubts over the viability of various possible ways of drawing the mental-act–bodily-act distinction, the paper draws some lessons from debates over embodied cognition which, arguably, further undermine the credibility of the distinction. The insignificance of the distinction is demonstrated in part by showing how the focus on “inner” acts hampers fruitful discussion of Galen Strawson’s skepticism of mental agency. Finally, the possibility is discussed that a distinction between covert and overt action should supplant the one between mental and bodily action.     

The end of mental illness thinking?

Mental health theory and practice are in a state of significant flux. This theoretical article places the position taken by the British Psychological Society Division of Clinical Psychology (DCP) in the context of current practice and seeks to critically examine some of the key factors that are driving these transformations. The impetus for a complete overhaul of existing thinking comes from the manifestly poor performance of mental health services in which those with serious mental health problems have reduced life expectancy. It advocates using the advances in our understanding of the psychological, social and physical mechanisms that underpin psychological wellbeing and mental distress, and rejecting the disease model of mental distress as part of an outdated paradigm. Innovative research in genetics, neuroscience, psychological and social theory provide the platform for changing the way we conceptualise, formulate and respond to psychological distress at both community and individual levels.     

Hand mental rotation is not systematically altered by actual body position: Laterality judgment versus same–different comparison tasks

It is commonly believed that during mental rotation of body parts, participants tend to imagine their own body part moving toward the stimulus, thus using an egocentric strategy. Several studies have also shown that the mental rotation of hands is affected by the actual hand position, especially if the hand is kept in an awkward position. However, this hand posture effect, as well as the use of an egocentric strategy during mental rotation of body parts, is not systematic. Several experiments have demonstrated that manipulating the stimulus features or the paradigm could induce a shift to visual and allocentric strategies. Here, we studied the effects of hand posture and biomechanical constraints on one-hand mental rotation (laterality judgment task), two-hand mental rotation (same–different judgment task), and mental rotation of one or two alphanumeric symbols (control tasks). Effects of posture and biomechanical constraints were observed solely for the laterality judgment task. Response times in the same–different hand mental rotation items were influenced by the angular disparity between the stimuli. We interpreted our result as evidence of the use of different strategies for each task. Future research should focus on disentangling the exact subprocesses in which an egocentric strategy is used, in order to propose better tests for participants with motor impairments.     

Some myths about ‘mental illness’

Radical psychiatrists and others assert that mental illness is a myth. The opening and closing portions of the paper deal with the impact such argument has had in law and psychiatry. The body of the paper discusses the five versions of the myth argument prevalent in radical psychiatry: (A) that there is no such thing as mental illness; (B) that those called ‘mentally ill’ are really as rational as everyone else, only with different aims; that the only reasons anyone ever thought differently was (C) because of unsophisticated category mistakes or (D) because of an adherence to the epistemology of a sick society; and (E) that the phrase ‘mental illness’ is used to mask value judgments about others’ behavior in pseudo‐scientific respectability. Reasons are given for rejecting each of these versions of the argument that mental illness is a myth.     

Evolutionary economics of mental time travel?

What is the function of our capacity for 'mental time travel'? Evolutionary considerations suggest that vivid memory and imaginative foresight may be crucial cognitive devices for human decision making. Our emotional engagement with past or future events gives them great motivational force, which may counter a natural tendency towards time discounting and impulsive, opportunistic behavior. In this view, whereas simple episodic memory provides us with a store of relevant, case-based information to guide decisions, mental time travel nudges us towards more restrained choices, which in the long term are advantageous, especially so given human dependence on cooperation and coordination.     

Is mental rotation controlled or automatic?

A task requiring the mental rotation of letters was performed either alone or during the retention interval of two short-term memory tasks. The retention of eight digits or random configurations of eight dots slowed overall reaction time on the mental-rotation task, but did not significantly alter the estimated rate of mental rotation. Conversely, performance on the memory tasks did not vary with the angle of mental rotation. These results support the view that attentional control is required to set up the mental structures required in mental rotation, but that the actual execution of the mental-rotation component can be relegated to subordinate systems that do not compete for attentional resources.     

Can mental rotation begin before perception finishes?

We conducted six experiments to determine if mental rotation can begin before perception finishes, as allowed by continuous flow models but not discrete stage models of information processing. The results of Experiments 1–3 showed that the effect of shape discriminability on RT was underadditive with the effect of stimulus orientation, suggesting that mental rotation began before shape discrimination had finished and that the two processes overlapped in time. The results of Experiments 4–6 indicated that mental rotation can overlap with color discriminations as well. In both sets of experiments, however, the amount of underadditivity tended to be much less than predicted by models allowing interference-free overlap. This suggests that mental rotation can overlap with perceptual analysis, contrary to fully discrete models, but that little rotation is carried out during this overlap due to interference between simultaneous discrimination and rotation processes.     

What’s up in mental rotation?

We report two experiments on the influence of head tilt on mental rotation. In Experiment I, subjects decided whether dot patterns were or were not repeated about a line. Their reaction times (RTs) were consistent with the interpretation that they mentally rotated the patterns so that the line was subjectively vertical before making their decisions. When the subjects tilted their heads, the RT functions shifted in the direction of the tilt, indicating that the subjective vertical lay closer to the retinal than to the gravitational vertical. In Experiment II, subjects decided whether singly presented alphanumeric characters in various orientations were standard or backward (mirror-reversed). Again, analysis of their RTs suggested mental rotation to the standard upright, but the function was unaffected by head tilt; in this case, the subjects operated in subjective gravitational rather than retinal coordinates. The choice of retinal or gravitational coordinates may depend on whether the stimuli are interpreted egocentrically or as part of the external world.     

Do infants bind mental states to agents?

Recent findings suggest that infants understand others’ preferential choice and can use the perspectives and beliefs of others to interpret their actions. The standard interpretation in the field is that infants understand preferential choice as a dispositional state of the agent. It is possible, however, that these social situations trigger the acquisition of more general, not person-specific knowledge. In a looking-time study we showed an Agent A demonstrating a choice, that only could have been interpreted as preferential based on the perspective (and thus the belief) of the agent, not the observer. Then we introduced a new agent (Agent B), who chose consistently or inconsistently with Agent A; also varying whether Agent B was an adult or a child. Results show that infants expected Agent B (both the adult and the child) to choose as Agent A, but only in the condition where according to Agent A’s knowledge two objects were present in familiarization(confirming previous evidence on the importance of contrastive choice). We interpret these results in the following way: (1) infants do not encode the perspectives of other agents as person-specific sources of knowledge and (2) they learn about the object, rather than the agent’s disposition towards that object. We propose that early theory of mind processes lack the binding of belief content to the belief holder. However, such limitation may in fact serve an important function, allowing infants to acquire information through the perspectives of others in the form of universal access to general information.     

Does mental rotation ability depend on sensory-specific experience?

No study has investigated the link between vision and touch with respect to spatial abilities using a within-subjects design. With this design, we compared participants’ tactile and visual mental rotation abilities, as measured by the Mental Rotations Test (Vandenberg & Kuse, 1978). Participants in four groups completed two consecutive sessions under no-switch (visual-visual or tactile-tactile) or switch conditions (visual-tactile or tactile-visual) to determine whether mental rotation abilities assessed in Session 2 depend on previous sensory-specific experiences (Session 1). Analysis of response accuracy revealed that all groups improved their performance in Session 2. Analysis of response time showed an improvement in visual and tactile performance during Session 2 for participants who first performed the task with the same modality. No effect of task repetition appeared for participants who performed in two different sensory conditions. These results reveal that mental rotation ability partly depends on sensory-specific conditions and that ability developed in a sensory-specific condition does not necessarily transfer to another sensory condition.     

The mother’s mental representation of her infant

Abstract

The mother’s intrapsychic mental representation of her infant begins before pregnancy and is modified during pregnancy and thereafter. Parents have conscious expectations and unconscious fantasies about their infant, which are all too often not consistent with reality. Early intervention in infant–parent disturbances is important for repair of the relationship and prevention of later pathogenic development. A clinical example of a mother’s unconscious ambivalent mental representations of her infant is presented.