Towards an American Indian Indigenous Theology

An indigenous American Indian theology must respond, first of all, out of the ongoing oppression of Indian communities. This means that our indigenous theologies must be explicitly and unashamedly political. After 500 years of colonialism and conquest, we must begin, in this process, to find ways to reclaim our own indigenous identities. As we struggle theologically with the residual effects of colonialism and conquest, this means that we will struggle to maintain or reclaim our cultures and our languages. We must assure our colonizer/missionary relatives that our peoples were in touch with the Creator long before the European colonialist ancestors brought the gospel of Jesus Christ to us. From this point on, we indigenous peoples must focus on rebuilding our national (indigenous) communities and not on building churches. That should be the substance of our theological reflection today. So our theologies must necessarily deconstruct the theological discourses of the colonialist Euro‐Western churches that have missionized and continue to missionize our peoples. This has to be our starting point before we can reconstruct useful ways of organizing our lives together as indigenous communities.     

Venerating Death

Abstract

In this paper, I am concerned with elucidating and expanding our attitudes toward our own death. As it is, our common attitudes toward our death are the following: we fear our premature death, and we dread our inevitable death. These attitudes are rational, but I want to argue that our attitudes toward death should be more complicated than this. A condition upon our value, our preciousness, as creatures is that we are vulnerable, and our vulnerability is, at bottom, a vulnerability to death. A corollary of this is that we could not be loved, either by ourselves or by others, for one cannot love—be concerned for—a being invulnerable to death. As a consequence, death plays a deep and abiding role in our value systems. Our susceptibility to premature and inevitable death is a condition upon our being valuable creatures and, in turn, it is a condition upon our being loved. Given the high value that we place on being valuable creatures who deserve love, we should equally place a high value on the constitutive conditions for being precious and loved. If, as I suggest, one of these conditions is that we will die, we should see our deaths not simply as something to fear or dread, but as something of great importance in our lives. Our deaths should be treated with awe, respect, and even praise.     

Empirical Content and Rational Constraint

It is often thought that epistemic relations between experience and belief make it possible for our beliefs to be about or “directed towards” the empirical world. I focus on an influential attempt by John McDowell to defend a view along these lines. According to McDowell, unless experiences are the sorts of things that can be our reasons for holding beliefs, our beliefs would not be “answerable” to the facts they purportedly represent, and so would lack all empirical content. I argue that there is no intelligible conception of what it is for beliefs to be answerable to the facts that supports McDowell's claim that our empirical beliefs must be justified by experience.     

Waking‐up: A neglected model for the afterlife

An inquiry into the possibility that life‐after‐death be understood as waking from a shared dream into the real world. Attempts to outlaw the possibility that ‘really’ we are, e.g., vat‐brains are shown to lead to unwelcome, anti‐realist conclusions about either the world or consciousness. The unsatisfactory nature of empirically observable (Humean) causal connections suggests that real causes may be found beyond the world of our present experience. Though such a story cannot now be proved to be true, we are entitled to entertain it as a serious possibility. An attempt is made to say what life is like in the ‘Real World’, whether this be a spatial world like our present one or not, and what moral it holds for our present life. I suggest (like Plato) that there are many levels of waking, and that our ‘Real Self should not be identified simply with our present egos.     

FREEDOM AND WEAKNESS OF WILL

Can absolute freedom of will be defended by arguing that apparent cases of diminished freedom when we act out of passion are cases of weakness of will? Rogers Albritton thought so. What is intriguing about Albritton's view is that he thought when we act from desire we are making choices, yet our desires are not functioning as reasons for those choices. So our desires must be influencing our choices in some other unspecified way that does not diminish our freedom. I challenge the coherence of this position. My strategy is to examine the views of leading theorists of the will – Descartes, Aquinas and Reid – to argue that the only clear way in which passions can influence our choices so that we can accurately be described as weak‐willed and yet nevertheless free is that our passions influence our choices by providing reasons for them.     

What shall we do with Norman? An experiment in communal discernment.

We were a group of Christian friends searching for affirmations that lay at the heart of our faith and reached to the limits of our existence and moral authority. As we have reflected on our role in deciding whether and to what extent we could assist in allowing our terminally ill friend, seventy-nine-year-old, Norman to die, we were deeply troubled by the moral ambiguity of our involvement. Through a careful process of authority through communal discernment, our responsibility for Norman became clear: we were to assist him in living the life he embraced in baptism -- a life which included a destiny that was conformed to the crucified and risen one. That was not the destiny we chose for Norman; it was the destiny he owned. We recognized with Norman that our lives are not our own to be guided by autonomy and liberty, but rather to be lived for the glory of Jesus the Christ.     

Terminator or Super Mario: Human/Computer Hybrids, Actual and Virtual

Abstract: Is a human/computer hybrid feasible: If so, in what ways would such hybridization affect our concept of what it means to be human? There are two forms of such hybridization, the actual and the virtual. Actual hybridization involves the implantation of mechanical devices in the human body. In actual hybridization the computer comes to us and to our body to enhance our functioning in our world. In virtual hybridization we go to the computer, projecting our minds into the world of cyberspace and being formed there. Perhaps the most common form of virtual hybridization is the immersion our children experience in the world of video games. Both forms of hybridization encourage us to think of ourselves only in terms of function, just when most of our theologians find that humans reflect the image of God through our relationships. This emphasis on function best serves the military, but leaves us in the theological community with a dissatisfying concept of what it means to be human.     

Endorsement and Autonomous Agency

We take self-governance or autonomy to be a central feature of human agency: we believe that our actions normally occur under our guidance and at our command. A common criticism of the standard theory of action is that it leaves the agent out of his actions and thus mischaracterizes our autonomy. According to proponents of the endorsement model of autonomy, such as Harry Frankfurt and David Velleman, the standard theory simply needs to be supplemented with the agent's actual endorsement of his actions in order to make room for our autonomy. I argue that their proposal fails and that a more substantive enrichment of the standard theory is called for.     

Right to life, right to die and assisted suicide

In 2002 Diane Pretty went to the European Court of Human Rights to gain a ruling about assisted suicide. In the course of this she argued that the right to life implied a right to die. This paper will consider, from an ethical rather than a legal point of view, how the right to life might imply (or not) a right to die, and whether this includes either a right that others shall help us die, or a right against non-interference if others are willing to help us. It does this by comparing the right to life to conceptions of property rights. This is not because I think human life is property, but because some of our ways of talking and thinking about our control over our own lives seem to be similar to our thoughts about our control over our own property. The right to life has traditionally been taken as a negative right, that is a right that others not deprive us of life. Pretty's argument, however, seems to be moving towards a positive right, not just to remain alive, but to be enabled in doing what we want to with our lives, and thus disposing of them if we so choose. The comparison with property rights suggests that the right to die only applies if our lives are ours absolutely, and may itself be modified by the suggestion that suicide harms all of us by devaluing human life in general.     

Intuition,No! …Quasirationality,Yes!

The miracles of intuitive judgment have long been celebrated, and they are no doubt there and worth celebrating, but our commitment to science requires us to unmask those miracles and bring them under examination. Our first task is to apply our knowledge to the development of cognitive skill in our species so that we can improve our political skill and thus reduce the yearly millions of deaths due to lack of that skill. Replacing reliance on “intuition” by turning to “quasirationality” can be our first step in that direction. This article indicates and explains how that step can be taken and describes some applications of the basic concepts that make it possible.     

A word about words

The title of my paper comes from an essay by Václav Havel. In his essay, Havel addressed most evocatively the question of the unique power of words for thinking and to influence, for good or for harm, as well as to inform and to educate. As analysts our medium is the word. I suggest that it is of inestimable importance that we are able to listen deeply to our patients' words and to be aware of our own. The quality of our ability to think deeply and consistently about the unconscious experience of our patient is intimately related to our ability to hear what is being said. The effect of our own words upon the patient likewise cannot be overstated. I offer my reflections on words in the analytic relationship and I give some clinical examples that I hope will illustrate my thoughts as to the power and the importance of what and how we hear and of what we say.     

The Sustainability Ethic: Political, Not Just Moral

Sustainable practices are commended to us both out of prudential regard for our own future and out of principled concern for the 'right to life' of endangered species, ecosystems and ways of life and for intergenerational justice among our own kind. The larger point of the 'sustainability ethic' might be more political, however. Insisting that any practice we adopt now must be sustainable into the indefinite future constitutes an institutional check preventing us from taking unfair advantage of our privileged temporal position vis-a-vis our successors.     

Answering to Future People: Responsibility for Climate Change in a Breaking World

Our everyday notions of responsibility are often driven by our need to justify ourselves to specific others – especially those we harm, wrong, or otherwise affect. One challenge for contemporary ethics is to extend this interpersonal urgency to our relations with those future people who are harmed or affected by our actions. In this article, I explore our responsibility for climate change by imagining a possible ‘broken future’, damaged by the carbon emissions of previous generations (including ourselves), and then asking what its inhabitants might think of our current behaviour, our moral thinking, and our excuses. In particular, I will focus on a simplified scenario where present people can only avoid a broken future by sacrificing Rawlsian favourable conditions. Suppose we refuse to avoid a broken future, on the grounds that we cannot be expected to make such great sacrifices. If the broken future lacks favourable conditions, will its inhabitants accept our excuses? Will they hold us responsible for things we regard as excusable? If so, should we be guided by their judgements or by our own?     

'Deny Yourself and Take up Your Cross': John Calvin on the Christian Life

John Calvin's vision of the Christian life is guided by the fundamental insight that what distorts our lives more than anything else is our blind self-love. This self-love is the reason why we love to hear things that flatter us, and hate to hear things that truly reveal who we are. Our self-love also provides the driving engine behind our pride, ambition and arrogance, whereby we seek the meaning of our lives in power, wealth and honor, so that we may despise those we consider to be inferior to us. If we are to be transformed more and more into the image and likeness of God, so that we may at the end be united with God in eternal life, we must eradicate this blind self-love from our hearts. Although there is much in Calvin's vision of the Christian life that may strike us as odd or even as alien, it is hard to disagree with his insight that blind self-love is the primary reason our lives do not express the image and likeness of God.     

Open your eyes and look harder! (An investigation into the idea of a responsible visual search)

In this paper, I explore and defend the idea that we have epistemic responsibilities with respect to our visual searches, responsibilities that are far more fine‐grained and interesting than the trivial responsibilities to keep our eyes open and “look hard.” In order to have such responsibilities, we must be able to exert fine‐grained and interesting forms of control over our visual searches. I present both an intuitive case and an empirical case for thinking that we do, in fact, have such forms of control over our visual searches. I then show how these forms of control can be used to aim the visual beliefs that result from our searches toward various epistemic goals.     

Ethical dilemmas in context: Some preliminary questions

I have tried to build on O'Neill's thought-provoking paper by examining two influences that shape and define ethical dilemmas in the community: our personal agendas and the broader context. The first influence is the way in which our personal and professional values shape our agendas for community work. The way these agendas frame the choices for action are a force to be recognized separate from the question of who constitutes our community constituency. Our values may push us into proactive roles and we must face the way our actions make personal/political statements. The broader context of the community situation and the ways in which resource limitations frame the ethical question also need to be actively recognized. Otherwise there is a danger of making the psychologist the victim by posing the ethical dilemma as a question of how they alone should find a solution. The nature of our personal agenda must be clear before we ask “responsible to whom?” The broader context must be considered before we ask “responsible for what?”     

Gender and Counseling in the Twenty-First Century: What Does the Future Hold?

As the twenty-first century approaches, counselors will be increasingly called on to assist individuals and society in adapting to changing conceptions of gender. Hence, counselors must be aware of the impact of gender on the way in which our society is defined, organized, and functions in order to do the best possible job for our clients. Ignoring the impact of conceptions of gender on our work is an invitation to disaster.     

Possible psychosomatic hazards to the therapist: patients as self-objects

This speculative paper concerns certain fundamentals of healing and psychotherapy which we mistakenly tend to take for granted. I discuss our need for the feeling of harmony, wholeness, and oneness. I call this archetypal need our 'normal autistic expectation'. When met, we experience well-being and 'healing'. If not sufficiently and reliably met, this expectation becomes an omnipotent demand ('autistic demand'). Frustration then brings about angry destructiveness, either outwardly directed or inwardly directed, with bodily changes which must be processed if bodily damage is to be minimized. Bereavement, the loss of a person necessary for one's feeling of wholeness (a 'self-object'), is an extreme and well-researched example of such damage. Our selfobjects are 'healing' when they help us to complete our sense of self. Our patients-, our profession, our colleagues, our place of work and our financial security are normally all part of our self-object structure. I give examples where patients' own needs for survival or intactness mean that they have to externalize their own hurt and anger for long periods of their therapy. This often means that the therapist's own wholeness and health are under attack, and even damaged permanently, or at least until the damage can be processed. The nature of 'processing' in this sense is therefore in need of energetic research.     

The poet’s school and the parrot’s cage: the educational spirituality of Rabindranath Tagore

Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), Asia’s first Nobel laureate, was a man of myriad gifts, but he sought to articulate a single global vision. He believed that for our flourishing we must strive towards ‘the other and the beyond’. In so doing we discover that, as we seek, we are ourselves being sought. Tagore believed that we find our meaning and fulfilment relationally; in our relationships one with another, to be sure, but fundamentally in our kinship with all that is. We must be liberated, Tagore believed, from the bounds of our separateness and so discover a wholeness larger than our individual well‐being. That wholeness is ultimately realised in our union with the eternal Divine Spirit. In the establishment of his ‘poet’s school’ at Shantiniketan Tagore sought to make his ideals come true. This paper will focus on Tagore’s understanding of childhood and on the pattern of education by which, he believed, the spirit of the child may be nurtured. It will also enter a plea that we return to someone whose neglect in the West has been much to its loss.     

What’s wrong with the evolutionary argument against naturalism?

Alvin Plantinga has argued that evolutionary naturalism (the idea that God does not tinker with evolution) undermines its own rationality. Natural selection is concerned with survival and reproduction, and false beliefs conjoined with complementary motivational drives could serve the same aims as true beliefs. Thus, argues Plantinga, if we believe we evolved naturally, we should not think our beliefs are, on average, likely to be true, including our beliefs in evolution and naturalism. I argue herein that our cognitive faculties are less reliable than we often take them to be, that it is theism which has difficulty explaining the nature of our cognition, that much of our knowledge is not passed through biological evolution but learned and transferred through culture, and that the unreliability of our cognition helps explain the usefulness of science.