The one-of-us effect in decision evaluation

Judgment-by-outcomes denotes basing retrospective evaluation of decisions on the valence of their outcomes (success versus failure). Although decisions are typically evaluated in social contexts, so far judgment-by-outcomes has been studied without regard to this context. This study examines the moderating effect of evaluator's identification with the decision maker (the one-of-us-effect) on the influence of outcome information on the evaluation of Arab and Jewish subjects were presented with two cases recounting operations by either Arab or Jewish underground directed against the British authorities in Palestine. One case was a success (from the underground's point of view) and one ended in failure. Consistent with the one-of-us effect, identification with the decision maker variably canceled the influence of outcome information altogether, accentuated or weakened its influence, or determined which outcome constituted successful and unsuccessful outcomes. The one-of-us effect exercised a differential influence over different facets of decision evaluation, influencing most strongly the assignment of sanctions (in-group decision makers were mostly rewarded, out-group decision-makers were mostly punished regardless of outcomes). Next, in order of potency, the effect influenced the evaluation of decision justification, the evaluation of the decision maker, and the evaluation of the quality of decision process.     

On avoiding framing effects in experienced decision makers

The present study aimed to (a) demonstrate the effect of positive–negative framing on experienced criminal justice decision makers, (b) examine the debiasing effect of visually structured risk messages, and (c) investigate whether risk perceptions mediate the debiasing effect of visual aids on decision making. In two phases, 60 senior police officers estimated the accuracy of a counterterrorism technique in identifying whether a known terror suspect poses an imminent danger and decided whether they would recommend the technique to policy makers. Officers also rated their confidence in this recommendation. When information about the effectiveness of the counterterrorism technique was presented in a numerical format, officers' perceptions of accuracy and recommendation decisions were susceptible to the framing effect: The technique was perceived to be more accurate and was more likely to be recommended when its effectiveness was presented in a positive than in a negative frame. However, when the information was represented visually using icon arrays, there were no such framing effects. Finally, perceptions of accuracy mediated the debiasing effect of visual aids on recommendation decisions. We offer potential explanations for the debiasing effect of visual aids and implications for communicating risk to experienced, professional decision makers.     

Criticisms of the criminal justice system: A decision making analysis

When a decision making analysis is applied to key decisions within the criminal justice system, e.g., bail, sentencing, and plea bargaining, a wide range of evidence suggests that the decision makers believe they follow policies other than those that actually guide their decisions; that the policies that are followed are often simple ones, involving only a few decision factors; and that the decision outcomes are often assigned to defendants in a reasonable manner but that, even so, the outcomes are often ineffective. Because many proposals for the reform of the criminal justice system are based on the testimony of decision makers and “experts” whose knowledge of the system is often flawed, it is unlikely that reforms will have a beneficial impact on criminal behavior until much more is known about the day-to-day decisions of judges, prosecutors, and probation officers.     

Instance‐based learning in dynamic decision making

This paper presents a learning theory pertinent to dynamic decision making (DDM) called instancebased learning theory (IBLT). IBLT proposes five learning mechanisms in the context of a decision‐making process: instance‐based knowledge, recognition‐based retrieval, adaptive strategies, necessity‐based choice, and feedback updates. IBLT suggests in DDM people learn with the accumulation and refinement of instances, containing the decision‐making situation, action, and utility of decisions. As decision makers interact with a dynamic task, they recognize a situation according to its similarity to past instances, adapt their judgment strategies from heuristic‐based to instance‐based, and refine the accumulated knowledge according to feedback on the result of their actions. The IBLT's learning mechanisms have been implemented in an ACT‐R cognitive model. Through a series of experiments, this paper shows how the IBLT's learning mechanisms closely approximate the relative trend magnitude and performance of human data. Although the cognitive model is bounded within the context of a dynamic task, the IBLT is a general theory of decision making applicable to other dynamic environments.     

Effects of visual familiarity on “same” and “different” decision processes

An experiment was conducted in which subjects matched upper and lower case versions of well-known abbreviations, such as BBC and etc, and meaningless controls. “Same” RT showed a familiarity effect for upper case versions of abbreviations such as BBC and GPO, but not for the lower case versions bbc and gpo. The converse did not occur for abbreviations such as etc, which were thought to occur most frequently in lower case. The “different” RT was inhibited by familiarity, with pairs such as IBM GPO being classified less rapidly than their lower case versions or controls. These effects occurred for subjects instructed to report “No” for “same” displays and “Yes” for “different” displays as well as for subjects given a conventional decision-report assignment. Some implications of these results for an account of the manner in which familiarity affects graphemic comparison processes are considered.     

Creating coherence in real‐life decision processes: Reasons,differentiation and consolidation

Svenson, O. & Jakobsson, M. (2009). Creating coherence in real‐life decision processes: Reasons, differentiation and consolidation. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 51, 93–102. Differentiation and Consolidation Theory describes human decision making as a process in which attractiveness values are restructured in order to reach a decision and support the decision made. Here, the theory was developed to include reasons pro and con alternatives and tested on students making decisions between two university psychotherapy training programs (cognitive‐behavioral and psychodynamic therapy). Before and also after the decision, the attractiveness of the chosen alternative was upgraded and the non‐chosen alternative downgraded. Different measures of evaluations of an alternative, such as “best” or “worse” converged over time until shortly after the decision. The number of reasons pro and con alternatives give a more complete picture than attractiveness and increased from the first to the last session. The reasons supporting the chosen alternative increased in strength, but reasons against the non‐chosen alternative decreased. In informal comments participants reported that the study also served as a decision aid.     

The role of impulses in shaping decisions

This paper explores the extent to which decision behavior is shaped by short‐lived reactions to the outcome of the most recent decision. We inspected repeated decision‐making behavior in two versions of each of two decision‐making tasks, an individual task and a strategic one. By regressing behavior onto the outcomes of recent decisions, we found that the upcoming decision was well predicted by the most recent outcome alone, with the tendency to repeat a previous action being affected both by its actual outcome and by the outcomes of actions not taken. Because the goodness of predictions based on the most recent outcome did not diminish as participants gained experience with the task, we conclude that repeated decisions are continuously affected by impulsive reactions. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Broadening behavioral decision research: Multiple levels of cognitive processing

The area of behavioral decision research—specifically, the work on heuristics and biases—has had a tremendous influence on basic research, applied research, and application over the last 25 years. Its unique juxtaposition against economics has provided important benefits, but at the cost of leaving it disconnected from too much of psychology. This paper explores an expanded definition of behavioral decision research through the consideration of multiple levels of cognitive processing. Rather than being limited to how decision makers depart from optimality, we offer a broader analysis of how decision makers define the decision problem and link decisions to goals, as well as a more detailed focus on processes associated with implementing decisions.     

Life choices well made: How selective control strategies relate to career and partner decision processes

There are many benefits of applying control strategies that foster engagement in pursuing selected goals (i.e., selective control strategies). We examined one such benefit by investigating how use of selective control strategies when making important real-life decisions helps young adults make satisfactory choices in the areas of work and love. In a prospective longitudinal study, 60 students who intended to choose a college major and/or find a romantic partner initially reported on their control strategies. Subsequently, we assessed changes in the perceived attractiveness of considered majors and partners during decision making and our participants’ satisfaction with their choices. As expected, use of selective control strategies predicted greater choice satisfaction. This association was mediated by the greater perceived attractiveness of chosen majors or partners, which increased during decision making. Applying selective control strategies during real-life decisions thus leads to more favorable evaluations of the resulting choices, which can ease their implementation.     

Processes of patient decision making: Theoretical and methodological issues

Abstract

There is a paucity of research studying patients' decision making processes. Traditional normative approaches investigating human decision have presented rational, analytic processing as a ‘gold standard’ for decision making with decision aids developed to facilitate such thinking. This paradigm has been challenged by the recent emergence of naturalistic decision making. Naturalistic approaches argue for techniques modelled closer to how decisions are actually made in ‘real life’. Early work in this evolving field suggests the importance of more automatic, intuitive processing such as the use of heuristic short-cuts. This paper discusses the contribution of naturalistic decision theory and assesses its usefulness as an alternative to classical decision approaches in investigating patient decision making. Approaches for measuring underlying cognitive processes are also critically discussed.     

To change or not to change: A matter of decision maker’s role

The status quo effect derived from loss aversion is common in decision making. However, we propose that advisors (vs. personal decision makers) are less susceptible to such an effect because they are less loss-averse. The difference in loss aversion between personal decision makers and advisors is reflected in both the query order and content. Compared to advisors, personal decision makers produce more queries favoring the status quo, at an earlier time, than those favoring the new option. As hypothesized, the status quo effect was observed among personal decision makers, but not among advisors (Studies 1 and 2). Query order and content were found to mediate the impact of decision maker’s role on the status quo effect (Study 2). When personal decision makers and advisors made queries in the same order (Study 3) or of the same content (Studies 4a and 4b), the difference between self–other decision making disappeared.     

解释水平视角下的自己-他人决策差异

研究基于解释水平理论, 考察自己决策和为他人提供建议是否存在认知和偏好上的差异。实验一采用2(自己决策/为他人建议)×2(价值：高/低)×2(可行性：高/低)被试间设计, 165名被试代表自己或他人评价选项的吸引力。实验二采用3×2混合设计, 81名被试代表自己、相似或不相似他人, 为“高价值-低可行”和“低价值-高可行”两选项出价。结果支持了“自己-他人决策差异”：自己决策比为他人提建议在更大程度上受可行性高低的影响, 更为偏爱可行性高的选项; 人际相似性能在一定程度上缩小上述差异。     

Future‐focussed thinking: combining scenario planning with decision analysis

This paper first describes current practice in decision analysis and argues that nothing in the technique's application is likely to challenge the strategic decision maker's current worldview of the course of future events that are modelled in the decision tree. By contrast, a scenario planning intervention in an organization has the potential to increase perceived threat and thus lead to a step change in strategic decision making. Strategic decisions are made against a backcloth of the operation of psychological processes that act, it is argued, to reduce the perceived level of environmental threat and result in strategic inertia. For this reason, it is recommended that scenario planning should be adopted as a standard procedure because of its ability to challenge individual and organizational worldviews. The use of scenario planning prior to conventional decision analysis is termed as ‘future‐focussed thinking’, and parallels are drawn between the current advocated approach and that of Keeney's value‐focussed thinking. Both serve to prompt the creation of enhanced options for subsequent evaluation by conventional decision analytic techniques. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Attributions of responsibility and affective reactions to decision outcomes

Immediate affective reactions to outcomes are more intense following decisions to act than following decisions not to act. This finding holds for both positive and negative outcomes. We relate this "actor-effect" to attribution theory and argue that decision makers are seen as more responsible for outcomes when these are the result of a decision to act as compared to a decision not to act. Experiment 1 (N = 80) tests the main assumption underlying our reasoning and shows that affective reactions to decision outcomes are indeed more intense when the decision maker is seen as more responsible. Experiment 2 (N = 40) tests whether the actor effect can be predicted on the basis of differential attributions following action and inaction. Participants read vignettes in which active and passive actors obtained a positive or negative outcome. Action resulted in more intense affect than inaction, and positive outcomes resulted in more intense affect than negative outcomes. Experiment 2 further shows that responsibility attributions and affective reactions to outcomes are highly correlated; that is, more extreme affective reactions are associated with more internal attributions. We discuss the implications for research on post-decisional reactions.     

Memory and frequency estimation processes in a decision task

Two experiments examined the role of information storage and frequency estimation processes in a simple decision task. On each trial from one to five simultaneous sequences of information were presented, and subjects were required to monitor and respond to each sequence. In one study independent groups of subjects gave decisions, recognition responses. or frequency judgments. In a second study recall responses were obtained from subjects as part of the decision and frequency judgment tasks. Changes in performance as the number of simultaneous sequences increased suggested an independence of decisions from memory for specific information. Performance on the decision and frequency judgment tasks exceeded at times that which was possible on the basis of specific information available. Other data suggested that subjects in the frequency estimation tasks maintained an accurate frequency count when possible, but in the decision task kept little more than a record of their currently favored hypothesis. When direct counting was prevented in the second experiment. performance in the two tasks was not significantly different, suggesting that the two processes are very similar under such conditions.     

How effortful decisions get enacted: the motivating role of decision processes,desires, and anticipated emotions

Building on recent research examining the influence of decision making on subsequent goal striving and decision enactment, we consider and elaborate on the mechanisms through which effortful decisions are made, maintained, and enacted. Our proposed framework builds on the Dholakia and Bagozzi ( 2002 ) model, distinguishes between two important types of intentions and desires, and shows that the motivation‐mustering function of the decision process is mediated by goal and implementation desires. In addition to decision processes, the roles of goal feasibility, anticipated emotions, attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control are also elaborated on. Through a two‐wave field study tracking real decisions and their pursuit by participants, we find empirical support for our model of effortful decision making and enactment. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.