Emotional intelligence and the construction and regulation of feelings

Emotionally intelligent people are defined in part as those who regulate their emotions according to a logically consistent model of emotional functioning. We indentify and compare several models of emotion regulation; for example, one internally consistent model includes tenets such as “happiness should be optimized over the lifetime.” Next, we apply that internally consistent model to the way a person can intervene in mood construction and regulation at non-, low-, and high-conscious levels of experience. Research related to the construction and regulation of emotion at each of these levels is reviewed. Finally, we connect our concept of emotionally intelligent regulation to its potential applications to personality and clinical psychology.     

Emotional signals in nonverbal interaction: dyadic facilitation and convergence in expressions, appraisals, and feelings

We examined social facilitation and emotional convergence in amusement, sadness, and fear in dynamic interactions. Dyads of friends or strangers jointly watched emotion-eliciting films while they either could or could not communicate nonverbally. We assessed three components of each emotion (expressions, appraisals, and feelings), as well as attention to and social motives toward the co-participant. In Study 1, participants interacted through a mute videoconference. In Study 2, they sat next to each other and either were or were not separated by a partition. Results revealed that facilitation and convergence are not uniform across different emotions and emotion components. Particularly strong supporting patterns emerged for the facilitation of and convergence in smiling. When direct interaction was possible (Study 2), friends showed a general tendency for strong convergence, with the exception of fear-related appraisals. This suggests that underlying processes of emotional contagion and social appraisal are differentially relevant for different emotions.     

Risk as feelings

Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at a decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making. Drawing on research from clinical, physiological, and other subfields of psychology, they show that emotional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks. When such divergence occurs, emotional reactions often drive behavior. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is shown to explain a wide range of phenomena that have resisted interpretation in cognitive-consequentialist terms.     

The language of feelings

The acquisition of a language of feelings is similar to the acquisition of other language and can be conceptualized within a Piagetian framework. The acquisition of this language of feelings is subject to certain pitfalls that are reflective of various emotional problems. The linguistic poverty for affect that is concomitant with being unable to label feelings points to the need for parents and therapists to be involved in helping the child or patient develop an affective schema. The development of a differentiated, accurate, and flexible language of emotion to both express personal feelings and evoke responses in others is a schematic gift which parents provide. We find that when parents have not provided this, a reparative language developmental task is part of a psychotherapy. A grasp of the interplay of the concepts ofassimilation andaccommodation in Piaget (1952) appears essential to encouraging a healthy language of feelings. Related concepts drawn from Schacter (1965), Laing (1967), Krystal (1979), Kelly (1955) and Malerstein and Ahern (1979) are interwoven in a Piagetian structure for a language of feelings.     

Guilty feelings, targeted actions

Early investigations of guilt cast it as an emotion that prompts broad reparative behaviors that help guilty individuals feel better about themselves or about their transgressions. The current investigation found support for a more recent representation of guilt as an emotion designed to identify and correct specific social offenses. Across five experiments, guilt influenced behavior in a targeted and strategic way. Guilt prompted participants to share resources more generously with others, but only did so when those others were persons whom the participant had wronged and only when those wronged individuals could notice the gesture. Rather than trigger broad reparative behaviors that remediate one's general reputation or self-perception, guilt triggers targeted behaviors intended to remediate specific social transgressions.     

Toward a phenomenology of feelings

Our understanding of emotion cannot be complete without an understanding of feelings, the experiential aspect of emotion. Despite their importance, little effort has been devoted to the careful apprehension of feelings. Based on our apprehension of many randomly selected moments of pristine inner experience, we present a preliminary phenomenology of feelings. We begin by observing that often feelings occur as directly experienced phenomena of awareness; however, often no feelings are present in experience, or if they are present, they are too faint to be observed by a process intended to observe them. Feelings range from vague to distinct and sometimes do, but other times do not, include bodily sensations. When bodily sensations are present, there is a wide range of clarity and location of these sensations. Sometimes people experience multiple distinct feelings and sometimes people experience one feeling that is a mix or blend of different feelings. We also discuss what feelings are not, including instances when feelings do not appear to be present, despite evidence suggesting the presence of underlying emotional processes (e.g., behavioral evidence of emotion). These instances of emotion but not feeling lead us to speculate that experiencing feelings is a skill developed over time through an interaction of interpersonal and intrapersonal events.     

Bodily feelings and felt inclinations

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - The paper defends a version of the perceptual account of bodily feelings, according to which having a feeling is feeling something about one’s body....     

Hidden feelings 1945-95

Abstract

It was a fact learnt early in life: wherever I travelled in Europe as a teenager, it paid me to explain that I was Dutch, not German. And when I left home at 18, in search of the elusive key to good faith and freedom, and came to Britain, crossing the Channel to reach the sole part of Europe untouched by enemy invasion, I felt I was welcomed like a lost daughter; many people told me of the part they played in the liberation of Holland in 1945. And now, fifty years after the historic events of the Second World War have passed, I still like to invoke the ‘magic’ if I can. While staying in a bed and breakfast in Coventry recently, I pointed out to the landlady that a morning call, as written down by the German guest, was requested at 7.15, instead of, as she had read, at 9.15. ‘Oh’, she said, annoyed, realizing the mistake: ‘Do they cross their number seven? We never do’. I was instantly eager to clear my name: ‘The Dutch never do so either’     

Emotions,feelings and intentionality

Emotions, I will argue, involve two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Both are intentional, in the sense of being directed towards an object. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition of one's body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one's body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action or an event; such emotional feelings involve a special way of thinking of the object of the emotion, and I draw an analogy with Frank Jackson's well-known knowledge argument to show this. Finally, I try to show that, even if materialism is true, the phenomenology of emotional feelings, as described from a personal perspective, cannot be captured using only the theoretical concepts available for the impersonal stance of the sciences.     

The nature of epistemic feelings

Among the phenomena that make up the mind, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have postulated a puzzling one that they have called “epistemic feelings.” This paper aims to (1) characterize these experiences according to their intentional content and phenomenal character, and (2) describe the nature of these mental states as nonconceptual in the cases of animals and infants, and as conceptual mental states in the case of adult human beings. Finally, (3) the paper will contrast three accounts of the causes and mechanisms of epistemic feelings: the doxastic account; the mental scanner account; and the heuristic mechanism account. The paper will argue in favor of the heuristic mechanism account.     

Attending to feelings and cognitive performance

The effect on cognitive performance of attending to internally generated stimuli was examined. Specifically, the effect of examining feelings and sensations upon performance in the Stroop test and upon the performance of mental addition was measured. In two initial experiments subjects more quickly named, in the Stroop test, the color of the ink (“red”) in which a color word (“green”) was printed following instructions to attend to their feelings. It was found that this facilitation was due in part to the slowing of the automatic, interfering habit of reading for word meanings. In a third experiment, the effect of attending to physical sensations on the back of the hand was found to have a similar facilitating effect and was seen as resulting from the allocation of attention to internally generated stimuli. In a final experiment, attending to feelings and to the physical sensations on the back of the hand was found to increase speed of mental addition. This effect was attributed to increased attention to internally generated stimuli (here knowledge about the arithmetic performance at the moment).     

Role-specific feelings of control and mortality

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of 2 different measures of personal control on mortality in late life. The 1st reflects control over the 3 roles that are most important to elderly study participants. The 2nd is a global measure that assesses control over life as a whole. Data provided by a nationwide survey of older adults (N = 884) indicate that feelings of control over the single most important role significantly reduce the odds of dying. In contrast, control over the 2nd and 3rd most important roles are not related to mortality, nor are feelings of control over life as a whole. The theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Factors in adolescent rebellious feelings.

To verify the existence and determine some sources of 15- and 16-year-old youths' (midteens') antisocial feelings, 174 midteens (89 males and 85 females) from two small Tennessee towns were administered L. Srole's Anomia Scale and two author-devised tests, the Inventory of Midteen Rearing Theories and the Rebellion Scale. As their parents' levels of education rose, midteens' feelings of anomie and rebellion decreased significantly: fathers F (3, 160) = 4.77,p less than .01; mothers F (3, 163) = 2.77, p less than .05. Midteen feelings of anomie and rebellion correlated positively with midteen perception of parent-midteen disagreement about how the midteen should be reared: Anomia r (172) = .25, p less than .01; Rebellion r (172) = .37, p less than .01. Probable causes of extremely rebellious feelings in midteens include parent-midteen conflict over how the midteen should be reared and the midteen's rejection of attending school as a worthwhile occupation.     

Fictions,feelings, and emotions

Many philosophers suggest (1) that our emotional engagement with fiction involves participation in a game of make-believe, and (2) that what distinguishes an emotional game from a dispassionate game is the fact that the former activity alone involves sensations of physiological and visceral disturbances caused by our participation in the game. In this paper I argue that philosophers who accept (1) should reject (2). I then illustrate how this conclusion illuminates various puzzles in aesthetics and the philosophy of mind.