动允直接知觉的共鸣原理

传统认知理论认为我们只能间接知觉动允,而生态认知心理学则认为对动允的知觉是个体与环境信息直接共鸣的过程。生态认知心理学首先判定动允并不是存在于我们头脑中的认识,而是实际存在于个体-环境系统中的事实,对动允的直接知觉就是对动允的检测而非推测,是对动允信息的拾取而非对记忆内容的提取。这种直接知觉表现为身体的相关动作机制（动作神经元、肌肉组织等）与环境中动允信息的共鸣。进化与学习在共鸣的形成与发展中具有重要作用。     

Solving the Interface Problem Without Translation: The Same Format Thesis

In this article, we propose a new account concerning the interlock between intentions and motor representations (henceforth: MRs), showing that the interface problem is not as deep as previously proposed. Before discussing our view, in the first section we report the ideas developed in the literature by those who have tried to solve this puzzle before us. The article proceeds as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we address the views by Butterfill and Sinigaglia, and Mylopoulos and Pacherie, respectively, and argue that both solutions entail a translation between representational formats, which both accounts aim to avoid. In Section 4, we present our brand‐new claim, according to which intentions and MRs partially share the same motor format, inasmuch as executable action concepts are naturally represented in the agent's motor system together with the action's outcomes. Indeed, since intentions are constituted by executable action concepts and since there is evidence that action concepts are represented (and, thus, built) in the same motor format as action outcomes, the interlock between intentions and MRs no longer constitutes a problem. Then, in Section 5, we report empirical evidence in support of our claim, and before concluding, in Section 6 we briefly clarify our relations with two very recent accounts that criticized the proposals by Mylopoulos and Pacherie and Butterfill and Sinigaglia: Shepherd's and Burnston's. Finally, in Section 7, we offer some remarks about the philosophical idea defended here. The basic insight is that interface without translation is possible because action concepts are such stuff as MRs are made on.     

Investigating the role of response in spatial context learning

Recent research has shown that simple motor actions, such as pointing or grasping, can modulate the way we perceive and attend to our visual environment. Here we examine the role of action in spatial context learning. Previous studies using keyboard responses have revealed that people are faster locating a target on repeated visual search displays ("contextual cueing"). However, this learning appears to depend on the task and response requirements. In Experiment 1, participants searched for a T-target among L-distractors and responded either by pressing a key or by touching the screen. Comparable contextual cueing was found in both response modes. Moreover, learning transferred between keyboard and touch screen responses. Experiment 2 showed that learning occurred even for repeated displays that required no response, and this learning was as strong as learning for displays that required a response. Learning on no-response trials cannot be accounted for by oculomotor responses, as learning was observed when eye movements were discouraged (Experiment 3). We suggest that spatial context learning is abstracted from motor actions.     

Investigating the role of response in spatial context learning

Recent research has shown that simple motor actions, such as pointing or grasping, can modulate the way we perceive and attend to our visual environment. Here we examine the role of action in spatial context learning. Previous studies using keyboard responses have revealed that people are faster locating a target on repeated visual search displays (“contextual cueing”). However, this learning appears to depend on the task and response requirements. In Experiment 1, participants searched for a T-target among L-distractors and responded either by pressing a key or by touching the screen. Comparable contextual cueing was found in both response modes. Moreover, learning transferred between keyboard and touch screen responses. Experiment 2 showed that learning occurred even for repeated displays that required no response, and this learning was as strong as learning for displays that required a response. Learning on no-response trials cannot be accounted for by oculomotor responses, as learning was observed when eye movements were discouraged (Experiment 3). We suggest that spatial context learning is abstracted from motor actions.     

Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action

Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; but, unlike intentions, motor representations cannot feature as premises or conclusions in practical reasoning. This implies that motor representation has a distinctive role in explaining the purposiveness of action. It also gives rise to a problem: were the roles of intention and motor representation entirely independent, this would impair effective action. It is therefore necessary to explain how intentions interlock with motor representations. The solution, we argue, is to recognise that the contents of intentions can be partially determined by the contents of motor representations. Understanding this content‐determining relation enables better understanding how intentions relate to actions.     

Prospective coding in event representation

A perceived event such as a visual stimulus in the external world and a to-be-produced event such as an intentional action are subserved by event representations. Event representations do not only contain information about present states but also about past and future states. Here we focus on the role of representing future states in event perception and generation (i.e., prospective coding). Relevant theoretical issues and paradigms are discussed. We suggest that the predictive power of the motor system may be exploited for prospective coding not only in producing but also in perceiving events. Predicting is more advantageous than simply reacting. Perceptual prediction allows us to select appropriate responses ahead of the realization of an (anticipated) event and therefore, it is indispensable to flexibly and timely adapt to new situations and thus, successfully interact with our physical and social environment.     

Intentional action: conscious experience and neural prediction

Intentional action involves both a series of neural events in the motor areas of the brain, and also a distinctive conscious experience that "I" am the author of the action. This paper investigates some possible ways in which these neural and phenomenal events may be related. Recent models of motor prediction are relevant to the conscious experience of action as well as to its neural control. Such models depend critically on matching the actual consequences of a movement against its internally predicted effects. However, it remains unclear whether our conscious experience of action depends on a precise matching process, or a retrospective inference that "I" must have been responsible for a particular event. We report an experiment in which normal subjects judged the perceived time of either intentional actions, involuntary movements, or subsequent effects (auditory tones) of these. We found that the subject's intention to produce the auditory tone produced an intentional binding between the perceived times of the subject's action and the tone. However, if the intention was interrupted by an imposed involuntary movement, followed by the identical tone, no such binding occurred. The phenomenology of intentional action requires an appropriate predictive link between intentions and effects, rather than a retrospective inference that "I" caused the effect.     

When do we simulate non-human agents? Dissociating communicative and non-communicative actions

There is strong evidence that we automatically simulate observed behavior in our motor system. Previous research suggests that this simulation process depends on whether we observe a human or a non-human agent. Measuring a motor priming effect, this study investigated the question of whether agent-sensitivity of motor simulation depends on the specific action observed. Participants saw pictures depicting end positions of different actions on a screen. All postures featured either a human or non-human agent. Participants had to produce the matching action with their left or right hand depending on the hand presented on the screen. Three different actions were displayed: a communicative action (emblem), a transitive (goal-directed) action and an intransitive action. We found motor priming effects of similar size for human and non-human agents for transitive and intransitive actions. However, the motor priming effect for communicative actions was present for the human agent, but absent for the non-human agent. These findings suggest that biological tuning of motor simulation is highly action-selective and depends on whether the observed behavior appears to be driven by a reasonable goal.     

On Agents That Have the Ability to Choose

We demonstrate ways to incorporate nondeterminism in a system designed to formalize the reasoning of agents concerning their abilities and the results of the actions that they may perform. We distinguish between two kinds of nondeterministic choice operators: one that expresses an internal choice, in which the agent decides what action to take, and one that expresses an external choice, which cannot be influenced by the agent. The presence of abilities in our system is the reason why the usual approaches towards nondeterminism cannot be used here. The semantics that we define for nondeterministic actions is based on the idea that composite actions are unravelled in the strings of atomic actions and tests that constitute them. The main notions used in defining this semantics are finite computation sequences and finite computation runs of actions. The results that we obtain meet our intuitions regarding events and abilities in the presence of nondeterminism.     

The Experience of Agency: Feelings, Judgments, and Responsibility

ABSTRACT— The experience of agency refers to the experience of being in control both of one's own actions and, through them, of events in the external world. Recent experimental studies have investigated how people recognise a particular event as being caused by their own action or by that of another person. These studies suggest that people match sensory inputs to a prediction based on the action they are performing. Other studies have contrasted voluntary actions to physically similar but passive body movements. These studies suggest that voluntary action triggers wide-ranging changes in the spatial and temporal experience not only of one's own body but also of external events. Prediction and monitoring of the consequences of one's own motor commands produces characteristic experiences that form our normal, everyday feeling of being in control of our life. We conclude by discussing the implications of recent psychological work for our notions of responsibility for action.     

Bend it like Beckham: Embodying the motor skills of famous athletes

Observing an action activates the same representations as does the actual performance of the action. Here we show for the first time that the action system can also be activated in the complete absence of action perception. When the participants had to identify the faces of famous athletes, the responses were influenced by their similarity to the motor skills of the athletes. Thus, the motor skills of the viewed athletes were retrieved automatically during person identification and had a direct influence on the action system of the observer. However, our results also indicated that motor behaviours that are implicit characteristics of other people are represented differently from when actions are directly observed. That is, unlike the facilitatory effects reported when actions were seen, the embodiment of the motor behaviour that is not concurrently perceived gave rise to contrast effects where responses similar to the behaviour of the athletes were inhibited.     

Bend it like Beckham: embodying the motor skills of famous athletes

Observing an action activates the same representations as does the actual performance of the action. Here we show for the first time that the action system can also be activated in the complete absence of action perception. When the participants had to identify the faces of famous athletes, the responses were influenced by their similarity to the motor skills of the athletes. Thus, the motor skills of the viewed athletes were retrieved automatically during person identification and had a direct influence on the action system of the observer. However, our results also indicated that motor behaviours that are implicit characteristics of other people are represented differently from when actions are directly observed. That is, unlike the facilitatory effects reported when actions were seen, the embodiment of the motor behaviour that is not concurrently perceived gave rise to contrast effects where responses similar to the behaviour of the athletes were inhibited.     

Subliminal action priming modulates the perceived intensity of sensory action consequences

The sense of control over the consequences of one’s actions depends on predictions about these consequences. According to an influential computational model, consistency between predicted and observed action consequences attenuates perceived stimulus intensity, which might provide a marker of agentic control. An important assumption of this model is that these predictions are generated within the motor system. However, previous studies of sensory attenuation have typically confounded motor-specific perceptual modulation with perceptual effects of stimulus predictability that are not specific to motor action. As a result, these studies cannot unambiguously attribute sensory attenuation to a motor locus. We present a psychophysical experiment on auditory attenuation that avoids this pitfall. Subliminal masked priming of motor actions with compatible prime–target pairs has previously been shown to modulate both reaction times and the explicit feeling of control over action consequences. Here, we demonstrate reduced perceived loudness of tones caused by compatibly primed actions. Importantly, this modulation results from a manipulation of motor processing and is not confounded by stimulus predictability. We discuss our results with respect to theoretical models of the mechanisms underlying sensory attenuation and subliminal motor priming.     

Action,Control and Sensations of Acting

Sensations of acting and control have been neglected in theory of action. I argue that they form the core of action and are integral and indispensible parts of our actions, participating as they do in feedback loops consisting of our intentions in acting, the bodily movements required for acting and the sensations of acting. These feedback loops underlie all activities in which we engage when we act and generate our control over our movements.The events required for action according to the causal theory, or Searle’s theory, do not add up to agency. I find the agent at work, her engagement in her action, in her sensation of acting.It is often thought that bodily movements are either mere events or actions. I suggest that there is a third possibility: that they are activities which are not actions. Activities, whether they are actions or not, differ from mere events in that they are controlled from within the brain. They are actions only if this control forms agent control, that is, control in which the conscious mind, the agents’ intentions in acting and her sensations of acting, participates.Internally wayward actions are characterized by the fact that the person involved does not have a sensation of action and therefore does not control her movements. In the absence of such a sensation she does not act.     

Phase-dependent reflex modulation in tibialis anterior during passive viewing of walking

It is well established that reflexes are highly adaptive, as they depend both on our intention and on the active state of the muscles. Reflex gains change dynamically during actions such as walking and running, with the gain of cutaneous reflexes being increased at the end of the stance phase but decreased at the end of the swing phase in the tibialis anterior (TA) muscle. Reflex gains can even change during the mere observation of an action. The mechanisms and functions of such modulations are unclear. It has been suggested that the changed reflex gains prevent the actual performance of actions that we see. However, the modulation of reflexes in response to seeing an action has never been reproduced for the active execution of such actions. In the present study, medium-latency cutaneous reflexes from the TA muscle, of which the activity and reflexes during walking are well known, were measured in human subjects. The results show that the gain changes of the medium-latency responses of the TA are the same as during active walking. We conclude that reflexes do not represent an inhibitory mechanism that prevents motor output during action observation. Instead, our findings provide evidence that even the peripheral spinal motor system is actively involved in the motor resonance processes, without evoking any measurable motor responses.     

The role of the motor system in conceptual processing: Effects of object affordances beyond response interference

Numerous behavioral and neuro-imaging studies have demonstrated that the motor system is activated when people are presented with manipulable objects. However it remains a matter of debate whether these results should be interpreted as evidence that certain conceptual processes employ motor programs. In order to address this issue, we conducted two experiments which required participants to assess the functions of tool-like objects and respond verbally. The results demonstrate that action affordances may constrain performance in tasks which are not based on the stimulus–response compatibility paradigm. We argue that this finding supports the causal role of the motor system in conceptual processing and that it cannot be explained by spreading of activation and response interference.     

When motor congruency modulates immediate memory for objects

In line with the embodied cognition view, some researchers have suggested that our capacity to retain information relies on the perceptual and motor systems used to interact with our environment (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997). For instance, the language production architecture would be responsible for the retention of verbal materials such as a list of words (Acheson & MacDonald, 2009). However, evidence for the role of the motor system in object memory is still limited. In the present experiments, participants were asked to retain lists of objects in memory. During encoding, participants had to pantomime an action to grasp (Experiments 1A & 1B) or to use the objects (Experiment 2) that was either congruent or incongruent with the objects to be retained. The results showed that performing an incongruent action impaired memory performance compared to a congruent action. This suggests that motor affordances play a role during object retention. The results are discussed in light of the embodied cognition view.     

How do we know what we are doing? Time, intention and awareness of action

Time is a fundamental dimension of consciousness. Many studies of the "sense of agency" have investigated whether we attribute actions to ourselves based on a conscious experience of intention occurring prior to action, or based on a reconstruction after the action itself has occurred. Here, we ask the same question about a lower level aspect of action experience, namely awareness of the detailed spatial form of a simple movement. Subjects reached for a target, which unpredictably jumped to the side on some trials. Participants (1) expressed their expectancy of a target shift during the upcoming movement, (2) pointed at the target as quickly and accurately as possible before returning to the start posiment to the target shift if required and (3) reproduced the spatial path of the movement they had just made, as accurately as possible, to give an indication of their awareness of the pointing movement. We analysed the spatial disparity between the initial and the reproduced movements on those with a target shift. A negative disparity value, or undershoot, suggests that motor awareness merely reflects a sluggish record of coordinated motor performance, while a positive value, or overshoot, suggests that participants' intention to point to the shifting target contributes more to their awareness of action than their actual pointing movement. Undershoot and overshoot thus measure the reconstructive (motoric) and the preconstuctive (intentional) aspects of action awareness, respectively. We found that trials on which subjects strongly expected a target shift showed greater overshoot and less undershoot than trials with lower expectancy. Conscious expectancy therefore strongly influences the experience of the detailed motor parameters of our actions. Further, a delay inserted either between the expectancy judgement and the pointing movement, or between the pointing movement and the reproduction of the movement, had no effect on visuomotor adjustment but strongly influenced action awareness. Delays during either interval boosted undershoots, suggesting increased reliance on a time-limited sensory memory for action. The experience of action is thus strongly influenced by prior thoughts and expectations, but only over a short time period. Thus, awareness of our actions is a dynamic and relatively flexible mixture of what we intend to do, and what our motor system actually does.     

Does motor interference arise from mirror system activation? The effect of prior visuo-motor practice on automatic imitation

Action perception may involve a mirror-matching system, such that observed actions are mapped onto the observer’s own motor representations. The strength of such mirror system activation should depend on an individual’s experience with the observed action. The motor interference effect, where an observed action interferes with a concurrently executed incongruent action, is thought to arise from mirror system activation. However, this view was recently challenged. If motor interference arises from mirror system activation, this effect should be sensitive to prior sensorimotor experience with the observed action. To test this prediction, we measured motor interference in two groups of participants observing the same incongruent movements. One group had received brief visuo-motor practice with the observed incongruent action, but not the other group. Action observation induced a larger motor interference in participants who had practiced the observed action. This result thus supports a mirror system account of motor interference.     

The Apology Paradox and the Non-Identity Problem

Janna Thompson has outlined 'the apology paradox', which arises whenever people apologize for an action or event upon which their existence is causally dependent. She argues that a sincere apology seems to entail a wish that the action or event had not occurred, but that we cannot sincerely wish that events upon which our existence depends had not occurred. I argue that Thompson's paradox is a backward-looking version of Parfit's (forward-looking) 'non-identity problem', where backward- and forward-looking refer to the perspective of an agent apologizing for or contemplating an action. The temporal perspective of the agent gives us the tools with which to dissolve the air of paradox which surrounds these problems. Each is best grasped from one temporal perspective, but the paradoxes arise when we attempt to examine it simultaneously from another. The evaluations appropriate to the apology paradox and the non-identity problem are therefore time-indexed.