Framing Effects in International Relations

Framing is the least well-developed central concept of prospect theory. Framing is both fundamental to prospect theory and remarkably underdeveloped in the prospect theory literature. This paper focuses on the many subtypes and variations of framing: thematic vs. evaluative; successful vs. failed; productive vs. counterproductive; purposeful, structural and interactive framing; counterframing; loss frames vs. gain frames; revolving framing vs. sequential framing; framing by a third party; and framing vs. priming. The bulk of the paper provides an analysis of framing and framing effects in foreign policy settings with an emphasis on U.S. foreign policy. We highlight framing effects during the Cold War, the Persian Gulf War, the current ``war on terrorism', and other IR/foreign policy settings. Our examination highlights the extent to which presidents and other significant world leaders use framing to shape policy debates and national security choices.     

Framing and Risky Choice as Influenced by Comparison of One's Achievements with Others: The Case of Investment in the Stock Exchange

Based on social comparison theory and equity theory, the first aim of this study was to examine the hypothesis that framing is affected not only by previous success or failure, but also by comparisons with relevant others' outcomes as well. The second aim of the study was to examine prospect theory propositions that people are risk aversive for gains and risk seeking for losses. A total of 220 students were administered scenarios that described outcomes of their stock investments (gains or losses). In addition, they were provided with information about their close friends' outcomes investing in similar stocks. Generally, the hypothesis regarding the influence of others' outcomes on framing was confirmed. However, results showed that, in contradiction to prospect theory, gain framing rather than loss framing was related to risk seeking behavior. Specifically, in the gain framing situation, the readiness to take risks was highest when the others' outcomes were equal to those of the participants. The limitations of prospect theory are discussed.     

框架效应及其认知机制的研究进展

框架效应违背了不变性原则,是描述性决策理论违背规范性理论的经典异像。以亚洲疾病问题为代表的经典框架效应又称作风险选择框架效应,此外还包括特征框架效应等不同类别。框架效应受损益值类型和大小等社会线索影响。除展望理论可以解释其认知机制外,模糊痕迹理论和概率心理模型等也对此加以解释。框架效应的脑机制在大脑右半球和杏仁核等区域。文章最后对全文做了总结及展望。     

Multiple prospect framing and decision behavior: The mediational roles of perceived riskiness and perceived ambiguity

Decision makers facing a multiple prospect, which is a bundle of single prospects, are influenced by whether outcome information is framed narrowly (segregated) or broadly (aggregated). The present research hypothesizes perceived riskiness and perceived ambiguity as two distinct mediators of the effect of broad versus narrow prospect framing on decision behavior. Perceived riskiness and perceived ambiguity were conceptually defined as psychological constructs and new multi-item scales were developed and validated to operationalize them. Two experiments (a 100-shot gamble in Experiment 1, N = 118, and a 30-year retirement investment in Experiment 2, N = 84) were conducted. Both experiments supported all three hypotheses: riskiness and ambiguity perceptions were distinct constructs (Hypothesis 1), perceived riskiness mediated the effect of multiple prospect framing on decision behavior (Hypothesis 2), and perceived ambiguity mediated the effect of multiple prospect framing on decision behavior (Hypothesis 3). These findings advance our understanding of the psychological mechanisms underlying framing effects for multiple prospects and have substantial business and policy implications.     

Effects of Framing on Actual Time Allocation Decisions

The purpose of this research was to test the effect of positive versus negative frames on the riskiness of actual time allocation decisions. Two experiments were conducted, one involving an unattractive task and the other involving an attractive exercise. Framing effects were observed in both experiments, and these effects were generally in line with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). However, the effects of framing were small to moderate in magnitude, and in some instances there was little or no effect. Implications of these results and directions for future research are discussed.     

When Does Framing Influence Preferences,Risk Perceptions,and Risk Attitudes? The Explicated Valence Account

When faced with an expected loss and a choice between a sure option and a risky option, the gain–loss framing of the problem has been shown to influence option preference. According to prospect theory, this framing effect is the result of contradictory attitudes about risks involving gains and losses. This article develops and tests an alternative explicated valence account (EVA), which proposes that preference reversals are caused by differences in the explicated outcome valences of the options under consideration. EVA can account for previous findings where framing effects are observed, eliminated, or even reversed. In two experiments, EVA successfully predicted when framing effects were observed, eliminated, and reversed. The findings also showed that although framing influenced risk perception, it did not influence risk attitudes. Copyright © 2015 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada Journal of Behavioral Decision Making © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Influencing Risk Preference in Decision Making: The Effects of Framing and Salience

Prospect theory predicts that people tend to prefer the sure option when choosing between two alternative courses of action framed in terms of gains and prefer the risky option when choosing between two alternatives framed as losses. Related research investigated the impact of emphasizing the probability of the positive outcome of a risky option versus emphasizing the probability of the negative outcome on preference. Most of these studies on the effects of "outcome salience" related their findings to prospect theory′s framing effect. It will be argued that most of these studies inaccurately applied prospect theory to explain the obtained effects and that these might be better understood in terms of salience. In four experiments we test the predictions that (1) choosing between two options in a gain problem will lead to decreased risk preference as compared to loss problems and (2) emphasizing the probability of positive outcomes of a risky option leads to increased preference for this option compared to emphasizing the probability of negative outcomes. Results confirm the impact of both prospect framing and outcome salience and indicate that these effects should be understood in terms of distinct, independent processes.     

Commonalities and Differences Among Frames: A Unification Model

We provide a review and a theoretically unifying model of framing effects. Beginning with a review of findings that prospect theory, fuzzy‐trace theory, and traditional dual process models do and do not explain, we develop a model of framing based partly on Bless and Schwarz's (2010) inclusion/exclusion model of assimilation and contrast. Our model is the first of its kind to be applied to all three valence framing manipulations and presents common mechanisms explaining findings in the framing literature that were previously difficult to conceptualize within a single theory (e.g., matching effects and cognitive effort). The model also accounts for why all three framing manipulations are influenced by differences between holistic/contextual versus analytic processing as well as the presence, absence, and direction of effects produced by different versions of framing manipulations. It also predicts contrast effects (Implications and Future Directions section) and applies to manipulations involving a frame and judgmental target. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effects of Framing, Reflection, Probability, and Payoff on Risk Preference in Choice Tasks

A meta-analysis of Asian-disease-like studies is presented to identify the factors which determine risk preference. First the confoundings between probability levels, payoffs, and framing conditions are clarified in a task analysis. Then the role of framing, reflection, probability, type, and size of payoff is evaluated in a meta-analysis. It is shown that bidirectional framing effects exist for gains and for losses. Presenting outcomes as gains tends to induce risk aversion, while presenting outcomes as losses tends to induce risk seeking. Risk preference is also shown to depend on the size of the payoffs, on the probability levels, and on the type of good at stake (money/property vs human lives). In general, higher payoffs lead to increasing risk aversion. Higher probabilities lead to increasing risk aversion for gains and to increasing risk seeking for losses. These findings are confirmed by a subsequent empirical test. Shortcomings of existing formal theories, such as prospect theory, cumulative prospect theory, venture theory, and Markowitz's utility theory, are identified. It is shown that it is not probabilities or payoffs, but the framing condition, which explains most variance. These findings are interpreted as showing that no linear combination of formally relevant predictors is sufficient to capture the essence of the framing phenomenon.     

Prospect theory analysis of guessing in multiple choice tests

The guessing of answers in multiple choice tests adds random error to the variance of the test scores, lowering their reliability. Formula scoring rules that penalize for wrong guesses are frequently used to solve this problem. This paper uses prospect theory to analyze scoring rules from a decision‐making perspective and focuses on the effects of framing on the tendency to guess. In three experiments participants were presented with hypothetical test situations and were asked to indicate the degree of certainty that they thought was required for them to answer a question. In accordance with the framing hypothesis, participants tended to guess more when they anticipated a low grade and therefore considered themselves to be in the loss domain, or when the scoring rule caused the situation to be framed as entailing potential losses. The last experiment replicated these results with a task that resembles an actual test. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

公共决策中的框架效应：理论解释及影响因素

公共决策中的框架效应是指在公共决策情境中, 人们的决策行为受媒体或领导人对同一问题的框架表述形式的影响而表现出不同决策偏好的现象。目前, 研究者对这一现象的解释主要有预期理论、查询理论和模糊痕迹理论。公共决策中框架效应的影响因素主要包括价值取向、知识水平、人际沟通、情绪以及框架的特征等。未来的研究需要从公共决策中框架效应的理论解释及神经机制、跨文化研究以及研究方式和应对策略等方面进一步探讨。     

社会偏好中的框架效应

社会偏好中的框架效应是指, 个体在决策中受到选择方案框架形式的影响而表现出合作、互惠及利他行为及倾向改变的现象, 是框架效应在社会偏好领域的运用。预期理论、错误知觉说、心理动力模型、情绪维护理论以及解释水平理论分别从价值函数、知觉偏差、内部心理动力、情绪及认知表征角度解释了社会偏好中的框架效应, 心理距离、价值取向、人格特质和文化等因素对社会偏好中的框架效应具有重要影响。未来的研究需要从社会偏好中的框架效应的心理机制与神经机制、研究范式及外部效度改进等方面作进一步探讨。     

Exploring the Valence‐Framing Effect: Negative Framing Enhances Attitude Strength

In his now‐classic research on inoculation theory, McGuire (1964 ) demonstrated that exposing people to an initial weak counterattitudinal message could lead to enhanced resistance to a subsequent stronger counterattitudinal message. More recently, research on the valence‐framing effect ( Bizer & Petty, 2005 ) demonstrated an alternative way to make attitudes more resistant. Simply framing a person's attitude negatively (i.e., in terms of a rejected position such as anti‐Democrat) led to more resistance to an attack on that attitude than did framing the same attitude positively (i.e., in terms of a preferred position such as pro‐Republican). Using an election context, the current research tested whether valence framing influences attitude resistance specifically or attitude strength more generally, providing insight into the effect's mechanism and generalizability. In two experiments, attitude valence was manipulated by framing a position either negatively or positively. Experiment 1 showed that negatively framed attitudes were held with more certainty than were positively framed attitudes. In Experiment 2, conducted among a representative sample of residents of two U.S. states during political campaigns, negatively framed attitudes demonstrated higher levels of attitude certainty and attitude‐consistent behavioral intentions than did attitudes that were framed positively. Furthermore, the effect of valence framing on behavioral intentions was mediated by attitude certainty. Valence framing thus appears to be a relatively low‐effort way to impact multiple features associated with strong attitudes.     

A critique of prospect theory and framing with particular reference to consumer decisions

Prospect theory is criticized in this article for being borrowed from psychology without appropriate acknowledgement, for requiring mathematical calculations that are beyond the average person, for not investigating information processing during prospect theory choices, and for lacking application to real‐world decisions—such as important product and service choices made by consumers. Further criticism is leveled at the prospect theory‐derived technique known as “framing,” which is based on one‐sided presentation of information and would be unethical in most consumer behavior situations.     

The illusion of certainty: A catastrophe model of decision framing

Tversky and Kahneman (1981) have proposed that decision frames act to bias the processing of decision-relevant information by decision makers. Decision frames act as illusions to which most decision makers are susceptible. We believe that catastrophe theory provides a unique framework by which the effects of decision framing can be studied. Catastrophe theory has been proposed as a way to explain the sudden shifts in preference in perceptual experiments (Stewart & Peregoy, 1983). Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) decision-framing concept, in decision situations, is proposed to be analogous to the cognitive, organizing centers underlying catastrophic changes in response in perceptual experiments. The results of this study were interpreted as demonstrating the heuristic value of catastrophe theory in describing the decision-framing phenomenon as a cognitive illusion. A version of this paper was presented to the Second Annual Convention of the american Psychological Society, June 7–10, 1990, Dallas, Texas.     

The Interplay of News Frames on Cognitive Complexity

This research considers how distinct news frames work in combination to influence information processing. It extends framing research grounded in prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) and attribution theory (Iyengar, 1991) to study conditional framing effects on associative memory. Using a 2 × 3 experimental design embedded within a probability survey (N= 379), tests examined the effects of two different frame dimensions—loss‐gain and individual‐societal—on the complexity of individuals' thoughts concerning the issue of urban growth. Findings indicate that news frames interact to generate more or less complex cognitive responses, with societal‐gain frame combinations generating the most detailed cognitions about the causes, components, and consequences of urban growth. Directions for research on media framing are discussed.