Philosophy as a thief?

This is a performative piece of writing in the presence of and inspired by Richard Shusterman's Philosophy and the Art of Writing. It tries to show that the relationship between the act of writing and the formation of our human consciousness (philosophical and, more deeply, poietic) is a developing and growing process through history, and before it. The dominance of an image consciousness was slowly challenged and then replaced by a linguistic consciousness with the advent of writing, and accelerated by the invention of printing and mass literacy. Shusterman teaches us an embodied kind of philosophizing that uses the word but isn't limited by it. This paper suggests that a return to image consciousness has already occurred and that the old book consciousness is disappearing. Lessons from the book consciousness are offered.     

God's organism? The chick as a model system for memory studies

The young chick is a powerful model system in which to study the biochemical and morphological processes underlying memory formation. Training chicks on a one trial passive avoidance task results in a molecular cascade in a specific brain region, the intermediate medial hyperstriatum ventrale. This cascade is initiated by glutamate release and engages a series of synaptic transients including increased calcium flux, up-regulation of NMDA-glutamate receptors, membrane protein phosphorylations, and the retrograde messenger NO. Expression of immediate early genes c-fos and c-jun precedes the synthesis, glycosylation, and redistribution, >4 hr downstream, of a number of synaptic membrane proteins, notably NCAM and L1. Other membrane proteins required in the early phase of memory formation include the amyloid precursor protein (APP) and apolipoprotein E. There are concomitant increases in dendritic spine number and changes in synaptic structure. Nonsynaptic factors, including corticosterone and BDNF, can modulate retention of the avoidance response, enhancing the salience of otherwise weakly retained memory. These results are discussed in relation to general concepts of memory formation and the spatio-temporal distribution of the putative memory trace.     

Cyclists as a minority group?

In the social sciences, several definitions of minority group can be found. The definitions include different aspects such as power/status, number, distinctiveness, social category, group context, dispositions, and discrimination. Compared to motorized road users, cyclists are considered vulnerable road users because they lack physical protection. We argue that such definition does not capture the social and cultural aspects that characterize the membership within the group of cyclists. We offer arguments and reflections based on recent literature advocating that cyclists may share some features of the experience of minority groups. Although cyclists differ from other minorities in important respects, they manifest many of the characteristics by which minority groups are defined.     

Land as a Global Commons?

Land is becoming increasingly scarce relative to the demands of the global economy; a problem significantly exacerbated by climate change. In response, some have suggested that land should be conceptualised as a global commons. This framing might seem like an appealing way to promote sustainable and equitable land use. However, it is a poor fit for the worldʼs land because global commons are generally understood as resources located beyond state borders. I argue that land can be seen to fit the definition of a global commons, if viewed in a particular way; namely, as a biogeochemical resource system that sequesters carbon emissions. The question then arises whether land should be conceptualised as a global commons. I consider this question by reference to three contemporary problems of land justice (land grabbing, forced displacement, and unfairness in land-based climate mitigation); arguing that the global-commons framing will not be conducive to understanding or responding to these problems. I leave the question of how the global community should conceptualise land in the context of climate change open, claiming that any answer must include the voices and perspectives of those whose livelihoods and identities are closely connected to the land.     

The confluence model: birth order as a within-family or between-family dynamic?

The confluence model explains birth-order differences in intellectual performance by quantifying the changing dynamics within the family. Wichman, Rodgers, and MacCallum (2006) claimed that these differences are a between-family phenomenon--and hence are not directly related to birth order itself. The study design and analyses presented by Wichman et al. nevertheless suffer from crucial shortcomings, including their use of unfocused tests, which cause statistically significant trends to be overlooked. In addition, Wichman et al. treated birth-order effects as a linear phenomenon thereby ignoring the confluence model's prediction that these two samples may manifest opposing results based on age. This article cites between- and within-family data that demonstrate systematic birth-order effects as predicted by the confluence model. The corpus of evidence invoked here offers strong support for the assumption of the confluence model that birth-order differences in intellectual performance are primarily a within-family phenomenon.     

Alzheimer' Disease as a Disconnection Syndrome?

This paper reviews the growing amount of evidence supporting the hypothesis that Alzheimer's disease includes a disconnection syndrome. This evidence came mainly from neuropathological, electrophysiological, and neuroimaging studies. Moreover, a few recent neuropsychological studies have also explored the effects of a disconnection between cerebral areas on cognitive functioning. Finally, and more generally, the contribution of this interpretation to the understanding of Alzheimer's disease cognitive deficits is considered.     

What is philosophy as a way of life? Why philosophy as a way of life?

Despite a recent surge of interest in philosophy as a way of life, it is not clear what it might mean for philosophy to guide one's life, or how a “philosophical” way of life might differ from a life guided by religion, tradition, or some other source. We argue against John Cooper that spiritual exercises figure crucially in the idea of philosophy as a way of life—not just in the ancient world but also today, at least if the idea is to be viable. In order to make the case we attempt to clarify the nature of spiritual exercises, and to explore a number of fundamental questions, such as “What role does reason have in helping us to live well?” Here we distinguish between the discerning and motivational powers of reason, and argue that both elements have limitations as guides to living well.     

The History of Science as a Graveyard of Theories: A Philosophers’ Myth?

According to the antirealist argument known as the pessimistic induction, the history of science is a graveyard of dead scientific theories and abandoned theoretical posits. Support for this pessimistic picture of the history of science usually comes from a few case histories, such as the demise of the phlogiston theory and the abandonment of caloric as the substance of heat. In this article, I wish to take a new approach to examining the ‘history of science as a graveyard of theories’ picture. Using JSTOR Data for Research and Springer Exemplar, I present new lines of evidence that are at odds with this pessimistic picture of the history of science. When rigorously tested against the historical record of science, I submit, the pessimistic picture of the history of science as a graveyard of dead theories and abandoned posits may turn out to be no more than a philosophers’ myth.     

The more,the better?: Number of decisions as a determinant of memorability

Three experiments tested alternative explanations to the Johnson-Laird, Gibbs, and deMowbray (1978) proposal that the number of decisions made about a word is a major determinant of its memorability. The alternatives considered were increased processing time, retrieval aids, and the number of positive decisions. In Experiment 1, subjects made a speeded classification about each word for a category defined by three properties. Though items with more target properties were processed longer and better remembered, within a property level processing time was not associated with better memory. In Experiment 2, subjects received three properties, but different groups responded “Yes” to words with all three properties, words with any of the three properties, or whether words had each of the properties. As predicted by the number-of-decisions hypothesis, but not by the other hypotheses, with an increasing number of target properties, recall generally increased in the ALL group, decreased in the ANY group, and remained constant in the EACH group. In Experiment 3, this recall pattern was replicated with a different set of two target properties. The number-of-decisions notion is contrasted to the elaboration principle, and a simple model is proposed. It is concluded that the number of decisions is a useful technique for investigating within-level encoding differences     

When is an alternative possibility robust?

According to some, free will requires alternative possibilities. But not any old alternative possibility will do. Sometimes, being able to bring about an alternative does not bestow any control on an agent. In order to bestow control, and so be directly relevant qua alternative to grounding the agent's moral responsibility, alternatives need to be robust. Here, I investigate the nature of robust alternatives. I argue that Derk Pereboom's latest robustness criterion is too strong, and I suggest a different criterion based on the idea that what agents need to be able to do is keep open the possibility of securing their blamelessness, rather than needing to directly ensure their own blamelessness at the time of decision.     

Desires as additional reasons? The case of tie-breaking

According to the Desire-Based Reasons Model reasons for action are provided by desires. Many, however, are critical about the Model holding an alternative view of practical reason, which is often called valued-based. In this paper I consider one particular attempt to refute the Model, which advocates of the valued-based view often appeal to: the idea of reason-based desires. The argument is built up from two premises. The first claims that desires are states that we have reason to have. The second argues that desires do not add to the stock of reasons the agent has for having them. Together the two theses entail that desires are based on reasons, which they transmit but to which they cannot add. In the paper I deal with a counterexample to the second premise: tie-breaking desires. I first distinguish two interesting cases and argue that only the second challenges the premise. Then I move onto analyze this challenge by focusing on Ruth Chang’s recent employment of it. I show that contrary to its counterintuitive appearance, the challenge can be sustained. However, I also argue that Chang overlooks the full potential of one particular response to the challenge: the introduction of higher-order reasons determining the normative significance of these desires. At the same time, I show that this response has a problem that Chang does not consider. As a result, the response can only partially disarm the challenge of tie-breaking desires; or not at all, depending on what significance we attribute to the counterexamples.     

Is Socrates free? The Theaetetus as case study

Most scholars agree that Plato’s concept of freedom, to the extent he has one, is ‘intellectualist’: true freedom is submission to the rule of reason through philosophical knowledge of rational order. Surprisingly, though, there are few explicit linkages of philosophy and freedom in Plato. Socrates is called many things in the dialogues, but not ‘free’. I aim to understand why by studying the Theaetetus, heretofore ignored in discussions of Platonic freedom. By examining the Digression (172c-177c) and Socrates’ ‘dream’ about wholes and parts (201c-206c), I show that describing freedom as ‘rule of reason’ simplifies what, for Plato, is a more tangled skein. In the Digression, philosophers are free in occupying a comprehensive standpoint transcending all limited and partial perspectives. Socrates’ dream, however, shows that logos cannot completely account for the knowledge of complex wholes or for itself as such a whole. Philosophical freedom cannot mean comprehensive discursive knowledge, then, since reason lacks a comprehensive grasp of itself. Socrates dreams of the rational whole, but is aware of why it remains only a dream, rather than wakeful knowledge. This awareness constitutes a freedom attained, not in total liberation from the confines of the partial human perspective, but within those confines.     

What Counts as Behavior? The Molar Multiscale View

Because the definition of behavior changes as our understanding of behavior changes, giving a final definition is impossible. One can, however, rule out some possibilities and propose some others based on what we currently know. Behavior is not simply movement, but must be defined by its function. Also, our understanding of behavior must agree with evolutionary theory. I suggest 4 basic principles: (a) only whole organisms behave; (b) behavior is purposive; (c) behavior takes time; and (d) behavior is choice. Saying that parts of an organism behave is nonsense, and, moreover, evolutionary theory explains the existence of organisms mainly through their adaptive behavior. Behavior is purposive in that behavior is shaped by its consequences, through an organism''s lifetime or through interactions with the environment across many generations of natural selection. Behavior takes time in that behavior is interaction with the environment that cannot take place at a moment. Moreover, at a moment in time, one cannot definitely identify the function of behavior. Identification of an activity requires a span of time. Behavior is choice in the sense that a suitable span of time always includes time spent in more than 1 activity. Activities include parts that are themselves activities on a smaller time scale and compete for time. Thus, behavior constitutes time allocation. An accounting problem arises whenever any behavior is attributed to multiple consequences. In the molar multiscale view, this raises the question of whether 2 activities can occur at the same time. The question remains open.     

Whose Meaning? The Wax and Gold Tradition as a Philosophical Foundation for an Ethiopian Hermeneutic

This essay is an attempt to assess critically the wax and gold tradition as a philosophical foundation of Ethiopian hermeneutics. In the first part, I shall analyze the wax and gold tradition as a poetic and literary tradition. After exploring how this tradition has shaped social and political interaction in the second part, in the third part I will show the implications of the wax and gold tradition for hermeneutics. I shall then make a critical assessment of the wax and gold tradition as an interpretive philosophy before closing the essay with concluding remarks.     

Problem and method: The possibility of comparative study—using “Lun Liujia Yaozhi” as an example

On the basis of general characteristics, comparative studies can be restricted by cross-cultural comparison in a narrow sense. In this paper, I take “Chinese philosophy” as an example to investigate the current problems within comparative studies. However, it is possible to embark on comparative study. “Lun Liujia Yaozhi” 论六家要旨 (“Discussion on the Main Points of the Six Schools”) conducts a successful comparison, from which we can extract the comparative method of “Problem and Method,” and it points directly to the basic structure of survival activities, and furnishes the possibility for cross-cultural comparisons.     

The detection of fear-relevant stimuli: are guns noticed as quickly as snakes?

Potentially dangerous stimuli are important contenders for the capture of visual-spatial attention, and it has been suggested that an evolved fear module is preferentially activated by stimuli that are fear relevant in a phylogenetic sense (e.g., snakes, spiders, angry faces). In this study, a visual search task was used to test this hypothesis by directly contrasting phylogenetically (snakes) and ontogenetically (guns) fear-relevant stimuli. Results showed that the modern threat was detected as efficiently as the more ancient threat. Thus, both guns and snakes attracted attention more effectively than neutral stimuli (flowers, mushrooms, and toasters). These results support a threat superiority effect but not one that is preferentially accessed by threat-related stimuli of phylogenetic origin. The results are consistent with the view that faster detection of threat in visual search tasks may be more accurately characterized as relevance superiority effects rather than as threat superiority effects.