断裂与复兴:土家族梯玛信仰与“玩菩萨”仪式的生存逻辑

在土家族历史上,梯玛信仰广泛存在,梯玛阶层在土家族社会运行中起着重要作用.改土归流尤其是近现代以来,在国家力量的作用下,梯玛信仰逐渐萎缩,在多数土家族地区逐渐消失,只是在土家族聚居的深处有残存.20世纪50年代社会主义改造后,梯玛信仰消失得更快,残存的地方也出现传承断裂,存世的梯玛寥寥无几.改革开放后,在土家语存留区的局部地方出现梯玛信仰的“复兴”.梯玛信仰的“复兴”与改革开放以来的制度变迁及地方精英复兴民族文化有关,与现代化进程中村落社会的内在需求有关,也与村落社会中不断流传的灵验故事有关.本文在描述梯玛信仰演变及其“玩菩萨”仪式的基础上,分析其生存逻辑,以此理解梯玛信仰“复兴”的合理性.     

南部方言区土家族"红衣老师"信仰调查报告

在实地调查的基础上,整理了南部方言区土家族红衣老师信仰的主要内容,并从民族性与混融性、地域性、原始宗教与人为宗教、道教的影响四个方面将其与北部方言区土家族的梯玛信仰作了简要的比较.     

土家族民间信仰研究述论

民间信仰是土家族研究领域中的核心问题,自潘光旦先生以降,学者着力甚多,成就斐然;就研究范式而言,土家族民间信仰研究大体上遵循着"信仰—事象"范式、"文化—象征"范式到"国家—社会"范式的嬗递路径。同时,相关研究也存在一些深层次的缺失,主要体现在五个方面:1.对既有知识体系缺乏系统的梳理与借鉴,使得研究流于表象,甚而不乏舛误;2.对土家族民间信仰多元性的忽视;3.社会与文化整体理念的缺失;4.对民众主位知识的遮蔽;5.学术研究服务现实社会发展功能的缺位。土家族民间信仰研究还有很大的拓展空间。     

论儒学对民间神明信仰的影响——以闽台民间神明信仰为例

儒家通过人的神化和神的道德化两个方面的造神运动实现了对民间神格塑造的影响。在鬼神信仰上的宗教伦理理性的价值取向是儒学对民间信仰产生影响的思想渊源,国家机器的神道设教和知识分子推动是这一影响的现实途径。     

五台山对日本灵山信仰的影响—— 以金峰山信仰为例

五台山在东亚佛教交流史上占有重要地位,不仅要归功于它在汇聚与传播佛教思想上的卓越功绩,还要归功于它所输出的"五台山圣地观"对整个东亚佛教圣地形成模式的影响.这其中以日本的灵山信仰最为明显.作为整体的"五台山圣地观",至迟7世纪后期传入日本,通过以菩提仙那为代表的入日弘法僧的推介、以圆仁为代表的入唐求法僧的弘扬,在日本广...     

民国时期乡村天主教徒的信仰状态与特征——以山西乡村教徒为例

民国时期的乡村教徒以当地方式信仰、礼敬天主、耶稣、玛利亚、圣人与天使,但懂得只有天主是最终的依赖者,大部分教徒不懂与天主进行交流,信仰目的兼有世俗功利性与信仰功利性,宗教活动中加入本地宗教活动内容,其信仰已相当程度上本土化,但其崇拜对象、信仰方式、宗教活动都尚在天主教教义的范围之内。与知识分子教徒相比,他们的信仰知识有限,缺乏救世、奉献精神,他们的信仰是天主教文化与中国乡土文化互相交流、融合而成的新信仰,具有西方天主教没有的新特征。     

乡村振兴背景下湘西传统民居保护策略——以土家族吊脚楼为例

党的十九大报告提出了大力实施乡村振兴战略,描绘了新时代新农村建设的美好蓝图。在这样的背景下,湘西土家族传统民居的保护问题应得到充分的重视。以湘西土家族典型民居吊脚楼为研究对象,梳理了其形成背景、来源、建筑特征与文化意蕴,分析了当前土家族吊脚楼存在的问题,并在此基础上提出了相应的保护对策。     

年画中的民间信仰——以上海小校场年画为例

作为祭神辟邪的物品,年画从诞生之际就与民间信仰文化紧密地结合在了一起;而小校场年画也以其浓厚的地域特色,反映出近代上海的都市民间信仰习俗。年画是中国独有的民间艺术形式,春节之际张贴于家户的内外,具有驱灾避邪、祈福迎祥的作用。各种题材的年画应节使用,逐渐发展成为百姓日常生活中的居家装饰画。     

新加坡的道教与民间教派、“信仰群”——以黄老仙师信仰为例

从实地调查的情况来看,新加坡的道教是一个非常宽泛的概念。凡是多神信仰,以神明、祖先、鬼为祭祀对象,以华人传统伦理道德为宗教义理,以道教斋醮科仪和扶乩降神为与神鬼界沟通手段者,都可以称之为道教信仰者。因为道教本身的包容性、宽泛性,易于出现分化的教派或教团。比如德教、一贯道等等,他们制定出自己的宗教制度、神明体系、信仰方式,是一种制度化的民间教团,也有学者称之为秘密教派。另有一些庙宇组织有着共同的神明崇拜体系、宗教仪式、道德理念,虽然制度化的形态尚不完整也不稳定,但已具备基本要素和雏形,此种信仰形态可称之为信仰群,如黄老仙师信仰、九皇大帝信仰等等。本文以新加坡的黄老仙师信仰为例,分析新加坡华人社会这一处于道教和民间教团之间的信仰群特色,并以此来探讨新加坡华人道教的发展问题。     

企业家与民间信仰的“标准化”——以闽南地区为例

在闽南地区,企业家进入民间宫庙管理的现象日渐普遍。企业家管理的宫庙,在转型中出现了趋同现象,即出现了传统文化化、社会公益化与区域化、国际化等发展趋势。企业家的士绅化,以及当前国家政治生态,导致了华琛(James L.Watson)笔下的神明标准化现象重又上演。这是当前闽南民间信仰在转型中逐渐趋同的重要原因。     

也谈道教的核心信仰

闵智亭道长在《道教的根本教理及其核心信仰》(《中国宗教》2003年4月号)一文中,指出:“道教的根本教理和核心信仰就是老子之道。道教把《老子》哲学理论从整体宇宙观出发,然后将自然之道、治国之道、修身之道,三者归纳于一个共同的自然规律中。”今天,深刻认识道教的核心信仰,是社会对道教发展的要求,也是道教适应社会发展的自身要求。有感于斯,笔者不揣简陋,愿取“以经解经”的方法,对《老子》的自然之道、治国之道和修身之道作如下述说:一、自然之道(一)道的本体1.道体不可以感官和理智测度首先,理智、语言都无法理解和说明道的本体。道…     

Functional belief and judgmental belief

Synthese - A division between functional (animal) belief, on the one hand, and judgmental (reflective) belief, on the other, is central to Sosa’s two-tier virtue epistemology. For Sosa, mere...     

The computational account of belief

Fodor and others who think that scientific, computational psychology will vindicate commonsense belief-desire psychology have maintained that belief can be identified with the explicit storage of a token with appropriate content. I review and develop problems for the explicit storage view and show that a more plausible account identifies belief with the disposition to use a token with appropriate content in explicit reasoning and planning processes and as a basis for action. I argue that this type of inner disposition account will also apply to most other common sense attitudes. The result is a realism about commonsense belief-desire psychology that is more modest than Fodor's: While such inner dispositions probably do exist, these states will probably not be the main focus of scientific psychological theories.     

The non-epistemic explanation of religious belief

Conclusion The preceding two sections have considered, respectively, the discreditation of psychological belief, and of propositional belief, which begins with the claim that a belief possessed by some person is non-epistemically explicable and ends with the claim that that person is unreasonable or that that belief is (probably) false. Obviously, only certain strategies of discreditation were discussed, and those only partially. But if the examples of discrediting strategies were representative, and the remarks made about them were correct, what, if anything, follows?It seems clear that the sheer fact that a person's belief is non-epistemically explicable entails very little if anything about the person's reasonability in holding it or the probable falsehood of the belief in question. Nor does the fact that a basic belief is held without reason or grounds seem to speak against the rationality of its believer - not at least with respect to the sort of propositions we called structural. It does not follow that one cannot rationally assess competing structural beliefs - that is another, and given the present argument an entirely open, question. It does seem correct that the more restrictive axioms of the ethics of properly held basic beliefs are ill-suited to deal responsibly with the acceptance of structural propositions. And at least some religious propositions - God exists among them - seem to me to be of that sort. Of course, that raises the question of what, exactly, a structural proposition is - which, again, is another topic.If the argument of this essay is correct, the shift from considering whether some particular (and perhaps idiosyncratic) person is reasonable in accepting some proposition, in cases where this is an interesting and debateable matter, to whether (on the whole) this proposition is one that can be accepted without rendering oneself unreasonable, seems to be an issue usually not capable of rational resolution without engaging in some sort of direct assessment of the proposition believed, and the strategy of trying to escape this by considering whether a person's acceptance of that proposition can be non-epistemically explained seems, on the whole, not a profitable enterprise. Further, often, at least, it can be countered in one or another of the ways we considered in the preceding two sections. So I am inclined to view the attempt to settle interesting debates about whether a person is reasonable in accepting a proposition by arguing that his acceptance is non-epistemically explicable as, on the whole, a failure.If anything, things are worse, so far as I can see, for attempts to argue from the fact that a person's belief is non-epistemically explicable to the conclusion that it is probably false. For, again, this argument has force only if the fact that this person's acceptance of it is non-epistemically explicable is not idiosyncratic, and this is establishable, often at least, only by appealing to the results of a direct assessment of the proposition believed (or by offering a judgment on this matter without benefit of any assessment, which of course is worthless). Nor, of course, is the nonepistemic explicability of a person's belief that P sufficient to discredit the person, let alone P, and the sorts of properties that are often alleged to accompany non-epistemically explicable beliefs seem either in fact not to accompany them, or to accompany only a basically irrelevant and uninteresting sub-set of them, or not to be such as to make falsehood of the propositions whose belief they accompany probable.A final comment These remarks, at best, scratch the surface of a difficult and complex topic. It is a topic on which, so far as I am aware, not a great deal has been written. My hope is that what I have said here may stimulate sufficient interest in the topic for others to provide a further exploration of the issues that I have here only been able to highlight.