财富与德性——亚当·斯密论“美好生活”

亚当·斯密的生活哲学是当前斯密思想研究的新话题,而对“美好生活”内涵的阐释,构成了斯密生活哲学的主要内容。斯密从“财富”“道德”“美德”三重维度阐释了“美好生活”的具体内涵。斯密认为,商业社会中的商品交换和劳动分工所带来的财富的增长和普及构成了“美好生活”的基本物质前提。在此基础上,人们在追求“财富”的过程中,不能偏废“德性”。“德性”具有关于普通品德的“道德”和关于高尚品德的“美德”的双重内涵。鉴于此,“美好生活”既可以是“财富”与“道德”的统一,也可以是“财富”与“美德”的统一。     

论亚当·斯密同情理论的发生机制

18世纪的英国道德哲学家亚当·斯密构建了以同情为基础的道德哲学体系,试图解决道德判断的本质问题,他尤其凸显了想象在整个同情过程中发挥的关键作用。以往的研究者们大都已经注意到了这一点,但本文旨在通过深入阐述想象在情感传递中的运作机理,进而更清晰地呈现斯密同情理论的发生机制。"公正的旁观者"在斯密的同情发生机制中扮演着最终审判者的角色,它是斯密在经验观察的基础上抽象出的一个理想概念,也是斯密追求道德判断客观化的一个逻辑结果。     

愤恨、惩罚与正义——亚当·斯密惩罚理论的一种解读

愤恨是人性中必不可少的组成部分.在斯密看来,这种通常似乎令人憎恶的激情,其基于合宜性的表达却成为捍卫社会正义与平等的心理机制.作为立即和直接促使人们去惩罚的情感,尽管需要怀疑其合理性,但合宜的愤恨不仅成为社会惩罚的基础,也是正义的保证.它所确立的正义感,肯定惩罚的正当性而确认正义的法则体系,其所衍生的功过赏罚的报偿结构,也将促成人性的完善和社会公正的实现.     

道德与美德辨析

功利与道义、责任与义务、规范与自由、必须与应该、他律与自律等等,一直是伦理学难以达成共识的根本性问题,追溯其根源,却缘于道德与美德相混淆。因而,辨析道德与美德而使之各归本位,这是推进伦理学前进的认知前提。客观论之,道德属于他律,是人人必须遵守的社会规范,所以,道德是功利的,它以自我利益持守为出发点,以权利与责任对等为基本原则,以实现个人利益为直接目的。道德是美德的基础,因而,美德属于自律,是对道德的卓越,是人人应该响应的社会倡导,所以,美德是道义的,它以自我利益放弃或超越为起步,以无私利他为基本准则,以履行责任之外的义务来增进他者利益为展开方式,以实现个性张扬和精神自由为直接目的。     

公民美德:特征及其意义

公民身份的政治和公共特性决定了公民美德不仅是一种政治美德,它还是公民个体在社会公共生活中应该具备的具有示范意义的公共性美德.政治性与公共性是公民美德的基本特性.作为一种身份美德,公民美德能够使个体以公民之立场理解并参与公共事务,创造并服务于公共利益,支持个体完成公民分内之事,从而自觉地维系公民身份,并确保公民所属政治共同体之发展与凝聚.     

论美德的特征及其意义

人们似乎认为,在以公域为主的时代,对人们的道德要求就是遵守普遍的社会法律规范和社会管理规范,个人的美德就是与这些普遍规范相适应的欲望、情感、气质、性格,它只具有一种工具性的价值。实际上,美德是人的一种内在价值,本身就是善。美德是心灵品质的优秀状态,是理智、情感、欲望相互渗透、融合、化通的状态。塑造美德是对人生意义的创造;美德中内涵着对行为对错的判断力,有着社会正义原则的普遍维度。     

区域美德与道德资源建设——以山东省聊城市改革开放以来的道德模范人物为例

改革开放以来,山东省聊城市产生了以孔繁森、张海迪、季羡林、徐本禹、白云等为代表的一大批在全省、全国具有重要影响的道德人物,直接促进了山东省乃至全国的道德建设。他们崇高道德品质的形成既有传统地域文化的影响,也有时代精神的呼唤,还有自身的人生磨练,更离不开成长过程中党和组织的培养。重视区域性道德模范人物的发掘和总结,加强对区域性道德模范人物的道德品质的研究,赋予其新的时代内涵,强化地方政府的投入和引导是将区域美德转化为有效道德资源的途径。     

道德心理：美德伦理学的反思与诉求

随着当代美德伦理学和心理科学的发展,道德心理问题的地位日益凸显.只有恰当的道德心理设计,才能支持道德理论的规范性要求.因此,伦理学的关键在于论证足以支撑道德要求、促使行为者采取正确行动的心理基础和心理资源.在当代美德伦理学看来,规则伦理以"义务感"为基本的道德心理,具有盲目性和单调性.对此,美德伦理学认为,应当充分意识到道德心理的多样性,意识到行为主体的个人因素的扰动作用,意识到道德心理其实与行为者的生活处境和生活追求密切相关.恰当运用各种心理资源以应对不同的道德情形,正是美德伦理学在道德心理问题上给我们的启示.     

就美德伦理的现代意义与万俊人教授商榷——以麦金太尔美德伦理思想为中心

在《美德伦理的现代意义》一文中,万俊人教授认为麦金太尔的美德伦理是在现代性道德文化语境内部对现代性进行反思。这不仅在根本上误读了麦金太尔的思想,而且基于此种误读寻求的美德伦理的现代意义掩盖了美德伦理原本应该具有的重大现实意义。本文试图通过对万俊人教授文中的核心观点进行辨析,阐明麦金太尔的美德伦理是跳出现代性道德概念框架,站在整个西方道德文化传统的立场上对现代性进行反思,并以此为基础揭示美德伦理的现代意义:对现代性道德概念框架本身进行批判反思,并指出一种符合人类道德生活客观实际的道德探究方法,即美德伦理探究方法。     

环境美德伦理学视阈中的正确行动理论

引导行为者做出保护环境的正确行动是环境伦理学的首要任务,但正确行动理 论在环境美德伦理学中尚未引起足够重视。后果主义环境伦理学将正确行动诉诸最好的或足 够好的后果;义务论环境伦理学将正确行动解释为普遍化的道德规则;而环境美德伦理学从 美德角度来界定正确行动。整体而言,环境美德伦理学语境下的正确行动理论呈现出多样化 的研究态势,但同时还面临着“人类中心主义”“循环论证”以及“不确定性”等质疑。 澄清这些疑点,有助于推进环境美德伦理学研究的深入。     

Virtue in Virtue Ethics

This paper represents two polemics. One is against suggestions (made by Harman and others) that recent psychological research counts against any claim that there is such a thing as genuine virtue (Cf. Harman, in: Byrne, Stalnaker, Wedgwood (eds.) Fact and value, pp 117–127, 2001). The other is against the view that virtue ethics should be seen as competing against such theories as Kantian ethics or consequentialism, particularly in the specification of decision procedures.     

Virtue and Salience

This paper explores two ways in which evaluations of an agent's character as virtuous or vicious are properly influenced by what the agent finds salient or attention-grabbing. First, we argue that ignoring salient needs reveals a greater deficit of benevolent motivation in the agent, and hence renders the agent more blameworthy. We use this fact to help explain our ordinary intuition that failing to give to famine relief (for example) is in some sense less bad than failing to help a child who is drowning right before your eyes, in a way that's compatible with the contention that there's no principled reason to see the one life-saving act as any more or less choiceworthy than the other. Second, we argue that alleged ‘virtues of ignorance’ (modesty, believing better of friends than the evidence supports, etc.) are better understood as ‘virtues of salience’. Rather than placing demands on what we believe, these virtues place demands on what we find salient.     

Virtue and Arguers

Is a virtue approach in argumentation possible without committing the ad hominem fallacy? My answer is affirmative, provided that the object study of our theory is well delimited. My proposal is that a theory of argumentative virtue should not focus on argument appraisal, as has been assumed, but on those traits that make an individual achieve excellence in argumentative practices. An agent-based approach in argumentation should be developed, not in order to find better grounds for argument appraisal, but to gain insight into argumentative habits and excellence. This way we can benefit from what a virtue argumentation theory really has to offer.     

Virtue and Continence

John McDowell argued that the virtuous person (VP) knows no temptation: her perception of a situation silences all competing motivations – be it fear in the face of danger or a strong desire. The VP cannot recognize any reason to act non-virtuously as a reason, and is never inclined to act non-virtuously. This view rests on the requirement that the VP rationally respond, and not merely react, to the environment – it rests on the requirement that the relation between the VP and the world (ethical requirements) must rule out the possibility that the VP is a brain in a vat. I will argue that the opposite is true: virtue requires a sensitivity to temptation. The VP, as such, must be able to recognize reasons for performing non-virtuous actions as reasons, and be inclined to perform them. She must find nothing human alien. This is so because the VP must possess the ability to understand non-virtuous agents, and understanding necessarily involves vulnerability to temptation. Otherwise, it will be argued, the VP views the actions of others as determined from outside the space of reasons. But the VP, like any other person, must have the ability to view the actions of others as rational responses to the environment, not only as reactions to it. Put differently, the VP’s view of others must rule out the possibility that they are brains in a vat – the possibility that their actions are merely caused, rather than justified, by the facts. Finally, it will be suggested that an amended conception of the VP can meet both requirements: view others as rationally responsive to the world, without relinquishing its relation to the facts.

德性与善

从根本上说,德性不仅是完成人们的内在利益所必需的品格,同时也是有益于整体生活的善的品格。德性作为一种品格,它在成就人的至善行为中能稳定和促进人的向善能力。