Why Take Both Boxes?

The crucial premise of the standard argument for two‐boxing in Newcomb's problem, a causal dominance principle, is false. We present some counterexamples. We then offer a metaethical explanation for why the counterexamples arise. Our explanation reveals a new and superior argument for two‐boxing, one that eschews the causal dominance principle in favor of a principle linking rational choice to guidance and actual value maximization.     

Teleological reasoning in infancy: the nai;ve theory of rational action

Converging evidence demonstrates that one-year-olds interpret and draw inferences about other's goal-directed actions. We contrast alternative theories about how this early competence relates to our ability to attribute mental states to others. We propose that one-year-olds apply a non-mentalistic interpretational system, the 'teleological stance' to represent actions by relating relevant aspects of reality (action, goal-state and situational constraints) through the principle of rational action, which assumes that actions function to realize goal-states by the most efficient means available. We argue that this early inferential principle is identical to the rationality principle of the mentalistic stance - a representational system that develops later to guide inferences about mental states.     

Second order inductive logic and Wilmers' principle

We extend the framework of Inductive Logic to Second Order languages and introduce Wilmers' Principle, a rational principle for probability functions on Second Order languages. We derive a representation theorem for functions satisfying this principle and investigate its relationship with the first order principles of Regularity and Super Regularity.     

A fregean principle

Frege held that the result of applying a predicate to names lacks reference if any of the names lack reference. We defend the principle against a number of plausible objections. We put forth an account of consequence for a first-order language with identity in which the principle holds     

关于道德原则的几点思考

信仰缺失、经济转型和文化变革,使信仰和道德从一元化走向了多元化,并引起了人们对道德的迷茫、沉思和渴求。在追求普遍适用道德原则的过程中,绝对主义把这种原则看成亘古不变的教条,而相对主义则否定这种原则的存在。我们认为,这种原则是存在的。它是绝对性与相对性的统一,是客观性与主观性的统一,是人们对历史必须性的一种表述形式。我们必须认真研究客观规律,才能总结出有价值的道德原则、范畴和规范。     

The implicit self and the specificity-matching principle: Implicit self-concept predicts domain-specific outcomes

According to the specificity-matching principle (Swann, Chang-Schneider, & McClarty, 2007), specific aspects of self-concept should predict domain specific outcomes, rather than broader outcomes. The purpose of the current study was to determine whether this principle, which has thus far been examined using explicit measures of the self, extends to the implicit self-concept. We tested this idea in the domain of math achievement. We observed that explicit math self-concept was correlated with specific outcomes (measures of math achievement), whereas explicit self-esteem was correlated with a broad outcome (satisfaction with life). Thus, we replicated the specificity-matching principle using explicit measures of self-esteem and self-concept. Moreover, we found that implicit self-concept was correlated with domain-specific outcomes, but not a global outcome, as the specificity-matching principle would predict. Furthermore, regression analyses indicated that implicit self-concept accounted for unique variance in the domain-specific outcomes, for which the other measures of the self could not account. Taken together, we conclude that the specificity-matching principle does indeed extend to the implicit self-concept.     

On Kim’s exclusion principle

In this paper we explore Jaegwon Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion. Kim’s support for the principle is clarified and we critically evaluate several versions of the dual explananda response authors have offered to undermine it. We argue that none of the standard versions of the dual explananda reply are entirely successful and propose an alternative approach that reveals a deep tension in Kim’s metaphysics. We argue that Kim can only retain the principle of explanatory exclusion if he abandons his longstanding critique of nonreductive physicalism.     

Dead People and the All-Affected Principle

Discussions of the all-affected principle as a solution to the boundary problem – how do we specify the group making democratic decisions? – have focused extensively on future people. We have yet to focus on dead people, however. This article tries to bridge this gap by arguing that the all-affected principle – i.e. the all actually affected interests principle – entails inclusion of dead people. This is true because dead people can be harmed or legally affected, and this is sufficient for having a claim to democratic inclusion. The last part of the article discusses where this leaves the all-affected principle in the quest for the proper boundary principle, including a discussion of possible institutional solutions to the enfranchisement of dead people.     

Historical Emissions and the Carbon Budget

How should the world's remaining carbon budget be divided among countries? We assess the role of a fault‐based principle in answering this question. Discussion of the role of historical emissions in dividing the global carbon budget has tended to focus on emissions before 1990. We think that this is in part because 1990 seems so recent, and thus post‐1990 emissions seem to constitute a lesser portion of historical emissions. This point of view was undoubtedly warranted in the early 1990s, when discussion of fault‐based principles in this context began. While this view still has some intuitive force, we find that it and the associated focus on pre‐1990 emissions are now out of date. Emissions since 1990 in fact constitute a large and rapidly increasing proportion of emissions since 1750 – approximately half of the carbon emissions due to fossil fuel use and cement production, at the time of writing. We show that a restricted fault‐based principle, according to which emissions should be divided among countries on the basis of their emissions since 1990, is both viable and powerful. We consider standard objections to a fault‐based principle in this context, how such a principle might more concretely be applied, and its likely implications.     

4-5岁幼儿数数行为的规则性与策略化应用特点的研究

本研究的主要目的是考察4-5岁儿童数数行为的规则性和策略化应用特点。研究选取了104名幼儿园中班儿童(年龄范围4-5岁),男女各半,采用现场实验法进行了逐一测查,测查任务为标准计数任务和数字复制任务。结果发现:4-5岁儿童的数数行为已经遵循一些数数规则,如固定顺序原则、一一对应原则和基数原则;但该年龄段的儿童还不会自发地把数数作为问题解决的策略应用于比较两组物体数目的问题上。     

On the minimal relative motion principle—lateral displacement of a contracting bar

Xausa, Beghi, and Zanforlin (J. Math. Psychol. 45(4) (2001) 635) provide an account of perceptual organization based on their ‘minimal relative motion’ principle. They claim that this principle can account for the percept generated by a contracting bar that is simultaneously translating laterally. We critique the mathematical analysis provided in the aforementioned paper. We conclude that the ‘minimal relative motion’ principle, in the form presented, cannot adequately explain the percept reported by observers.     

Ethical Principles and the Communication of Forensic Mental Health Assessments

Our premise is that ethics is the essence of good forensic practice and that mental health professionals must adhere to the ethical principles, standards, and guidelines of their professional bodies when they communicate their findings and opinions. We demonstrate that adhering to ethical principles can improve the quality of forensic reports and communications. We demonstrate this by focusing on the most basic principles that underlie professional ethical standards and guidelines, namely, Fidelity and Responsibility, Integrity, Respecting Rights and Dignity of Persons, and Justice and Fairness. For each principle we offer a brief definition and explain its demands. Then we identify ways in which the principle can guide the organization, content, or style of forensic mental health report writing, offering illustrative examples that demonstrate or abuse the principle.     

癫痫的诊治与人文思想

癫痫是神经科常见的疾病之一,对于患者的学习、生活和工作均有不同程度影响。它的发病机制尚不十分清楚,主要是以药物治疗为主。在癫痫的诊断中要根据病情和患者的实际情况选择合适的检查;在癫痫的治疗中须按照最优化的医疗原则选择最佳的治疗方案。在治疗中要注意结合人文思想来提高癫痫的治疗效果。     

脊柱侧弯手术治疗进展

随着医学技术的发展,脊柱侧弯的治疗方法也在不断的进步。针对其治疗方法的改变,提出以下思考和分析：（1）脊柱侧弯的治疗方法遵循着螺旋式上升,曲折式前进的发展过程;（2）运用适度原则和最优化原则,为患者制定个体化治疗方案;（3）运用运动发展的眼光即动态性原则来观察和解决脊柱侧弯手术治疗中存在的问题。     

Negative transfer in human associative learning

Models of attentional allocation in associative learning are typically structured according to one of two guiding principles: the predictiveness principle, which posits that attention is paid to cues that have reliably predicted an outcome in the past, or the uncertainty principle, which states that attention is paid to cues about which little is known. Both principles are well supported by studies of animals. However, in studies of human learning, there is very little direct empirical support for the uncertainty principle. In the study reported here, we addressed this gap by investigating negative transfer, a phenomenon that may provide unique support for the uncertainty principle. In two human learning experiments using an allergist task, we replicated the primary findings of previous research on animal learning. We believe that these data provide the first direct evidence for the uncertainty principle in human associative learning.     

Knowledge of counting principles: How relevant is order irrelevance?

Most children who are older than 6 years of age apply essential counting principles when they enumerate a set of objects. Essential principles include (a) one-to-one correspondence between items and count words, (b) stable order of the count words, and (c) cardinality—that the last number refers to numerosity. We found that the acquisition of a fourth principle, that the order in which items are counted is irrelevant, follows a different trajectory. The majority of 5- to 11-year-olds indicated that the order in which objects were counted was relevant, favoring a left-to-right, top-to-bottom order of counting. Only some 10- and 11-year-olds applied the principle of order irrelevance, and this knowledge was unrelated to their numeration skill. We conclude that the order irrelevance principle might not play an important role in the development of children’s conceptual knowledge of counting.     

Quantum mechanics and violations of the sure-thing principle: The use of probability interference and other concepts

The use of quantum mechanical concepts in social science is a fairly new phenomenon. This paper uses one of quantum mechanics’ most basic concepts, probability interference, to explain the violation of an important decision theory principle (the ‘sure-thing principle’). We also attempt to introduce other quantum mechanical concepts in relation to the sure-thing principle violation.     

Facteur d’impact et mondialisation culturelle

In the present article, we recall the principle of articles consummation as defined by the ISI creator (Institute for Scientific Information). That principle justifies the impact factor (IF) used as a measure of a journal scientific value, of a researcher or of a researcher group… We expose some assumptions that support the IF validity. Further we demonstrate that, on the one hand, these assumptions are not very well established and, on the other hand, that principle and the IF success bias the scientific activity. We consider next two shapes that this bias could take: at best a phenomenon of fashions, at worst, an ideological war having as purpose the American way of thinking domination.     

“Local determination”, even if we could find it,does not challenge free will: Commentary on Marcelo Fischborn

Marcelo Fischborn discusses the significance of neuroscience for debates about free will. Although he concedes that, to date, Libet-style experiments have failed to threaten “libertarian free will” (free will that requires indeterminism), he argues that, in principle, neuroscience and psychology could do so by supporting local determinism. We argue that, in principle, Libet-style experiments cannot succeed in disproving or even establishing serious doubt about libertarian free will. First, we contend that “local determination”, as Fischborn outlines it, is not a coherent concept. Moreover, determinism is unlikely to be established by neuroscience in any form that should trouble compatibilists or libertarians—that is, anyone who thinks we might have free will. We conclude that, in principle, neuroscience will not be able undermine libertarian free will and explain why these conclusions support a coherent compatibilist notion of causal sourcehood.