Redefining ‘Intrinsic’*

Several alleged counterexamples to the definition of ‘intrinsic’ proposed in Rae Langton and David Lewis,‘Defining “Intrinsic”’, are unconvincing. Yet there are reasons for dissatisfaction, and room for improvement. One desirable change is to raise the standard of non‐disjunctiveness, thereby putting less burden on contentious judgements of comparative naturalness. A second is to deal with spurious independence by throwing out just the disjunctive troublemakers, instead of throwing out disjunctive properties wholesale, and afterward reinstating those impeccably intrinsic disjunctive properties that are not troublemakers. (The second of these changes makes the first more affordable.) A third, suggested by Brian Weatherson, would be to invoke the general principle that the intrinsic and the extrinsic characters of things are independent, rather than relying just on one special case of this principle; but it is none too obvious how to do this.     

Intrinsicality without Naturalness

Rae Langton and David Lewis have proposed an account of "intrinsic property"that makes use of two notions: being independent of accompaniment and being natural. We find the appeal to the first of these promising; the second notion, however, we find mystifying. In this paper we argue that the appeal to naturalness is not acceptable and offer an alternative definition of intrinsicality. The alternative definition makes crucial use of a notion commonly used by philosophers, namely, the notion of one property being had in virtue of another property. We defend our account against three arguments for thinking that this "in virtue of"notion is unacceptable in this context. We also take a look at a variety of cases in which the definition might be applied and defend it against potential counterexamples. The upshot, we think, is a modest but adequate account of what we understand by "intrinsic property."     

PREDICTION AND PREDICATION

Nelson Goodman's own solution to his new riddle of induction turns on the degree to which predicates are entrenched in our use of language. However, this solution requires that judgements concerning the degree to which a predicate is entrenched can be made independently of any canon of perceptible similarity. I argue that this requirement cannot be met. The riddle itself depends upon the claim that since ‘green’ can be defined positionally in terms of ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’, ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’ are symmetrically related to ‘green’ and ‘blue’, and positionality is therefore ‘an entirely relative matter’. However, in order to establish that positionality is an entirely relative matter, we would need to provide a non-positional definition of ‘grue’, rather than a positional definition of ‘green’. We therefore need to decide whether ‘grue’ can be defined ostensively by means of a single sample, as ‘green’ can. I argue that any attempt to provide such a definition is bound to fail, and hence the new riddle of induction does not reveal that ‘the roots of inductive validity are to be found in our use of language’.     

The speech naturalness of people who stutter speaking under delayed auditory feedback as perceived by different groups of listeners

This study investigated listeners' perception of the speech naturalness of people who stutter (PWS) speaking under delayed auditory feedback (DAF) with particular attention for possible listener differences. Three panels of judges consisting of 14 stuttering individuals, 14 speech language pathologists, and 14 naive listeners rated the naturalness of speech samples of stuttering and non-stuttering individuals using a 9-point interval scale. Results clearly indicate that these three groups evaluate naturalness differently. Naive listeners appear to be more severe in their judgements than speech language pathologists and stuttering listeners, and speech language pathologists are apparently more severe than PWS. The three listener groups showed similar trends with respect to the relationship between speech naturalness and speech rate. Results of all three indicated that for PWS, the slower a speaker's rate was, the less natural speech was judged to sound. The three listener groups also showed similar trends with regard to naturalness of the stuttering versus the non-stuttering individuals. All three panels considered the speech of the non-stuttering participants more natural. EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES: The reader will be able to: (1) discuss the speech naturalness of people who stutter speaking under delayed auditory feedback, (2) discuss listener differences about the naturalness of people who stutter speaking under delayed auditory feedback, and (3) discuss the importance of speech rate for the naturalness of speech.     

Reasoning about complex probabilistic concepts in childhood

The competencies of children, particularly their understanding of the more complex probabilistic concepts, have not been thoroughly investigated. In the present study participants were required to choose the more likely of two events, a single event, and a joint event (conjunctive or disjunctive). It was predicted that the operation of the representativeness heuristic would result in erroneous judgements when children compared an unlikely component event with a likely-unlikely conjunction (the conjunction fallacy) and when a likely component event was compared to a likely-unlikely disjunction. The results supported the first prediction with both older children aged between 9 and 10 years and younger children aged between 4 and 5 committing the conjunction fallacy. However, the second prediction was not confirmed. It is proposed that the basis of representativeness judgements may differ between the conjunctive and disjunctive cases with absolute frequency information possibly playing a differential role.     

基于假设检验的项目相合性指标研究

在认知诊断评估中,评价认知模型与作答数据的拟合非常重要。已有的层级相合性指标(HCI)仅能用于评价连接规则下模型与数据的拟合情况,有必要研究分离规则下相合性指标。HCI假设某项目上正确作答,便推断其子项目上的错误作答为失拟。由于作答反应的随机性,提出基于假设检验的项目相合性指标。该指标可用于区分连接规则和分离规则的作答数据、评价Q矩阵质量和衡量作答数据中的噪音、还可为评价认知模型和选择认知诊断模型提供参考。     

Two routes to perspective: Simulation and rule‐use as approaches to mentalizing

We review evidence relating to children's ability to acknowledge false beliefs within a simulation account according to which our focus is set by default to the world as we know it: hence, our current beliefs assume salience over beliefs that do not fall into this category. The model proposes that the ease with which we imaginatively shift from this default depends on the salience of our current belief, relative to the salience of the belief that is being simulated. However, children do use a rule‐based approach for mentalizing in some contexts, which has the advantage of protecting them from the salience of their own belief. Rule‐based mentalizing judgements might be faster, cognitively easier and less prone to error, relative to simulation‐based judgements that are much influenced by salience. We propose that although simulation is primary, rule‐based approaches develop as a shortcut; we thus grow from individuals capable of using only simulation into individuals capable of both techniques.     

In defense of the disjunctive

Are there any disjunctive properties—features of things such as being either red or round, or Nelson Goodman’s infamous example of being grue (i.e. either green if observed on or before 2500 A.D. or blue otherwise)? As esoteric as the question may seem at first, central issues about the metaphysics of properties hinge upon its answer, such as whether reductive views about special science properties can handle the phenomenon of multiple realizability. A familiar argument for a negative answer is that disjunctive properties fail to guarantee that their instances are similar in some genuine respect. In this paper, I respond to a novel, sophisticated version of this argument developed in recent work by Paul Audi. Along the way, I develop two new accounts of what it is for a property to be disjunctive—which rely on important recent work on the nature of essence and analysis—and clarify what one is committed to in believing that there are any disjunctive properties at all.     

A little learning is a dangerous thing: an experimental demonstration of ignorance-driven inference

Studies of ignorance-driven decision making have been employed to analyse when ignorance should prove advantageous on theoretical grounds or else they have been employed to examine whether human behaviour is consistent with an ignorance-driven inference strategy (e.g., the recognition heuristic). In the current study we examine whether - under conditions where such inferences might be expected - the advantages that theoretical analyses predict are evident in human performance data. A single experiment shows that, when asked to make relative wealth judgements, participants reliably use recognition as a basis for their judgements. Their wealth judgements under these conditions are reliably more accurate when some of the target names are unknown than when participants recognize all of the names (a "less-is-more effect"). These results are consistent across a number of variations: the number of options given to participants and the nature of the wealth judgement. A basic model of recognition-based inference predicts these effects.     

Cueing the interpretation of a Necker Cube: a way to inspect fundamental cognitive processes

The term perceptual bistability refers to all those conditions in which an observer looks at an ambiguous stimulus that can have two or more distinct but equally reliable interpretations. In this work, we investigate perception of Necker Cube in which bistability consists of the possibility to interpret the cube depth in two different ways. We manipulated the cube ambiguity by darkening one of the cube faces (cue) to provide a clear cube interpretation due to the occlusion depth index. When the position of the cue is stationary the cube perceived perspective is steady and driven by the cue position. However, when we alternated in time the cue position (i.e. we changed the position of the darkened cube face) two different perceptual phenomena occurred: for low frequencies the cube perspective alternated in line with the position of the cue; however for high frequencies the cue was no longer able to bias the perception but it appears as a floating feature traveling across the solid with the cube whole perspective that returns to be bistable as in the conventional, bias-free, case.     

I can't believe this isn't wood! An investigation in the perception of naturalness

For most people “naturalness” is a highly appreciated material characteristic. For instance, a natural wooden floor is seen as more valuable than a fake replica, though they may be comparable in quality and durability. In the present study we investigated how sensory input (vision and touch) contributes to the perception of naturalness in wood. Participants rated samples of wood or imitations thereof, such as vinyl and veneers. We first attempted to provide a validation of the measurement of perceived naturalness by comparing four psychophysical measurement methods (labelled scaling, magnitude estimation, binary decision, and ranked ordering). Second, we investigated the contribution of vision and touch by measuring the perception of naturalness in three exploration modalities (vision only, touch only, and visuo-tactile). The results show a high degree of consistency across measurement methods, suggesting that we measured a common underlying construct that relates to naturalness. It also suggests that this construct is represented on a metathetic (categorical) continuum. Moreover, we found that both vision and touch are highly correlated predictors of visuo-tactile perception of naturalness.     

Cueing the interpretation of a Necker Cube: a way to inspect fundamental cognitive processes

The term perceptual bistability refers to all those conditions in which an observer looks at an ambiguous stimulus that can have two or more distinct but equally reliable interpretations. In this work, we investigate perception of Necker Cube in which bistability consists of the possibility to interpret the cube depth in two different ways. We manipulated the cube ambiguity by darkening one of the cube faces (cue) to provide a clear cube interpretation due to the occlusion depth index. When the position of the cue is stationary the cube perceived perspective is steady and driven by the cue position. However, when we alternated in time the cue position (i.e. we changed the position of the darkened cube face) two different perceptual phenomena occurred: for low frequencies the cube perspective alternated in line with the position of the cue; however for high frequencies the cue was no longer able to bias the perception but it appears as a floating feature traveling across the solid with the cube whole perspective that returns to be bistable as in the conventional, bias-free, case.     

A little learning is a dangerous thing: An experimental demonstration of ignorance-driven inference

Studies of ignorance-driven decision making have been employed to analyse when ignorance should prove advantageous on theoretical grounds or else they have been employed to examine whether human behaviour is consistent with an ignorance-driven inference strategy (e.g., the recognition heuristic). In the current study we examine whether—under conditions where such inferences might be expected—the advantages that theoretical analyses predict are evident in human performance data. A single experiment shows that, when asked to make relative wealth judgements, participants reliably use recognition as a basis for their judgements. Their wealth judgements under these conditions are reliably more accurate when some of the target names are unknown than when participants recognize all of the names (a “less-is-more effect”). These results are consistent across a number of variations: the number of options given to participants and the nature of the wealth judgement. A basic model of recognition-based inference predicts these effects.     

Holding an object one is looking at: Kinesthetic information on the object’s distance does not improve visual judgments of its size

Visual judgments of distance are often inaccurate. Nevertheless, information on distance must be procured if retinal image size is to be used to judge an object’s dimensions. In the present study, we examined whether kinesthetic information about an object’s distance—based on the posture of the arm and hand when holding it—influences the object’s perceived size. Subjects were presented with a computer simulation of a cube. This cube’s position was coupled to that of a rod in the subject’s hand. Its size was varied between presentations. Subjects had to judge whether the cube they saw was larger than, smaller than, or the same size as a reference. On some presentations, a small difference was introduced between the positions of the rod and of the simulated cube. When the simulated cube was slightly closer than the rod, subjects judged the cube to be larger. When it was farther away, they judged it to be smaller. We show that these changes in perceived size are due to alterations in the cube’s distance from the subject rather than to kinesthetic information.     

A new definition of well-behaved discrimination functions

A discrimination function shows the probability or degree with which stimuli are discriminated from each other when presented in pairs. In a previous publication [Kujala, J.V., & Dzhafarov, E.N. (2008). On minima of discrimination functions. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 52, 116–127] we introduced a condition under which the conformity of a discrimination function with the law of Regular Minimality (which says, essentially, that “being least discriminable from” is a symmetric relation) implies the constancy of the function’s minima (i.e., the same level of discriminability of every stimulus from the stimulus least discriminable from it). This condition, referred to as “well-behavedness,” turns out to be unnecessarily restrictive. In this note we give a significantly more general definition of well-behavedness, applicable to all Hausdorff arc-connected stimulus spaces. The definition employs the notion of the smallest transitively and topologically closed extension of a relation. We provide a transfinite-recursive construction for this notion and illustrate it by examples.     

A Logic for Disjunctive Ignorance

In this paper, we introduce a notion of ‘disjunctive ignorance’, which is a weak combination of two forms of ignorance in the literature. We propose a logical language with ‘disjunctive ignorance’ as a sole modality, explore the logical properties of this notion and its related notions, and axiomatize it over various frame classes. By finding suitable reduction axioms, we extend the results to the case of public announcements and apply it to Moore-like sentences.

     

Relativity of judgements about sound amplitude and the asymmetry of the same-different ROC

The problem of deciding whether two things are the same or different in magnitude can be solved by judging one magnitude relative to the other, or by making absolute judgements about the magnitude of each. The shape of the resulting receiver operating characteristic depends on which solution is adopted. In order to obtain empirical receiver operating characteristics, we therefore had subjects rate their confidence that two tone amplitudes were the same or different. Four subjects each made 500 ratings of three differences in amplitude. The asymmetry in the obtained characteristics indicated that subjects made relative rather than absolute judgements of the amplitudes, despite the fact that making absolute judgements would lead to better performance on the task.     

The Direction of Causation and the Direction of Time

It is, it seems, a fundamental fact that the future is due to the present, or, more mildly, is affected by the present, but the past is not. What does this mean? It is not clear and, if we try to make it clear, it turns into nonsense or a definition…     

Linguistic-pragmatic factors in interpreting disjunctions

' The connective or can be treated as an inclusive disjunction or else as an exclusive disjunction. Although researchers are aware of this distinction, few have examined the conditions under which each interpretation should be anticipated. Based on linguistic-pragmatic analyses, we assume that interpretations are initially inclusive before either (a) remaining so, or (b) becoming exclusive by way of an implicature (but not both). We point to a class of situations that ought to predispose disjunctions to inclusive interpretations and to situations that encourage exclusive interpretations. A disjunction's ultimate interpretation is based on its potential informativeness, where the interpretation of the disjunctive utterance having the smallest number of true conditions is considered most informative. Our investigation leads to five experiments employing arbitrary materials. Among the problems expected to encourage inclusive interpretations are those that present disjunctions in the antecedents of conditionals and in question forms. The best candidates to produce implicatures are those disjunctions that underdetermine an expected conjunctive conclusion, although other disjunctive utterances that are more informative as exclusive are discussed and tested.