元认知研究的理论意义

简要介绍了弗劳威尔、布朗等人的元认知理论和斯登伯格的元成份理论。这些理论的基本思想是一致的──重视认知主体对自身认知活动的计划、监控、评价和调节。元认知思想与皮亚杰的形式运算、自我调节以及平衡化思想有着深刻的内在一致性。而且,无认知的本质可以用控制论思想加以说明。     

On the inconclusiveness of “crucial” cognitive tests of dissonance versus self-perception theories

Several recent experiments are claimed to have tested conflicting predictions of cognitive dissonance and self-perception theories. It is argued that these claims fail to take into account the capacity of each formulation to account adequately for results “predicted” by the other. This argument is then continued, at a metatheoretical level, to reach the conclusion that the two theories are not capable of producing unequivocally contradictory predictions of cognitive consequences of experimental procedures.     

自发走神和有意走神及其与元认知的关系

走神包括有意走神和自发走神两种类型,元认知对二者的影响可能不同。研究使用两维度走神量表和元认知-30量表,对国内部分高校学生的走神和元认知(元认知信念、元认知加工和认知自信判断)进行调查,结果显示:(1)走神可以划分为有意走神和自发走神;(2)失控和危险感既能预测自发走神也能预测有意走神,但认知自信只能预测自发走神,认知的自我意识只能预测有意走神。说明元认知对自发走神和有意走神的影响存在差异。     

The Challenge-and-Response Model of Normal Anxiety

This article attempts to provide a conceptual framework placing anxiety in a personal growth perspective. The authors first discuss two different theories of anxiety, review some structural models of anxiety, and stress that anxiety should be studied as a certain kind of relation or interaction between the subject and her stimuli. Then a challenge-and-response model of normal anxiety of its cognitive components is established, which sorts anxiety into heteronomous one and autonomic one, and supposes that heteronomous anxiety includes two dimensions: the fall between the level of external challenge and the level of self challenge, and the importance of the external challenge. Some related evidences for the preceding hypothesis are examined, and then compared with related models. Finally, based on the model, a valid coping strategy of anxiety was put forward, from which the mechanism of normal coping style of anxiety in daily life can be well understood.     

Matters of conscience and conscientiousness: the place of ego development in the Five-factor model

The Five-factor model (FFM; Digman, 1990; Goldberg, 1990) and Loevinger's (1994) theory of ego development are two active research traditions that are often construed as incompatible approaches to the study of personality. For example, each theory proposes a different view of the concept of conscientiousness. Loevinger argued that FFM conscientiousness, which emphasizes attributes such as order, self-discipline, and achievement striving, lacks a moral component and is more similar to the conformist stage in her theory. To investigate these claims, we administered the Revised NEO-Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992) and the Washington University Sentence Completion Test (WUSCT; Hy & Loevinger, 1996) to 120 university students on 2 separate occasions. Together, the five traits of the FFM significantly predicted item sum scores from the WUSCT (multiple R = .54). Unique linear relationships of Openness to Experience and Agreeableness with ego level demonstrated that the two theories proposed similar constructs. We argue that these two FFM dimensions have conceptual relevance to the cognitive and interpersonal aspects of the ego development construct. We draw further connections between these FFM dimensions, ego development, and human values.     

Assessing Conversational Cognition Levels of Cognitive Theory and Associated Methodological Requirements

Despite the prominence of cognitively oriented research in interpersonal communication, relatively little is known about the interplay of cognitive and communicative processes during conversation. For interpersonal communication scholars or at least those interested in interaction, the study of cognition is most useful if it reveals how interactants produce, monitor, modify, and process messages while engaged in conversation. The failure to collect data about in-process conversational cognition is partially due to excessive reliance on what have been identified as “implementation level” cognitive theories and models. Such theories are primarily concerned with specifying cognitive “architectures” and provide little guidance about how cognition is adapted to conversational tasks. However, a dearth of methodological creativity is also partially to blame for the lack of data about in-process conversational cognition. On encountering the admittedly formidable methodological difficulties of collecting data about conversational cognition, researchers have tended to rely on traditional but inadequate methods, or worse, have simply ignored theoretical questions pertinent to cognition in-process. This article suggests that claims about cognition can be made at four levels—biological, implementation, algorithmic, and rational—but that theoretical claims about conversational cognition can most usefully be pursued at the rational and algorithmic levels. In an effort to promote more research at these levels, criteria for studying conversational cognition are proposed, and promising methods are reviewed.     

简单与复杂物理问题解决及状态元认知

本研究采用认知作业分析及问卷法,研究了中学生简单与复杂物理问题解决的表征机制及状态元认知结构。结果显示：(1)物理问题解决是对问题的表征状态不断转换的过程,其受认知主体信息的提取、转换、整合能力及状态元认知的影响;(2)中学生物理问题解决中的状态元认知主要由他的自我效能感、自我监测、策略系统三种成分构成;(3)复杂问题解决的关链是正确提取范畴性知识以形成对问题的深层表征。     

Ringing the changes: In tribute to Arthur R. Peacocke1

Justin Barrett's consideration of some challenges for religious belief raised by evolutionary and cognitive theories of religion was criticized by Howard Van Till for overstating tensions, mischaracterizing the most important epistemological issues, and proposing a solution that perpetuates war on evolution. We argue that each of these claims is untrue, and is not conducive to dialogue that constructively engages and attempts to resolve tensions between science and religion where they do exist.     

Emotions,Me, Myself and I

We are prone to think that the emotions someone undergoes are somehow revelatory of the sort of person she is, and philosophers working in the field have frequently insisted upon the existence of an intimate relation between a subject and her emotions. But how intimate is the relation between emotions and the self? I first explain why interesting claims about this relation must locate it at the level of emotional intentionality. Given that emotions have a complex intentional structure – they are about an object and evaluate it – this means that the relation between emotions and the self may take different shapes. My discussion focuses on three different claims about this relation. According to the first claim, all emotions are about the subject who undergoes them. The second claim appeals to a more moderate form of reflexivity and affirms that emotions always feature a representation of other psychological states of the subject. The third understands the relation between emotions and the self in evaluative terms: emotions are said to evaluate relationally, one of the terms of this relation being the subject who undergoes it. I argue that all three claims apply, at best, only to a limited subset of emotions and that they must sometimes give way to claims that do not presuppose any intentional connection between emotions and the self.     

New Horizons for a Theory of Epistemic Modals

Recent debate over the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic modals has focused on intuitions about cross-contextual truth-value assessments. In this paper, we advocate a different approach to evaluating theories of epistemic modals. Our strategy focuses on judgments of the incompatibility of two different epistemic possibility claims, or two different truth value assessments of a single epistemic possibility claim. We subject the predictions of existing theories to empirical scrutiny, and argue that existing contextualist and relativist theories are unable to account for the full pattern of observed judgments. As a way of illustrating the theoretical upshot of these results, we conclude by developing a novel theory of epistemic modals that is able to predict the results.     

Cognitive and AI models of reasoning

Although relatively few in number, cognitive neuroscience studies of reasoning have two general implications for cognitive theories of deduction. First, an important distinction among these theories is whether they focus on the effect of personally relevant content on the processes and representations underlying deductive reasoning. Evidence is reviewed indicating that there is a neuroanatomical basis for both content-independent and content-dependent theories of deduction. Clinical and neuroimaging studies appear to show that content-independent reasoning is mediated by the left hemisphere, whereas content-dependent reasoning is mediated by regions in the right hemisphere and the bilateral ventromedial frontal cortex. In normal subjects, reasoning is likely to be based on contributions from both hemispheres. Second, clinical evidence indicates that the visuospatial processes used in deductive reasoning are mediated by the posterior areas of the left hemisphere, and that verbal and visuospatial reasoning representations overlap at the neuroanatomical level. This finding weighs against the claims of mental-model theory that deduction involves a significant nonverbal component. Further investigation, particularly with contemporary neuroimaging methods, is needed to test these preliminary conclusions.     

Intelligence,Practice and Virtue: A Critical Review of the Educational Benefits of Expertise in Physical Education and Sport

The paper calls for a re-evaluation of physical education’s cognitive value claims, as this issue is fundamental to many of the conceptual difficulties the subject faces. Current epistemological challenges are reviewed before analysing the structural connections between intelligent practice and intelligent virtues, and the possibilities for physical education to better articulate its’ intrinsic and instrumental values claims. The paper evaluates arguments made on this basis and reviews revised curriculum planning and pedagogical practices, which could support an enhanced focus on learners’ wider aspirations and achievements; factors crucial for a virtuous life. While applauding enquiry into the possibilities for considering physical education as a moral endeavor, the paper raises concerns about conceptual clarity in intellectual and empirical accounts of virtue. The paper concludes by advocating further research on the interrelationship between intellectual and empirical accounts of skill, evaluation of learners’ decision-making and the aims of physical education and school sport programmes.     

The Strong-Tie Requirement and Objective-List Theories of Well-Being

Many philosophers with hedonistic sympathies (e.g., Mill, Sidgwick, Sumner, Feldman, Crisp, Heathwood, and Bradley) have claimed that well-being is necessarily experiential. Kagan once claimed something slightly different, saying that, although unexperienced bodily events can directly impact a person’s well-being, it is nonetheless true that any change in a person’s well-being must involve a change in her (i.e., either in her mind or in her body). Kagan elaborated by saying that a person’s well-being cannot float freely of her such that it is affected by events that do not affect her (Kagan 1992, 169–189). These two claims—that well-being is necessarily experiential and that changes in well-being must involve changes in the person—are two different ways of specifying the general intuition that a person’s well-being must be strongly tied to her. This general intuition imposes an adequacy constraint on welfare theorizing: To be adequate, a welfare theory cannot allow that someone can be directly benefited by events that are not strongly tied to her. Call this the strong-tie requirement. The strong-tie requirement is easily satisfied by welfare hedonism, but it poses problems for desire-fulfillment welfare theories and objective-list welfare theories. Though a great deal has been written about desire-fulfillment welfare theories in relation to the strong-tie requirement, not as much has been written about objective-list welfare theories in relation to the strong-tie requirement. This paper argues that objective-list welfare theories can satisfy the strong-tie requirement, though probably only if they take a perfectionist form, as opposed to a brute-list form.     

元认知训练的动机增强效应

如何激发学习动机是当前教育工作者、心理学研究者都很关注的一个问题。干预动机变量已经被证明是一种可行的方法,我们认为,认知干预也是激发学习动机的一种有效途径。为了检验这一假设,本研究对47名初二学生进行为期三周的数学元认知训练。差异显著性检验表明,在元认知训练中,被试的动机和元认知都有一定改善;路径分析进一步表明,元认知的改善导致了动机的改善。这一结论为动机激发这一现实问题提供了一条新思路,并且使我们对于元认知与动机的关系形成了更为全面的认识。     

The Ontology of Musical Versions: Introducing the Hypothesis of Nested Types

This article explores the ontological nature of musical versions. I assume the widespread view that type/token ontologies offer the best explanation of the repeatable nature of works of music. However, I show that traditional type/token theories, which distinguish only between two levels of objects, face two problems when applied to the phenomenon of musical versions. First, they are not able to accommodate the familiar intuition of our musical practices that the work versioned is repeated in its versions’ performances. Second, they are not able to distinguish between two different phenomena of our practices: the phenomenon of a work's versions and the phenomenon of works inspired by, or derived from, other works. These undesirable consequences are entailed, under traditional two‐level type/token theories, by the nature of types as ontologically thin entities. I defend that the hypothesis of nested types, a multiple‐level type/token theory, can avoid these two problems while preserving the theoretical virtues of traditional two‐level type/token theories and structural monism—the most widely shared view about the individuation of musical works, according to which musical works are individuated by one, and only one, sound structure.     

Contextual judgments of quality of life and adolescent cognitive development

This research explored the relationship between adolescents' level of cognitive reasoning and their contextual judgments of the factors affecting quality of life. In comparison to adolescents at relatively lower levels of cognitive development, it was predicted that those who have achieved higher levels of cognitive reasoning would be: (1) more likely to identify social and interpersonal aspects of life as factors related to quality of life and (2) less likely to identify self issues. Subjects were 443 tenth-grade students from four Michigan school districts. The students were administered the Reasoning Level Test (RLT) and also asked to identify the aspects of their lives that they felt were the most and least satisfying at the moment. A median split was performed and each student was assigned to either a high or low cognitive-level group based upon his/her RLT score. The findings supported the above predictions, but more so in regard to negative than positive factors. The findings are also in line with cognitive-developmental theories of adolescence and indicate that cognitive structures and the specific nature of the factors perceived to influence one's life may mediate contextual judgments of these factors.     

Different attentional blink tasks reflect distinct information processing limitations: an individual differences approach

To study the temporal dynamics and capacity-limits of attentional selection and encoding, researchers often employ the attentional blink (AB) phenomenon: subjects' impaired ability to report the second of two targets in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) stream that appear within 200-500 ms of one another. The AB has now been the subject of hundreds of scientific investigations, and a variety of different dual-target RSVP paradigms have been employed to study this failure of consciousness. The three most common are those where targets are defined categorically from distractors; those where target definition is based on featural information; and those where there is a set switch between T1 and T2, with the first target typically being featurally defined and T2 requiring a detection or discrimination judgment (probe task). An almost universally held assumption across all AB theories is that these three tasks measure the same deficit; however here, using an individual differences approach, we demonstrate that AB magnitude is only related across categorical and featural tasks. Thus, these paradigms appear to reflect a distinct cognitive limitation from that observed under set-switch conditions.     

A cognitive development framework

Prominent stage theories of cognitive development show evidence of a structure in which each stage contains a number of subsidiary levels. Comparisons of the stages in these theories have commonly been made through the established links with stages of Piaget’s theory. In response to Kagan’s criticism of Piaget’s theory, features of these developmental theories were used in this paper as the basis for a general framework of interactive stages and levels of cognitive operations. Some implications of the proposed framework in relation to cognitive development theories and directions for further research are examined. Further application of this framework could help to identify commonalities in cognitive operations across different contents, contexts and cultures.     

What will they say?—Public Announcement Games

The last two decades have seen a rising interest in (a) the notion of a scientific phenomenon as distinct from theories and data, and (b) the intricacies of experimentally producing and stabilizing phenomena. This paper develops an analysis of the stabilization of phenomena that integrates two aspects that have largely been treated separately in the literature: one concerns the skills required for empirical work; the other concerns the strategies by which claims about phenomena are validated. I argue that in order to make sense of the process of stabilization, we need to distinguish between two types of phenomena: phenomena as patterns in the data (“surface regularities”) and phenomena as underlying (or “hidden”) regularities. I show that the epistemic relationships that data bear to each of these types of phenomena are different: Data patterns are instantiated by individual data, whereas underlying regularities are indicated by individual data, insofar as they instantiate a data pattern. Drawing on an example from memory research, I argue that neither of these two kinds of phenomenon can be stabilized in isolation. I conclude that what is stabilized when phenomena are stabilized is the fit between surface regularities and hidden regularities.     

A cognitive development framework

Prominent stage theories of cognitive development show evidence of a structure in which each stage contains a number of subsidiary levels. Comparisons of the stages in these theories have commonly been made through the established links with stages of Piaget’s theory. In response to Kagan’s criticism of Piaget’s theory, features of these developmental theories were used in this paper as the basis for a general framework of interactive stages and levels of cognitive operations. Some implications of the proposed framework in relation to cognitive development theories and directions for further research are examined. Further application of this framework could help to identify commonalities in cognitive operations across different contents, contexts and cultures.