How to Feel Good Without Feeling Good About Yourself (or The Art of Living)

In this article, I will discuss three realities of the activating event (A) and argue the importance of making staying in the moment a key concept of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy. I will also discuss the unlikelihood of reaching personal happiness and inner peace with a concept of self-worth. I will then provide two equations for happiness that help us achieve the ultimate goal of inner peace and will virtually guarantee that we feel good without feeling good about ourselves.     

Without Intuitions

This paper criticizes Analytic philosophy with its reliance on intuitions in pursuit of conceptual analysis. Rejecting naturalism as an alternative philosophical method, I offer in its place a pragmatic and revisionary conception of philosophical method. I explain the method of Analytic philosophy and show why reliance on intuitions is essential to that method, which is unable to provide substantive answers to philosophical problems. I further show that reflective equilibrium or wide analysis requires some criterion of intuition choice and that this criterion can be applied directly to definitions themselves.     

Form Without Matter

Three different concepts of matter are identified: matter as what a thing is immediately made of, matter as stuff of a certain kind, and matter in the (dubious) sense of material 'substratum'. The doctrine of hylomorphism, which regards every individual concrete thing as being 'combination' of matter and form, is challenged. Instead it is urged that we do well to identify an individual concrete thing with its own particular 'substantial form'. The notions of form and matter, far from being correlative, are relatively independent. There is nothing absurd in the notion of form without matter . Matter provides neither a principle of individuation nor a criterion of identity for individual concrete things: their form alone provides both. Finally, a substance ontology which admits also the existence of particular qualities, or tropes, is to be preferred both to a substance ontology which denies the existence of tropes and to a pure trope ontology.     

Terminating Without Fatality

The psychoanalytic relationship is unique among intimate relationships, in that its ultimate goal is separation. After termination, the analysand mourns the loss of the analyst and while feeling vulnerable and bereft, faces demanding emotional tasks alone. The post-termination phase is a precarious time during which the hard-won gains of an analysis may be threatened or even lost. Given the analysand's vulnerability, it is disturbing that many of our common termination practices may undermine the patient's leave-taking and harm the positive internal images of the analyst and the analytic relationship that have been forged during the analysis. Findings from recent research about the patient's experience after analysis are presented and implications are drawn for practice regarding the termination and post-termination phases. The author recommends that our theory and technique of termination should be reexamined and revised in light of new research and within the context of contemporary two-person theories of psychoanalysis.

In real life, only death and hostility bring a libidinal relationship to an end. The kind of termination psychoanalysis demands is without precedent.

—Martin Bergmann (1997, p. 163)     

Language Without Linguistics

Synthese - Though Mr. Lin purports to attack “Chomsky's view of language” and to defend the “common sense view of language”, he in fact attacks “views” that...     

Argumentation Without Arguments

A well-known ambiguity in the term ‘argument’ is that of argument as an inferential structure and argument as a kind of dialogue. In the first sense, an argument is a structure with a conclusion supported by one or more grounds, which may or may not be supported by further grounds. Rules for the construction and criteria for the quality of arguments in this sense are a matter of logic. In the second sense, arguments have been studied as a form of dialogical interaction, in which human or artificial agents aim to resolve a conflict of opinion by verbal means. Rules for conducting such dialogues and criteria for their quality are part of dialogue theory. Usually, formal accounts of argumentation dialogues in logic and artificial intelligence presuppose an argument-based logic. That is, the ways in which dialogue participants support and attack claims are modelled as the construction of explicit arguments and counterarguments (in the inferential sense). However, in this paper formal models of argumentation dialogues are discussed that do not presuppose arguments as inferential structures. The motivation for such models is that there are forms of inference that are not most naturally cast in the form of arguments (such as abduction, statistical reasoning and coherence-based reasoning) but that can still be the subject of argumentative dialogue. Some recent work in artificial intelligence is discussed which embeds non-argumentative inference in an argumentative dialogue system, and some general observations are drawn from this discussion.