Colour, world and archimedean metaphysics: stroud and the quest for reality

This paper proposes a fundamentally opposite conception of the possibility of metaphysics to that of Barry Stroud in The Quest for Reality and other writings. I discuss Stroud’s views on everyday ‚truth’ and metaphysics (Section 1), on interpretation (Section 2 – replying with a theory of ‚quasi-understanding’), and his ‚no threat’ claim (Section 3). But the main argument (Section 4) is a response to Stroud’s claim that we have no right either to affirm or to deny the metaphysical reality of colours. Stroud’s view resembles Carnap’s (1950, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4, 20–40), that experience can in some sense never settle the metaphysical issue between e.g. materialism, idealism and phenomenalism; though we can allow everyday ‚knowledge’ e.g. that there is a fallen tree in the garden outside, as something available on all three views. (Carnap takes the undecidability as a sign that the metaphysical issue is a pseudo-question; Stroud insists it is factual, but places it beyond our ken, ‚external’.) I argue, instead, that metaphysical argument is possible from within our conceptual scheme and epistemic situation (as in Gareth Evans’s arguments for realism over phenomenalism); that ‚external’ and ‚internal’ questions cannot be separated as Stroud wishes; and that if we really were denied knowledge on ‚metaphysical’ matters, that would infect our right to claim knowledge of ‚observational’ matters too. And I sketch a theory of colour that would allow us to conclude (at once ‚metaphysically’ and ‚internally’) that things are indeed ‚really’ coloured. For all his expressions of sympathy for Wittgenstein, Stroud’s metaphysics is remarkably Cartesian.     

Reply to Commentaries

In our response, we address four themes arising from the commentaries. First, we discuss the distinction between cognition and metacognition and show how to draw it within our framework. Next, we explain how metacognition differs from social cognition. The underlying mechanisms of metacognitive development are then elucidated in terms of interaction patterns. Finally, we consider measures of metacognition and suitable methods for investigating it. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reply to benjamin

Action and insight form an essential dialectic within the psychoanalytic process. Yet many recent psychoanalytic formulations, while emphasizing integration, have continued to view psychoanalytic and action‐oriented techniques dichotomously. It is reasoned that certain behavioral‐cognitive techniques that promote adaptive behavior can become an active part of an in‐depth analytic experience, providing material for an exploration that results in new ways not only of relating but also of experiencing the self and others. Such an approach, while at times helpful to certain patients, can be counterproductive for others. An integrative approach is compatible with many recent psychoanalytic frameworks emphasizing a two‐person psychology, but not with a one‐person vision of the psychoanalytic situation; in the two‐person view, it is reasoned that an integrative approach is capable of maintaining the integrity of the analytic process. The outlined technique reflects a relational psychoanalytic orientation emphasizing internalized object relations, with the use of action‐oriented techniques organized by the superordinate goal of modifying psychic structure, conceptualized principally in terms of self‐ and object‐representations. Reasoning that this approach is congruent with certain theoretical contributions from Gill, Mitchell, Sandier, and especially Wachtel, among others, I state underlying assumptions of the approach, preliminary technical guidelines, and illustrative case material.     

Reply to Commentaries

In reply to my discussants, I take up their questions on the subjects of foolishness, the analyst's dreams, and the unnamed patient. My responses to them bring me back to my own father to ask questions that had not been asked yet about my mother's release; back to the return of my patient after years of absence, and the additional history I learned then; and back to Lacan's seminar and my Lacanian analytic training to question that approach to the treatment of madness.     

Reply to Commentary

In my reply to Dr. Philip Ringstrom, I acknowledge our mutual understanding of some of the impasses that we face in working with couples, particularly those whom Ringstrom describes as reflecting characteristics of “mutual inductive identification.” I reemphasize the role of the implicit domain in these and further elaborate ideas about why couples presenting in this way are so difficult to impact. These include the ways in which the brain is organized around prediction and problems in the ability to metacommunicate. I then discuss some clinical interventions to address this.     

Reply to Commentaries

In my response to the commentaries, I take up Dr. Cushman's concerns about my use of the term “empathy,” grounding my use in the term's changing definitions over time. I take up Dr. Harris's concerns by elaborating on my views about the complexity of identifications and the fluidity of both subjective agency and power structures.     

Reply to Commentaries

The following response to discussions by Benjamin and by Fonagy and Target focuses on several issues raised, including linearity versus multiplicity in the assessment of developmental capacities, the complex interplay of shame and subjectivity in an intersubjective field, the notion of surrender in resolving therapeutic impasse, and some thoughts on the concept of the third, as they are exemplified in this case material.