信息表征形式对初中生解决MHD问题的影响

研究以经典MHD问题作为实验任务,通过两个实验分别探讨了心理模型表征与条件关系表征、以及文字表述辅以图形的表征对初中生解决MHD问题的影响.结果发现:(1)心理模型表征与明确选手行为与主持人行为之间的条件关系表征都没有有效促进被试解决MHD问题;(2)文字表述辅以图形的表征显著提高了被试MHD问题的推理成绩.这似乎说明对初中生而言,适当的信息表征形式有助于促进其解决MHD问题.     

决策任务反应模式对偏好反转的影响

在经典彩票问题研究的基础上,探讨了匹配和选择两种反应模式及其先后顺序对被试偏好反转的影响,以及被试性别与其偏好反转的关系。研究结果发现:(1)反应模式的变化导致偏好反转的发生;(2)偏好反转存在反应顺序效应,先匹配后选择条件下的偏好反转率显著大于先选择后匹配条件下的偏好反转率;研究结果不支持后悔理论;(3)不同性别被试在选择和匹配任务中的偏好及其反转率没有显著性差异。     

陌生人印象偏好的实验研究

以80名大学女生为被试,在关系自我理论的框架下,采用移情研究的双时段范式,以实验法考察了关系自我和重要他人对于陌生人印象偏好的影响。结果发现：在无提示的条件下,与重要他人相似的陌生人得到更多的印象偏好;在有提示的条件下,这种由相似性而产生的偏好会显著降低。证明了重要他人对陌生人印象偏好的影响,并讨论了关系自我在其中发挥的中介作用。     

不同视角条件下条件推理任务和选择任务的反应模式

在不同视角条件下,要求被试先后完成选择任务和条件推理任务,考察被试在不同视角条件下对两种任务的反应模式。实验结果表明,提供强制情境下对立角色违反规则的信息时,两种任务的反应模式没有明显的关联;提供非强制情境下的反例信息时,两种任务的反应模式出现分离趋势;当对规则的语义关系进行充分非必要或必要非充分关系的解释时,两者又趋于一致。分析表明,被试采用多种策略完成选择任务,而是否采用条件推理的逻辑取决于特定情境能否激活这种逻辑。     

学习方式对关系类别间接性学习的影响

以96名大学生为被试,以4特征虚拟外星生物为实验材料,通过类别的间接性学习,探讨学习方式对关系类别间接性学习的影响,结果发现：类别的间接性学习条件下,限定分类任务中,被试更倾向于选择关系作为类标准;参照条件下被试限定分类结果与标准的关系类别的分类结果的杰卡德相似性显著高于个人条件;被试分类结果的简单关系类别的杰卡德相似性显著高于复杂关系类别的杰卡德相似性,4特征关系类别的间接性学习中存在单一性效应。     

时距估计任务中的间断期望效应

使用单任务研究程序,采用引入提示线索的方法,以产生时距作为反应指标对存在间断的时距估计任务中的间断期望效应和提示线索效应（注意效应）进行系统考察,并对间断时距的效应、产生时距与等待时距的关系问题作出进一步探讨。结果表明,间断位置（等待时距）因素是被试时间判断的主要线索,被试的产生时距随着等待时距的增加而延长。间断实验中表现出极其显著的提示线索效应,此效应既增加了时距估计的变异,又延长了被试的时距估计。无间断实验条件下,被试表现出显著的间断期望效应,被试对间断的期望有损于时间估计。     

参照性交流对关系类别间接性学习的促进作用

以大学生为被试,以4特征虚拟外星生物为实验材料,采用类别的间接性学习范式——个人条件和参照条件,及一个无功能条件,通过三个实验任务（功能预测、自由分类和维度选择）,探讨参照性交流范式下关系类别的间接性学习特点。结果发现：类别的间接性学习条件下,自由分类任务中,被试更倾向于选择关系作为类标准;功能预测的关系类别的间接性学习过程中,参照条件下的功能预测成绩显著高于个人条件,这种差异体现在参照惯例形成的学习过程的中后期;关系类别的间接性学习条件下,参照条件下被试的选择性注意水平显著高于个人条件,这种差异主要表现于选择性注意的指向性方面,而不体现于选择性注意的集中性（对无关维度的抑制）方面。     

内源性眼跳前的空间注意转移

采用线运动错觉(illusory line motion)测量的单任务范式,以色块为眼跳提示刺激,用三个实验对内源性眼跳前是否存在空间注意转移进行了探讨。实验一要求被试将眼睛跳往提示刺激处,通过对线运动错觉的分析确定该条件下的空间注意转移规律;实验二要求被试在将视线保持在注视点处的条件下判断目标色块是否出现,以探明线运动错觉是否受对目标色块前注意阶段加工的影响;实验三要求被试将眼睛跳往提示刺激的对侧,分析眼跳位置与提示刺激空间方位的一致性对空间注意转移的影响。获得以下主要结果：(1)内源性眼跳前存在注意转移;(2)在视线保持在注视点处的条件下,注意未受对提示刺激前注意加工的引导;(3)眼跳目标位置与提示目标位置的空间一致性对眼跳前空间注意转移无显著影响。     

任务设置影响负相容效应的机制——自上而下认知控制对阈下启动信息加工的影响

结合掩蔽启动范式和Go-Nogo范式,考察了任务设置影响负相容效应的机制。实验中以指向左或右的双箭头为掩蔽启动项,在两个Block中的Go试次中分别以箭头和汉字为目标项,要求被试对箭头或汉字做辨别反应,Nogo试次中不呈现目标项,被试无需反应。结果发现:Go试次中,只有在箭头任务设置下才出现负相容效应,脑电结果表现为一致条件下P3潜伏期显著长于不一致条件;Nogo试次中,箭头任务设置下的P3波幅显著大于汉字任务设置下的P3波幅。说明负相容效应受到任务设置这种自上而下认知控制过程的影响,且这种影响发生在阈下启动信息加工阶段。支持注意敏化模型,提示可以在更普遍的角度上理解负相容效应。     

强弱语义语境下的否定句加工机制

2个眼动实验分别探讨强弱语义语境下的否定句加工机制, 以便考察语言理解是命题表征的过程还是经验模拟的过程, 抑或是二者兼具。在实验中, 被试首先听句子(强语义语境：如“胳膊不是弯曲的”的备择选项为“伸直的胳膊”, 其中“弯曲−伸直”为具有反义关系的强语义连接关系; 弱语义语境：如加工“裙子不是蓝色的”的备择选项为“黑色的裙子”, “蓝色−黑色”为弱语义连接关系), 然后会看到4张同时呈现的图片, 被试的任务是按键选择与句子描述匹配的图片。结果发现, 在强语义语境条件下, 被试在早期(201~600 ms时窗)对描述事件否定状态的图片(弯曲的胳膊)与描述事件实际状态的图片(伸直的胳膊)的注视概率没有差别, 晚期(601 ms后)仅对描述事件实际状态的图片的注视概率更高; 弱语义语境条件下, 被试在早期(401~600 ms)仅对描述事件否定状态的图片(蓝裙子)注视概率更高, 晚期(801 ms后)仅对描述事件实际状态的图片(黑色裙子)注视概率更高; 并且, 都对描述事件否定状态的图片的注视概率低于随机水平。结果支持符号依存假设和抑制假设。     

A randomised Monty Hall experiment: The positive effect of conditional frequency feedback

The Monty Hall dilemma (MHD) is a notorious probability problem with a counterintuitive solution. There is a strong tendency to stay with the initial choice, despite the fact that switching doubles the probability of winning. The current randomised experiment investigates whether feedback in a series of trials improves behavioural performance on the MHD and increases the level of understanding of the problem. Feedback was either conditional or non-conditional, and was given either in frequency format or in percentage format. Results show that people learn to switch most when receiving conditional feedback in frequency format. However, problem understanding does not improve as a consequence of receiving feedback. Our study confirms the dissociation between behavioural performance on the MHD, on one hand, and actual understanding of the MHD, on the other. We discuss how this dissociation can be understood.     

动机的概率意义——概率归并定理与Monty Hall问题的非贝叶斯解

本文探讨Monty Hall问题认知困惑的形成因素。通过对该问题数学结构的分析,导出一个与该问题的解密切相关的定理——概率归并定理;并依据该定理给出了Monty Hall问题的一种更直观的数学解。     

Baumann on the Monty Hall problem and single-case probabilities

Peter Baumann uses the Monty Hall game to demonstrate that probabilities cannot be meaningfully applied to individual games. Baumann draws from this first conclusion a second: in a single game, it is not necessarily rational to switch from the door that I have initially chosen to the door that Monty Hall did not open. After challenging Baumann’s particular arguments for these conclusions, I argue that there is a deeper problem with his position: it rests on the false assumption that what justifies the switching strategy is its leading me to win a greater percentage of the time. In fact, what justifies the switching strategy is not any statistical result over the long run but rather the “causal structure” intrinsic to each individual game itself. Finally, I argue that an argument by Hilary Putnam will not help to save Baumann’s second conclusion above. See Moser and Mulder (1994, pp. 115–116, 118).     

The lure of choice

We report three studies demonstrating the ‘lure of choice’ people prefer options that allow them to take further choices over those that do not, even when the extra choices cannot improve the ultimate outcome. In Studies 1 and 2, participants chose between two options: one solitary item, and a pair of items between which they would then make a further choice. Consistent with the lure of choice, a given item was more likely to be the ultimate choice when it was initially part of a choice pair than when it was offered on its own. We also demonstrate the lure of choice in a four‐door version of the Monty Hall problem, in which participants could either stick with their original choice or switch to one of two unopened doors. Participants were more likely to switch if they could first ‘choose to choose’ between the two unopened doors (without immediately specifying which) than if they had to choose one door straightaway. We conclude by suggesting that the lure of choice is due to a choice heuristic that is very reliable in the natural world, but much less so in a world created by marketers. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Logical Analysis of Monty Hall and Sleeping Beauty

Hintikka and Sandu’s independence-friendly (IF) logic is a conservative extension of first-order logic that allows one to consider semantic games with imperfect information. In the present article, we first show how several variants of the Monty Hall problem can be modeled as semantic games for IF sentences. In the process, we extend IF logic to include semantic games with chance moves and dub this extension stochastic IF logic. Finally, we use stochastic IF logic to analyze the Sleeping Beauty problem, leading to the conclusion that the thirders are correct while identifying the main error in the halfers’ argument.     

Single-case probabilities and the case of Monty Hall: Levy’s view

In Baumann (American Philosophical Quarterly 42: 71–79, 2005) I argued that reflections on a variation of the Monty Hall problem throws a very general skeptical light on the idea of single-case probabilities. Levy (Synthese, forthcoming, 2007) puts forward some interesting objections which I answer here.     

Overcoming illusory inferences in a probabilistic counterintuitive problem: The role of explicit representations

In the context of conditional probabilities, a good example of the marked discrepancy between intuition and formal reasoning is the Monty Hall dilemma (MHD). We used the MHD to study the effects of practicing the game, making explicit the underlying structure, or enhancing the representation of the different possibilities, on reaching and stating the correct answer. The results of the experiments showed that accumulated experience with the MHD increased the proportion of switching responses but did not change erroneous intuitions (Experiment 1). However, when the dilemma was presented in the form of an adversary game that made the underlying structure more explicit, more participants formed complete mental representations that enabled them to reason correctly (Experiment 2). This result was observed even without any practice with the game if the participants were encouraged to represent possibilities (Experiment 3). Therefore, in this context, correct reasoning seems to depend more on the ability to consider different possibilities than on extensive practice with the game.     

The psychology of the Monty Hall problem: discovering psychological mechanisms for solving a tenacious brain teaser

The Monty Hall problem (or three-door problem) is a famous example of a "cognitive illusion," often used to demonstrate people's resistance and deficiency in dealing with uncertainty. The authors formulated the problem using manipulations in 4 cognitive aspects, namely, natural frequencies, mental models, perspective change, and the less-is-more effect. These manipulations combined led to a significant increase in the proportion of correct answers given by novice participants, largely because of the synergy of frequency-based formulation and perspective change (Experiments 1, 2). In a raining study (Experiment 3) frequency formulation and mental models, but not Bayes's rule training, showed significant positive transfer in solving related problems.     

Complex form of instrumental behavior of dogs

A complex form of higher nervous activity, conditional reflex transswitching or switching, was elaborated in four dogs under conditions of unrestrained movements, freedom of reinforcement choice (food or water), place of reinforcement determined by situation factors as well as independent switching on of conditional stimuli. It was shown that motivated goal-directed behavior of the animals was determined by activation of forward and backward connections. The chains of instrumental conditioned reflexes forming in the final analysis the complex behavior are developed according to the “trialand-error” principle. In the instrumental conditioned reflexes there are two constantly coexisting types of mutually complementing conditioned connections of the signal with reinforcement—direct and indirect. In experiments with unrestrained conditions of animals and independent regulation of the experiment, one of the frequently encountered physiological mechanisms of generalization appears to be efferent and afferent generalization.     

The Monty Hall dilemma in pigeons: Effect of investment in initial choice

In the Monty Hall dilemma, humans are initially given a choice among three alternatives, one of which has a hidden prize. After choosing, but before it is revealed whether they have won the prize, they are shown that one of the remaining alternatives does not have the prize. They are then asked whether they want to stay with their original choice or switch to the remaining alternative. Although switching results in obtaining the prize two thirds of the time, humans consistently fail to adopt the optimal strategy of switching even after considerable training. Interestingly, there is evidence that pigeons show more optimal switching performance with this task than humans. Because humans often view even random choices already made as being more valuable than choices not made, we reasoned that if pigeons made a greater investment, it might produce an endowment or ownership effect resulting in more human-like suboptimal performance. On the other hand, the greater investment in the initial choice by the pigeons might facilitate switching behavior by helping them to better discriminate their staying versus switching behavior. In Experiment 1, we examined the effect of requiring pigeons to make a greater investment in their initial choice (20 pecks rather than the usual 1 peck). We found that the increased response requirement facilitated acquisition of the switching response. In Experiment 2, we showed that facilitation of switching due to the increased response requirement did not result from extinction of responding to the initially chosen location.