PHILOSOPHY AND THE GOOD LIFE IN THE ZHUANGZI

The ancient Chinese text the Zhuangzi raises a mix of epistemological, psychological, and conceptual challenges against the value and usefulness of philosophical disputation. But instead of advocating the elimination of philosophy, it implicitly embraces a broader conception of philosophy, the goal of which is to engage us to reflect on our limitations, question things we take for granted, and better appreciate alternative perspectives and possibilities. Philosophy thus understood is compatible with a variety of methods and approaches: fictions, jokes, paradoxes, spiritual exercises, argument, disputation, and so on. Philosophical practices, on this view, also pave the way for an open-minded, adaptive and flexible way of living that is at the core of the Zhuangist good life.     

THE WAY, THE RIGHT, AND THE GOOD

This article argues that Kongzi's religious ethics suggests an alternative way of understanding the relationship between the right and the good, in which neither takes clear precedence in terms of being more foundational for ethics. The religious underpinnings of Kongzi's understanding of the Way are examined, including the close relationship between tian ("Heaven") and the Way. It is shown that following the Way is defined primarily by the extent to which one's actions express certain virtues, and not whether one's actions are conducive to the best overall outcome or whether they are inherently right irrespective of consequences. It is then argued that the Way is seen as constitutive of both the right and the good, and that this understanding of the right and the good has important implications for contemporary virtue ethics, religious ethics, and political philosophy.     

BUDDHISM,NATURALISM, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS

Owen Flanagan's important book The Bodhisattva's Brain presents a naturalized interpretation of Buddhist philosophy. Although the overall approach of the book is very promising, certain aspects of its presentation could benefit from further reflection. Traditional teachings about reincarnation do not contradict the doctrine of no self, as Flanagan seems to suggest; however, they are empirically rather implausible. Flanagan's proposed “tame” interpretation of karma is too thin; we can do better at fitting karma into a scientific worldview. The relationship between eudaimonist and utilitarian strands in Buddhist ethics is more complex than the book suggests. Flanagan is right to criticize incautious and imprecise claims that Buddhism will make practitioners happy. We can make progress by distinguishing between happiness in the sense of a Buddhist version of eudaimonia, and happiness in the sense of attitudinal pleasure. Doing so might result in an interpretation of Buddhist views about happiness that was simultaneously philosophically interesting, historically credible, and psychologically testable.     

快乐感与社会支持的关系

采用量表法以304个成年人为被试研究了快乐感和社会支持的关系。差异检验表明,男性的正向情感和社会支持源显著多于女性;而女性对社会支持的利用度显著高于男性;在快乐感、负向情感和人际支持上没有显著的性别差异。回归分析表明,社会支持中的人际支持(主要包括配偶、父母、朋友、邻里、同事的支持)和支持利用度(包括遇到烦恼时对支持的利用以及团体参与程度)对快乐感、正向情感和负向情感具有较好的预测作用。     

外向性与快乐感相关变量的关系

该研究的目的是考察外向性对快乐感的直接和间接影响,建立外向性与快乐感相关变量的结构模型。对342名被试施测中国外向性量表、社会交往量表、社会支持量表、应对方式量表和情感量表,运用结构方程模型对数据进行拟合。结果显示：外向性不仅直接影响快乐感,还通过社会交往、社会支持、应对方式对快乐感给予间接影响。最后讨论了外向性人格特点与快乐感相关变量的关系。     

LOCKE,SUSPENSION OF DESIRE,AND THE REMOTE GOOD

The chapter ‘Of power“ of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding is a very fine discussion of agency and a very complex piece of philosophy. It is the result of the superimposition of at least three layers of text (those of the first, second and fifth editions of the Essay), expressive of widely differing views of the same matters. The argument concerning agency and free will that it puts forward (as it now stands, reporting Locke's last word on the subject) is thus beset with problems, and even inconsistencies. But these textual and analytical difficulties should not hide from us the relevance and, in a way, the deep coherence of Locke's philosophy of action. In what follows, I will attempt to cast some light on this complicated interpretive and conceptual matter, by a careful reading of some parts of Locke's discussion. The first section shows how accounting for the evaluation and choice of remote goods, in terms of their real value and in preference to smaller, nearer ones, is a crucial problem for Locke's philosophy of action. The second section reads Locke's move from an internalist to an externalist view of motivation as a first, conceptually complex step towards such an account; and shows how this is linked to a change in the concept of will. The third and fourth sections reconstruct Locke's account (a pattern of suspension and examination of occurrent desire); discuss the role of the motivational and normative concept of happiness; and cast some doubt on the consistency of Locke's position.