Predicting the Strength of Preference for Labor Contracts Using Policy Modeling

This study tests the predictive accuracy of policy models that describe the cognitive strategies used when subjects evaluate labor contracts. Subjects rated labor contracts that varied in wage offered, job security, and profit sharing plans. Profit sharing plans varied in two dimensions: the time when the profit was received and level of stability that was known about the company′s ability to maintain a profit. All the subjects appeared to average the subjective values of the contract features; however, subjects differed in the way they weighted the outcomes. One week later, subjects returned to choose between labor contracts and to indicate how much they preferred each choice. The preference orderings that were predicted by the policy model for the majority of the subjects were fairly consistent with the observed preference ratings. However, in the preference task, the observed preference ratings for the acceptable contracts were stronger than predicted by the policy model. Furthermore, contracts that were rated as least attractive were rated in the preferences task as more similar to each other than predicted. For the majority of subjects, these results indicated that policy modeling would be a useful method of representing information about an individual′s point of view to predict how they might compare contracts when asked to trade off the features. One small group of subjects rated the contracts based almost exclusively on wage during the rating task and then used wage, security, and profit sharing when comparing the contracts. The advantages of the policy model as a method of anticipating the value of labor contracts in the preference task are discussed as an approach to studying the resolution of conflict between two parties.     

Aiming at the top? Upward social comparison of abilities after failure

This study examined the effects of feedback on a task on information seeking and partner preferences as forms of social comparison. It was predicted that subjects who experienced failure and perceived control over future performance would, for reasons of self-improvement, choose more strongly upward a comparison other than subjects who experienced success or perceived no control. In the experiment, 121 college students were given either failure, average, or success feedback on a bogus test for either a stable or a controllable ability. Next, the subjects choose a comparison other whose test material they would examine, and a comparison other as a partner for writing an evaluation of the test. As predicted, the preferences for information seeking and affiliation were more strongly upward when subjects experienced failure than when subjects experienced success. Perceived control partly resulted in more strongly upward choices in information seeking for subjects experiencing failure.     

What a person thinks upon learning he has chosen differently from others: Nice evidence for the persuasive-arguments explanation of choice shifts

Small shifts in choice occur even without discussion, when individuals merely know each other's preference. This appears to support an interpersonal comparison explanation of group induced shifts in choice and to refute explanations based on persuasive argumentation. The present study demonstrates the contrary, that such effects are consistent with the persuasive-arguments formulation and are obtained under particular conditions specified only by the latter theory, to wit: Knowledge of other's choices is assumed to lead a person to think of reasons (arguments) others might have had for their choices-reasons which ordinarily would not come to mind without this knowledge. Such reasoning functions in the same way as persuasive argumentation during group discussion; it causes the person to persuade himself that an alternative course of action now has greater merit than the one he initially preferred. To test this analysis, an experiment was performed in which subjects responded to choice-dilemma items under three different conditions: Following their own choice (I) they learned what several others had chosen and then wrote arguments in support of alternatives given in that same item; (II) they learned what several others had chosen and then wrote arguments in support of alternatives given in a different item; and (III) they received no information about others' choices but merely wrote arguments on that item. As predicted, shifts in choice occurred only if the person knew what others chose and had an opportunity to think about the latter (condition I); they did not occur if an opportunity to think of others' choices was denied (condition II), nor if knowledge of others' choices was withheld (condition III). Content analysis of the arguments subjects produced in conditions I and II completely supported the hypothesis, as did analyses of responses to postexperimental questionnaire which directly asked the subjects about their feelings and thoughts upon learning what others had chosen.     

Effects of objective feedback and "single other" or "average other" social comparison feedback on performance judgments and helping behavior

In two studies, participants received positive or negative feedback about their performance on a verbal task and then provided hints to another person on a subsequent, different task. It was expected that participants would give more helpful hints after positive than after negative feedback but that this would be more apparent when the feedback was based on performance comparisons with the "average participant" than on comparisons with another person or an objective standard. This effect was expected to be mediated by judgments of one's performance on the first task. These predictions were supported. Participants seemed aware of the effect of feedback on their hint choices, and their hint choices did not alter their affect levels. Also, participants receiving comparative (single or aggregated target) feedback exhibited changes in self-ascribed importance of the performance domain. Implications for social comparison theory and self-evaluation maintenance theory are discussed.     

Consumer information processing strategies in middle and late adulthood

The purpose of the present study was to investigate the extent to which performance of a complex cognitive task of a type resembling that encountered in everyday life is maintained through adulthood. A total of 80 subjects participated; 20 in their thirties, 20 in their fifties, 20 in their sixties, and 20 in their seventies. Subjects were asked to make preference judgments with respect to 32 pocket-size notebooks of a sort they might encounter as consumers in a stationery or variety store. Independently, they were also asked to express their preferences with respect to each of the four dimensions on which the notebooks varied. With only minor differences across age groups, most subjects demonstrated the ability to integrate their individual dimension preferences into a complex preference judgment of an object embodying those dimensions, in a logically consistent manner.     

Morningness versus eveningness arousal patterns in young adults.

The preference for morning versus evening time for activities requiring alertness was investigated. Responses from 9 individuals categorized as "owls" and 7 classed as "larks" based on their scores on the Morningness Versus Eveningness Questionnaire were compared to a group of 11 classified as "neither" on measures of sleep attitude and personality factors of arousal. No statistically significant differences were found; however, an item analysis yielded a statistically significant difference among the groups' responses on questions involving personal choices of sleep/wake schedules. This distinguishing aspect between the groups denotes the utility of subjective measures of preference. Our findings complement those from other subjective and experimental studies of "owls" and "larks" and add the important dimension of inquiring about personal preferences of subjects.     

Self-Enhancement Among Major League Soccer Players: The Role of Importance and Ambiguity on Social Comparison Behavior1

This study was conducted to examine psychological mechanisms underlying self enhancing comparisons among 88 male major league professional soccer players. In line with other research, the results suggest that positive beliefs about oneself are more difficult to maintain with regard to unambiguous comparison dimensions. More interestingly, similar results were found by contrasting comparisons with a specific other to those with a vague other, a more ambiguous comparison target. Furthermore, it was confirmed that the more value subjects attach to a dimension of comparison, the more they consider themselves superior on that dimension. The practical implications of these results for competitive sport are discussed.     

Framing Effects: Dynamics and Task Domains

The author examines the mechanisms and dynamics of framing effects in risky choices across three distinct task domains (i.e., life–death, public property, and personal money). The choice outcomes of the problems presented in each of the three task domains had a binary structure of a sure thing vs a gamble of equal expected value; the outcomes differed in their framing conditions and the expected values, raging from 6000, 600, 60, to 6, numerically. It was hypothesized that subjects would become more risk seeking, if the sure outcome was below their aspiration level (the minimum requirement). As predicted, more subjects preferred the gamble when facing the life–death choice problems than facing the counterpart problems presented in the other two task domains. Subjects’ risk preference varied categorically along the group size dimension in the life–death domain but changed more linearly over the expected value dimension in the monetary domain. Framing effects were observed in 7 of 13 pairs of problems, showing a positive frame–risk aversion and negative frame–risk seeking relationship. In addition, two types of framing effects were theoretically defined and empirically identified. Abidirectional framing effectinvolves a reversal in risk preference, and occurs when a decision maker's risk preference is ambiguous or weak. Four bidirectional effects were observed; in each case a majority of subjects preferred the sure outcome under a positive frame but the gamble under a negative frame. In contrast, aunidirectional framing effectrefers to a preference shift due to the framing of choice outcomes: A majority of subjects preferred one choice outcome (either the sure thing or the gamble) under both framing conditions, with positive frame augmented the preference for the sure thing and negative frame augmented the preference for the gamble. These findings revealed some dynamic regularities of framing effects and posed implications for developing predictive and testable models of human decision making.     

Extension of the taste-test analogue as an unobtrusive measure of preference for alcohol

The utility of the taste-test analogue for obtaining an unobtrusive measure of preference for alcohol was examined. Thirty-two male undergraduates participated in each of two taste-rating tasks. In each task. subjects were presented with two beakers containing beverages they were to rate. Although one container was labeled “Alcohol”, and the other was labeled “Orange Juice”, both actually contained only orange juice. Subjects rated the beverages differently on 52% of the dimensions for which ratings were completed. Furthermore, subjects estimated that they had consumed an average of over three ounces of alcohol in the combined taste tests. Wider use of the analogue preference test may have significant value in the study of the determinants of human alcohol drinking behavior.     

The effect of time pressure on risky choice behavior

Thirty six subjects chose individually between pairs of gambles under three time pressure conditions: High (8 seconds), Medium (16 seconds) and Low (32 seconds). The gambles in each pair were equated for expected value but differed in variance, amounts to win and lose and their respective probabilities. Information about each dimension could be obtained by the subject sequentially according to his preference.The results show that subjects are less risky under High as compared to Medium and Low time pressure, risk taking being measured by choices of gambles with lower variance or lower amounts to lose and win. Subjects tended to spend more time observing the negative dimensions (amount to lose and probability of losing), whereas under low time pressure they preffered observing their positive counterparts. Information preference was found to be related to choices.Filtration of information and acceleration of its processing appear to be the strategies of coping with time pressure.     

Interpersonal attraction as a measure of estimation of cohesiveness in elite volleyball teams

This study examined differences in interpersonal attraction between starters and nonstarters of elite male volleyball teams and the correlation between interpersonal attraction and teams' final place. 106 players from 10 teams of the A1 Greek National Volleyball League completed by a sociometric method an especially developed questionnaire. Subjects were classified as starters and nonstarters by means of a protocol of players' starting status administered to teams' coaches. Analysis showed that the task and the social dimension of interpersonal attraction differed significantly between starters and nonstarters. Starters scored higher than nonstarters on both dimensions of interpersonal attraction. Starters' task dimension of interpersonal attraction was positively correlated with the team's task dimension. Also, the teams' task dimension was positively correlated with teams' final placing, suggesting that, when starters are attracted to each other with regard to the common competitive goal, the team's performance is enhanced and leads to higher scoring.     

Type A behavior pattern and self-evaluation of abilities: empirical tests of the self-appraisal model

The self-appraisal model proposes that Type A behavior reflects active attempts to generate diagnostic information about abilities, particularly in situations that evoke high uncertainty. In Study 1, subjects were provided feedback indicating high or low uncertainty about underlying abilities in two domains. When subjects were more uncertain of their ability in one domain than in the other, Jenkins-Activity-Survey-defined Type As (but not Type Bs) subsequently constructed tests that were biased to assess the more uncertain domain. Study 2 examined postfailure performance. The model holds that Type As perform poorly because they suspend information gathering when faced with evidence that requisite abilities are absent. Results indicated that deficits emerged only if Type As believed that a second task assessed the same abilities as the initial task on which they failed. A final study examined social comparison among Type As and Bs. Results indicated that Type As engaged in social comparison to obtain diagnostic information, primarily when they were uncertain of their ability levels.     

The Relative Importance of Probabilities, Outcomes, and Vagueness in Hazard Risk Decisions

This study investigated the joint effects of vagueness on both the probability and the outcome dimensions of hazard risk, using both pairwise choice and rating response tasks. Seventy-two subjects evaluated risk stimuli (concerning either environmental or health hazards), which varied in the level of probability of loss, the amount of loss, and the precision with which each dimension was specified. We found strong evidence of a consistent individual attitude toward vagueness on both risk dimensions and an almost equal number of vagueness-seeking and precision-seeking subjects. Choices were consistent with a decision rule based on dimension preference, but attitude toward vagueness significantly predicted choice in cases where a dimension preference rule was not appropriate. An asymmetric preference reversal pattern was also demonstrated, with many subjects choosing an option in a pair that they rated as more risky.     

Reactions to objective self-awareness

In order to determine reactions to objective self-awareness, 96 female undergraduates received either positive or negative feedback on a “creativity” task prior to being given an opportunity to write a response to a visual cue. Half of the subjects were made objectively self-aware, via a mirror, during the visual cue task; half were not. In addition, half of the subjects were led to believe that the visual cue task was highly related to creativity, while half learned that the task was low in relevance. A “longer the response, the better” standard of correctness was established for all subjects. As predicted, the results indicated that when made objectively self-aware, subjects who received negative feedback wrote more in response to the visual cue than did those who received positive feedback, a difference which was not obtained for the subjectively self-aware subjects. The task relevance manipulation also produced a significant main effect. A similar pattern of results was obtained on a measure of the time spent on the task. The implications of the results for objective self-awareness theory are considered.     

Multidimensional scaling of the TAT and the measurement of achievement motivation

Subjects rated all pairs of eight TAT cards and ten Rorschach cards for similarity. They were also scored for n-Ach using imagery scoring on stories to TAT cards. Two similarity dimensions were found for the TAT stimuli, identified as number of persons and degree of strong affect. Those high and low on need for achievement for both sexes differed significantly on degree of salience afforded to each dimension, those high weighting the affect dimension more, and those low the person dimension more. Dimensions of the Rorschach found by Wainer et al. (1976) were replicated, but did not discriminate individuals on need for achievement. The results are discussed in terms of the interpretation of the dimensions, the possible relationship of affect to achievement motivation, and the possible practical implications for the use and measurement properties of projective tests.     

Index: Contents of Volume 35 (1971)

Subjects rated all pairs of eight TAT cards and ten Rorschach cards for similarity. They were also scored for n-Ach using imagery scoring on stories to TAT cards. Two similarity dimensions were found for the TAT stimuli, identified as number of persons and degree of strong affect. Those high and low on need for achievement for both sexes differed significantly on degree of salience afforded to each dimension, those high weighting the affect dimension more, and those low the person dimension more. Dimensions of the Rorschach found by Wainer et al. (1976) were replicated, but did not discriminate individuals on need for achievement. The results are discussed in terms of the interpretation of the dimensions, the possible relationship of affect to achievement motivation, and the possible practical implications for the use and measurement properties of projective tests.     

Mediating Role of Memory of Another Person's Choicein Social Influence on Preference

We often tend to fit our subjective preference with those of others after merely being faced with what other people prefer. This is known as social conformity. However, it is still unclear how the impact of such a social influence on subjective preference is modulated by the personal characteristics of the other person (e.g., whether the person is trustworthy) and the explicit memory of those personal characteristics (e.g., remembering who evaluated the objects). To clarify explicit memory's underlying role regarding social influence, we asked participants to evaluate their preference for abstract paintings both before and after observing binary choices made by others whose behaviors could be labeled as trustworthy, neutral, or untrustworthy. The results showed the following: (a) even without explicit memory of who made a choice and which painting was chosen, the participants preferred chosen over unchosen paintings; and (b) such preference changes were modulated by the subjective trustworthiness of others only when they explicitly remembered who made a choice.     

Predicting one’s own and others’ 16 PF scores

This study examined the relationship between subjects’ actual test derived scores and their estimates of what those scores would be. Sixty subjects completed the 16 PF (form D) and then estimated the scores on each dimension for themselves and another person they knew well. The results showed significant positive correlations on 9 of the 16 dimensions for themselves. The dimensions they were best at estimating were Desurgency-Surgency, Untroubled adequacy-guilt proneness and Threctia-Parmia. Only two correlations (both negative) reached significance concerning their ability to predict another known person’s scores. Whereas subjects believed they were like the other person they nominated (13 of the 16 correlations were significantly positive), in actual fact their test derived scores showed only two significant findings, one positive and the other negative. Results are discussed in terms of lay theories of personality and their relationship to personality assessment.     

Single linear ordering versus multiple discrepant orderings in the cognitive representation of social structures

Previous studies have assumed that people have a predilection for single linear orderings, of which status congruence is a special case. Eighty-two subjects were run in a two-stage experiment to examine preference for linear orderings and whether single or multiple discrepant orderings are preferred when 1 instead of having to learn, subjects freely construct social structures, and 2 the material they are presented is more specified and less simplified than is usually the case in cognitive bias studies. In the first stage Ss were presented with sets of five individual characteristic dimensions, of which three were inherently orderable. Their task was to attribute one characteristic from each dimension to each of five fictitious persons. In the second stage, Ss were asked, for three types of influence (professional, political and cultural), to build an influence structure among the five persons constructed in the first stage. In Stage 1, linear ordering was used for three of the five dimensions. Two of these dimensions used a single ordering, while the third was only weakly related to the first two. In Stage 2, largely transitive but incomplete relations of influence were established, based on a salary-occupational hierarchy. The completeness of the relation depended on the nature of the influence.     

The Effect of Giving Informal Performance Feedback on Subsequent Formal Memory-Based Performance Evaluations1

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that raters' formal memory-based performance evaluations can be significantly influenced by their having previously given the ratee informal performance feedback. In Experiment 1 subjects either did or did not give informal feedback to another person who performed either well or poorly on an interviewing task. In Experiment 2 subjects role played giving informal feedback about behavior relevant to only one of the two performance dimensions subsequently evaluated. In both experiments subjects later ratcd the interpersonal and task performance of the feedback recipient. The results of both studies support the hypothesis for ratings of interpersonal performance. Giving informal feedback to a ratee exhibiting good interpersonal performance led to more positive interpersonal performance ratings, whereas giving informal feedback to a ratee exhibiting poor interpersonal performance led to more negative interpersonal performance ratings. Task performance ratings, on the other hand, were not affected. Conditions likely to have mitigated the impact of giving informal feedback on the task performance ratings are discussed, as are the implications of the results for practical strategies to improve the quality of formal memory-based performance evaluations.