麦金太尔论社会关系、共同利益与个人利益

我们从出生到死亡都处在一种接受与给予的关系中 ,我们从谁那里接受和给予谁往往是不对称的。这是我们参与到这个网络中不得不懂得的。在这个接受与给予的关系中 ,有我们的共同利益和我们个人的利益。同时 ,处在这样一种关系中 ,也需要我们遵守相应的德性规则。     

论德性与独立的实践推理者

德性对于人的兴盛是必不可少的。没有道德德性,我们就不能实现从动物性理智到实践推理的转变,其次不能继续有推理的实践;如果不发展某种程度的德性,我们就不能适当地关怀和教育他人。所以,德性必须首先获得,然后才能维持在推理的实践之中。最后,我们在成为实践推理之后,我们仍然需要他人的维护,这种需要同时也是一种对德性的需要。     

和谐社会视野下德性重建基本途径探析

当前德性重建已经成为社会呼声,并成为构建和谐社会中的应有之义.德性重建有两条基本途径:一是创建有利于“道德觉解”的良好社会生活环境,二是推进德性养育的载体——社会共同体——的建设.这两者本身就是德性实践,其必将加快人们“道德觉解”和德性重建进程,并有力推进和谐社会建设.     

德性论视域下和谐“医患共同体”的构建

当前"医患共同体"的构建应当回归"德性基础主义"的建构路径。德性论思想从五个维度展现了其对构筑和谐"医患共同体"的理论价值及意义。在和谐"医患共同体"的实际构建中德性价值具体表现在以下几方面:"环境和谐"的德性建构、"文化和谐"的德性塑造、"医疗和谐"的德性创设、"生命和谐"的德性构造。     

德性论视域下和谐"医患共同体"的构建

当前"医患共同体"的构建应当回归"德性基础主义"的建构路径.德性论思想从五个维度展现了其对构筑和谐"医惠共同体"的理论价值及意义.在和谐"医患共同体"的实际构建中德性价值具体表现在以下几方面:"环境和谐"的德性建构、"文化和谐"的德性塑造、"医疗和谐"的德性创设、"生命和谐"的德性构造.     

当代中国公民的正义德性及其塑造

公平正义是人类真挚的追求,个人和制度是正义的两个基本的维度。正义德性是保护和追求自己和他人"应得"的道德品性,具有三个层面的特征,即具体表现形式的复合性,原则与品性的融合性,"知、情、意、行"的相互贯通性。随着我国现代化进程的加快,公民已经初步树立起正义德性,然而由于传统文化的惯性、市场经济条件下资本逻辑的作用以及教育的缺位,公民的正义德性还存在一些问题,突出体现在民主意识、法治意识、诚信意识等方面。公民正义德性存在问题的根源在于现代性对于传统共同体的消解,因此公民正义德性培养的着力点应当是建构现代共同体。     

德性论与伦理学

伦理学中有价值论、规范论或义务论,但没有专门研究德性问题的德性论.德性问题是一个重要的人生问题,也是一个重要的社会问题,尤其是当代社会的严重问题,而且只有伦理学才能从理论和实践的结合上给予系统的回答.因此,应该建立德性论专门研究德性问题.德性论研究什么是德性以及如何形成德性的问题,其主要任务是确立伦理学的德性原则.德性论与价值论、规范论一起分别从人的品质、目的、行为方面解释和回答人生问题,它们是相对独立、相互补充的,共同给人生提供伦理学原则并研究回答人生的伦理学问题.德性伦理学属于德性论的研究,但德性伦理学是西方伦理学的一个流派,而不是伦理学的一个相对独立的分支.     

回归共同体主义与拯救德性——现代德性伦理学评介

回归共同体主义与拯救德性——现代德性伦理学评介龚群（中国人民大学哲学系１００８７２）现代西方伦理学以元伦理学、规范伦理学和应用伦理学而三分天下。不过,随着近２０年来规范伦理学理论的发展,前两者呈现一种融合的趋势。或者说,元伦理学和规范伦理学呈现一个此...     

麦金太尔的德性伦理观

在麦金太尔看来,德性与实践内在相关,有了德性,则可获得实践的内在利益,没有德性,则不可能,或只能揽取实践的外在利益.并且,一定类型的实践都需要相应的德性来维持.同时,作为个人的德性在于个人的可叙述的自我统一性,以及自我处于一种叙述背景关联之中.     

共同体感与道德赋能——论共同善的情感基础与实践机制

共同善是伦理学的一个重要范畴,但公共与私人、共同体与自我之间的冲突常常会导致现实中面对"共同善"时难以回避的道德两难困境。对共同体与个人何者优先的不同回答,会导致对"共同善"概念的不同理解。若把共同善建基于个体自我关切的互惠互利,则容易陷入"单元论"的谬误;而在交互主体性的视角中强调共同体之优先性,虽在概念上更为完备,但同样难以回应多元文化"不可通约性"的诘难。因此,要回应这一诘难并为共同善进行辩护,其中一个方案是论证"共同体感"的先天价值,为共同善建构稳固的道德情感基础。而在实践中,共同体感的先天存在无法避免共同善所遭受的冷遇及不同个体在实践中所呈现的特殊性,这一难题的解决需要我们进一步探索共同善的道德实践机制,这为激发道德感知与规范情感的道德赋能概念创造了理论和实践空间。     

Improving accepting and giving compliments with individuals with developmental disabilities

Individuals with developmental disabilities, such as autism spectrum disorder, typically exhibit conversation skill deficits, with two prevailing deficits including giving and accepting compliments. The current study used an individualized approach to assess and teach accepting and giving compliments specific to performance, possession, and appearance with three adolescents and young adults with developmental disabilities. We taught these skills using behavioral skills training and prompting during conversations utilizing a multiple-baseline design across participants. We also observed generalization and treatment extension of the participants' skills in conversations with adults not associated with teaching and in the absence of any teaching procedures. The results support the efficacy of the procedures used toward improving giving and accepting compliments within the context of a conversation. We discuss considerations to improve the social acceptability of and refinements to the teaching procedures and acquired skills.     

The Proper Structure of the Intellectual Virtues

If we adopt a virtue approach to epistemology, what form should the intellectual virtues take? In this paper, I argue that the proper structure of the intellectual virtues should be one that follows the tradition of internalism in epistemology. I begin by giving a general characterization of virtue epistemology and then define internalism within that framework. Arguing for internalism, I first consider the thought experiment of the new evil demon and show how externalist accounts of intellectual virtue, though constructed to accommodate our intuitions in such cases, cannot fully do so. I further argue that only adopting an internalist structure of the virtues will provide intellectual virtues that appropriately mirror the structure of the classical moral virtues. Finally, I argue that only an internalist structure of the virtues can explain why the intellectual virtues are valuable in themselves.     

THE DESIRES OF OTHERS

An influential view, defended by Thomas Scanlon and others, holds that desires are almost never reasons. I seek to resist this view and show that someone who desires something does thereby have a reason to satisfy her desire. To show this, I argue, first, that the desires of some others are reasons for us and, second, that our own desires are no less reason‐giving than those of others. In concluding, I emphasize that accepting my view does not commit one to a desire‐based account of reasons. Desires can be simply one kind of reasons alongside many others.     

非ST段抬高急性冠脉综合征药物治疗规范化分析

回顾性分析我院收治的129例非ST段抬高急性冠脉综合征患者的临床资料。对比在非ST段抬高急性冠脉综合征诊治上与最新指南的差距,找出改进措施。结果表明我院的临床实践与最新指南存在较大差距,在强化抗栓,调脂治疗,B受体阻滞剂及血管紧张素转换酶抑制荆类药物使用上均有待提高。今后应采取更加积极的措施,规范用药,以达到更好的预后和转归效果。     

The time of our lives: Psychological disorders,time perception and the practice of mindfulness

Psychological disorders are associated with a wide variety of distortions of time perception. In this paper, I briefly review what is known about time perception and its disorders and suggest that the practice of mindfulness may be effective by virtue of its effect on our relationship with time.     

Meaning in Life: In Defense of the Hybrid View

According to Susan Wolf's hybrid view about meaning in life, a life is meaningful in virtue of subjective attraction to objectively valuable pursuits. Recently, several philosophers have presented counterexamples to the subjective element in Wolf's view. We argue that these examples are not clearly successful and present a modified version which is even stronger in the face of them. Finally, we offer some positive reasons for accepting a subjective condition on a meaningful life.     

Athletic Virtue: Between East and West

Despite the rich philosophical heritage of the East, the connection between athletics and education for character or virtue is more commonly associated with the West. Classical Eastern philosophy does focus on virtue, but it seems to exclude sport as a means of cultivation since the Confucian is uninterested in victory and the Daoist seeks passivity and avoids contention. A closer look reveals, however, that Eastern conceptions of virtue have much in common with those of Ancient Greece so often linked to sport. Combining research in the history and philosophy of sport with analysis of such texts such as the Analects of Kongzi (Confucius), Laozi's Daodejing, Plato's Republic and Epictetus's Handbook, this paper argues that the enlightened practice of sport has the potential to cultivate qualities common both to de and aretē. The fact that sport was linked to virtue in Ancient Greece but not Ancient China derives from different ideas about social prestige more than different conceptions of ethical education. Indeed, the enlightened practice of modern sport may develop a more universal kind of virtue; thereby providing common ground upon which to heal the East-West split in a way characterised by mutual respect and emphasising our common humanity.     

The Logic of Chastity: Women,Sex, and the History of Philosophy in the Early Modern Period

Before women could become visible as philosophers, they had first to become visible as rational autonomous thinkers. A social and ethical position holding that chastity was the most important virtue for women, and that rationality and chastity were incompatible, was a significant impediment to accepting women's capacity for philosophical thought. Thus one of the first tasks for women was to confront this belief and argue for their rationality in the face of a self‐referential dilemma.     

Accepting Forgiveness

Forgiving wrongdoers who neither apologized, nor sought to make amends in any way, is controversial. Even defenders of the practice agree with critics that such “unilateral” forgiveness involves giving up on the meaningful redress that victims otherwise justifiably demand from their wrongdoers: apology, reparations, repentance, and so on. Against that view, I argue here that when a victim of wrongdoing sets out to grant forgiveness to her offender, and he in turn accepts her forgiveness, he thereby serves some important ends of apology and reparation, no matter what else he did—or did not do—by way of repair. Although much overlooked, the simple act of accepting forgiveness joins victim and offender in affirming and acting upon some important shared background assumptions, including many of those expressed in standard apologies. Perhaps more surprisingly, I argue that accepting forgiveness also fulfills the duty to counteract any concrete harm wrongfully inflicted. The argument helps explain some otherwise puzzling features of forgiveness, including that a victim can change her offender’s normative status, making him a less fitting target of the resentment, indignation and shunning of others, and even his own guilt pangs, simply by forgiving him.