The psychoanalytic vision of Hans Loewald

Hans Loewald is a comprehensive and original theorist on a par with any major post-Freudian thinker, yet neither his ideas nor his person have become the basis for a Loewaldian school or approach, and he is not as well known as other innovators of comparable quality. In this paper the author attempts to characterize the scope and depth of Loewald's theory-his vision of the psyche and psychic life, or metapsychology, his characterization of the psychoanalytic process, and his vision of the clinical and human goals of psychoanalysis. She suggests that Loewald holds in all of these realms, and without apparent contradiction, a doubled-emphatically ego-psychological and emphatically object-relational-perspective, and an equal commitment to both the first topography and the structural theory. His views throughout are undergirded by a bi-directional developmental view that centers on differentiation and integration. The paper includes brief reflections on how to assess psychoanalytic theories, like Loewald's, developed before empirical research that seems to challenge them.     

Hans Loewald: A radical conservative

Hans Loewald's work was relatively marginalized in its day and it is little known outside the United States. It is, however, assuming increasing importance in American psychoanalysis. Loewald's attractiveness as a theoretician is due, in no small part, to his rigor and synthetic reach. He is able to accomplish the difficult feat of remaining non-sectarian and systematic at the same time. Indeed, Loewald's work contains an integrative vision that is unusual in today's fragmented psychoanalytic world. This author tries to show how Loewald attempts to reconcile many of the rigid oppositions that often become reified in analytic controversies: structural theory versus relational psychoanalysis, traditionalism versus revisionism, oedipal versus pre-oedipal, modernist versus postmodernist and hermeneutical versus scientific. The article examines how Eros, understood in terms of the psyche's synthetic strivings, plays a major role in Loewald's theory. The author also situates Loewald's position within contemporary psychoanalytic discussions of epistemology. These discussions tend to criticize the objectivism of modern science-and analysis in so far as it models itself on science-and stress countertransference and the subjectivity of the analyst. Loewald's argument, however, runs in the opposite direction. Because of his concern with the autonomy and individuality of the patient, he is concerned with the clinical dangers rising from an overemphasis on the subjectivity of the analyst.     

From Ghosts to Ancestors: The Psychoanalytic Vision of Hans Loewald

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

The concept of energy in psychoanalytic theory

Freud's early attempts to account for repression and for the occurrence of neurotic symptoms in terms of detachable and displaceable quantities of affect‐charge (cathexis) has continued to be a basic aspect of psychoanalytic theory. This is unfortunate since the account is inadequate and its central concept, that of a quantity of energy, is unsuited to the task at hand. We see that, despite the appropriateness of describing neurotic behavior in dynamic/economic terms, the use of energy concepts on the theoretical level is an explanatory dead‐end.     

On the logic of psychoanalytic theory

Psychoanalytic theory shows some specific features and problems. It exists in a number of variations, according to different schools as well as cultural and subcultural conditions, with different understandings even of core concepts. Instead of producing definite knowledge, results remain uncertain. They vary in use and imply a permanent reworking of ideas and conceptions. This is the effect of the kind of theory psychoanalysis has to use. Since psychodynamics are a special kind of heterogeneous, changing, always different, emergent-in a word, autopoietic-reality, psychoanalysis cannot use the methods of a denotative theory (algorithmic reduction leading to strictly defined and formulated calculations) but has to use connotative theories. Connotative theories use open concepts which provide an active and flexible access to autopoietic reality. They are able to cope with the difference between singularities as well as with the distance between general logic and empirical reality. Problems tied to this possibility are structural fuzziness, a dependence on forms of use, multiple paradigms and difficulties in legitimation and balance of theories. This causes problems of institutionalisation. These problems are not a sign of immaturity but the normal way in which connotative theories appear and develop. They can therefore not be eliminated but only be treated in a better way.