Imagination or exposure causes imagination inflation

To examine the effects of exposure to complex autobiographical events on imagination inflation, subjects performed a 3-stage procedure. First, they rated their confidence that a list of events had happened in their childhood. Second, subjects imagined and paraphrased complex fictitious events 0, 1, 3, or 5 times. Finally, they rated their confidence for the childhood events a second time. We found that subjects became more confident that the fictitious events really did happen in childhood, regardless of whether they were imagined or paraphrased. There was no repetition effect beyond that of a single exposure. Taken together with the results of other research, our data suggest that the greater processing fluency associated with the target events drives imagination inflation.     

Imagery perspective and source monitoring in imagination inflation

The present experiments suggest that imagery perspective—first person (own) versus third person (observer’s)—influences source-monitoring judgments. Imagination inflation (Garry, Manning, Loftus, &; Sherman, 1996) occurs when imaginary experience with events is mistaken for real experience. In Experiment 1, the perspective used to visualize real past events depended on memory test wording (“remember doing?” vs. “happened to you?”). Experiment 2 manipulated the perspective used to visually imagine counterfactual events and showed that the effect on imagination inflation depended on memory test wording. Imagination inflation was most likely when memory test wording encouraged participants to visualize real events from the same perspective as they had used to imagine counterfactual ones. Imagination inflation may result not simply from having created imaginary representations of events, but also from having created representations that match the decision criteria used in source monitoring.     

Warnings reduce the magnitude of the imagination inflation effect

Imagination inflation occurs when people increase their confidence that an event actually happened after imagining the details of the event. The purpose of this study was to determine whether warning people about the imagination inflation effect would reduce their tendency to inflate their ratings of the imagined events. In one condition, we warned participants about the deleterious effects of imagining distant events. Compared with a control group that did not receive a warning, this group produced a significantly smaller imagination inflation effect. We discuss these results and the imagination inflation effect in the context of 2 theories designed to explain the cognitive processes that produce this effect.     

Using source cues and familiarity cues to resist imagination inflation

To investigate whether people can resist imagination inflation--the imagination-induced increased confidence that fictitious childhood events really happened--we gave them different types of cues. In a three-stage procedure, participants: (1) rated their confidence that a list of childhood events had happened to them, (2) imagined some of these events, and (3) made confidence ratings a second time. Subjects received either no cues about the source of the imagined event, an additional source cue (perspective), an additional familiarity cue (a plausibility questionnaire), or both cues. Only subjects who had both types of cues resisted imagination inflation. These results suggest that additional cues can sometimes safeguard people from becoming more confident that fictitious events were genuine experiences.     

Individual differences in Pollyannaism

The Pollyanna Principle states that people process pleasant information more accurately and efficiently than less pleasant information. This study examined whether different measures of Pollyanna tendencies are correlated with each other. Fourteen measures of Pollyannaism were derived for 133 students. The results showed that subjects who rated themselves as optimistic or happy also showed Pollyannaism on other measures of happiness, believed that the events in their lives were pleasant, gave themselves positive ratings on personality characteristics, recalled pleasant words more often than unpleasant words, supplied more free associations to pleasant stimuli than to unpleasant stimuli, listed pleasant items first, and judged that pleasant words were more frequent in the English language.     

Creating nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions using an imagination inflation procedure

The current experiments examined the creation of nonbelieved true and false memories after imagining bizarre and familiar actions using the imagination inflation procedure (Goff & Roediger, 1998). In both experiments, participants took part in three sessions. In Session 1, participants had to perform or imagine simple familiar actions (e.g., “stir the water with the spoon”) and bizarre actions (e.g., “balance the spoon on your nose”). A day later, participants needed to imagine simple actions of which some were new actions, and some were old actions that appeared in the first session. After a week, the participants completed a recognition task. For those actions that were correctly or incorrectly remembered as having been performed, the participant was challenged that the action was not performed in order to evoke nonbelieved true and false memories. In general, we found that the imagination inflation procedure can successfully induce participants to produce nonbelieved memories. In Study 1, we successfully induced nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions, although in general nonbelieved memory rates were low. In Study 2, more participants formed nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions than for familiar actions. Also, we found that especially belief was more susceptible to revision when memories were challenged than recollection. In two experiments, we showed that nonbelieved memories can successfully be induced for both familiar and bizarre actions.     

Exploring the role of repetition and sensory elaboration in the imagination inflation effect

Two experiments were conducted to examine whether a misattribution of specific characteristics or a misattribution of global familiarity underlies false memories as assessed through imagination inflation. Using the paradigm developed by Goff and Roediger (1998), we found that the proportion of false memories increased with repeated imagination, replicating the imagination inflation effect. False memories developed through imagination were greatest in conditions that forced participants to include sensory detail in their imaginings. Finally, conscious recollection more often accompanied false memories in perceptually detailed imagination conditions, whereas feelings of familiarity more often accompanied false memories in conditions that lacked sensory cues. These results suggest that imagination that contains more perceptual information leads to more elaborate memory representations containing specific characteristics that can be confused with actually performed actions. Confusion based on these representations, as opposed to confusion based on processing fluency, is more likely to lead to false memories.     

Individual differences in cognitive arithmetic

Unities in the processes involved in solving arithmetic problems of varying operations have been suggested by studies that have used both factor-analytic and information-processing methods. We designed the present study to investigate the convergence of mental processes assessed by paper-and-pencil measures defining the Numerical Facility factor and component processes for cognitive arithmetic identified by using chronometric techniques. A sample of 100 undergraduate students responded to 320 arithmetic problems in a true-false reaction-time (RT) verification paradigm and were administered a battery of ability measures spanning Numerical Facility, Perceptual Speed, and Spatial Relations factors. The 320 cognitive arithmetic problems comprised 80 problems of each of four types: simple addition, complex addition, simple multiplication, and complex multiplication. The information-processing results indicated that regression models that included a structural variable consistent with memory network retrieval of arithmetic facts were the best predictors of RT to each of the four types of arithmetic problems. The results also verified the effects of other elementary processes that are involved in the mental solving of arithmetic problems, including encoding of single digits and carrying to the next column for complex problems. The relation between process components and ability measures was examined by means of structural equation modeling. The final structural model revealed a strong direct relation between a factor subsuming efficiency of retrieval of arithmetic facts and of executing the carry operation and the traditional Numerical Facility factor. Furthermore, a moderate direct relation between a factor subsuming speed of encoding digits and decision and response times and the traditional Perceptual Speed factor was also found. No relation between structural variables representing cognitive arithmetic component processes and ability measures spanning the Spatial Relations factor was found. Results of the structural modeling support the conclusion that information retrieval from a network of arithmetic facts and execution of the carry operation are elementary component processes involved uniquely in the mental solving of arithmetic problems. Furthermore, individual differences in the speed of executing these two elementary component processes appear to underlie individual differences on ability measures that traditionally span the Numerical Facility factor.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Individual differences in customer sociability

Two studies examined the quality of clerk-customer interactions. In the first study, customers in a mall were followed from one purchase to another and retest reliability of customer sociability was found to be 0.73. A second study of the same and another mall found a retest reliability of 0.56 for customer sociability and a correlation of 0.57 between sociability of different salespersons serving the same customer. These results indicate that the sociability of salesperson—customer interactions is determined by stable individual differences in customer sociability, and suggest that salespeople do better to echo than to escalate customer sociability.     

Individual differences in thinking-aloud performance

A key method in current research on thinking is to have subjects think aloud as they work on some task. Considerable individual differences usually emerge in the quantity and quality of thinking-aloud records. This article reports an experimental sudy of such individual differences. Subjects took Cattell’s 16-PF personality test, a self-relevation scale, and a test of verbal fluency. The 35 subjects then attempted three 8-puzzle tasks under thinking-aloud instructions. The resulting thinking-aloud records (protocols) were scored in terms of length, number of words per puzzle move, number of goal references, and number of goal references per move. The different protocol measures intercorrelated highly in each problem. Furthermore, each of the protocol measures correlated over different puzzles; that is, someone who produced a long protocol on one problem tended to produce a long protocol on other problems. However, none of the protocol measures correlated with any of the personality scores or with the verbal fluency measure. It is concluded that there is consistency within individuals in protocol quantity and completeness, and that this tendency merits further investigation.     

Individual differences in deductive reasoning

Three studies are reported, which examined individual differences in deductive reasoning as a function of intellectual ability and thinking style. Intellectual ability was a good predictor of logical performance on syllogisms, especially where there was a conflict between logic and believability. However, in the first two experiments there was no link between ability and performance on indicative selection tasks, in sharp contrast to previous research. This correlation did, however, return in the final study. Our data are consistent with the claim that the correlation with logical accuracy on abstract selection tasks is found primarily with participants of relatively high ability. At lower levels, pragmatically cued responses are given but those of slightly higher ability divorce the rule from the scenario and respond consistently (though incorrectly) across problems. Self-report questionnaires were generally poor predictors of performance, but a measure of the ability to generate alternative representations proved an excellent predictor. These results are consistent with a mental models approach to reasoning and also have implications for the debate about human rationality.     

Individual differences in music performance

Music cognition depends on the existence and deployment of processes for detecting, storing and organizing musical materials according to underlying structural features. Common cultural experiences develop these processes to a certain degree, but specifically designed and supported learning environments are required to achieve the levels of expertise required to perform western art music. Certain motivational and social factors are therefore implicated in the maintenance of activities that promote skill-acquisition, such as practice. Expert musical performance is not just a matter of technical motor skill, it also requires the ability to generate expressively different performances of the same piece of music according to the nature of intended structural and emotional communication. This review examines these abilities and describes how some of them have been shown to have lawful relationships to objective musical and extra-musical parameters. Psychological research is thus engaged in a process of demystifying musical expertise, a process that helps to improve upon culturally prevalent, but ultimately non-explanatory, notions of inborn 'talent'.     

Individual differences in hedonic capacity

Hedonic capacity--an individuals ability to experience pleasurable affect--is important, not Only in accounting for the development of psychopathology but in understanding normal personality as well. In this article, the development and validation of three scales of hedonic capacity are described. One scale consists of MMPI items, a second consists of CPI items, and the third combines items from both inventories. These scales demonstrated acceptable internal consistency and test-retest reliability. Initial support for the construct validity of the scales was also obtained. Because they have been constructed from the MMPI and CPI, the scales described in this article can be used to address important questions in research on schizophrenia, depression, and normal personality with a wide variety of data that has already been collected.     

Individual differences in television comprehension

Two experiments explored individual differences in memory and comprehension for adults presented information on television. Experiment 1 tested the correlation between comprehension of television and reading with young adults. The ability to comprehend these two forms of media was significantly correlated (r = .69). This finding is contrary to results from our previous study with third and sixth graders (Pezdek, Lehrer, & Simon, 1984). Experiment 2 probed two specific individual differences factors as predictors of television comprehension. The results were that good television comprehenders (1) had higher visual/spatial ability, as assessed by psychometric test performance, and (2) were more likely to utilize an imagery-based strategy in the sentence-picture verification task of Clark and Chase (1972) (e.g., “STAR IS ABOVE PLUS”). These results suggest differences in the comprehension processes that operate on information presented in different forms of media.