B. F. Skinner's Science and Human Behavior: its antecedents and its consequences

Skinner's Science and Human Behavior marked a transition from a treatment of behavior that took physics as its reference science to one that emphasized behavior as a fundamental part of the subject matter of biology. The book includes what may be Skinner's earliest statement about the similarity of operant selection to Darwinian natural selection in phylogeny. Other major topics discussed in the book included multiple causation, private events, the self, and social contingencies. Among the important antecedents were Skinner's own Behavior of Organisms and Keller & Schoenfeld's Pincinples of Psychology. Current developments in education, behavioral economics, and some behavior therapies can be attributed at least in part to Skinner's seminal work. The effective behavioral analysis of governmental and religious systems will probably depend on elaborations of our understanding of verbal behavior.     

Psychology as a Science of Subject and Comportment,beyond the Mind and Behavior

The turn of qualitative inquiry suggests a more open, plural conception of psychology than just the science of the mind and behavior as it is most commonly defined. Historical, ontological and epistemological binding of this conception of psychology to the positivist method of natural science may have exhausted its possibilities, and after having contributed to its prestige as a science, has now become an obstacle. It is proposed that psychology be reconceived as a science of subject and comportment in the framework of a contextual hermeneutic, social, human behavioral science. Thus, without rejecting quantitative inquiry, psychology recovers territory left aside like introspection and pre-reflective self-awareness, and reconnects with traditions marginalized from the main stream. From this perspective psychology might also recover its credibility as a human science in view of current skepticism.     

Multiple levels of inquiry in cognitive science

Summary Gibsonian ecological psychology, symbolic information processing, and connectionist information processing are frequently construed as three competing paradigms or research traditions, each seeking dominance in experimental psychology and in cognitive science generally. There is an important element of truth in this perspective, and any adequate account of the development of experimental psychology over the past 30 years would have to examine seriously how the various conceptual frameworks, experimental endeavors, and social institutions have figured in this conflict. But the goal of this paper is not to characterize the historical dynamics within experimental psychology and cognitive science; rather, it is to consider what sorts of rapprochement is possible. Rapprochement, however, is not sought simply for its own sake or out of an a priori conviction that scientific enterprises should be unified. Spirited controversy between competing traditions is often an important component of progess (Laudan, 1977). Rapprochement has a purpose when alternative theoretical traditions have reached a point when each confronts serious shortcomings that can best be overcome by incorporating alternative perspectives. In this paper I try to show that this is the situation that exists in experimental psychology and cognitve science generally with respect to the three traditions enumerated above. I first explore how cognitive inquiry directed at internal procedures for processing information could benefit from a detailed study of the context of cognition, including insights provided by the Gibsonian tradition. Second, I examine the current controversy between symbolic and connectionist approaches and address the question of what contributions each offers to the other. Finally, I offer a framework in which multiple levels of inquiry in cognitve science can be related.     

斯金纳激进行为主义的一个理论特色及其反思

斯金纳激进行为主义的一个理论特色是包容对私人事件(语言、意识、思维)的研究,体现了斯金纳激进行为主义的特有认识论立场及独特的行为分析理论和行为解释原则。     

B. F. Skinner's Utopian Vision: Behind and Beyond Walden Two

This paper addresses B. F. Skinner's utopian vision for enhancing social justice and human well-being in his 1948 novel, Walden Two. In the first part, we situate the book in its historical, intellectual, and social context of the utopian genre, address critiques of the book's premises and practices, and discuss the fate of intentional communities patterned on the book. The central point here is that Skinner's utopian vision was not any of Walden Two's practices, except one: the use of empirical methods to search for and discover practices that worked. In the second part, we describe practices in Skinner's book that advance social justice and human well-being under the themes of health, wealth, and wisdom, and then show how the subsequent literature in applied behavior analysis supports Skinner's prescience. Applied behavior analysis is a measure of the success of Skinner's utopian vision: to experiment.     

BIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Abstract. The sciences may be conceptualized as a hierarchy ranked by level of organization (e.g., many-body physics ranks above particle physics). Each science serves as an antidiscipline for the science above it; that is, between each pair, tense but creative interplay is inevitable. Biology has advanced through such tension between its subdisciplines and now can serve as an antidiscipline for the social sciences—for anthropology, for example, by examining the connection between cultural and biological evolution; for psychology, by addressing the nature of learning and the structure of the unconscious; for economics, by examining economically irrational behavior and by comparing economic activity in humans and other species. Sociology, concerned mainly with advanced literate societies, is relatively remote from the genetic basis of human social behavior. However, moving between biological and social levels of organization generates richness and points to new and unexpected principles.     

Skinner on cognition

One of the most controversial, if not the most controversial, aspect of behaviorism is its claims (actual and putative) concerning cognition. Part of this controversy is caused by egregious exegetical errors on the part of Skinner's critics. Critics can then easily refute behaviorism by attributing these problematic claims to Skinner. This paper attempts to faithfully describe Skinner's claims regarding cognition. Skinner advances several arguments regarding the role of cognitions in human behavior and in the science of human behavior. We suggest that there are two distinct kinds of claims in this web: 1) claims regarding the proper relation between science and cognitions and 2) claims regarding the status of cognitions as natural events. Due to the multiplicity and interdependence of many of these arguments, it is best to view Skinner's position on cognition as consisting of a web of interdependent claims.     

Jacques Loeb, B. F. Skinner, and the legacy of prediction and control

The biologist Jacques Loeb is an important figure in the history of behavior analysis. Between 1890 and 1915, Loeb championed an approach to experimental biology that would later exert substantial influence on the work of B. F. Skinner and behavior analysis. This paper examines some of these sources of influence, with a particular emphasis on Loeb's firm commitment to prediction and control as fundamental goals of an experimental life science, and how these goals were extended and broadened by Skinner. Both Loeb and Skinner adopted a pragmatic approach to science that put practical control of their subject matter above formal theory testing, both based their research programs on analyses of reproducible units involving the intact organism, and both strongly endorsed technological applications of basic laboratory science. For Loeb, but especially for Skinner, control came to mean something more than mere experimental or technological control for its own sake; it became synonomous with scientific understanding. This view follows from (a) the successful working model of science Loeb and Skinner inherited from Ernst Mach, in which science is viewed as human social activity, and effective practical action is taken as the basis of scientific knowledge, and (b) Skinner's analysis of scientific activity, situated in the world of direct experience and related to practices arranged by scientific verbal communities. From this perspective, prediction and control are human acts that arise from and are maintained by social circumstances in which such acts meet with effective consequences.     

Interbehavioral psychology and radical behaviorism: Some similarities and differences

Both J. R. Kantor's interbehavioral psychology and B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorism represent wellarticulated approaches to a natural science of behavior. As such, they share a number of similar features, yet they also differ on a number of dimensions. Some of these similarities and differences are examined by describing their emergence in the professional literature and by comparing the respective units of analysis of the two approaches-the interbehavioral field and the three-term contingency. An evaluation of the similarities and differences shows the similarities to be largely fundamental, and the differences largely ones of emphasis. Nonetheless, the two approaches do make unique contributions to a natural science of behavior, the integration of which can facilitate the development of that science and its acceptance among other sciences and within society at large.     

From mechanistic to functional behaviorism.

A shift from mechanistic behaviorism to functional behaviorism is presented against the background of two historical traditions, one with an emphasis on form, the other with an emphasis on function. Skinner's work, which made more contributions to a functional behaviorism than to a mechanistic behaviorism, exemplifies this shift. The two traditions and an account of Skinner's development of functional relations are presented in order to show Skinner's contributions to aligning modern behavior analysis with the functional tradition.     

The folk psychology of souls

The present article examines how people's belief in an afterlife, as well as closely related supernatural beliefs, may open an empirical backdoor to our understanding of the evolution of human social cognition. Recent findings and logic from the cognitive sciences contribute to a novel theory of existential psychology, one that is grounded in the tenets of Darwinian natural selection. Many of the predominant questions of existential psychology strike at the heart of cognitive science. They involve: causal attribution (why is mortal behavior represented as being causally related to one's afterlife? how are dead agents envisaged as communicating messages to the living?), moral judgment (why are certain social behaviors, i.e., transgressions, believed to have ultimate repercussions after death or to reap the punishment of disgruntled ancestors?), theory of mind (how can we know what it is "like" to be dead? what social-cognitive strategies do people use to reason about the minds of the dead?), concept acquisition (how does a common-sense dualism interact with a formalized socio-religious indoctrination in childhood? how are supernatural properties of the dead conceptualized by young minds?), and teleological reasoning (why do people so often see their lives as being designed for a purpose that must be accomplished before they perish? how do various life events affect people's interpretation of this purpose?), among others. The central thesis of the present article is that an organized cognitive "system" dedicated to forming illusory representations of (1) psychological immortality, (2) the intelligent design of the self, and (3) the symbolic meaning of natural events evolved in response to the unique selective pressures of the human social environment.     

Ernst Mach and B. F. Skinner: Their similarities with two traditions for verbal behavior

Ernst Mach is most closely associated with a positivism that demanded a language of close contact with reality. Mach linked this view with the tradition of the quest for an ideal language in which meaning is a property of a word. Logical positivism and the S-R psychology of the early B. F. Skinner also participated in this ideal-language positivism. In addition, Mach showed an affinity with another tradition-a pragmatic-selectionist tradition-although that tradition and Mach's similarities with it were not as well developed. Mach showed no difficulty in jointly maintaining both of these traditions although they have been regarded as deeply incompatible. When the later Skinner adopted a pragmatic selectionism for his later views on verbal behavior, he rejected his earlier views that were aligned with S-R psychology as well as with logical positivism and its sympathizers. Nevertheless, some statements consistent with "meaning is a property of a word" remained for some time in Skinner's writing.     

Jung's mediatory science as a psychology beyond objectivism

In this paper, the author argues that Jung's non-objectivist--yet scientific--epistemology and his empirical/hermeneatic methods of inquiry situate him within a psychological tradition that, in many respects, began with William James and, today, is finding expression in the work of many non-Jungian cognitive scientists. In an effort to encourage dialogue between Jungians and scholars within related intellectual traditions, the author presents evidence from the corpus of Jung's work that demonstrates that, like William James, Jung intentionally rejected the absolutist claims of objectivism and the opposite position on 'anything goes' relativism, emotivism, or subjectivism. Instead, Jung forged a path that led to the meta-psychological position similar to internal realism (Putnam 1981) or experientialism (Lakoff 1987) and to a theoretical psychology that gave a central place both to unconscious cognitive structure and to imagination. This he labelled a 'mediatory science'. The psychological theories developed within this mediatory science framework represent an early articulation of key constructs that are currently used by a number of cognitive scientists seeking to understand how we make sense of experience.     

西方心理学自我同一性概念的解析

我同一性作为西方心理学中一个重要的概念,广泛地应用于发展心理学、人格心理学、社会心理学、咨询心理学、教育心理学和文化心理学。但由于自我同一性概念内涵的丰富与复杂以及研究者理论框架的不同,使自我同一性的概念缺乏明确统一的定义,从而影响了同一性概念的理论功能。本文分析了埃里克森自我同一性概念的奠基、自我同一性概念的实证研究以及自我同一性概念发展的新趋向,透视了西方心理学自我同一性概念不同层面和不同维度上的含义。最后,提出了整合自我同一性概念应关注的范畴以及自我同一性概念的理解。     

The greening of relationship science

This article briefly outlines the salutary implications for psychology of the development of a science of interpersonal relationships, which has emerged as multidisciplinary in nature and international in scope. Discussed are the potentials of relationship science: to unite psychological scholars with other social, behavioral, and biological scientists; to help integrate many subdisciplines within psychology; to bridge the chasm between researcher and practitioner; to extend knowledge of human behavior to people's daily lives and natural surroundings; and to inform issues of national concern. The realization of these potentials, however, requires transcendence of psychologists' traditional individualistic orientation, as well as more research on the impact of affect on cognition and research on the impact of relationships' exterior environments on their interior dynamics.     

On the origin and preservation of cumulative record in its struggle for life as a favored term

This paper offers a case study of the origins, emergence, and evolution of the term cumulative record as the name for the means by which B. F. Skinner brought his behavior under the control of his subject matter. Our methods included on-line searches, reviews of Skinner's publications, and journal codings and counts. The results reveal that the term is not originally attributable to Skinner, but emerged earlier in ordinary language and in another discipline--education. It was not even original to Skinner in print in his own science. Still, the term was once original to him, which we address with additional analyses of his having originated and advanced it. We conclude with a discussion the constraints of our methods, suggestions for future research, and the variable appreciation of technology and terminology in science studies.     

Radical behaviorism and scientific frameworks. From mechanistic to relational accounts.

A substantial portion of B. F. Skinner's scholarship was devoted to developing methods and terms for a scientific study of behavior. Three concepts central to scientific accounts--cause, explanation, and theory--are examined to illustrate the distinction between mechanistic and relational frameworks and radical behaviorism's relationship to those frameworks. Informed by a scientific tradition that explicitly rejects mechanistic interpretations, radical behaviorism provides a distinctive stance in contemporary psychology. The present analysis suggests that radical behaviorism makes closer contact with the "new world view" advocated by physicists and philosophers of science than does much of contemporary psychology.     

试析现代西方心理学的文化转向

西方心理学正在展现出对文化影响日渐增加的关注。这种文化转向既有科学哲学和历史的原因,也受到世界范围内心理学本土化运动的影响。文化转向的主要表现是：(1)对心理学自然科学模式的反思与诘难;(2)多元文化心理学的兴起;(3)跨文化心理学面临的批评及其转变;(4)认知心理学、发展心理学和健康心理学等分支领域对文化影响的关注。作者认为,文化的转向对于西方心理学的发展具有积极的意义。