共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 0 毫秒
1.
2.
3.
4.
Michael Glanzberg 《Synthese》2009,166(2):281-307
This paper argues that relativity of truth to a world plays no significant role in empirical semantic theory, even as it is
done in the model-theoretic tradition relying on intensional type theory. Some philosophical views of content provide an important
notion of truth at a world, but they do not constrain the empirical domain of semantic theory in a way that makes this notion
empirically significant. As an application of this conclusion, this paper shows that a potential motivation for relativism
based on the relativity of truth to a world fails. 相似文献
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Approximate truth 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Thomas Weston 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》1987,16(2):203-227
Conclusion The technical results presented here on continuity and approximate implication are obviously incomplete. In particular, a syntactic characterization of approximate implication is highly desirable. Nevertheless, I believe the results above do show that the theory has considerable promise for application to the areas mentioned at the top of the paper.Formulation and defense of realist interpretations of science, for example, require approximate truth because we hardly ever have evidence that a particular scientific theory corresponds perfectly with a portion of the real world. Realists need to assert, then, that evidence for a theory is evidence for its approximate truth, not its truth (see [3] and [18]). Approximate truth is, however, a vague notion, and specification of quantity terms and of a sense of approximation are needed to make precise applications of it. Suitability of both vocabulary and sense of approximation depend on the subject matter, and their selection is a partly empirical matter that raises complex issues. In light of the number of common inferences which are not continuous, realists also need to be concerned about indiscriminate use of deductive logic to derive consequences from approximately true theories. These issues will be considered further in a future paper.Approximate truth also has potential application in areas of artificial intelligence that require inference from inaccurate data. In the qualitative physical theories of de Kleer and Brown [6], for example, qualitative values are derived by partitioning the real numbers into regions. Inferences leading from inside to outside a region must be identified and avoided, and approximate implication and continuity may prove useful in doing this. More generally, growing use of predicate logic as a programming language invites application of the theory of approximate truth as a symbolic substitute for numerical evaluation of computation errors. This too will be the subject of a future paper.Thanks to R. Boyd, A. Garfinkel, H. Hertz, P. Solomon, P. Suppes, S. Weissman, and anonymous referees for advice and criticism. 相似文献
10.
Robert Almeder 《Synthese》1990,85(3):507-524
Special thanks go to Paul Humphreys for his criticisms and helpful comments. Also Richard Gale, Gerald Massey, Nicholas Rescher, David Blumenfeld, James Humber, Richard Ketchum, and Wolfgang Dietel made helpful comments on an earlier version. Each found something in need of repair. Finally, I would like to thank the Hambidge Center and the Center for the Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh for providing in 1988 the setting and the resources that made this paper possible. 相似文献
11.
12.
13.
Lars Bergström 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(4):421-435
W. V. Quine has made statements about truth which are not obviously compatible, and his statements have been interpreted in more than one way. For example, Donald Davidson claims that Quine has an epistemic theory of truth, but Quine himself often says that truth is just disquotational. This paper argues that Quine should recognize two different notions of truth. One of these is disquotational, the other is empiricist. There is nothing wrong with recognizing two different notions of truth. Both may be perfectly legitimate, even though, to some extent, they may be applicable in different contexts. Roughly speaking, a sentence is true in the empiricist sense if it belongs to a theory which entails all observation sentences which would be assented to by the speakers of the language in question (and no observation sentences which would be dissented from by these speakers). Various objections to this idea are discussed and rejected. 相似文献
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
Steven Rappaport 《Philosophia》1998,26(3-4):519-524
20.