道德信仰的两重规定及其限度

道德必须以信仰为基础 ,道德信仰既是对道德的信仰 ,又是对善的终极追求。两者合为一体 ,统一于道德信仰这一主体的道德意识之中的 ,它们从不同的角度与层面反映了人对道德的态度与意愿。这是研究道德信仰应有的理论视点。     

无神论道德建设面临的问题

一、信仰制约在道德建设中的分量 什么叫道德?"道德归根到底是被人们的经济 条件所决定的评价人们的思想和行为的善与恶,光 荣与耻辱,公正与偏私的感觉、观念、原则和规范 的总和,它依靠社会舆论,社会习俗和人们内心信 念的力量,保证人们对它的遵守。"(孙国华主编:《法 学基础理论》,中国人民大学出版社,1987年版,第281页),在 这里,道德的来源和实现途径被分解成了社会舆 论、社会习俗和内心信念三个部分。内心信念是与     

论道德生活史研究的独特视阈及原则要求

道德生活史是一个国家和民族道德生活的历史叙述和再现,是以不同时期的道德生活为研究对象并力图揭示其发生发展线索的集描述性伦理学与规范性伦理学为一体的学科。道德生活史的研究因道德生活的本质特点决定了它有自己独特的研究视阈和原则要求。道德生活史的研究既是一种实证性的描述研究,同时又是一种规范性的价值研究,必须超越自然主义和超验主义的研究立场,而将自然主义与超验主义作一有机的整合,必须既联系伦理思想来进行研究但是又不能局限于伦理思想的研究,必须坚持事实与价值相统一、一元与多元相统一以及内容与形式相统一的研究原则。     

道德信仰及其培育的基本理路

当前道德领域突出问题与长期忽视道德信仰的培育和倡导直接相关。道德信仰是人们对社会倡导的道德标准和行为准则所持的极度信赖和遵从的稳定的心理状态及行为倾向,具有整合道德品质的功能。道德治理是道德信仰养成的现实前提;道德信仰是道德治理的精神基础。道德信仰培育,需要在正确认识和理解其极端重要性的前提下,立足于培养人对于道德的尊重和敬畏感,把创新道德教育和厉行道德治理有机地结合起来。     

对干部同样必须加强理想教育——一次道德调查说明的问题

不久前,我们与上海市委宣传部的同志合作,对上海市市民的道德状况进行了一次较大规模的抽样问卷调查。调查的内容包括社会道德的各方面问题。在近6000名调查对象中有各行各业干部1424人。 通过数据分析,我们深深感到,目前,干部在理想方面的状况虽说总的情况是健康的,但是的确也存在不少问题,有相当多的干部理想淡薄,其中一些人完全丧失了革命理想。这种情况说明对干部,包括党员干部,同样必须抓紧进行共产主义理想教育,这应引起各级党组织的充分注意。 首先,让我们看看干部的信仰和他们对幸福的     

从上帝到他人:论列维纳斯现象学神学的内在伦理进路

列维纳斯指出,上帝是一个道德行动,而不是抽象的宗教事件.在“上帝死了”之后要想保持上帝信仰,我们必须从伦理的维度对上帝进行重新阐释.列维纳斯从现象学的维度描述了人类的宗教经验,这种经验结构是一种伦理结构.上帝信仰并不是偶像崇拜,也不是神秘的个人体验,而是人与人伦理关系的最初结构,这种结构导向最高的善;爱上帝在根本上是爱邻人.     

道德信仰何以可能——康德道德信仰的理性基础及其现实性重建

与宗教信仰相对立,康德试图要在主体自身理性的基础上确立起对道德的信仰.主体自身"纯粹的实践理性"是康德道德信仰的理性基础.但是,"纯粹的实践理性"存在着现代性道德困境,如果不能化解这一悖论,那么"道德"就难以成为理性存在者的普遍信仰.为此,康德试图以制度公正作为现实中的上帝来确保建立"善恶因果联系"的理性法则.因此,康德的道德信仰的理性基础包括个体的道德理性和制度的道德理性两个方面.尽管由于康德的矛盾心态和他所处的社会现实,他的政治与道德一体的实践哲学最终是不彻底的.但康德的意义无疑可以帮助我们把对道德信仰的思考从"纯粹的实践理性"导向更加理性和成熟的"实践的理性".     

印光和康德的契合点:以信仰引领道德——兼论当代社会道德危机的根源与出路

关于信仰与道德的关系,中国佛教净土宗第十三祖印光的"儒佛双美论"强调,"得到阿弥陀佛接引,往生西方极乐世界"的净土信仰能使净土宗信众内心变得十分纯净,并且生发出一种不可思议的力量,此力量可引领信众"诸恶莫作,众善奉行",成为世俗的道德楷模;而在德国古典哲学家康德看来,对"至善"的追求和对上帝和天堂的信仰能引领人们严格地实践道德,认真履行自己的道德义务,不畏惧因坚守道德而吃亏。由此可见,以信仰引领道德,道德因信仰而周全,此乃印光和康德在思想上的一个契合点。从这一契合点出发,我们关注和思考当代社会道德危机的根源与出路。     

“信仰”范畴的马克思主义解读及其当代启示

需要信仰而又能够具有信仰,是人之为人的一个重要表征和内在规定性。在数千年的信仰发展史上,人类产生了诸多不同的信仰形式。宗教是信仰存在的最主要形式,但信仰绝非宗教所独有,马克思主义就是一种完全不同于宗教的科学信仰形式。我们必须以真理性与价值性相统一的态度对待马克思主义信仰,既要在理论上重视,更要在行动中努力践行,不断把信仰的力量转化为持续推动人类趋向更高境界的强大物质力量。     

社会转型时期的诚信与道德建设

道德必须以诚信为基础:一方面有赖于人们对道德及其总体性原则是否具有坚定信念,一方面有赖于人们对社会成员能否共同遵守具体性道德规范的相互信任.社会转型时期,利益格局和生存样态的深刻变迁对诚信的两个方面造成了强大的冲击,并由此引发了道德问题.当前的道德问题表现在两个相互强化的方面,即总体性道德原则的缺失与沦丧,以及具体性道德规范、道德认知和道德评价的错位与混乱.道德建设的核心与重点在于诚信建设,而诚信建设又必须以正确揭示当前的利益格局和生存样态为前提.     

Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism

Though moral relativism has had its supporters over the years, it is not a dominant position in philosophy. I will argue here, though, that the view is an attractive position. It evades some hardcore challenges that face absolutism, and it is reconcilable with an appealing emotivist approach to moral attitudes. In previous work, I have offered considerations in favor of a version of moral relativism that I call “perspectivalism.” These considerations are primarily grounded in linguistic data. Here I offer a self‐standing argument for perspectivalism. I begin with an argument against moral absolutism. I then argue that moral terms, such as ‘wrong’ and ‘right’, require for their application that the moral judge instantiate particular affective states, and I use this claim to provide further defense of moral relativism.     

Patient Moral Relativism in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Zhuangzi</Emphasis>

Moral relativism familiar in the Western philosophical tradition, according to David Lyons, is either agent relativism (moral judgments are relative to the standards of the agent or the agent group) or appraiser relativism (moral judgments are relative to the standards of the appraiser(s) or appraiser group(s)). As Lyons has convincingly argued, they are both problematic. However, in the ancient Chinese Daoist classic, the Zhuangzi, we can find a different type of moral relativism, which I call patient relativism (moral judgments are relative to the patients’ standards). In the essay, I aim to argue in what sense Zhuangzi is a patient relativist and how patient relativism can avoid the problem of agent relativism and appraiser relativism.     

Moral Relativism

Moral relativism comes in many varieties. One is a moral doctrine, according to which we ought to respect other cultures, and allow them to solve moral problems as they see fit. I will say nothing about this kind of moral relativism in the present context. Another kind of moral relativism is semantic moral relativism, according to which, when we pass moral judgements, we make an implicit reference to some system of morality (our own). According to this kind of moral relativism, when I say that a certain action is right, my statement is elliptic. What I am really saying is that, according to the system of morality in my culture, this action is right. I will reject this kind of relativism. According to yet another kind of moral relativism, which we may call epistemic, it is possible that, when one person (belonging to one culture) makes a certain moral judgement, such as that this action is right, and another person (belong to another culture) makes the judgement that the very same action is wrong, they may have just as good reasons for their respective judgements; it is even possible that, were they fully informed about all the facts, equally imaginative, and so forth, they would still hold on to their respective (conflicting) judgements. They are each fully justified in their belief in conflicting judgements. I will comment on this form of moral relativism in passing. Finally, however, there is a kind of moral relativism we could call ontological, according to which, when two persons pass conflicting moral verdicts on a certain action, they may both be right. The explanation is that they make their judgements from the perspective of different, socially constructed, moral universes. So while it is true in the first person's moral universe that a certain action is right, it is true in the second person's moral universe that the very same action is wrong. I explain and defend this version of ontological moral relativism.     

Bioethics in the third millennium: some critical anticipations

Its promises to the contrary notwithstanding, bioethics is plural. There is a diversity of content-full moral undertandings of the good and the right. Moreover, there is no secular means in principle to set this diversity aside without begging the question. This moral diversity exists both as a sociological condition and as a moral epistemological constraint. Without succumbing to a metaphysical scepticism or moral relativism, the bioethics of the future, if it is to be honest, should learn how to live with robust moral diversity.     

Commitment

Recently there has been a re-emphasis by both educators and counselors of the concept of commitment. Can this concept bear scrutiny or is it only a popular slogan? It is argued that this concept can find meaning only in a moral absolute. The author points out that relativism is itself a moral absolute. If then we take this concept seriously we are faced with certain difficulties. If this concept is valid for education and counseling then we must either re-examine the issue of religion in the schools or be content with engendering a moral vacuum. It is maintained that the former is the only valid alternative and the author argues for the moral absolute of loving one's neighbor as himself rather than the more prevalent moral absolute of relativism.     

Moral Relativism and Majority Rule

A number of arguments against relativism are based on the concept of majority rule. Since, the arguments allege, on relativism moral truth is founded on majority opinion, relativism entails that (a) moral progress and reform are impossible, (b) propaganda, advertising, brainwashing, and high birth rates turn mistaken moral judgments into correct ones, (c) moral horrors, if enough people believe them acceptable, are not moral horrors at all, (d) finding out what’s right and what’s wrong is extremely easy, (e) moral reasoning is very different from what we normally take it to be, and (f) internal criticism of a moral code is impossible. These arguments get their due in this article, which first defines and explicates relativism and then exposes, explains, and criticizes the arguments. Especially important to understand about the relation between relativism and majority opinion is the notion of a convention. Accordingly, it is discussed at some length.     

A coherent moral relativism

Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face.     

MORAL CONTEXTUALISM AND MORAL RELATIVISM

Moral relativism provides a compelling explanation of linguistic data involving ordinary moral expressions like 'right' and 'wrong'. But it is a very radical view. Because relativism relativizes sentence truth to contexts of assessment it forces us to revise standard linguistic theory. If, however, no competing theory explains all of the evidence, perhaps it is time for a paradigm shift. However, I argue that a version of moral contextualism can account for the same data as relativism without relativizing sentence truth to contexts of assessment. This version of moral contextualism is thus preferable to relativism on methodological grounds.     

彼彻姆和查瑞斯的原则主义进路及其改进

在全球化、多元化背景下,彼彻姆和查瑞斯通过寻找普世原则来容纳道德多元主义和避免道德相对主义,进而为医学伦理学提供一系列清晰、明确、有效的道德规范的努力无疑是可贵的,但其原则主义存在的突出问题是反思平衡方法在实践中不能有效解决根本性的道德冲突。针对这一不足,我们尝试提出解决道德冲突的更有希望的思路。     

Relativism of Distance - a Step in the Naturalization of Meta-Ethics

Bernard Williams proposed his relativism of distance based on the recognition “that others are at varying distances from us”. Recent work in moral psychology and experimental philosophy highlights the prevalence of folk relativism in relation to spatial and temporal distance. However, Williams’ relativism of distance as well as recent empirical findings which seem to support some of Williams’ main ideas on this issue have received scant attention. In this article, we would like to focus on the phenomenon of moral relativism regarding spatiotemporal distance as an entry point to the nature of folk moral relativism and the methodology of meta-ethics. To do so, we first introduce Williams’ relativism of distance. Then we compare Williams’ approach on this matter to recent experimental approaches on folk relativism. On this score the main result is that Williams’ proposal is consistent with several well-established insights on the experimental study of folk relativism. Williams’ relativism of distance is not only empirically plausible, but it is also of relevance for shaping the methodology of an empirically informed meta-ethics. We close this paper by stressing this methodological contribution.