从"德性优先"到"德知并建"——由"良知坎陷"问题引出的中国哲学形上学现代诠释的反思

牟宗三先生的"良知坎陷"有三类提法.只有在道德形上学的圆善层面上进行解读,知识才能得以保存.这固然在儒家心学系统中已经达至圆满,却未必是现代新儒家返本开新的最佳典范.成中英先生在尊重先秦儒家经典的原义上建立了本体诠释学,以一本多体的态度看待道德与知识,在新外王的现代开展上甚于"良知坎陷"的处理方式,为现代中国哲学形上学...     

“仁者浑然与物同体”何以实现?——儒家视域下的程明道思想

儒家以忠恕为仁体的道德基石,忠者尽己,恕者推己,程明道以"扩充得去"为恕,以"天地变化草木蕃"之生生不息表述仁体扩充得去意象。儒家精神,欲使人本其爱亲敬兄之良知良能,扩而充之,由一己小家推及万物,及至全人类,进而至于大同,正是孟子"亲亲而仁民,仁民而爱物"的思想精髓。由博爱万物进至万物一体之大同,必以其爱亲敬兄之良知良能为始基,故曰"孝弟为仁之本"。明道思想之"仁者,浑然与物同体","仁者以天地万物为一体",最能透悟全体,彻悟儒家万物一体的思想进路。     

文化自信与中国美学研究

正在西方近现代化的历史进程中,存在着一种重要的文化与思想动力,那就是中国传统文化思想的影响。1582年,意大利人利玛窦来到中国,掀开了中西文化交流史上"中学西渐"的序幕。他把儒家学说与基督教义相联系,认为"儒家这一教派的最终目的和总的意图是国内的太平和秩序。他们也期待家庭的经济安全和个人的道德修养……完全符合良心的光明和基督教的真理"[1]。利玛窦的介绍使西方人看到     

"三位一体"的中国化诠释

基督教的中国化有三重含义:当代性、历史性与内在且超越性.其当代含义是,在保持基督教的核心教义不变的前提下,与社会主义社会相适应,积极服务于社会.其历史含义是,不同历史时期基督教在中国的本土化、处境化发展.其内在且超越性的基础是"道成肉身":超越的上帝在时空中显现,在历史中生活,将迥然相异的两种不同性质的"存在"结合于一身,使基督教信仰可以突破几千年犹太民族文化传统的束缚,将罗马帝国对于耶稣基督及其犹太民族的暴力统治转化为基督教普世化的契机,并在之后不同的历史和文化中,不断地实现其本土化和现代化."道成肉身"的基督教在与文化的冲突融合中,产生了基督教的核心教义"三位一体".     

从君子“修身”到义人“成圣”——关系性“罪”论视角下的耶儒思想融合之尝试

儒家~([1])历来重视"修身",这是"成仁"之本。君子是儒家的理想人格,而想要成为君子就要从修身开始。儒家的"修身"强调先天的善与后天的努力结合,从而实现从"现实的我"到"理想的我"的过渡。基督教则主张悔罪、重生努力过圣洁的生活是达到"成圣"地步的一生操练。这两种获得理想人格的路径似乎看起来相行不悖,但二者对人的本性,特别是对"罪"的理解并不一致。缺乏罪感文化的国人对于"罪"、"犯罪"等话题的讳莫如深,并不能掩盖中国传统文化中已经存在的"罪"之理念。笔者想要尝试的是,基督教的罪观在中国文化中并不是陌生的,在关系性"罪"论的指引下找到基督教和儒家文化之间的契合点。     

晚清传教士对孔子的认识——以德国传教士安保罗为个案

孔子被历代中国人称为"圣人"。及至西来的基督教传教士把耶稣的福音传到了中土,打破了中国人心目中已有的观念,究竟是应该"心归孔子"还是"心归耶稣",成了中国人几百年来心中萦绕的难题,也成为儒家与基督教两种文化较量的核心议题。德国传教士安保罗以儒学经典为基本依据,特别对孔子进行了详尽的考察,提出不仅"孔子是上帝赐予中华民族的一位伟大先导者",而且儒家思想与基督教思想有相通之处,还担负着传布上帝福音的重要使命。     

基督教在儒家乡土的传播:空间与限度

近现代中国,基督教作为一种异域文明,难以嵌入曲阜儒家乡土社会的文化空间。但自20世纪80年代起,特殊环境下的"因缘际会",却使少部分乡民走进了基督教信仰的世界。近年来,乡村社会保障体系的完善、公共文化产品供给的增加、传统文化习俗活动的张扬等诸多因素,逐渐削弱了基督教迅速传播的外缘性"动力",基督教在儒家乡土的发展呈现明显的式微态势。     

儒家与基督教“诚”伦理之比较

无论是儒家的还是基督教的伦理体系都非常重视"诚"的伦理规范,前者的诚论主要变现为要把天道之"诚"内化为人道之"实"("信")1,后者的诚论集中体现为对于人格化的至上神——上帝的虔诚信仰。两种诚论体系之间既有相似的论证逻辑,从真实无妄、表里如一的情感要求上来看,基督教的虔诚与儒家的诚信是相通的。同时,二者也有明显的差异,这突出地表现在二者的强制性程度之上。在现阶段的社会诚信建设中,我们可以借鉴基督教的虔诚伦理,增强诚信建设的外在的强制力和助推力。     

德性之"仁"与规范之"仁"——简论早期儒家的"仁"说及其现代价值

"仁"是早期儒家学说中的重要范畴.这一范畴既表明了儒家所理解并推崇的最高德性,又界定了儒家所主张的人们生活中普遍适用的行为规范.在儒家学者看来,如果一个人在社会生活中能够自觉地坚持"由仁义行",其结果则可为"行仁义".换言之,一个人若能够具备由"仁"这一范畴所表达的美好德性,实践由"仁"这一范畴所界定的伦理规范,其行为就会是道德的行为,亦即能获取自己圆满的人生价值.在儒家学说中,这种以"仁"范畴表达和论释的人的美德与行为规范及二者统一的伦理思想,值得我们在新的时代条件下借鉴与思考.因为人的德性与人的德行统一,德性是德行的基础,具备良好的德性,可导引行为的道德;坚持德行,则可以完善和彰显人的美德,正是今天我们在现实生活中倡导与追求的伦理意识.而这样的伦理意识早已蕴含在儒家以"仁"范畴为中心建构起来的仁学系统之中.     

儒学当代复兴的思想视域问题——"儒学三期"新论

儒家没有新的,然而儒学是常新的.儒家的复兴在于儒学的重建.儒学的当代重建必须在当代的"生活-存在"的思想视域中进行,才能顺应当代的生活、而避免原教旨主义.这就需要对儒学史进行一种新的认识,为此,本文提出一种新的"儒学三期"说.     

试析儒家忠恕思想中的"己"

在忠恕思想中,"己"或"自我"带有鲜明的儒家特色,主要表现在三个方面:其一,"已"作为忠恕思想的起点,并非世界的中心,而是与他人、社会相互依存、互为条件,从而不断拓展、延伸;其二,"己"概念蕴涵了深刻的道德追求,被赋予了极高的道德期望;其三,在"忠恕之道"中,"己"的价值将在日常道德行动中、在道德原理的实践中得以显现.     

Accepting Forgiveness

Forgiving wrongdoers who neither apologized, nor sought to make amends in any way, is controversial. Even defenders of the practice agree with critics that such “unilateral” forgiveness involves giving up on the meaningful redress that victims otherwise justifiably demand from their wrongdoers: apology, reparations, repentance, and so on. Against that view, I argue here that when a victim of wrongdoing sets out to grant forgiveness to her offender, and he in turn accepts her forgiveness, he thereby serves some important ends of apology and reparation, no matter what else he did—or did not do—by way of repair. Although much overlooked, the simple act of accepting forgiveness joins victim and offender in affirming and acting upon some important shared background assumptions, including many of those expressed in standard apologies. Perhaps more surprisingly, I argue that accepting forgiveness also fulfills the duty to counteract any concrete harm wrongfully inflicted. The argument helps explain some otherwise puzzling features of forgiveness, including that a victim can change her offender’s normative status, making him a less fitting target of the resentment, indignation and shunning of others, and even his own guilt pangs, simply by forgiving him.

     

Inarticulate Forgiveness

Influentially, Pamela Hieronymi has argued that any account of forgiveness must be both articulate and uncompromising. It must articulate the change in judgment that results in the forgiver's loss of resentment without excusing or justifying the misdeed, and without comprising a commitment to the transgressor's responsibility, the wrongness of the action, and the transgressed person's self‐worth. Non‐articulate accounts of forgiveness, which rely on indirect strategies for reducing resentment (for example, reflecting on the transgressor's bad childhood), are said to fail to explain forgiveness. This paper argues that the articulateness condition is not a necessary condition for forgiveness. It responds to numerous objections advanced against non‐articulate accounts, including the claim that the resentment‐mitigating practices they involve amount to excusing. Appealing to P. F. Strawson's distinction between objective and participant attitudes, it argues that forgivers can take transgressors to be detrimentally causally shaped by their past while holding them to be morally responsible.     

Forgiveness in Context

Book reviewed:
Fraser Watts and Liz Gulliford (eds). Forgiveness in Context: Theology and Psychology in Creative Dialogue.     

Forgiveness and recidivism

The teaching of Jesus on limitless forgiveness is a difficult one with which to reckon, especially when an offense is repeated again and again (recidivism), sometimes by the same offender. This article finds in the gospel of Matthew (Matt. 18:15–17) and Paul's letters to the Corinthians (I Cor 5:2–11 and II Cor 2:5–8) a model of forgiveness that is assertive, confrontative and direct in style, pastoral in application and reconciling in spirit.Dr. Donnelly (Ph.D. Claremont Graduate School) is an Associate Professor of Theology and Spirituality at St. John's University, New York, and a Visiting Lecturer at Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey. She has published over a dozen articles on the subject of forgiveness and reconciliation as well as two books:Learning to Forgive (Macmillan 1979; Abingdon, 1982) andPutting Forgiveness into Practice (Argus, 1982).     

Blame After Forgiveness

When a wrongdoing occurs, victims, barring special circumstance, can aptly forgive their wrongdoers, receive apologies, and be paid reparations. It is also uncontroversial, in the usual circumstances, that wronged parties can aptly blame their wrongdoer. But controversy arises when we consider blame from third-parties after the victim has forgiven. At times it seems that wronged parties can make blame inapt through forgiveness. If third parties blame anyway, it often appears the victim is justified in protesting. “But I forgave him!” In other cases, however, forgiveness seems irrelevant: B can forgive A, but it can still seem that third parties can aptly blame A for the wrong against B. This perplexity adds a dimension to ongoing discussion regarding criteria for apt blame and the related issues of standing and fittingness. This paper explores the status of third party blame after forgiveness. I argue that while post forgiveness blame is often inapt, in many other cases forgiveness is irrelevant. This difference is explained by appeal to the various relationships third parties might have to wronged parties, and how these differences affect the ways we blame and thereby blame’s aptness.     

集体主义背景下的宽恕研究及其对心理治疗的启示

以往的宽恕理论和宽恕干预的方法多是基于西方个人主义文化背景的, 缺乏集体主义背景下的相关研究。在集体主义背景下, 被冒犯者应对伤害的方式、宽恕的策略以及影响宽恕的人格特质都与个人主义有明显的区别。此外, 跨文化的宽恕模型也从不同角度描述了集体主义背景下的宽恕, 决定性宽恕和情绪性宽恕模型区分了不同形式的宽恕在不同文化中的表现; 基于自我和人格特质的宽恕模型描述了不同背景下影响宽恕的人格因素; 宽恕的动态过程模型描述了宽恕过程中的文化影响因素。对于这些内容的总结也对集体主义背景下的宽恕干预具有一定的启示作用。