Practical Certainty

When we engage in practical deliberation, we sometimes engage in careful probabilistic reasoning. At other times, we simply make flat out assumptions about how the world is or will be. A question thus arises: when, if ever, is it rationally permissible to engage in the latter, less sophisticated kind of practical deliberation? Recently, a number of authors have argued that the answer concerns whether one knows that p. Others have argued that the answer concerns whether one is justified in believing that one knows that p. Against both of these, this paper argues that the answer concerns whether p is ‘practically certain’—that is, whether the actual epistemic probability that p differs from epistemic certainty that p only in ways that are irrelevant to the decision one currently faces.     

Waiting When Both Certainty and Magnitude Are Increasing: Certainty Overshadows Magnitude

In everyday decision making, people often face decisions with outcomes that differ on multiple dimensions. The trade‐off in preferences between magnitude, temporal proximity, and probability of an outcome is a fundamental concern in the decision‐making literature. Yet, their joint effects on behavior in an experience‐based decision‐making task are understudied. Two experiments examined the relative influences of the magnitude and probability of an outcome when both were increasing over a 10‐second delay. A first‐person shooter video game was adapted for this purpose. Experiment 1 showed that participants waited longer to ensure a higher probability of the outcome than to ensure a greater magnitude when experienced separately and together. Experiment 2 provided a precise method of comparing their relative control on waiting by having each increase at different rates. Both experiments revealed a stronger influence of increasing probability than increasing magnitude. The results were more consistent with hyperbolic discounting of probability than with cumulative prospect theory's decision weight function. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Losing the Certainty of Self

In his theory of trauma, Ferenczi points to the disbelief of adults of a child's account of an event as an actual traumatizing factor. Ferenczi also states that of all the consequences of the trauma, which include identification with the aggressor, psychic coma, departure from the possibility of dreams, and a fall to the hell of nightmares, the most important and fundamental is the lack of certainty of self. The disbelief of the adults destroys the certainty of what is perceived and experienced; it has the power of annihilating the child's belief in his own perceptions, his trust in his own senses. The loss of certainty of self appears to be a common characteristic in patients with distinct psychic dynamics. We will analyze the loss of certainty of self in cases of patients of the NEPECC (Núcleo de Estudos em Psicanálise e Clínica da Contemporaneidade) [Center of Studies in Psychoanalysis and Contemporarity Clinic] at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.     

Wittgenstein and Basic Moral Certainty

In On Certainty, Wittgenstein’s reflections bring into view the phenomenon of basic certainty. He explores this phenomenon mostly in relation to our certainty with regard to empirical states of affairs. Drawing on these seminal observations and reflections, I extend the inquiry into what I call “basic moral certainty”, arguing that the latter plays the same kind of foundational role in our moral practices and judgements as basic empirical certainty does in our epistemic practices and judgements. I illustrate the nature and significance of basic moral certainty via critical examination of contemporary philosophical “explanations” of the wrongness of killing. These pseudo explanations, as I show them to be, will be seen to founder in a similar manner to Moore’s “Proof” of an external world, that is, in a manner that discloses the phenomenon of basic (moral) certainty.     

On Certainty: Wittgenstein and Einstein

The paper focuses on the role of relativistic ideas in Wittgenstein's philosophy. In particular, it focuses on On Certainty (1969), where in (305), Wittgenstein explicitly invokes Einstein's theory of relativity: “Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory.” The aim of the paper is to establish a connection between Wittgenstein and Einstein that is both theoretically and exegetically sound. In particular, the paper argues that Wittgenstein's reaction to scepticism closely resembles Einstein's reaction to the ether.     

Immediacy and Certainty in Intertemporal Choice

Time delay and uncertainty are deeply interrelated though the nature of the interaction between these two constructs remains equivocal. The immediacy and the certainty effects provide an easy access to study the relationship between time delay and uncertainty. Three experiments are described which examine the effect of uncertainty on the immediacy effect and the effect of time delay on the certainty effect. We also present analytical arguments that lead to the tentative conclusion that immediacy is more likely to be a derivative of certainty than the reverse. It is further proposed that laboratory experiments may undermine the importance of uncertainty underlying time delays as demonstrated in experiment 4. Theoretical and methodological intricacies associated with separating uncertainty and time delay are discussed.     

Upward Social Projection and Attitude Certainty

Predicting the attitudes of a powerful out-group can influence attitude strength and the perceived status of in-group members. American farmers indicated their own attitude positions on eight issues relevant to conflict with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and then estimated the positions either of their in-group, the EPA, a control out-group, or participated in a no-estimation control condition. The estimation of attitude disagreement with EPA agents elicited negative thoughts about their power and control which mediated a decrease in self-certainty. Assumed attitude contrast also diminished the perceived status of farmers. Discussion focuses on relational and instrumental sub-group connections.     

Wittgenstein,Ethics and Basic Moral Certainty

Alice Crary claims that “the standard view of the bearing of Wittgenstein's philosophy on ethics” is dominated by “inviolability interpretations”, which often underlie conservative readings of Wittgenstein. Crary says that such interpretations are “especially marked in connection with On Certainty”, where Wittgenstein is represented as holding that “our linguistic practices are immune to rational criticism, or inviolable”. Crary's own conception of the bearing of Wittgenstein's philosophy on ethics, which I call the “intrinsically‐ethical reading”, derives from the influential New Wittgenstein school of exegesis, and is also espoused by James Edwards, Cora Diamond, and Stephen Mulhall. To my eyes, intrinsically‐ethical readings present a peculiar picture of ethics, which I endeavour to expose in Part I of the paper. In Part II I present a reading of On Certainty that Crary would call an “inviolability interpretation”, defend it against New Wittgensteinian critiques, and show that this kind of reading has nothing to do with ethical or political conservatism. I go on to show how Wittgenstein's observations on the manner in which we can neither question nor affirm certain states of affairs that are fundamental to our epistemic practices can be fruitfully extended to ethics. Doing so sheds light on the phenomenon that I call “basic moral certainty”, which constitutes the foundation of our ethical practices, and the scaffolding or framework of moral perception, inquiry, and judgement. The nature and significance of basic moral certainty will be illustrated through consideration of the strangeness of philosophers' attempts at explaining the wrongness of killing.     

Vocational Certainty and Indecision in College Freshmen

Three groups of entering college freshmen, possessing varying degrees of identification of educational-vocational goals, were compared on a variety of personality, achievement, aptitude, school, and family factors. The major differences indicated that the most undecided group was more dependent than the other two groups, but equal to the most decided group in academic achievement, while a middle, or tentatively decided group, was not as successful academically as the most and least decided groups. These findings suggest that educational-vocational indecision has at least two dimensions. A need for different counseling approaches in dealing with uncertain students depending upon the antecedents of their uncertainty is likely.     

World‐Pictures and Wittgensteinian Certainty

Although certainty is a fundamental notion in epistemology, it is less studied in contemporary analytic epistemology than other important notions such as knowledge or justification. This paper focuses on Wittgensteinian certainty, according to which the very basic dimension of our epistemic practices, the elements of our world‐pictures, are objectively certain, in that we cannot legitimately doubt them. The aim of the paper is to offer the best philosophical way to clarify Wittgensteinian certainty, in a way that is consonant with Wittgenstein's fundamental insights. The paper critiques two alternative proposals for clarifying Wittgensteinian certainty that are philosophically unsatisfying: the rule view and the proposition view. Finally, it instead shows how viewing world‐pictures as pictures, in the sense of unclear conceptions, is a more philosophically fruitful approach to understanding world‐pictures.     

The Quest For Certainty In Feminist Thought

In this paper I argue that the essentialism/antiessentialism debate among feminists is a variety of the idealist/realist split that Dewey addressed in The Quest for Certainty. I attempt to use Dewey's thought to subvert this opposition so that we can remove the feminist discussion from the structure of an idealist/realist either/or.     

Fallibilism and the Certainty Norm of Assertion

Topoi - Among the main reactions to scepticism, fallibilism is certainly the most popular nowadays. However, fallibilism faces a very strong and well-known objection. It has to grant that...     

Certainty,reasonableness and argumentation in law

This paper defends a position that parts ways with the positivist view of legal certainty and reasonableness. I start out with a reconstruction of this view and move on to argue that an adequate analysis of certainty and reasonableness calls for an alternative approach, one based on the acknowledgement that argumentation is key to determining the contents, structure, and boundaries of a legal system. Here I claim that by endorsing a dialectical notion of rationality this alternative account espouses an ambitious approach to reasoning in law and conceives of the theory of legal argumentation as the vantage point from which to analyze legal systems and tackle the main problems connected with their existence. Next, I look at what this alternative approach does for the way we should go about treating certainty and reasonableness, considered singularly as well as in their reciprocal relationship. I conclude on this basis that when argumentation receives its due emphasis in law we have to redefine certainty and reasonableness and recast their connection as non-conflictive.