The use of stories in moral development. New psychological reasons for an old education method

Contemporary approaches to moral development and moral education emphasize propositional thinking and verbal discussion of abstract moral dilemmas. In contrast, this article proposes that narratives (stories) are a central factor in a person's moral development. Support for this position comes from recent theoretical contributions of Bruner, Sarbin, Spence, Tulving, and others, who have emphasized narrative thought as a major form of cognition that is qualitatively different from abstract propositional or scientific thinking. In addition, over the last 10 to 20 years psychologists investigating and conceptualizing moral development have come to emphasize such processes as empathy (Hoffman), caring and commitment (Gilligan), interpersonal interaction (Haan), personal character and personality (Coles; Hogan; Staub; Rushton). It is proposed that narratives and narrative thinking are especially involved in how these processes lead to moral development and therefore that narrative should be rehabilitated as a valuable part of moral education.     

A Missing Piece of the Contemporary Character Education Puzzle: The Individualisation of Moral Character

The different sorts of virtuous people who display various virtues to a remarkable degree have brought the issue of individualisation of moral character to the forefront. It signals a more personal dimension of character development which is notoriously ignored in the current discourse on character education. The case is made that since in practice, the individualisation of moral character must, by necessity, advance side by side with the cultivation of virtues, a full account of character education needs to give consideration to both concerns. After analysing the specific ways which temperament, social roles, and occupations respectively contribute to the individualisation of moral character, some practical implications are drawn to shed new light on the common practice of the inculcation of virtues. Firstly, since the varieties of moral personality is the norm, it is appropriate to encourage the educated to become virtuous people of different sorts. Secondly, given the influence that temperament may exert on virtue, having good knowledge of each child’s temperament, identifying the specific difficulties possibly confronting him/her accordingly, and then providing more opportunities to strengthen the cultivation of the related virtues are crucial. Thirdly, since children with different temperaments are inclined to identify with different sorts of moral exemplars, it is valuable to present them a great variety of moral models, from which they can choose the kind of virtuous people they would want to emulate. Lastly, since assuming different occupations and social roles is liable to result in various moral characters, character formation cannot be confined to the family or school. Among others, workplaces and communities are also important variables.     

Character: The Prospects for a Personality‐Based Perspective on Morality

In the early parts of the 20th century, character made up a major part of psychology, specifically of personality psychology. However, an influential observational study of children's moral behavior, conducted by Hartshorne, May, and colleagues in the 1920s, suggested that consistency in morality‐related behavior was lower than many people expected. Some psychologists interpreted such results to mean that there was no consistency in moral behavior and thus that there were no stable, meaningful individual differences in moral behavior – character did not exist. Recent years have witnessed a reinvigoration of character, ethics, and morality as objects of psychological study. Our purpose in this paper is to contribute to this reinvigoration by reviewing the use of the concept of “character” within psychology, considering whether the evidence supports the notion of moral character as a psychological construct, and suggesting new prospects for research on moral character.     

The VIA inventory of strengths,positive youth development,and moral education

ABSTRACT

The VIA Inventory of Strengths and the VIA model were originally developed to assess and study 24 character strengths. In this paper, I discuss how the VIA Inventory and its character strength model can be applied to the field of moral education with moral philosophical considerations. First, I review previous factor analysis studies that have consistently reported factors containing candidates for moral virtues, and discuss the systematic structure and organization of VIA character strengths. Second, I discuss several issues related to the VIA model, including a lack of previous studies that directly support the moral justifiability of the model and the presence of a fundamental virtue component required for optimal moral functioning in virtue ethics, phronesis, practical wisdom, in the model. Finally, I propose future directions for research on the VIA model in order to address the aforementioned issues and facilitate the application of the model in moral education.     

On the Irreducibility of Moral Incapacity

There is a growing consensus that moral incapacities are an important feature of the moral life and moral character. Philosophers are, however, somewhat at odds over the status and explanatory role of such volitional limits in models of moral psychology. They are sometimes understood reductively, as the products or expressive manifestations of underlying, working parts of character (such as dispositions, beliefs, passions, and values). Others view moral incapacities as constitutive elements of character, that is, primitive features of moral mindedness and agency which help give a person their moral substance and shape. I defend the constitutive conception by arguing against the most promising reductive account available: Dwight Furrow’s account of the incapacity underlying Oscar Schindler’s moral heroism. This gives strong evidence that moral incapacity is a basic and constitutive feature of our conception of character.     

Being good to look good: Self-reported moral character predicts moral double standards among reputation-seeking individuals

Moral character is widely expected to lead to moral judgements and practices. However, such expectations are often breached, especially when moral character is measured by self-report. We propose that because self-reported moral character partly reflects a desire to appear good, people who self-report a strong moral character will show moral harshness towards others and downplay their own transgressions—that is, they will show greater moral hypocrisy. This self-other discrepancy in moral judgements should be pronounced among individuals who are particularly motivated by reputation. Employing diverse methods including large-scale multination panel data (N = 34,323), and vignette and behavioural experiments (N = 700), four studies supported our proposition, showing that various indicators of moral character (Benevolence and Universalism values, justice sensitivity, and moral identity) predicted harsher judgements of others' more than own transgressions. Moreover, these double standards emerged particularly among individuals possessing strong reputation management motives. The findings highlight how reputational concerns moderate the link between moral character and moral judgement.     

The problem with moralism

Moralism is often described as a vice. But what exactly is wrong with moralism that makes it aptly described as a character flaw? This paper will argue that the problem with moralism is that it downgrades the force of legitimate moral criticism. First, I will argue that moralism involves an inflated sense of the extent to which moral criticism is appropriate. Next, I will examine the value of legitimate moral criticism, arguing that its value stems from enabling us to take a stand against immoral behavior. Finally, I will argue that unwarranted moral criticism downgrades the force of legitimate moral criticism and that this is why moralism should be seen as a vice.     

The education of the categorical imperative

In this article, I examine anew the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant and its contributions to educational theory. I make four claims. First, that Kant should be read as having the Categorical Imperative develop out of subjective maxims. Second, that moral self-perfection is the aim of moral education. Third, that moral self-perfection develops by children habituating the results of their moral maxims in scenarios and cases. Fourth, that character and culture, Kant’s highest aims for humanity, are the ultimate beneficiaries of this process.     

The education of the categorical imperative

In this article, I examine anew the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant and its contributions to educational theory. I make four claims. First, that Kant should be read as having the Categorical Imperative develop out of subjective maxims. Second, that moral self-perfection is the aim of moral education. Third, that moral self-perfection develops by children habituating the results of their moral maxims in scenarios and cases. Fourth, that character and culture, Kant’s highest aims for humanity, are the ultimate beneficiaries of this process.     

The Limits of Mercy

Our characters are formed, at least in part, by forces beyond our control. Should this lead us to mitigate the responsibility of those who turn out badly? Martha Nussbaum argues that we ought to be merciful to wrongdoers on these grounds. Against Nussbaum, I argue that we have important moral reasons to treat people as responsible for character and hence to eschew mercy. Treating someone as responsible is required if we are to treat them as a moral agent, to treat them as having a moral point of view that is worth hearing. However my point is not that there are no reasons for mercy, but simply that there are other reasons, to do with respect, that pull in the opposite direction. The result is not a decision procedure for all cases but a better understanding of the complex moral geography.     

道德概念的垂直空间隐喻及其对认知的影响

采用不同的研究方法考察道德概念的垂直空间隐喻表征, 及其对于人的认知的影响。实验1采用迫选法, 在明确要求被试把道德词放在垂直空间位置的上方或下方时, 发现在意识层面, 被试倾向于把道德词放在垂直空间的上部, 把不道德词放在垂直空间的下部。实验2采用无关任务法, 对实验词语作褒贬义判断, 实验结果发现, 道德词出现在空间的上方(相对于下方)时, 被试对道德词作褒贬义判断的时间短; 不道德词出现在空间的下方(相对于上方)时, 被试作褒贬义判断的时间则短。实验3通过记忆任务发现, 道德概念的启动使得个体高估了相继出现的客体的高度和长度, 不道德概念的启动使得个体低估了其高度和长度。三个实验的结果表明, 汉语道德概念的垂直空间隐喻具有心理现实性; 汉语道德概念的垂直空间隐喻既存在于无意识层面又可以在意识的层面显现; 汉语道德概念的垂直空间隐喻表征会影响对物体的高度和长度的估计, 表现为汉语道德概念隐喻表征的“认知偏移效应”。     

善恶人格的特质差序

善恶问题是人们在社会生活中的重要话题, 在对他人进行知觉时, 人们首先关心的信息是什么, 是否会对不同类型善恶特质有所权衡?研究基于人格心理学视角, 通过4个研究对该问题进行了探讨。研究首先探究了人格的道德概念激活时善恶的差异, 并以代表性、好恶度、特质度和重要性为衡量指标分别考察了不同类型善恶特质的核心程度差异。结果发现, 善恶人格的特质差序体现在两个方面：(1)善恶人格间的差序, 在人格的道德范畴中, 存在善人格的优先效应; (2)善恶人格内的差序, “善”的核心由内到外为尽责诚信、仁爱友善与包容大度、利他奉献; “恶”的核心由内到外为凶恶残忍、背信弃义与污蔑陷害、虚假伪善。研究有助于进一步理解中国人的善恶观, 为善恶领域的探究提供了新思路。     

When actions speak volumes: The role of inferences about moral character in outrage over racial bigotry

Inferences about moral character may often drive outrage over symbolic acts of racial bigotry. Study 1 demonstrates a theoretically predicted dissociation between moral evaluations of an act and the person who carries out the act. Although Americans regarded the private use of a racial slur as a less blameworthy act than physical assault, use of a slur was perceived as a clearer indicator of poor moral character. Study 2 highlights the dynamic interplay between moral judgments of acts and persons, demonstrating that first making person judgments can bias subsequent act judgments. Privately defacing a picture of Martin Luther King, Jr. led to greater moral condemnation of the agent than of the act itself only when the behavior was evaluated first. When Americans first made character judgments, symbolically defacing a picture of the civil rights leader was significantly more likely to be perceived as an immoral act. These studies support a person‐centered account of outrage over bigotry and demonstrate that moral evaluations of acts and persons converge and diverge under theoretically meaningful circumstances. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Problem of Moral Luck: An Argument Against its Epistemic Reduction

Whom I call ‘epistemic reductionists’ in this article are critics of the notion of ‘moral luck’ that maintain that all supposed cases of moral luck are illusory; they are in fact cases of what I describe as a special form of epistemic luck, the only difference lying in what we get to know about someone, rather than in what (s)he deserves in terms of praise or blame. I argue that epistemic reductionists are mistaken. They implausibly separate judgements of character from judgements concerning acts, and they assume a conception of character that is untenable both from a common sense perspective and with a view to findings from social psychology. I use especially the example of Scobie, the protagonist of Graham Greene’s novel The Heart of the Matter, to show that moral luck is real—that there are cases of moral luck that cannot be reduced to epistemic luck. The reality of moral luck, in this example at least, lies in its impact on character and personal and moral identity.

道德敏感性的研究现状与展望

道德敏感性是对情境的道德含意的领悟和解释能力,是道德行为产生过程中逻辑上的初始心理成分。道德敏感性与个体对情境的自动化加工及其伴随着的直觉情绪有着密切的关系。情境的背景与特征,个体的角色卷入、道德图式以及人格特点等因素都可能影响个体的道德敏感性。道德敏感性研究已在儿童早期发展、职业伦理以及测验方法等领域取得一定成果,但其理论构建仍需进一步完善、深化,与教育干预密切相关的发展研究有待加强,研究方法也需拓展和改进     

Morality Predicts Enjoyment But Not Appreciation of Morally Ambiguous Characters

Understanding the role of morally ambiguous characters such as anti-heroes in entertainment experiences has become a central concern for media researchers. Some have argued that different character schemas or tropes may vary along specific moral domains, whereas others promote a linear progression of moral violation from hero to villain. This study presents the results of survey data (N = 294) examining the perceptions of established character tropes in terms of character morality, enjoyment, and appreciation responses. Popular perceptions of character tropes drawn from the website TV Tropes did not significantly differ in terms of which moral domains they upheld or violated, but demonstrated a linear progression of moral violation across five domains of morality. Perceptions of character tropes also did not differ significantly in associations with enjoyment, appreciation, or variables drawn from character identification literature such as self-expansion, wishful identification, or homophily. When examining media responses, however, self-expansion, wishful identification, and moral violation were all strongly related to enjoyment. Unlike enjoyment, appreciation was not related to moral violation. These results are discussed in terms of hedonic and eudaimonic responses to characters.     

Moral Character and the Significance of Action: Judging Dmitri Karamazov

The paper considers the problematic relation between a person and her action as it is expressed in the problem of blame and moral judgement. I argue that blaming someone for her action does affect our moral judgement of her, but does not imply condemnation of her moral character. I use the example of Dmitri Karamazov to show that a response to a particular situation, although shaped by the previous character of the person, does not follow from it and can in turn affect and change the person's character by changing the way in which she perceives what is valuable.     

Evil and moral detachment: further reflections on The Mirror Thesis

A commonly accepted claim by philosophers investigating the nature of evil is that the evil person is, in some way, the mirror image of the moral saint. In this paper I will defend a new version of this thesis. I will argue that both the moral saint and the morally evil person are characterized by a lack of conflict between moral and non-moral concerns. However, while the saint achieves this unity through a reconciliation of the two, the evil person does so by eliminating moral concerns from her character.     

The development and validation of a measure of character: The CIVIC

The present research study sought to develop and validate a character scale – the Comprehensive Inventory of Virtuous Instantiations of Character using a total sample size of 3679 across five studies. In Study 1, character trait items were generated using an integrative classification system. In Study 2, character trait scales were further refined and their factor structure examined, revealing eight higher-order character dimensions or character cores: appreciation, intellectual engagement, fortitude, interpersonal consideration, sincerity, temperance, transcendence, and empathy. Study 3 established convergent validity of character traits with extant measures and discriminability from personality facets, social desirability, and moral cognitive development. Study 4 revealed that character cores were more strongly related to evaluative constructs than personality dimensions. Study 5 demonstrated that character cores predicted performance and psychological well-being outcomes above and beyond personality. The implications of our findings for the assessment and taxonomy of character are discussed.