The self in Kierkegaard's pseudonyms

Conclusion This is essentially what I take to be Kierkegaard's ontological foundation of human existence. It is the structure which both makes possible and unifies the different modes of existing which he so fully describes in his pseudonyms. The further task is one of demonstrating concretely the relation of these modes (stages) of existing to his ontology.This essay will appear in my book, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms, to be published by Princeton University Press in 1975. I would like to thank the Princeton University Pres for permission to publish a portion of the book in this journal. I would also like to acknowledge my colleagues' helpful criticisms of the original draft of this paper which I read in a departmental seminar at Iowa State University last fall. Some of their suggestions were incorporated in the final draft.     

Wright's Argument from Neutrality

In the first chapter of his book Truth and Objectivity (1992), Crispin Wright puts forward what he regards as 'a fundamental and decisive objection' to deflationism about truth (p. 21). His objection proceeds by an argument to the conclusion that truth and warranted assertibility coincide in normative force and potentially diverge in extension ( I call this the 'argument from neutrality'). This argument has already received some attention. However, I do not believe that it has been fully understood yet. In this short paper, I shall assess the cogency of Wright's objection in some detail. My agenda is as follows. First, I give what I believe to be an adequate rendering of the objection. Secondly, I reveal the real force of the neutrality argument and say thirdly why it does not, as Wright thinks, refute deflationism. Finally, I argue that Wright's insistence that truth is a 'substantial property' is uncongenial to the overall project of his book.     

Rayo’s Metametaphysics

Abstract

In his important book The Construction of Logical Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), Agustín Rayo lays out a distinctive metametaphysical view and applies it fruitfully to disputes concerning ontology and concerning modality. In this article, I present a number of criticisms of the view developed, mostly focusing on the underlying metametaphysics and Rayo’s claims on its behalf.     

You Must Have Thought This Book Was About You1: Reply to Daniel Dennett

Daniel Dennett's review 2 of my book, Human Nature and the Limits of Science, 3 was apparently conceived as part of a multiple review, anticipating an author's response, so I am grateful for the opportunity to satisfy this expectation. Indeed, Dennett uses this excuse to justify devoting his own contribution to responding to those parts of the book directed explicitly at his own work, leaving other imagined reviewers to take care of other issues. Since he has things to say about most of the topics in the book he evidently interpreted this remit widely, in fact taking the book as “presented as an antidote of sorts to [his] own world view” (p. 482). Let me begin, therefore, by reassuring Dennett that, while I certainly had some critical things to say about some of his views, the book most certainly was not intended as an ad hominem attack. The nine pages (out of 187) on which his work is cited fairly accurately reflects the extent to which his views figured in my thinking. Curiously, his ire seems most strongly aroused by my assault on his views on free will in which, apparently, I agree with nearly everything he says and, worse still, fail to cite him at all.     

Heideggerian Meditations on an Alternative Ontology for Ecological Psychology: A Response to Turvey's (1992) Proposal

In his last book, Gibson (1979/1986) clearly described crucial elements for an ontology for ecological psychology, but left his overarching ontology implicit and incomplete. As a partial remedy, Turvey (1992) presented a compact, well- packaged outline of an ontology for ecological psychology derived in part from the work of Bunge. In appreciation of Turvey's pioneering and thought-provoking attack on this difficult issue, we offer our own reflections on Turvey's propertied realism. In reviewing Turvey's work we use both the insights of Heidegger and recent experimental findings in ecological psychology to argue for the need for a different ontological foundation. We argue that a Heideggerian ontology can provide us with a broader and more complete ontological foundation with which to deal with complex issues, such as prospective control, than can Turvey's proposed ontology. Also, we suggest that a Heideggerian ontology can be used to supply what is missing or understated in Gibson. We argue against propertied realism as a basis for ecological psychology's ontology and contend that a proper conception of intentionality provides a way to transcend traditional object-subject ontologies. We propose that fields should be considered real ontological entities that differ from matter. Finally, we reflect on how the highly nonscientific language of Heidegger might possibly be formalized to make it more suitable for scientific use.     

How Is Critical Ontology Possible? Toward the Foundation of the General Theory of the Categories, Part One (1923)

This is a translation of an early essay by the German philosopher Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950). In this 1923 essay Hartmann presents many of the fundamental ideas of his new critical ontology. He summarizes some of the main points of his critique of neo-Kantian epistemology, and provides the point of departure for his new approach in an extensive criticism of the errors of the classical ontological tradition. Some of these errors concern the definition of an ontological category or principle, and others concern the relations among categories themselves. The outline for the new ontology is sketched through the correctives Hartmann appends to the treatment of each error, prefiguring his mature ontological system.     

An Adamsian Theory of Intrinsic Value

In this paper I develop a theological account of intrinsic value drawn from some passages in Robert Merrihew Adams’ book Finite and Infinite Goods. First I explain why Adams’ work on this topic is interesting, situate his theory within the broader literature on intrinsic value, and draw attention to some of its revisionist features. Next I state the theory, raise some problems for it, and refine it in light of those problems. Then I illustrate how the refined theory works by showing that it has the resources to deal with some seemingly formidable objections.     

王弼"大衍义"略论

王弼易学的特点是以<老>解<易>,以他在<老子注>中所阐发的玄学本体论思想为基础来解释<周易>,这主要体现在他的<周易略例>当中.而他对"大衍之数"的解释,也使"大衍义"在其思想体系中占有重要地位.联系<周易略例>我们就能看出,"大衍义"是连接王弼玄学中老学和易学的桥梁,它体现了王弼玄学的体用观念,为王弼思想由老学向易学的过渡打下了基础.     

On the "Gray's Elegy" Argument and its Bearing on Frege's Theory of Sense

In his recent book, The Metaphysicians of Meaning (2000), Gideon Makin argues that in the so-called "Gray's Elegy " argument (the GEA) in "On Denoting", Russell provides decisive arguments against not only his own theory of denoting concepts but also Frege's theory of sense. I argue that by failing to recognize fundamental differences between the two theories, Makin fails to recognize that the GEA has less force against Frege's theory than against Russell's own earlier theory. While I agree with many aspects of Makin's interpretation of the GEA, I differ with him regarding some significant details and present an interpretation according to which the GEA emerges as simpler, stronger, and more integrated.     

Alonzo church:his life,his work and some of his miracles

This paper is dedicated to Alonzo Church, who died in August 1995 after a long life devoted to logic. To Church we owe lambda calculus, the thesis bearing his name and the solution to the Entscheidungsproblem.His well-known book Introduction to Mathematical LogicI, defined the subject matter of mathematical logic, the approach to be taken and the basic topics addressed. Church was the creator of the Journal of Symbolic Logicthe best-known journal of the area, which he edited for several decades

This paper is in three sections. The first is written in journalistic style:the story of the life of AlonzoChurch is told, including some of the many anecdotes I have collected from different sources. The secondpart is devoted to his work, but is far from being exhaustive. The last part is more original; in it I attempto show that Church’s great discovery was lambda calculus and that his remaining contributions weremainly inspired afterthoughts in the sense that most of his contributions as well as some of his pupils derivefrom that initial achievement. Included are Kleene’s Recursion Theory and the completeness proof ofHenkin. I have added an appendix in which is presented the typed lambda calculus and a proof of theundecidability of first-order logic     

Generation,interiority and the phenomenology of Christianity in Michel Henry

In this paper I focus on a central phenomenological concept in Michel Henry’s work that has often been neglected: generation. Generation becomes an especially important conceptual key to understanding not only the relationship between God and human self but also Henry’s adoption of radical interiority and his critical standpoint with respect to much of the phenomenological tradition in which he is working. Thus in pursuing the theme of generation, I shall introduce many phenomenological-theological terms in Henry’s trilogy on Christianity as well as how he understands the relationship between phenomenology and theology. In the final sections of the paper, I turn to positively defining Henry’s notion of divine generation and examine the theological implications of it in light of his confrontation and rejection of the doctrine of creation in the book of Genesis found in his book, Incarnation: une philosophie de la chair. Humans are not created but are eternally generated, a bold claim that brings Henry to the brink of a kind of interiorized pantheism or Gnostic dualism. Finally, I offer some critical comments specifically about Henry’s doctrine of generation in light of the tension between auto-affection and hetero-affection and thus how one might think “after Henry” in light of the basic Augustinian theological distinction between self and God and the intentionality of faith opened up by that distinction.     

Comments on Fabian Freyenhagen,Adorno's Practical Philosophy

In this paper, I offer some critical comments on Fabian Freyenhagen's book, Adorno's Practical Philosophy. Although I am largely in agreement with many of his arguments about the value of Adorno's negativism for contemporary critical theory, I raise a few critical questions that are grouped around the following three headings: immanent critique, objectivism, and skepticism. My primary aim in pursuing these questions is not to haggle over fine points of Adorno interpretation but rather to consider how these three issues bear systematically on the vision for critical theory that Freyenhagen has put forward.     

Review of B. F. Skinner's The Behavior of Organisms

As I reread my review nearly 50 years later, I think of the circumstances. I had heard a paper by Fred at the Ithaca meeting of the APA in 1932, and recall the praise by Edna Heidbreder, who was sitting next to me, whose remark was that “He has a clean mind.” The year before his book appeared, I had already cited eight of his published papers in a review of the conditioned response in relation to conventional learning experiments that appeared in the Psychological Bulletin (1937, 34, 61–102). It may be because of that the editor sent me Fred's book to review.

When I received the copy of his new book to review, I read it carefully, and soon reported on it orally before Lewis Terman's weekly seminar to get comments and questions before revising my review. I was pleased by Terman's excitement over the originality of Fred's approach.

     

Reiman on Labor,Value, and the Difference Principle

In As Free and as Just as Possible: The Theory of Marxian Liberalism, Jeffrey Reiman proposes to develop a theory of “Marxian Liberalism.” ‘Liberalism’ here is defined by the principle that “sane adult human beings should be free in the sense of free from coercion that would block their ability to act on the choices they make.” While the idea of coercion could use some glossing, it is not obvious that poverty, unemployment, racism, and sexism are as such coercive. In this book, it is, very broadly, economic inequality that is the focus, and the argument is that a previously insufficiently appreciated idea that is broadly Marxian shows us that we need a Rawlsian Difference Principle to counteract inherent coercion in the system of free enterprise capitalism. I argue that the book wrongly places the component of labor in the system of economic exchange. We do not as such exchange labor: we exchange services; and because of this there is no normative pull toward his thesis that there is something fundamentally wrong—some people are being unjustly exploited—when several hours of one person’s labor are required to purchase the output of just one of another person’s. Liberalism, I argue, rejects Marxism.     

Egalitarians,sufficientarians, and mathematicians: a critical notice of Harry Frankfurt’s On Inequality

This critical notice provides an overview of Harry Frankfurt’s On Inequality and assesses whether Frankfurt is right to argue that equality is merely formal and empty. I counter-argue that egalitarianism, properly tweaked and circumscribed, can be defended against Frankfurt’s repudiation. After surveying the main arguments in Frankfurt’s book, I argue that whatever plausibility the ‘doctrine of sufficiency’ defended by Frankfurt may have, it does not strike a fatal blow against egalitarianism. There is nothing in egalitarianism that forbids acceptance of the moral platitude expressed in sufficientarianism's positive thesis, (viz., it is morally important that everyone have enough). Nor is there anything in egalitarianism as such that makes it impossible to recognize the banal truth that there are many important things besides equality, and that many dimensions of human affairs are improperly appraised from a relational or comparative point of view. The fact that a relational or comparative point of view is sometimes out of place, however, surely does not mean that it always is. I conclude with the suggestion that egalitarianism is most compelling when it is understood as a normative conception of social relations (rather than, as Frankfurt seems to assume throughout his book, a thesis about the equal distribution of something) and thus presides over precisely those aspects of human affairs for which that relational or comparative point of view is germane.     

Parfit on Free Will,Desert, and the Fairness of Punishment

In his recent monumental book On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues for a hard determinist view that rejects free will-based moral responsibility and desert. This rejection of desert is necessary for his main aim in the book, the overall reconciliation of normative ethics. In Appendix E of his book, however, Parfit claims that it is possible to mete out fair punishment. Parfit’s position on punishment here seems to be inconsistent with his hard determinism. I argue that Parfit is mistaken here, in a way that leads him to unjustified optimism about the possibility of fair penalization. Insofar as we take the free will problem seriously, we cannot reconcile a belief in the absence of desert with a belief in the fairness of penalization.     

Impetus for a robust science of behavior: A review of Nevin's Behavioral Momentum: A scientific metaphor

Nevin provides a scientific role model, illustrating momentum in his own research and providing impetus through his effects on the scientific behavior of his students and his colleagues. I discuss his book in the context of a review of the history of the concept of extinction, I cite his introduction of signal‐detection analysis into behavior analysis as a contribution not covered in this book, I briefly consider applications, such as the potential extension to fluency procedures in education, and I critique his concept of momentum, relating it to other metaphors for maintained behavior such as the dynamics of sensory systems and robustness in biological accounts of the stability of phenotypes.     

BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY: PAST,PRESENT, AND FUTURE. A REVIEW OF HARRY HEFT'S ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN CONTEXT

Relations between behavior analysis and ecological psychology have been strained for years, notwithstanding the occasional comment on their affinities. Harry Heft's (2001) Ecological Psychology in Context provides an occasion for reviewing anew those relations and affinities. It describes the genesis of ecological psychology in James's radical empiricism; addresses Holt's neorealism and Gestalt psychology; and synthesizes Gibson's ecological psychology and Barker's ecobehavioral science as a means for understanding everyday human behavior. Although behavior analysis is excluded from this account, Heft's book warrants a review nonetheless: It describes ecological psychology in ways that are congruent and complementary with behavior analysis (e.g., nonmediational theorizing; the provinces of natural history and natural science). After introducing modern ecological psychology, I comment on (a) Heft's admirable, albeit selective, historiography; (b) his ecological psychology—past and present—as it relates to Skinner's science and system (e.g., affordances, molar behavior); (c) his misunderstandings of Skinner's behaviorism (e.g., reductionistic, mechanistic, molecular); and (d) the theoretical status of Heft's cognitive terms and talk (i.e., in ontology, epistemology, syntax). I conclude by considering the alliance and integration of ecological psychology and behavior analysis, and their implications for unifying and transforming psychology as a life science, albeit more for the future than at present.