Why do young infants fail to search for hidden objects?

Recent evidence indicates that infants as young as 3.5 months of age understand that objects continue to exist when hidden (Baillargeon, 1987a; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1990). Why, then, do infants fail to search for hidden objects until 7 to 8 months of age? The present experiments tested whether 5.5-month-old infants could distinguish between correct and incorrect search actions performed by an experimenter. In Experiment 1, a toy was placed in front of (possible event) or under (impossible event) a clear cover. Next, a screen was slid in front of the objects, hiding them from view. A hand then reached behind the screen and reappeared holding the toy. The infants looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible event, suggesting that they understood that the hand's direct reaching action was sufficient to retrieve the toy when it stood in front of but not under the clear cover. The same results were obtained in a second condition in which a toy was placed in front of (possible event) or behind (impossible event) a barrier. In Experiment 2, a toy was placed under the right (possible event) or the left (impossible event) of two covers. After a screen hid the objects, a hand reached behind the screen's right edge and reappeared first with the right cover and then with the toy. The infants looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible event, suggesting that they realized that the hand's sequence of action was sufficient to retrieve the toy when it stood under the right but not the left cover. A control condition supported this interpretation. Together, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that by 5.5 months of age, infants not only represent hidden objects, but are able to identify the actions necessary to retrieve these objects. The implications of these findings for a problem solving explanation of young infants' failure to retrieve hidden objects are considered.     

When does repeated search in scenes involve memory? Looking at versus looking for objects in scenes

One might assume that familiarity with a scene or previous encounters with objects embedded in a scene would benefit subsequent search for those items. However, in a series of experiments we show that this is not the case: When participants were asked to subsequently search for multiple objects in the same scene, search performance remained essentially unchanged over the course of searches despite increasing scene familiarity. Similarly, looking at target objects during previews, which included letter search, 30 seconds of free viewing, or even 30 seconds of memorizing a scene, also did not benefit search for the same objects later on. However, when the same object was searched for again memory for the previous search was capable of producing very substantial speeding of search despite many different intervening searches. This was especially the case when the previous search engagement had been active rather than supported by a cue. While these search benefits speak to the strength of memory-guided search when the same search target is repeated, the lack of memory guidance during initial object searches-despite previous encounters with the target objects-demonstrates the dominance of guidance by generic scene knowledge in real-world search.     

How special are objects? Children's reasoning about objects, parts, and holes

Discrete physical objects have a special status in cognitive and linguistic development. Infants track and enumerate objects, young children are biased to construe novel words as referring to objects, and, when asked to count an array of items, preschool children tend to count the discrete objects, even if explicitly asked to do otherwise. We address here the question of whether discrete physical objects are the only entities that have this special status, or whether other individuals are salient as well. In two experiments, we found that 3-year-olds are just as good at identifying, tracking, and counting certain nonobject entities (holes in Experiment 1; holes and parts in Experiment 2) as they are with objects. These results are discussed in light of different theories of the nature and development of children's object bias.     

Manual exploration of objects is related to 7-month-old infants’ visual preference for real objects

The present study examined whether infants’ visual preferences for real objects and pictures are related to their manual object exploration skills. Fifty-nine 7-month-old infants were tested in a preferential looking task with a real object and its pictorial counterpart. All of the infants also participated in a manual object exploration task, in which they freely explored five toy blocks. Results revealed a significant positive relationship between infants’ haptic scan levels in the manual object exploration task and their gaze behavior in the preferential looking task: The higher infants’ haptic scan levels, the longer they looked at real objects compared to pictures. Our findings suggest that the specific exploratory action of haptically scanning an object is associated with infants’ visual preference for real objects over pictures.     

Individuation of objects – a problem for structuralism?

This paper identifies two aspects of the structuralist position of S. Shapiro which are in conflict with the actual practice of mathematics. The first problem follows from Shapiros identification of isomorphic structures. Here I consider the so called K-group, as defined by A. Grothendieck in algebraic geometry, and a group which is isomorphic to the K-group, and I argue that these are not equal. The second problem concerns Shapiros claim that it is not possible to identify objects in a structure except through the relations and functions that are defined on the structure in which the object has a place. I argue that, in the case of the definition of the so called direct image of a function, it is possible to individuate objects in structures.     

The sound of darkness: why do auditory cues aid infants' search for objects hidden by darkness but not by visible occluders?

In manual search tasks designed to assess infants' knowledge of the object concept, why does search for objects hidden by darkness precede search for objects hidden by visible occluders by several months? A graded representations account explains this décalage by proposing that the conflicting visual input from occluders directly competes with object representations, whereas darkness merely weakens representations. This study tests the prediction that representations of objects hidden by darkness are strong enough for infants to bind auditory cues to them and support search, whereas representations of objects hidden by occluders are not. Six-and-half-month-olds were presented with audible or silent objects that remained visible, became hidden by darkness, or became hidden by a visible occluder. Search required engaging in the same means-end action in all conditions. As predicted, auditory cues increased search when objects were hidden by darkness but not when they were hidden by a visible occluder. Results are discussed in the context of different facets of object concept development highlighted by graded representations perspectives and core knowledge perspectives and in relation to other work on multimodal object representations.     

Delayed memory for visual—haptic exploration of familiar objects

Long-term memory of haptic, visual, and cross-modality information was investigated. In Experiment 1, subjects briefly explored 40 commonplace objects visually or haptically and then received a recognition test with categorically similar foils in the same or the alternative modality both immediately and after 1 week. Recognition was best for visual input and test, with haptic memory still apparent after a week's delay. Recognition was poorest in the cross-modality conditions, with performance on the haptic-visual and visual-haptic cross-modal conditions being nearly identical. Visual and haptic information decayed at similar rates across a week delay. In Experiment 2, subjects simultaneously viewed and handled the same objects, and transfer was tested in a successive cue-modality paradigm. Performance with the visual modality again exceeded that with the haptic modality. Furthermore, initial errors on the haptic test were often corrected when followed by the visual presentation, both immediately and after 1 week. However, visual test errors were corrected by haptic cuing on the immediate test only. These results are discussed in terms of shared information between the haptic and visual modalities, and the ease of transfer between these modalities immediately and after a substantial delay.     

Do infants reach for perceived objects? A reply to Stiles-Davis

Stiles-Davis proposes that the infants in our experiments (Hofsten & Spelke, 1985) did not reach for perceived objects in order to manipulate them, but rather touched perceived surfaces in order to explore their boundaries. Her commentary raises questions about infants' perception of the boundaries, the unity, and the manipulability of objects. More deeply, it raises the question of what an object is for an infant. We consider each of these questions in turn, in light of our own findings and those of other studies of object-directed reaching, object perception, and the object concept. We suggest that young infants organize the visual world into entities that are bounded, unitary, and manipulable and that infants endow those entities with the core properties of physical objects.     

Impossible objects∗

This paper deals with the Meinong‐Russell controversy on nonsubsistent objects. The first part notes the similarity of certain contemporary semantical developments to Meinonj;'s theory of nonsubsistent objects. Then it lays out the major features of Meinong's famous theory, considers Russell's objections to same and Meinong's counter‐objections to Russell, and argues that Russell's well‐known argument fails. However, it is possible to augment Russell's argument against Meinong with sound Russellian principles in such a way that it presents at least a strong inclining reason against Meinong's theory of impossible objects.     

Visual search for a socially defined feature: what causes the search asymmetry favoring cross-race faces?

Levin (1996, 2000) reported that white subjects search for black targets more quickly than they search for white targets, suggesting that black faces are perceived as having a feature that is lacking in white faces. Here we test one of the implications of this asymmetry by having subjects search for same-race (SR) and cross-race (CR) faces that are distorted to look less like each other (producing caricatures that enhance race-specifying features), or are distorted to look more like each other (a prototypical distortion expected to reduce the salience of race-specifying features). Experiments 1 and 2 show that caricaturing the feature-positive CR distractors speeds search for the SR face and that prototypical distortion slows this search. The same distortions in SR faces did not affect the search slopes. However, these distortions also eliminated the overall advantage for CR faces. Experiment 3 shows that trial-to-trial variation in the specific distractors in each display can eliminate the asymmetry and suggests that this asymmetry depends on the subjects' ability to set a consistent a priori perceptual criterion when searching for a CR target, while the distortion effects emphasize the importance of distractor-rejection processes in determining the form of a serial search asymmetry.     

When is search for meaning in life beneficial for well-being? A cross-national study

Previous research has found cross-national variations in the association between search for meaning in life (SMIL) and well-being (i.e. SMIL–WB link). This study extended and tested a “self-improvement hypothesis” that accounts for such cross-national variations based on an international database—the sixth wave of World Values Survey. SMIL represents a self-improvement effort which is more demanded in contexts with stronger external constraints. Thus, we expected a stronger positive SMIL–WB link in such contexts. A series of multilevel analyses was used to verify this hypothesis. The results showed that the SMIL–WB link varied across different societies, with well-being indexed by happiness, life satisfaction and subjective health. Moreover, external constraints from cultural, social-institutional, economic and ecological contexts (collectivism, peace threats, economic scarcity and environmental threats) moderated the SMIL–WB links. We thus call for advancing SMIL theory by considering person–context interaction.     

Is analytical psychology a religion? Jung's search for a substitute for lost faith

Analytical psychology does not aim at curing neurotic symptoms, but at bringing about a change in the patient's attitude to him or her self, and therefore to life in general. This new attitude can be described as religious, but it has nothing to do with creeds or conventional forms of worship. Analytical psychology is not a religon, but can be described as a prolegomenon to religion or religion in statu nascendi.     

Do objects in working memory compete with objects in perception?

It is generally assumed that “perceptual object” is the basic unit for processing visual information and that only a small number of objects can be either perceptually selected or encoded in working memory (WM) at one time. This raises the question whether the same resource is used when objects are selected and tracked as when they are held in WM. In two experiments, we measured dual-task interference between a memory task and a Multiple Object Tracking task. The WM tasks involve explicit, implicit, or no spatial processing. Our results suggest there is no resource competition between working memory and perceptual selection except when the WM task requires encoding spatial properties.     

Chinese ecclesiology – post-denominationalism and the search for an ecclesiological language

The quest for ecclesiology is apparent in Chinese theology and church life, both in China and abroad. It has been responded to with reference to different sorts of deductively elaborated ecclesiologies. This article suggests that analyses of present teaching and practices in Chinese churches should be undertaken in order to understand more precisely what sort of implicit or explicit ecclesiologies are already operative. On the basis of an ecclesiological hermeneutics, it would be possible to achieve an ecclesiological reconstruction in Chinese theology, recognising the given divine revelation.     

Does partial difficult search help difficult search?

Olds, Cowan, and Jolicoeur (2000a, 2000b) showed that exposure to a display that affords pop-out search a target among distractors of only one color) can assist processing of a related display that requires difficult search. They added distractors of an additional color to the initial simple display and analyzed response time distributions to show that exposure to the initial display aided subsequent search in the difficult portion (this finding was called search assistance). To test whether search assistance depends on perceptual grouping of the initial items, we presented initial items that were more difficult to group (two colors of distractors, instead of just one). The target appeared (on 50% of the trials) among distractors of two colors, and then after a delay, more distractors of those two colors were added to the display. Exposure to the initial easier portion of the display did not assist processing of the second portion of the display when the initial display contained a large number of items; we found tentative evidence for assistance with small numbers of initial items. In the Olds et al. (2000a, 2000b) studies, it was easy to group the initial distractor items, because they were all the same color. In contrast, in the present study, it was difficult to group the heterogeneous initial distractor items. Search assistance is found only when initial item grouping is relatively easy, and thus we conclude that search assistance depends on grouping.     

Thirst for confirmation in multi-attribute choice: Does search for consistency impair decision performance?

Experimental evidence suggests that people often do not feel comfortable with making decisions based on a single piece of evidence and that they systematically look for confirming evidence before choosing. The goal of this paper is to investigate whether such behavior is appropriate for multi-attribute binary choice. We model the experimentally observed “thirst for confirming redundancy” (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956) through a simple heuristic strategy (CONF) that needs two consistent cues to make a binary choice. Analytical expressions for the probabilities that CONF chooses correctly between two alternatives and takes a decision after considering fewer than all pieces of evidence are presented. Importantly, CONF is advantageously insensitive to cue ordering. The model performs equally well in both structured environments, where cues are ordered by validity, and unstructured environments, where the cues are not consulted in the order of their validity. We further compare the performance of CONF with the performance of other heuristics in a series of simulated three-cue environments, where the cues are continuous and vary in both predictive ability and inter-correlation. We show that across environments, CONF balances the advantages and disadvantages of other simple models. We conclude that confirmation-seeking in multi-attribute decision making is a simple, fast, and robust “ignorance” strategy that hedges your bets when you know that you might not know.     

Satisfaction at last: Evidence for the “satisfaction” hypothesis for multiple-target search errors

ABSTRACT

Multiple-target visual searches are susceptible to Subsequent Search Miss (SSM) errors—a reduced accuracy for target detection after a previous target has already been detected. SSM errors occur in critical searches (e.g., evaluations of radiographs and airport luggage x-rays), and have proven to be a stubborn problem. A few SSM theories have been offered, and here we investigate the “satisfaction” account: failing to completely finish a search after having found a first target. Accuracy on a multiple-target search task was compared to both how long participants spent searching after finding a first target and their target sensitivity in a separate vigilance task. Less time spent searching and poor vigilance predicted higher SSM error rates. These results suggest that observers who are more likely to miss a second target are less likely to thoroughly search after finding a first target, thus offering some of the first evidence for the “satisfaction” account.