Bystanders’ responses to offline bullying and cyberbullying: The role of empathy and normative beliefs about aggression

Cyberbullying often takes place with the virtual presence or knowledge of bystanders. While we have some evidence about the determinants of bystanders’ responses to offline bullying, we lack empirical studies concerning the variables that influence bystanders’ responses to cyberbullying. The current study examines bystanders’ responses to offline bullying and cyberbullying incidents. Two types of responses were captured: support toward the victims and the reinforcement of bullies’ actions. Using data from 321 German adolescents (ages 12–18; M = 14.99; 44% girls), the association between bystanders’ responses and normative beliefs about verbal aggression and cyberaggression, and affective and cognitive empathy, were tested in a path model. Both types of normative beliefs positively predicted the reinforcement of bullies, and normative belief about verbal aggression also predicted support for the victims of offline bullying. Both types of empathy predicted support in offline bullying, but only affective empathy predicted support in cyberbullying. There was no link between affective or cognitive empathy to the reinforcement of bullies. Moreover, bystanders’ tendencies to respond supportively to the victim or to reinforce the bully were rather consistent in both cyber‐ and offline bullying, but there was no link between support and reinforcement. The findings are discussed with regard to implications for prevention and intervention efforts.     

My point is valid,yours is not: myside bias in reasoning about abortion

The study explores whether people are more inclined to accept a conclusion that confirms their prior beliefs and reject one they personally object to even when both follow the same logic. Most of the prior research in this area has relied on the informal reasoning paradigm; in this study, however, we applied a formal reasoning paradigm to distinguish between cognitive and motivational mechanisms leading to myside bias in reasoning on value-laden topics (in this case abortions). Slovak and Polish (N?=?387) participants indicated their attitudes toward abortion and then evaluated logical syllogisms with neutral, pro-choice, or pro-life content. We analysed whether participants’ prior attitudes influenced their ability to solve these logically identical reasoning tasks and found that prior attitudes were the strongest predictor of myside bias in evaluating both valid and invalid syllogisms, even after controlling for logical validity (the ability to solve neutral syllogisms) and previous experience of logic.     

The Wished‐For Always Wins Until the Winner Was Inevitable All Along: Motivated Reasoning and Belief Bias Regulate Emotion During Elections

How do biases affect political information processing? A variant of the Wason selection task, which tests for confirmation bias, was used to characterize how the dynamics of the recent U.S. presidential election affected how people reasoned about political information. Participants were asked to evaluate pundit‐style conditional claims like “The incumbent always wins in a year when unemployment drops” either immediately before or immediately after the 2012 presidential election. A three‐way interaction between ideology, predicted winner (whether the proposition predicted that Obama or Romney would win), and the time of test indicated complex effects of bias on reasoning. Before the election, there was partial evidence of motivated reasoning—liberals performed especially well at looking for falsifying information when the pundit's claim predicted Romney would win. After the election, once the outcome was known, there was evidence of a belief bias—people sought to falsify claims that were inconsistent with the real‐world outcome rather than their ideology. These results suggest that people seek to implicitly regulate emotion when reasoning about political predictions. Before elections, people like to think their preferred candidate will win. After elections, people like to think the winner was inevitable all along.     

Internet Safety and the Silver Surfer: The Relationship Between Gist Reasoning and Adults' Risky Online Behavior

Currently, fewer older adults are online compared with younger generations. However, with many new initiatives aiming to significantly increase the number of older internet users, they will increasingly be exposed to potential victimisation from internet fraud, a fundamental issue affecting all adult internet users. Despite this, little research has examined online risk‐taking across the adult lifespan or adults' reasoning about risky online behaviors. Using fuzzy trace theory, we investigated adults' online risk‐taking behavior and intentions, and whether these behaviors were related to different ways of reasoning about risk, namely, gist reasoning (using qualitative, intuitive knowledge) and verbatim reasoning (using quantitative, specific knowledge). Participants (326 adults, 18–79 years old, M_age = 49.54 years) reported their past risk‐taking behavior, future online risk intentions, gist and verbatim reasoning about online risk, sensation seeking, and time spent online. Age was negatively correlated with past risk‐taking, time online, future risk intentions, and sensation seeking. However, time spent online was positively related to future risk intentions, suggesting that spending more time using the internet could lead individuals to take more risks. Increased verbatim reasoning predicted increased intentions to take online risks, while gist reasoning predicted reduced intentions to take risks online. Our findings extend online risk research applying fuzzy trace theory to adolescents and young adults and suggest that online safety training incorporating gist‐based reasoning strategies could benefit all adults and, in particular, older generations. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Moral foundations and political attitudes: The moderating role of political sophistication

Political attitudes can be associated with moral concerns. This research investigated whether people's level of political sophistication moderates this association. Based on the Moral Foundations Theory, this article examined whether political sophistication moderates the extent to which reliance on moral foundations, as categories of moral concerns, predicts judgements about policy positions. With this aim, two studies examined four policy positions shown by previous research to be best predicted by the endorsement of Sanctity, that is, the category of moral concerns focused on the preservation of physical and spiritual purity. The results showed that reliance on Sanctity predicted political sophisticates' judgements, as opposed to those of unsophisticates, on policy positions dealing with equal rights for same‐sex and unmarried couples and with euthanasia. Political sophistication also interacted with Fairness endorsement, which includes moral concerns for equal treatment of everybody and reciprocity, in predicting judgements about equal rights for unmarried couples, and interacted with reliance on Authority, which includes moral concerns for obedience and respect for traditional authorities, in predicting opposition to stem cell research. Those findings suggest that, at least for these particular issues, endorsement of moral foundations can be associated with political attitudes more strongly among sophisticates than unsophisticates.     

Identifying and changing the normative beliefs about aggression which lead young Muslim adults to join extremist anti‐Semitic groups in Pakistan

Two studies investigated the role of beliefs about the acceptability of aggression (“normative beliefs”) against Jews in determining who would join an extremist group. In Study 1, students in a university in Pakistan (N=144) completed self‐report attitude measures, and were subsequently approached by a confederate who asked whether they wanted to join an extremist anti‐Semitic organization. Normative beliefs about aggression against Jews were very strong predictors of whether participants agreed to join. In Study 2, participants (N=92) were experimentally assigned to either a brief educational intervention, designed to improve inter‐group relations, or to a control group. They also filled in self‐report attitude measures pre and post intervention. Participants in the intervention group were much less likely to agree to join the extremist group, and this effect of the intervention on joining was mediated by changes in normative beliefs about aggression against Jews. The results have implications for theories of inter‐group aggression and interventions to prevent people from being recruited into extremist groups. Aggr. Behav. 35:514–519, 2009. © 2009 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

条件推理中否定前件下信念偏差发生阶段的ERP研究

以日常生活中的条件推理语句为实验材料,采用大、小前提和结论依次呈现的“推断-判断”范式,利用事件相关电位(event-related brain potential, ERP)技术探讨了条件推理中否定前件下信念偏差效应的脑内时程动态变化。结果发现：在行为反应上,较信念促进,信念阻碍下的正确率更低反应时更长;在脑电上,两条件(信念阻碍和信念促进)诱发的ERP波形仅在大前提加工阶段出现明显的分离。这表明该推理下的信念偏差效应可能早在对大前提的语义表征阶段就已发生。     

Beyond the Information Given: Causal Models in Learning and Reasoning

ABSTRACT— The philosopher David Hume's conclusion that causal induction is solely based on observed associations still presents a puzzle to psychology. If we only acquired knowledge about statistical covariations between observed events without accessing deeper information about causality, we would be unable to understand the differences between causal and spurious relations, between prediction and diagnosis, and between observational and interventional inferences. All these distinctions require a deep understanding of causality that goes beyond the information given. We report a number of recent studies that demonstrate that people and rats do not stick to the superficial level of event covariations but reason and learn on the basis of deeper causal representations. Causal-model theory provides a unified account of this remarkable competence.     

No reason for identity: on the relation between motivating and normative reasons

This essay is concerned with the relation between motivating and normative reasons. According to a common and influential thesis, a normative reason is identical with a motivating reason when an agent acts for that normative reason. I will call this thesis the ‘Identity Thesis’. Many philosophers treat the Identity Thesis as a commonplace or a truism. Accordingly, the Identity Thesis has been used to rule out certain ontological views about reasons. I distinguish a deliberative and an explanatory version of the Identity Thesis and argue that there are no convincing arguments to accept either version. Furthermore, I point out an alternative to the Identity Thesis. The relation between motivating and normative reasons can be thought of as one of representation, not identity.     

Relational and Contextual Reasoning: Philosophical and Logical Aspects

This essay is a commentary on Helmut Reich's recently published book on relational and contextual reasoning (RCR). Reich's ideas are relevant in contexts of conflict, and they enable us to consider the notion of objectivity differently. He makes us see the constraints in individual perspectives. His book also can enable people to formulate problems of human concern in a wider and richer framework, which may lead to solutions not obtainable on the basis of binary logic.     

Walton's Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning: A Critique and Development

The aim of the paper is to advance the theory of argument or inference schemes by suggesting answers to questions raised by Walton's Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning (1996), specifically on: the relation between argument and reasoning; distinguishing deductive from presumptive schemes, the origin of schemes and the probative force of their use; and the motivation and justification for their associated critical questions.     

Information Distortion and Voting Choices: The Origins and Effects of Factual Beliefs in Initiative Elections

To account for voter decision making in initiative elections, we integrate theory and research on public opinion, misinformation, and motivated reasoning. Heuristic and motivated reasoning literatures suggest that voters' preexisting values interact with political sophistication such that politically knowledgeable voters develop systematically distorted empirical beliefs relevant to the initiatives on their ballots. These beliefs, in turn, can predict voting preferences even after controlling for underlying values, regardless of one's political sophistication. These hypotheses were tested using a 2003 voter survey conducted prior to a statewide initiative election that repealed a workplace safety regulation. Results showed that only those voters knowledgeable of key endorsements had initiative-specific beliefs that lined up with their underlying antiregulation values. Also, voters' empirical beliefs had an effect on initiative support even after controlling for prior values, and political sophistication did not moderate this effect.     

决策与推理的双系统——启发式系统和分析系统

近来,在决策与推理的研究中,研究者提出了双系统作用模型：基于直觉的启发式系统和基于理性的分析系统。启发式系统加工速度较快,不占用或占用很少的心理资源,容易受背景相似性、刻板印象的影响;分析系统加工速度慢,占用较多的心理资源,遵从逻辑和规则,而且两个系统有不同进化历史和神经基础。该文根据已有的相关研究,综述了双系统在决策与推理中可能的作用机制、相互关系、个体差异,同时指出了目前研究存在的不足     

Gross gods and icky atheism: Disgust responses to rejected religious beliefs

Disgust is an emotional response that helps to maintain and protect physical and spiritual purity by signaling contamination and motivating the restoration of personal cleanliness. In the present research we predicted that disgust may be elicited by contact with outgroup religious beliefs, as these beliefs pose a threat to spiritual purity. Two experiments tested this prediction using a repeated taste-test paradigm in which participants tasted and rated a drink before and after copying a passage from an outgroup religion. In Experiment 1, Christian participants showed increased disgust after writing a passage from the Qur'an or Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion, but not a control text. Experiment 2 replicated this effect, and also showed that contact with an ingroup religious belief (Christians copying from the Bible) did not elicit disgust. Moreover, Experiment 2 showed that disgust to rejected beliefs was eliminated when participants were allowed to wash their hands after copying the passage, symbolically restoring spiritual cleanliness. Together, these results provide evidence that contact with rejected religious beliefs elicits disgust by symbolically violating spiritual purity. Implications for intergroup relations between religious groups is discussed, and the role of disgust in the protection of beliefs that hold moral value.     

Reasoning about make-believe and hypothetical suppositions: Towards a theory of belief-contravening reasoning

The present study explores how suppositions which conflict with accepted beliefs are represented and reasoned about. Two studies test the predictions regarding the nature and developmental changes in children's ability to represent and reason about hypothetical or make-believe suppositions which violate their everyday knowledge and beliefs. In Study 1, 46 4th- and 5th-graders were introduced to a hand puppet, Freddy, who made claims inconsistent with generally accepted beliefs (e.g., “all dogs meow”) because he was pretending (Make-Believe Condition) or believed them (Hypothetical Condition). Participants were asked to think like Freddy and judge whether a conclusion (“There's a dog; does it meow?”) follows logically from the claim. In Study 2, 40 kindergarten (6-year-olds), 3rd–4th grade (10-year-olds), and college students were asked to represent belief contravening make-believe (pretend in a make-believe world that dogs meow) and hypothetical (imagine what the real world would be like if dogs meow) premises, evaluate conclusions of the premises (Rover is a dog, does Rover meow?) and make judgments about the attributes (growl, wag tail, purr, and eat mice) of the entity (a meowing dog) they created. The prediction that it would be easier to represent and reason from belief-contravening suppositions in the Make-Believe than Hypothetical conditions was confirmed in each study, although the two forms of reasoning were directly correlated (Study 2). The results were discussed in terms of the similarities (compartmentalization and integration) and differences (reconciliation) of processes involved in fancifully (make-believe) or seriously (hypothetical) representing and reasoning about belief-contravening suppositions.     

Non-monotonicity and Informal Reasoning: Comment on Ferguson (2003)

In this paper, it is argued that Ferguson’s (2003, Argumentation 17, 335–346) recent proposal to reconcile monotonic logic with defeasibility has three counterintuitive consequences. First, the conclusions that can be derived from his new rule of inference are vacuous, a point that as already made against default logics when there are conflicting defaults. Second, his proposal requires a procedural “hack” to the break the symmetry between the disjuncts of the tautological conclusions to which his proposal leads. Third, Ferguson’s proposal amounts to arguing that all everyday inferences are sound by definition. It is concluded that the informal logic response to defeasibility, that an account of the context in which inferences are sound or unsound is required, still stands. It is also observed that another possible response is given by Bayesian probability theory (Oaksford and Chater, in press, Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK; Hahn and Oaksford, in press, Synthese).     

道德推理与道德行为关系的元分析

目前道德心理学中存在对道德推理作用的质疑, 这一质疑源自哲学领域的著名争论。从经典道德心理学理论来说, 道德推理应该是道德行为的重要决定因素, 但新近的观点则否定这一重要作用。本研究采用元分析技术探讨道德推理与道德行为的关系。通过文献搜索与检查, 获得了50项研究和83个独立效应量, 共包含16738名被试。检验表明发表偏差不会影响元分析的结果, 选择随机效应模型是准确的。通过随机效应模型的元分析表明, 道德推理与道德的行为有显著的正相关, 与不道德的行为有显著的负相关。调节效应分析表明, 道德推理测量工具的类型会影响道德推理与道德行为的关系, 被试年龄阶段会影响道德推理与不道德行为的关系。这些结果肯定了道德推理的作用, 也强调了研究过程中要关注测量工具的类型, 指出了需要开发更全面的道德推理测量工具。     

规范错觉对外出就餐中食物浪费的影响：心理机制与应对策略

规范错觉是指个体的规范感知与实际存在于群体中的社会规范之间存在差异, 规范错觉影响了社会生活的方方面面。对957份问卷调查的分析显示, 人们普遍高估了他人的食物浪费(行为错觉)以及对浪费的赞同程度(态度错觉), 而这两种错觉又加剧了人们自身的浪费行为。中介效应检验显示, 印象管理中的社交性维度部分中介了两种错觉与浪费行为间的关系。两个随机对照实验进一步检验了描述性(命令性)规范信息对行为(态度)错觉的影响, 结果发现, 描述性规范信息降低了行为错觉, 并通过社交性减少了浪费行为; 而命令性规范信息并不改变态度错觉本身, 但通过降低态度错觉对浪费的影响而减少了浪费行为。上述结果意味着两种规范信息尽管高度相似, 但其作用机制却可能不同, 同时这一发现也为政策制定者提出了两种干预途径。     

Reasoning about rights and duties: mental models,world knowledge and pragmatic interpretation

We address the way verb-based and rule-content knowledge are combined in understanding institutional deontics. Study 1 showed that the institutional regulations used in our studies were readily categorised into one of two content groups: rights or duties. Participants perceived rights as benefiting the addressees identified by the rule, whereas they perceived duties as benefiting the collective that imposed the rule. Studies 2, 3, and 4 showed that rule content (rights vs. duties) had clear effects on perceptions of violations and relevance of cases for explaining the rule, even when controlling for deontic verb, phrasing of the action permitted by a right, or the formality of the deontic verb. These effects are incompatible with a simple pragmatic disambiguation approach to pragmatic modulation, as they often induce permissibility judgments that contradict the core semantic meanings of the deontic verbs. Other ways of reconciling verb meaning with rule content should be considered in a fuller theory of the interpretation of institutional rules.     

Political distrust,perceived threat,and intentions to engage in normative and violent collective action: A mixed-methods study

In three studies, we examined the role of distrust and perceived threat in intentions to engage in normative and violent non-normative collective action. A field-based qualitative study of 35 pro-democracy protestors during the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-Extradition protests revealed that perceived threat to Hong Kong values alongside distrust of political institutions spurred collective action engagement and support for defensive violent collection action. In Study 2, a questionnaire (N = 639) testing pro-democracy action intentions demonstrated direct paths on both normative and violent collective action intentions from distrust and threat. In Study 3 (N = 133), experimental trust and threat manipulations demonstrated a significant association between distrust and threat on violent collective action intentions and acceptance, and a significant interaction on acceptance of violent collective action. Our results reveal the importance of distrust and threat in attitudinal support for, and engagement in, collective action and their role in transitioning from non-violent to violent collective action.