BIOLOGY TEACHERS’ CONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF LIFE IN BRAZIL,ARGENTINA, AND URUGUAY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

Teachers’ conceptions about the origin of life in three Latin American countries with contrasting levels of secularism were analyzed: Argentina (Catholic constitution), Brazil (formally secular but not in practice), and Uruguay (consolidated secularism). A European survey questionnaire was used and the interpretation of the results drew on Barbour's four categories concerning the relationships of science and religion. A large majority of Argentinian and Uruguayan teachers were clearly evolutionist, even when believing in God (Independence or Dialogue category), with no difference between Argentina and Uruguay. The majority of Brazilian teachers assumed a religious position about the origin of life, being creationist (Conflict or Independence categories) or evolutionary creationist (Dialogue or Integration categories). Differences of Brazilian teachers’ conceptions may result from the higher percentage of evangelicals and lower proportion of agnostics/atheists. Brazilian Catholic teachers were more creationist than their Catholic colleagues in Argentina and Uruguay. Distinct patterns were found, but further research is needed to understand possible classroom impacts.     

WHAT IS “SECULAR”? TECHNO‐SECULARISM AND SPIRITUALITY

Abstract. I argue that there is no “roaring reality of rampant secularism” with “technological application as its chief agent,” as claimed by John Caiazza (2005). Two phenomena, techno‐religion and a spirituality of technology, suggest a different picture of reality: Technology may be an alternative spirituality rather than an ally of a secularism that makes “nutcrackers of the soul” out of people who should be “dancers” (Nietzsche). An analysis of secularism and its manifold causes indicates that secularism is a fruit of both science and religion. The secular is a companion of religion rather than its enemy. Hence, I recommend a heuristic instead of an ontological use of the concept of secularism. In a technological age, religion is changing rather than being displaced. These changes are illustrated by the increase of private religiosity, megachurches, and cyber‐spirituality. Energized by the tension between finitude and creativity, technology shares in the marks of spirituality (Philip Hefner) and in the potential for good and evil. In this situation, fundamentalism and dogmatism in religion, science, and technology are a greater threat than secularism.     

Survey Experiments on Candidate Religiosity,Political Attitudes,and Vote Choice

Because identification with and affect toward social groups is a primary heuristic for citizens, the social group profiles of candidates are important for electoral behavior. We focus on an increasingly important element of candidates’ social characteristics: their levels of religiosity and secularism. We argue that as religious groups and identities become structured less by what religion they are and more by how religious they are (or are not), candidate religiosity and secularism should condition the impact of political orientations such as partisanship and cultural policy attitudes on vote choice. Highly religious candidates should attract more support from Republicans and from cultural conservatives, while overtly secular candidates should appeal more to Democrats and cultural liberals. Using a survey experiment in which respondents evaluate a state legislative candidate with varying levels of religiosity and secularism, we find strong support for our argument.     

Are high levels of religiosity inconsistent with a high valuation of science? Evidence from the United States,China and Iran

We asked whether high levels of religiosity are inconsistent with a high valuation of science. We explored this possibility in three countries that diverge markedly in the relation between the state and religion. Parents in the United States (n = 126), China (n = 234) and Iran (n = 77) completed a survey about their personal and parental stance towards science. The relation between religiosity and the valuation of science varied sharply by country. In the U.S. sample, greater religiosity was associated with a lower valuation of science. A similar but weaker negative relation was found in the Chinese sample. Parents in the Iranian sample, by contrast, valued science highly, despite high levels of religiosity. Given the small size of our United States and Iranian samples, and the non-probabilistic nature of our samples in general, we caution readers not to generalise our findings beyond the current samples. Despite this caveat, these findings qualify the assumption that religiosity is inconsistent with the valuation of science and highlight the role of sociocultural context in shaping adults' perception of the relation between religion and science.     

Religious Affiliation and Attendance Among Immigrants in Eight Western Countries: Individual and Contextual Effects

This study examines the religious affiliation and participation of immigrants from a large-scale, comparative perspective. I propose a "specific migration" framework, in which immigrants' religiosity is an outcome of both individual characteristics and contextual properties related to immigrants' country of origin, country of destination, and combinations of origin and destination (i.e., communities). I use notions discussed in the religion and migration literature that fit into this scheme. To test these ideas, I collected and standardized 20 existing surveys on immigrants in eight Western countries, yielding about 38,000 immigrants. Applying multilevel models, I found, among other things, that: (1) immigrants from countries with higher levels of modernization express lower levels of religious commitment; (2) immigrants in religious countries are more religious themselves; and (3) the well-documented higher levels of religious commitment among women is not generalizable to immigrants.     

SCIENTISM AND TECHNOLOGY AS RELIGIONS

Abstract. Jacques Ellul, by far the most significant author in the serious discussions on the interface between religion and technology, is apparently not known to the science‐and‐religion field. The reason is the imprecise use of the terminology. In scientific formulation the relationship can be summarized as technology /religion:: science/theology. The first pair are robust three‐dimensional templates of most human experience; the second pair are linear, abstract concerns of a minority of citizens. In the parallel community—now well developed throughout academia—of science, technology, and society, where the technology/religion matters have been discussed more than the science/religion pair, John Caiazza's point that “techno‐secularism is the real problem” has been front and center for some decades. Among the theologians most aware of this, Raimundo Panikkar, Langdon Gilkey, and Huston Smith, Smith is the one who has taken the case much further than Caiazza, recognizing the danger of the real theological challenge from the religion of scientism and actively working against it. I write from a unique background among those involved in this debate—that of being deeply embedded simultaneously both in the modern science and technology establishment and in the reform of the religious enterprise for fifty years. I make the case that matters are worse than even Smith posits. He shows that scientism as a fundamentalist modern secularism serves the exact function of the theology behind the practiced religion of America and the West, that is, technology. An unexpected ray of hope has appeared in the sudden emergence of whole‐person healing (also known as complementary and alternative medicine), which is used regularly by well over half the population. This reintroduction of the spiritual dimension into this key technology of health will certainly be a major turning point.     

ATHENS,JERUSALEM, AND THE ARRIVAL OF TECHNO‐SECULARISM

Abstract. Western civilization historically has tried to balance secular knowledge with revealed religion. Science is the modern world's version of secular knowledge and resists the kind of integration achieved by Augustine and Aquinas. Managing the conflict between religion and evolution by containing them in separate “frames,” as Stephen J. Gould suggested, does not resolve the issue. Science may have displaced religion from the public square, but the traditional science‐religion conflict has become threadbare in intellectual terms. Scientific theories have become increasingly abstract, and science has been attacked from the left as a source of objective knowledge. However, technology, not science, has displaced religious belief, a phenomenon I call techno‐secularism. Robert Coles's suggestion that secularism is a form of doubt inevitably attached to religious belief, and William James's reduction of religious experiences to psychological states, evaluating them according to their “cash value,” are unhelpful. Technology enables us to remake our environment according to our wishes and has become a kind of magic that replaces not just revealed religion but also theoretical science. Techno‐secularism has an ethical vision that focuses on healthful living, self‐fulfillment, and avoiding the struggles of human life and the inevitability of death.     

Religion at the European Parliament: the Italian case

Italy is a predominantly Catholic country that developed historically on the basis of a strong, dominant religion and weak state institutions. Yet, openly clerical parties, direct advocates of the interests of the Catholic Church, have nowadays virtually disappeared and the relevance of the religious cleavage is decreasing, in favour of a more indirect support for these interests, mainly among moderate and conservative forces. Although the overall level of secularisation in Italy has increased, the degree of religiosity of Italian society remains one of the highest of the 27 member-states of the European Union (EU) and polarisation over religious issues in domestic politics remains high, particularly regarding moral values and family matters. In our study we explore the role of religion within the Italian political sphere with regard to the functioning of political representation, by taking into account the sub-national, national and European levels of government. We focus on the attitudes and behaviours of Italian political elites at the EU level. We hypothesise a strong influence of religion on the articulation between national and European politics. Our findings consistently show that the degree of religiosity of the Italian delegation to the European Parliament (EP) is high. However, the impact of such a high degree of religiosity among the members of the EP (MEPs) on their political activities appears less direct than one might predict, while the degree of political secularism is higher among Italian MEPs than among their national or regional counterparts. When we discuss a case study, namely the accession of Turkey to the EU, our data show that the religious attitudes of Italian MEPs play a crucial role in their stance on Turkish accession. The picture that emerges is thus nuanced. Religion significantly impacts on Italian MEPs’ ideological, political and moral attitudes, but plays a smaller role in their activities; while their left-right collocation emerges as the most relevant predictor, despite a number of exceptions.     

One Conception of Secularism for All? A Comparison of Conceptions of Laïcité among Nonbelievers,Catholics, and Muslims in France

In European countries, a large number of people feel that Islam is incompatible with secularism. France's legal principle of laïcité (a type of state “secularism”) has governed the relationship between religion and society since 1905. However, recent research suggests that there coexist two distinct lay conceptions of laïcité that differ most notably in their tolerance for the presence of religious symbols in public places, one inclusive, the other restrictive. This latter conception appears to target mainly Muslims. The present research examined the lay conceptions of laïcité held by Catholics, Muslims, and nonbelievers. Analyses of participants’ responses (N = 375) to a scale measuring lay beliefs about laïcité confirmed the existence of two distinct lay conceptions of laïcité that differed in the importance given to public expression of religious beliefs, religious neutrality of the state, and equal treatment of different religions. The results also showed that, independent of participants’ religiosity, the restrictive conception was more prevalent among nonbelievers, the two conceptions were equally prevalent among Catholics, and the inclusive conception was more prevalent among Muslims.     

Muslim anti‐secularist discourse in the context of Muslim‐Christian relations

This article observes and critically evaluates some of the main components of Muslim anti‐secularist discourse: the assumption that there is ‘no separation between religion and politics’, that the Shari^c a represents the antithesis of secularism, that secularism is a specifically Western or Christian phenomenon, and that secularism is causally related to a crisis of values in contemporary Western civilization. After observing some recent attempts to justify secularism on Islamic grounds, the article draws conclusions not just with respect to the discourse but also with regard to the underlying issues. The relevance of this topic to Muslim‐Christian relations emerges in two ways. Firstly, attention is paid to the way in which Christianity, or the West (the two are sometimes conflated), provides a significant Other for the purposes of self‐definition; and secondly, a comparative perspective on certain issues reflects shared concerns between Muslims and Christians on the role of religion in the modem nation‐state.     

THE ATHENS/JERUSALEM TEMPLATE AND THE TECHNO‐SECULARISM THESIS—KICKING THE CAN DOWN THE ROAD

Abstract. The publication of my article “Athens, Jerusalem, and the Arrival of Techno‐secularism” (2005) in Zygon was followed by twenty‐one responses, most of them critical. In this essay I reply by clarifying the earlier one, separating out its two major theses: the Athens/Jerusalem template and the techno‐secularism thesis. The Athens/Jerusalem template is a typology that provides a historical basis for understanding why religion/science conflicts persist by showing that the contrasts between intellectual knowledge and revealed knowledge are permanent features of Western cultural history. Postmodern criticisms often have a negative edge, rejecting “canonical” accounts but not presenting alternative explanations. Historical context is helpful in understanding religion/science conflicts, which continue to exist. The present cultural situation is that technology is replacing religion—and science—as the dominant condition and theory of our culture. Evidence for the techno‐secularism thesis can be seen in the nature of electronic entertainment, which invades the silence required for religious contemplation and obscures the scientific laws that are the basis for the new technology.     

EMERGENCE FROM PHYSICS TO THEOLOGY: TOWARD A PANORAMIC VIEW

Abstract. At its best, the emergence debate provides a helpful model of what religion‐science scholarship can and should involve. (At its worst it represents the faddishness and bandwagon effects to which our field is also prone.) Those involved in the debate must pay close attention to concrete theories and results in the natural sciences. They rely on the careful conceptual distinctions that philosophers of science draw concerning complexity, novelty, and organization. The resulting views about human mentality and consciousness are tested against these results and checked for their adequacy to the phenomena of human experience. Emergentist theories of nature and personhood have entailments for one's theory of religion and for theological reflection; conversely, theological accounts may constrain one's interpretation of emergent phenomena. In my response to the four symposiasts I draw out these deeper dimensions of the emergence debate.     

The ecclesial dimension in the dialogue between theology and science

This article discusses the role of the science–religion dialogue in reaction to modern secularism, atheism and nihilism. It is argued that the only viable way for such a dialogue is along the lines of radical theological commitment implying the ecclesial dimension. It is carefully discussed as to how the ecclesial dimension can enter the dialogue. Ultimately it is concluded that the dialogue between science and theology explicates the para-eucharistic essence of science, thus reconciling it with theology in the sense of the commonality of their experiential origin in humanity made in the image of God.     

Religion,Inclusive Individualism,and Volunteering in Europe

A well supported finding in social science is that religiosity is associated with pro-social behaviours such as volunteering, but the religious decline in Europe characterising the latter part of the twentieth century has not been accompanied by decline in voluntary participation. This period is also associated with a sharp increase in the moral emphasis on individual autonomy and inclusiveness over social norms and traditions. In this analysis of the European Values Study (2008–2010), I examine the relationship between religion and volunteering, taking both individual values and aggregate norms into account. Religious attendance is found to be associated with volunteering at the individual level. However, the average citizen’s likelihood of volunteering is lower in more religious countries. This could be due in part to secular countries’ high levels of inclusive individualism (autonomy values and generalised trust) which are positively associated with volunteering among both religious and non-religious respondents.     

The protestant secular in the study of American religion: reappraisal and suggestions

This article provides a theoretical and historiographical overview of secularism in the study of American religion. It focuses on how scholars have used the concept of the ‘Protestant secular’ in works on law, politics, and culture. Although it has been useful, we argue that this concept has lost some of its analytical utility in the effort to explain secularism predominantly in terms of its Protestant nature. In turn, this article looks to literature on secularism globally in order to suggest ways forward. Refocusing on secularism as a strategy of state governance ought to bring precision to both ‘Protestantism’ and ‘the secular,’ as well as shift attention toward state power and the high stakes of classification. An analysis of this strategy requires investigation into how states produce and police the category ‘religion’ and its neighboring concepts – for example, the ‘secular’ and the ‘superstitious’ – in order to render, manage, and colonize various populations.     

Neither public nor private religion: the Russian Orthodox Church in the public sphere of contemporary Russia

Cross-country comparative studies of religion (e.g. the Religion Monitor) do not cover some important issues regarding the religious situation in Russia. The problem of contemporary Russian religiosity is beyond individual religiosity or religiosity as a spiritual phenomenon. In Russia—one of the countries which experienced Communism as a period of enforced secularization, there are very few people who have had any religious socialization or who have the experience of belonging to the Christian Church or to any religion. The main point of this article is that what is happening with religion in post-Soviet Russia cannot be adequately explained by the concept of ‘public religion’ and the dichotomy of public vs. private religion, due to the practices of private religion manifesting at a very low level among the Russian population, despite the fact that a large number of Russians consider themselves to be Orthodox Christians. However, the representation of the Church in the public sphere has little to do with what concerns Russians who are in some way involved in parishes. As an alternative tool we propose to describe the religiosity of Russians through the methods of network analysis. Results of a content analysis of contemporary Russian and Soviet media, survey data of the Russian population, and data obtained in a network analysis of parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church are used for substantiating this conclusion.     

Expressing the Nature and Meaning of DNA: Six Books for Teachers and Students

DNA is an important agent not only in chemistry and biology but also in technology and modern culture. A number of books approach the double helix from different angles. These perspectives include (1) the science of DNA and genetics; (2) genetic engineering; (3) the ethics of manipulating genetic material; and (4) DNA in culture and religion. Various views of DNAprovide insights into human nature beyond its molecular composition.     

Is the Connection Between Religiosity and Psychological Functioning Due to Religion’s Social Value? A Failure to Replicate

Increasingly, religion and spirituality has been tied to well-being. However, the mediators are likely multifold, contextually dependent, and remain unclear. A recent report suggested that this is due to religion’s social value and presented results indicating that religiosity was more strongly related to psychological adjustment within countries with higher mean religiosity. Effect sizes were small, and given previous research suggesting other more proximal mediators, it was my hypothesis that these findings would not be replicated. Analysis of data from the European Social Survey revealed no significant interactions between country-level religiosity and individual religiosity in predicting psychological well-being. These conflicting findings point to the nuanced nature of the religion–health relationship and suggest that this correlation is unlikely to be due to social valuation. Studies using cursory measures are likely to explain only a small proportion of the variance, yield contradictory findings, and fail to significantly enhance theory in this domain.     

The “religiosity gap” in a clinical setting: experiences of mental health care consumers and professionals

ABSTRACT

In Western countries, professionals in mental health care (“professionals”) tend to be less religious than “consumers”. This qualitative study explores the meaning of this “religiosity gap” for professionals and consumers in mental health care. Both a regular, secular and a Christian clinic in the Netherlands participated in this study. Content analysis was applied to 35 consumer interviews and 18 interviews with professionals. Consumers reported negative experiences (e.g., perceived disrespect and a lack of confidence) and/or negative expectations (e.g., misunderstanding and misinterpretation) related to a religiosity gap. They also mentioned advantages of a “religiosity match”, like safety and confidence and appreciated professionals’ religious/spiritual self-disclosure. Professionals in secular care setting tended to avoid religion and spirituality. In both clinics, they tended to neutralise religious/spiritual differences and be reticent in self-disclosure. Professionals are recommended to recognise the relevance of a religiosity gap and to consider different strategies in approaching religion/spirituality.     

Sense of community among Muslims in the Brazil–Paraguay border: narratives of belonging and generational differences

ABSTRACT

The so-called ‘Triple Frontier’—the border between Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina—is the ‘host society’ of an important Muslim community, composed mainly of Lebanese immigrants and their descendants born in Brazil and Paraguay. In less than two decades, Shi’i and Sunni Arab Muslims created mosques, religious centres, a cemetery, and three schools. Mosques, schools, and religious centres are spaces for the production of a sense of community. The institutional discourse of these entities emphasises the connection between religion and community origin, considering Islam as part of ‘Arab culture’. Taking generational differences into account, this article aims to analyse the narratives of plural identity expressed in the meanings attributed to the immigrants’ self-identification as Muslims. Based on fieldwork in the South American border area, this work aims to shed light on the way in which immigrants and their descendants reinterpret their religious belonging, informed by the new experience of living in multi-religious societies.