Definition and the Question of “Woman”

Within recent feminist philosophy, controversy has developed over the desirability, and indeed, the possibility of defining the central terms of its analysis—"woman,”“femininity,” etc. The controversy results largely from the undertheorization of the notion of definition; feminists have uncritically adopted an Aristotelian treatment of definition as entailing metaphysical, rather than merely linguistic, commitments. A “discursive” approach to definition, by contrast, allows us to define our terms, while avoiding the dangers of essentialism and universalism.     

The Struggle for the Nature of “Prejudice”: “Prejudice” Expression as Identity Performance

This article develops an identity performance model of prejudice that highlights the creative influence of prejudice expressions on norms and situations. Definitions of prejudice can promote social change or stability when they are used to achieve social identification, explanation, and mobilization. Tacit or explicit agreement about the nature of prejudice is accomplished collaboratively by persuading others to accept (1) an abstract definition of “prejudice,” (2) concrete exemplars of “prejudice,” and (3) associated beliefs about how a target group should be treated. This article reviews three ways in which “prejudice” can be defined in the cut and thrust of social interaction, namely, by mobilizing hatred and violence, by accusation and denial, and by repression. The struggle for the nature of prejudice determines who can be badly treated and by whom. Studying such ordinary struggles to define what counts (and does not count) as “prejudice” will allow us to understand how identities are produced, norms are set into motion, and populations are mobilized as social relations are reformulated.     

A Review of “Suicidal Intent” Within the Existing Suicide Literature

The results of a systematic literature review that investigated suicide intent are presented. Of the 44 relevant articles identified, 17 investigated the relationships between various suicide risk factors and suicide intent and 25 publications investigated the relationships between suicide intent and various suicide outcomes. Despite recent advancements in the definition and nomological validity of suicide intent, a high degree of variability in the empirical measurement and analysis of suicide intent was found. Such variability limits future research related to measuring suicidal risk and outcomes, reporting suicide intent, or the meaningful comparison of diagnostic approaches or treatments across multiple studies.     

On Abolishing “Death”: An Etymological Note

The distinction is made between two uses of the word “death,” specifically, your death (the death of the other) and my death (the death of the self). It makes (logical, epistemological and phenomenological) sense for me to speak of your death, but not for me to speak of my death—inasmuch as, by reasonable definition, I cannot possibly ever experience my death. Dying is experienceable—although one can never be certain. The word death is a perfectly good word for the demise of the other; the word omega is suggested to allude to that non-event (the cessation of the self) now routinely spoken of as “my death,”     

Counseling and Human Resource Development: Response to “Career Development in Business and Industry”

The author responds to an article by Dorn (1986) on career development in business and industry. Clarification regarding definition, job titles, job roles, and points of entry for behavioral science professionals is provided. Emphasis is placed on human resource development rather than the more generic use of counseling or career development in business and industry.     

The professionalization of psychologists as court personnel: Consequences of the first institutional commitment law for the “feebleminded”

The first law providing for the permanent, involuntary institutionalization of “feeble‐minded” individuals was passed in Illinois in 1915. This bill represented the first eugenic commitment law in the United States. Focusing on the consequences of this 1915 commitment law within the context of intelligence testing, eugenics, and the progressive movement, this paper will argue that the then newly devised Binet–Simon intelligence test facilitated the definition and classification of feeble‐mindedness that validated feeble‐mindedness theory, enabled the state to legitimize the eugenic diagnosis and institutionalization of feeble‐minded individuals, and especially empowered psychologists to carve out a niche for themselves in the courtroom as “experts” when testifying as to the feeble‐mindedness of individuals.     

Against “Transracialism”: Revisiting the Debate

This article critically reflects on some of the themes and assumptions at stake in the “transracialism” controversy, and connects them to important works in critical race theory: namely Rey Chow's notion of “coercive mimeticism” and Sara Ahmed's critique of white liberal multiculturalism. It argues that the analytic account of “race” that Tuvel draws upon in her article—Sally Haslanger's—is politically problematic, both on its own terms and in light of broader reflections on racialized and gendered power relations. In particular, I critique Haslanger's assumption that all racial identities exist on the same conceptual plane: that a single variable definition of “race” can be applied to any particular racialized group—including white and nonwhite racial identities. This erases racialized power relations, especially where, in liberal “multicultural” nations, whiteness constitutes the implied standard against which an appearance of “racial difference” is conjured. Finally, I extend my argument to the issue of treating “race” and gender analogously. Rejecting this move, I propose an alternative way of conceptualizing these as analytically distinct, yet constitutively interdependent, phenomena. In order to situate the debate historically, I consider an example of “racial transgression” from twentieth‐century China.     

THE AMBIGUITY OF MORAL EXCELLENCE: A Response to Aaron Stalnaker's “Virtue as Mastery”

This response draws on Saba Mahmood's work on Muslim subjectivities in order to consider how Stalnaker's conceptualization of virtue might be applied to non‐Confucian sources. I argue that when applied cross‐culturally, Stalnaker's revised definition of “skillful virtue” raises normative and metaethical questions about what counts as a skill versus a mere bodily practice, the process by how skill is acquired, and how we can both allow for the ambiguity of skills and continue to make constructive arguments about them.     

“I think it, therefore it’s true”: Effects of self-perceived objectivity on hiring discrimination

A sense of personal objectivity may prompt an “I think it, therefore it’s true” mindset, in which people assume that their own beliefs and introspections are, by definition, valid and therefore worthy of being acted on. In the present studies, priming a sense of personal objectivity increased gender discrimination, particularly among decision-makers who endorsed stereotypic beliefs or who had stereotypic thoughts made cognitively accessible through implicit priming. Implications for discrimination in organizational contexts, and for theories of attitude–behavior consistency, are discussed.     

“Women Don't Get AIDS,They Just Die From It”: Memory,Classification, and the Campaign to Change the Definition of AIDS

In this paper, I examine activist group ACT UP's campaign to change the US Centers for Disease Control surveillance case definition of HIV and AIDS. This campaign's effects included a profound shift in how AIDS is understood, and thus in some real way in what it is. I argue that classification should be understood as a political formation with material effects, attending to the words of activists, most of them women, who contested the way AIDS was defined in a moment when no one else thought that definition needed to be changed. I argue that philosopher Sue Campbell's work on the importance of understanding memory and feeling as relational helps understand the histories of death and loss, resistance and fierce joy, crystallized in activist responses to HIV and AIDS.     

Beyond “Survivor”: How Childhood Sexual Abuse Informs the Identity of Adult Women at the End of the Therapeutic Process

A qualitative method was used to explore how adult women experienced their identity after extensive therapy to deal with childhood sexual abuse. Seven women shared their healing journeys and their perceptions of the role of the abuse in their current life and self‐perceptions. Phenomenological analysis of the interview data revealed 5 common themes related to participants' self‐definition and self‐acceptance, sense of visibility and connection to others, current worldview, and residual losses. These findings are discussed in terms of their implications for trauma counselors.     

“WAITING FOR THE BARBARIANS”: IDENTITY AND POLEMICISM IN THE NEO‐PATRISTIC SYNTHESIS OF GEORGES FLOROVSKY*

Georges Florovsky (1893–1979), with his “neo‐patristic synthesis”, is perhaps the most influential modern Orthodox theologian, having mentored and/or taught such theologians as Lossky and Zizioulas. However, his theology enshrines a troubling paradigm where a Pan‐Orthodox Eastern identity (“Christian Hellenism”) is asserted over against the heterodoxy of an Other which is often the West. The article traces this paradigm then argues that Florovsky's construction of Eastern Orthodoxy is dependent on German Romanticism and that his polemicism blinded him to this fact. It briefly suggests, on the basis of the Chalcedonian definition, a new "dialectical" theology of ecclesial identity where identity is established in an encounter with the Other, rather than in demonizing it.     

An Integral Psychology Response to Helminiak's (2001) “Treating Spiritual Issues in Secular Psychotherapy”

This article is a response to D. A. Helminiak's (2001) “Treating Spiritual Issues in Secular Psychotherapy” from the perspective of K. Wilber's integral psychology. The article consists of 3 sections: (a) a selective summary of integral psychology, including the perennial philosophy, 10 levels of development, lines of development, temporary states, types of orientations, the self, and the 4 quadrants; (b) various conceptual issues; and (c) usefulness to mental health practitioners (MHPs). Although D. A. Helminiak's endeavor to formulate a clear and functional definition of spirituality is commended, his claim of novelty is shown to be unwarranted. It is argued that K. Wilber's integral model is more comprehensive, clear, coherent, and helpful to MHPs.     

The Divine Horizon: Rethinking Political Community in Luce Irigaray's “Divine Women”

The question of the transcendent, that which operates above and beyond the material stuff of the world, remains an enduring one for feminism, bound up as it is with the foundations of feminism's corporeal politics and the definition of its political subject. With the specificity of the situated and meaningful body grounding feminist politics, the universal and neutral status of the speaking subject has been diagnosed as masculine, and unable to properly account for sexed differences. On this basis, political community, collectivity forged along the lines of a common identity, is considered important in the realization of feminist political goals, yet is also problematic in view of its reliance upon a universal category of identity through which to motivate for political change. Acknowledging these tensions, this paper revisits Luce Irigaray's essay “Divine Women” to suggest that in her rethinking of the divine as a shared horizon through which women can potentially achieve autonomy, the nature of the transcendent, the universal, and the identity of the feminine are also reconfigured in surprising ways. In a specific address to the dilemma of political community, Irigaray makes available a notion of the divine that is already differently inhabited.     

Psychology's own mindfulness: Ellen Langer and the social politics of scientific interest in “active noticing”

Ellen Langer's mindfulness construct is presented as “indigenous” to disciplinary psychology. Langer's early work laid the foundations for the research program she would come to call the psychology of possibility. Studying inattentive behavior (mindlessness) and intentionally reflective cognition (mindfulness) placed her work directly in line with the theoretical priorities of the 1970s and influenced the direction of research in several subdisciplines related to social cognition. Positioning Langer's work at an intersection crossed by various discourse communities in psychology explains much of its influence within the discipline. However, its relevance is additionally related to a broader field of research and application also employing the terminology of mindfulness. While superficially synonymous, the majority of mindfulness research is distinguished from Langer's due to differences in origination, definition, and goals. Comparative assessments are used as a lens through which to interrogate the social politics of mindfulness theories’ burgeoning success over the past half century.     

Memory,Cognitive Processing,and the Process of “Listening” A Reply to Thomas and Levine

In a recent issue of Human Communication Research, Thomas and Levine (1994) explored the “listening” construct, examining listening from both a cognitive and behavioral point of view. In so doing, they made several inaccurate statements about my own research and positions that I have taken concerning listening. Linear models of memory (first short-term memory, then intermediate storage, then long-term memory) do not describe listening. What I have written in the past is that, like memory, listening has short-term and long-term elements, that listening research ought to examine short-term processing more carefully than before, and that any general definition of listening ought to include all elements, including long-term elements. Additional misstatements appear concerning the role of memory in the assessment of listening. In addition to these misstatements, they ignored some extremely important constructs in listening, principally that of listener involvement. In addition, the model that they present as a causal explanation for listening behaviors has several serious flaws. Nonetheless, in focusing on some nonverbal indicators of listening, they have made a real contribution to the understanding of listening as a communication skill.     

“PURE” VERSUS “PRACTICAL” EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Abstract: In this article I distinguish a type of justification that is “epistemic” in pertaining to the grounds of one's belief, and “practical” in its connection to what act(s) one may undertake, based on that belief. Such justification, on the proposed account, depends mainly on the proportioning of “inner epistemic virtue” to the “outer risks” implied by one's act. The resulting conception strikes a balance between the unduly moralistic conception of William Clifford and contemporary naturalist virtue theories.     

That “Ought” Does Not Imply “Right”: Why It Matters for Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethicists sometimes say that a right action is what a virtuous person would do, characteristically, in the circumstances. But some have objected recently that right action cannot be defined as what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances because there are circumstances in which a right action is possible but in which no virtuous person would be found. This objection moves from the premise that a given person ought to do an action that no virtuous person would do, to the conclusion that the action is a right action. I demon‐strate that virtue ethicists distinguish “ought” from “right” and reject the assumption that “ought” implies “right.” I then show how their rejection of that assumption blocks this “right but not virtuous” objection. I conclude by showing how the thesis that “ought” does not imply “right” can clarify a further dispute in virtue ethics regarding whether “ought” implies “can.”