In the beginning was the doing: the premises of the practical syllogism

If practical reasoning deserves its name, its form must be different from that of ordinary (theoretical) reasoning. A few have thought that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, rather than a mental state. I argue here that if the conclusion is an action, then so too is one of the premises. You might reason your way from doing one thing to doing another: from browsing journal abstracts to reading a particular journal article. I motivate this by sympathetically re-examining Hume's claim that a conclusion about what ought to be done follows only from an argument one of whose premises is likewise about what ought to be done.     

Out of the Cave of the Cyclops

ABSTRACT

Despite the deep respect that readers continue to discover in the great twentieth-century texts of hermeneutics, the academic career and reputation of Gadamer's philosophical version has fallen into the shadows; it seems a long time since the heady days that it could claim universality as an intellectual koiné. This decline is a genuine shame, because at the peak of its reputation it held out the promise of returning the power of humanistic judgement to greater recognition against the domination of method in an age of technique. Gadamer teased out the unreflective meta-logic of the Western traditions of prudence as an alternative paradigm and powerful antidote to our rationalist excesses. This paper offers one strategy for salvaging that effort and recuperating an important role for philosophical hermeneutics in the academy.     

Idealization of the analyst by the young adult

Idealization is an intrapsychic process that serves many functions. In addition to its use defensively and for gratification of libidinal and aggressive drive derivatives, it can contribute to developmental progression, particularly during late adolescence and young adulthood. During an analysis, it is important to recognize all the determinants of idealization, including those related to the reworking of developmental conflicts. If an analyst understands idealization solely as a manifestation of pathology, he may interfere with his patient's use of it for the development of autonomous functioning.     

Unconscious goal activation and the hijacking of the executive function

Building on research on unconscious human goal pursuit and the dynamic nature of our mental and physical world, this study examined the idea that an unconsciously activated goal hijacks executive control for its own attainment. This "hijacking" of the executive function by an unconscious goal should be evidenced by impaired performance on an unrelated task relying on executive control. The results of 6 experiments show that subliminal activation of a socializing goal, or an idiosyncratic personal goal, or an academic goal, harmed participants' performance on an executive function task, such as inhibition of prepotent responses and detection of text errors during reading. These effects were unique to executive control, were similar when the goal was activated consciously, and were independent of task motivation and perceived inter-goal relatedness between the primed goal and task goal. Furthermore, an unconscious goal occupied executive control to advance itself more strongly when the goal had personal value. Implications for theory and research on unconscious goal pursuit and the executive function are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

From the fixity of the past to the fixity of the independent

There is an old but powerful argument for the claim that exhaustive divine foreknowledge is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. A crucial ingredient in this argument is the principle of the “Fixity of the Past” (FP). A seemingly new response to this argument has emerged, the so-called “dependence response,” which involves, among other things, abandoning FP for an alternative principle, the principle of the “Fixity of the Independent” (FI). This paper presents three arguments for the claim that FI ought to be preferred to FP.

     

Subtyping and social consensus: the role of the audience in the maintenance of stereotypic beliefs

Two studies investigated the effect of stereotypes held by a prospective audience on participants' reactions to a stereotype‐disconfirming member. In Study 1, participants formed an impression of a positive disconfirming gay in order to communicate it to an audience known to hold a negative versus positive stereotype about gays. As predicted, participants subtyped the deviant more in the former than in the latter case. Moreover, participants' stereotype at the end of the study mirrored the audience's assumed stereotypes about gays. In Study 2, participants learned about a stereotype allegedly held by an ingroup or an outgroup audience about Belgians and then received information about a Belgian who disconfirmed the stereotype. As predicted, the deviant was seen as less typical when he violated the stereotype held by an ingroup than by an outgroup audience. Also, participants' stereotype about Belgians was more similar to the one held by the ingroup audience. A mediational analysis confirmed that participants subtyped the disconfirming member in order to embrace the stereotype advocated by the ingroup audience. Results are discussed in light of recent models of stereotype change. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Synchronicity,the infinite unrepressed,dissociation and the interpersonal

This paper uses the logic derived by Matte Blanco to provide an Archimedean point and a mathematics, both of which Jung complained of lacking, with which to validate the notion of synchronicity and to demonstrate that it is one of the inevitable properties of an unconscious which is unrepressed such as Jung's collective unconscious, and that such an unconscious will also be affective and interpersonal as well as intrapersonal. These have important clinical implications. After an exposition of Matte Blanco's thinking, some clinical material is presented of an episode in which patient and author both suffered the same psychosomatic symptom some time just prior to a session. Correspondences between Matte Blanco's logically derived ideas and Jung's phenomenological observations are made.     

On the transformative character of collective intentionality and the uniqueness of the human

Current debates on collective intentionality focus on the cognitive capacities, attitudes, and mental states that enable individuals to take part in joint actions. It is typically assumed that collective intentionality is a capacity which is added to other, pre-existing, capacities of an individual and is exercised in cooperative activities like carrying a table or painting a house together. We call this the additive account because it portrays collective intentionality as a capacity that an individual possesses in addition to her capacity for individual intentionality. We offer an alternative view according to which the primary entity to which collective intentionality has to be ascribed is not the human individual, but a “form of life.” As a feature of a form of life, collective intentionality is something more than the specific capacity exercised by an individual when she cooperates with others. Collective intentionality transforms all the capacities of the bearers of this specific form of life. We thus call our proposal the transformative account of collective intentionality.     

Academic Ethics at the Undergraduate Level: Case Study from the Formative Years of the Institute

Academic ethics among students at an undergraduate level are dictated by a variety of factors. Institutional cultures, personal preferences and notions of ethics, external factors, and peer-pressure are some of the factors that play an important role in the ethical behavior of an undergraduate student. The present study is an attempt to understand the student behavior in a three year old technical Institute in India. At a time when the higher technical education sector in India is rapidly expanding, the study presents trends in undergraduate students regarding academic ethics. The study highlights the factors that are most important in governing ethical behavior of students, and allow for corrective measures at a formative stage in the Institute’s life.     

Suárez and the doctrine of the transcendentals

This article discusses Suárez's views concerning the transcendentals, that is, being and those attributes of it that extend to everything. In particular it explores Suárez's notion of transcendentality and the way in which he conceived the transcendental attributes of being are related to it. It makes two claims: First, that Suárez has an intensional, rather than an extensional understanding of transcendentality; and, second, that Suárez's understanding of truth and goodness, as expressing real extrinsic denominations based on real relations, appears to contain an inconsistency.I am grateful to Jane Bristol, John Doyle, and Scott MacDonald for their comments on an early draft of this paper.     

Therapy and the aesthetics of the self

Post-structuralists argue that personal identity is a function of societal power dynamics. This becomes especially problematic for persons recruited into problem-saturated identities. In this paper, inspired by Foucault's call for us to ‘create ourselves as a work of art’ (p. 262), I explore the therapeutic value of an aesthetic approach to identity. Instead of orienting to the client as one to be known and understood, we might envisage his or her life as an open-ended, never quite finalised oeuvre. Identity is therefore conceptualised not as something one ‘is’, but as a creative performance. A therapeutic case is presented to highlight some of the possibilities and challenges associated with such an approach.     

Regret and the Consciousness of the Past

This paper offers a phenomenological analysis of (1) the relationship between regret and episodic memory, (2) the temporal structure of ‘regretful memory’, (3) the affective and evaluative dimension of regretful memory and (4) the counterfactual dimension of regretful memory. Based on Husserl’s phenomenology, I offer an analysis of regret’s complex structures of intentionality and time-consciousness. Husserl held that episodic memory requires two temporal orientations on one’s own experience: the past now that one relives and the present now in which one does the reliving. If memory generally entails two temporal perspectives, regretful memory brings in a third point of temporal reference: that now that could have been. Drawing on Hoerl and McCormack, I give an account of regret as a mnemic and counterfactual form of intentional consciousness that confronts an alternative past and attempts to negotiate between two essential yet conflicting features of its actual past: its contingency and its irreversibility. On this basis, I then draw on Bagnoli to offer a phenomenological theory of regretful memory as an emotional mode of valuing possibilities that belong to the past.     

Transient time and the persistence of the concrete

Conclusion I suggest that Carter and Hestevold's arguments for L1 and L2 can be given a chance to succeed if (i) everywhere in them that we find an occurrence of the thesis Transient Time we replace it with an occurrence of Presentism, and (ii) everywhere in them that we find an occurrence of the thesis Static Time we replace it with an occurrence of Presentism's denial. I'm fairly confident that their arguments for L1 would succeed if these changes were made. (If Presentism is true, nothing has temporal parts, for some at least of the temporal parts of a thing extended in time must be past or future. But if nothing has temporal parts, Endurance must be true.) I'm less confident that their arguments for L2 would succeed if those changes were made. But if the changes that I suggest are not made, the arguments for L1 and L2 certainly fail.     

Shared spatial representations for numbers and space: the reversal of the SNARC and the Simon effects

In 4 experiments, the authors investigated the reversal of spatial congruency effects when participants concurrently practiced incompatible mapping rules (J. G. Marble & R. W. Proctor, 2000). The authors observed an effect of an explicit spatially incompatible mapping rule on the way numerical information was associated with spatial responses. The authors also observed an effect of an incompatible numerical mapping rule (if smaller than 5, press right; if larger than 5, press left) on the Simon effect. This effect was observed only when both tasks used the same effectors. The results point to a shared spatial representation for explicit spatial information (locations) and implicit spatial information (numbers).     

Understanding the impact of self-concept on the stylistic properties of images

Much research has shown that the stylistic properties of visual images can serve as an important source of persuasion. However, the existing literature seldom incorporates characteristics of consumers, such as self-concept, as a determining factor in the effectiveness of images' stylistic properties. In the context of exploring a specific stylistic property, camera angle, we demonstrate across three experiments that when an upward-looking camera angle is employed to depict a product, participants with an ought-self (motivated by duties and obligations) generate more favorable product evaluations than participants with an ideal-self (motivated by hopes and aspirations). The reverse is found when a downward-looking angle is utilized. We also explore the mechanism underlying these effects. That is, individuals with an ideal-self and ought-self use different control strategies (influencing versus adapting to existing realities) impacting their product evaluations.     

Concerning the Madrid Lecture: the equivocal character of Pavlov's reflexological objectivism and its influence on the distorted concept of the physiology-psychology relationship

The aim of this study is to bring to light and make clear the characteristic equivoque Pavlov made when he conceived the neurophysiological circuit involved in conditioned behavior as if this circuit contained or reduced, in its own terms, such behavior. I also wish to point out how this interpretation implies a distorted concept of the relationships between neurophysiology and behavior. As an alternative, it is proposed that behavior, which is always operant behavior, is not at all reducible to its neurophysiological ingredients, but instead acts like an arrow-head for adaptation that, in turn, confers a subordinate function to the neurophysiological ingredients involved. To make this evident, behavior is considered an operant organic activity that takes place in an environment of "remote co-present" texture, and different from its neurophysiological ingredients, which take place within the context of spatial contiguity relationships.     

Witchcraft, Relativism and the Problem of the Criterion

This paper presents a naturalistic response to the challenge of epistemic relativism. The case of the Azande poison oracle is employed as an example of an alternative epistemic norm which may be used to justify beliefs about everyday occurrences. While a distinction is made between scepticism and relativism, an argument in support of epistemic relativism is presented that is based on the sceptical problem of the criterion. A response to the resulting relativistic position is then provided on the basis of a particularist response to scepticism combined with a naturalistic approach to the warrant of epistemic norms. It is argued that it is possible to comparatively assess the ability of epistemic norms to lead to epistemic aims. As against the epistemic relativist, it is possible to provide an objective basis for the choice between alternative epistemic norms.     

Creativity and modelling the measurement process of the Higgs self-coupling at the LHC and HL-LHC

This paper provides an account of the nature of creativity in high-energy physics experiments through an integrated historical and philosophical study of the current and planned attempts to measure the self-coupling of the Higgs boson by two experimental collaborations (ATLAS and CMS) at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) and the planned High Luminosity Large Hadron Collider (HL-LHC). A notion of creativity is first identified broadly as an increase in the epistemic value of a measurement outcome from an unexpected transformation, and narrowly as a condition for knowledge of the measurement of the self-coupling of the Higgs. Drawing upon Tal’s model-based epistemology of measurement (2012) this paper shows how without change to ‘readings’ (or ‘instrument indicators’) a transformation to the model of the measurement process can increase the epistemic value of the measurement outcome. Such transformations are attributed to the creativity of the experimental collaboration. Creativity, in this context, is both a product, a creative and improved model, and the distributed collaborative process of transformation to the model of the measurement process. For the case of the planned measurements at the HL-LHC, where models of the measurement process perform the epistemic function of prediction, creativity is included in the models of the measurement process, both as projected quantified creativity and as an assumed property of the future collaborations.

     

Reactance,the self,and its group: When threats to freedom come from the ingroup versus the outgroup

We investigated the assumption that independent versus interdependent self‐construals yield different manifestations of psychological reactance in different group contexts. We expected collectivists (interdependent) to value the collective freedom of an ingroup more in face of an outgroup threat than individualists (independent) who should be protective of their individual freedom especially within an ingroup. In Study 1, we showed that collectivists (Taiwanese students) did not show reactance when a threat to their freedom of choice originated in the ingroup, but they did show reactance when it originated in an outgroup. In Study 2, Austrian students showed more reactance the more interdependent their self‐construal was when confronted with an outgroup restriction. However, the more independent Austrian students' self‐construal was, the more reactance they showed when the threat came from the ingroup. Priming an independent (versus interdependent) self‐construal in Study 3, we again observed more reactance when freedom was restricted by the ingroup. The findings underline the importance of understanding psychological reactance as a socially situated phenomenon. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.