The authority of pleasure

The aim of the paper is to reassess the prospects of a widely neglected affective conception of the aesthetic evaluation and appreciation of art. On the proposed picture, the aesthetic evaluation and appreciation of art are non‐contingently constituted by a particular kind of pleasure. Artworks that are valuable qua artworks merit, deserve, and call for a certain pleasure, the same pleasure that reveals (or at least purports to reveal) them to be valuable in the way that they are, and constitutes their aesthetic evaluation and appreciation. This is why and how art is non‐contingently related to pleasure. Call this, the Affective View. While I don't advance conclusive arguments for the affective view in this paper, I aim to reassess its prospects by (1) undermining central objections against it, (2) dissociating it from hedonism about the value of artworks (the view that this value is grounded in, and explained by, its possessors’ power to please), and (3) introducing some observations on the practice of art in support of it. Given that the objections I discuss miss their target, and given the observations in support of it, I conclude that the affective view is worth serious reconsideration.     

Atmospheres of law: Senses,affects, lawscapes

In this article, I deal with airs and sounds and scents, while keeping an eye on the law. My field of enquiry is the interstitial area between sensory and affective occurrences, namely sensory experiences that are traditionally thought to be a causal result of external stimuli, and affective experiences that are mostly associated with emotional changes and generally allude to something internal. I am arguing that there is no constructive difference between internal and external origin of occurrences. In its stead, I suggest the concept of atmosphere, namely an attempt at understanding affective occurrences as excessive, collective, spatial and elemental. However, it quickly becomes apparent that an atmosphere is legally determined. The law controls affective occurrences by regulating property of sensory stimulation. At the same time, the law guides bodies into corridors of sensory compulsion – an aspect of which is consumerism in capitalist societies. The law achieves this by allowing certain sensory options to come forth while suppressing others, something which is particularly obvious in cases of intellectual property protection that capture the sensorial. I deal with the law in its material, spatial manifestation and in particular through what I have called the ‘lawscape’, namely the fusion of space and normativity. I employ a broadly Deleuzian methodology with insights from radical geography, affective studies, and urban and critical legal theory in order to develop and link the various parts of the text.     

In-between Believing

For any proposition p , it may sometimes occur that a person is not quite accurately describable as believing that p , nor quite accurately describable as failing to believe that p . I describe such a person as in an 'in-between state of belief'. I argue for the prevalence of in-between states of believing, and assert the need for an account of belief that allows us intelligibly to talk about in-between believing. I suggest that Bayesian and representationalist approaches are inadequate to the task, and that a Rylean dispositional account of belief might do the trick.     

Heidegger,Art, and the Overcoming of Metaphysics

In this paper, I advance a new interpretation of Heidegger's reflections on art as we find them in his essay, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. I begin, in Section 1, by uncovering the fundamental concern that motivates Heidegger's essay. I show that Heidegger's reflections on art are part of his attempt to uncover a path beyond the history of metaphysics. I then suggest, in Section 2, that while Heidegger does think that art may allow for the overcoming of metaphysics, recent interpreters [Dreyfus ( 2005 ), Thomson ( 2011 ), and Young ( 2001 )] have mistook the kind of art that Heidegger has in mind here. The kind of art that can allow for the overcoming of metaphysics, I argue, is not art that simply thematizes and/or reconfigures cultural worlds (as these interpreters have argued). It is instead what Heidegger calls ‘primal poesy’. After discussing the nature of primal poesy, I show in more detail how this kind of art may be capable of getting us beyond the history of metaphysics in Section 3. Finally, in Section 4, I reconsider the more common reading of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ in light of the interpretation I've offered in Sections 2 and 3.     

Empathy and the aesthetic: Why does art still move us?

In this article I will argue for the affective-motivation (background affective attitude or orientation) hypothesis that incubates the aesthetic experience and sets the deep frame of our engagement with art. For this, I look at these microgenetic—early passages of (a) affective perception as mapped into the early emergence of tertiary qualities that underlie a sensorimotor synchronization—a coupling of action, emotion and perception via mirroring that result in dynamic embodied anticipatory control and a feeling of proximity/connectedness and (b) developmental passages that are characterized by spatiotemporal coordination and proximity of the self-other/interactive object and thus structure intentionality, shape experience, in an engaging world of action potentialities forming a background affective attitude. As I will argue these qualitative emergent layers provide the minimal for the aesthetic and the ‘feeling into’ empathy, or their phenomenological counterparts enable engaged, embodied perception and imagination underlying expressive symbolic communication in interpersonal settings but also for the possibility of art. These layers have an ‘echoing’ effect (pre-attentive) when we let ourselves to be ‘moved’ from within by art. The underlying mechanism could be found in the mirroring interface of the upcoming bottom-up and feeding forward anticipatory/predictive (top-down) function of the ‘embodied action’ representations that are affective, imitative and grounded in the body-affective matrix—carrying experiential affordances and keeping the intersubjective ties between spectator and beheld/object. Given the asymmetry on action tendency between them that affords the ‘subordination of the goal-directed action’ into to the means of the action’s unfolding, aesthetic experiences can go deeply back reconstructing the first level of emerging consciousness where both the aesthetic and ethic became actualities. This could be by itself deeply rewarding, amplifying the experience to the ‘edge’. This is a ‘hot’ cognition self-restructuring related to morality when facing the sufferings—so there might be something special bout art and negative emotions in relation to empathy.     

‘I’ll Make It Up to You:’ Examining the effect of apologies on forgiveness

Receiving an apology is a key component to the management of conflict and the likelihood that forgiveness will occur. However, not all apologies are effective at alleviating interpersonal conflict. The current research focused on the content of an apology (e.g. ‘I’ll make it up to you; I was wrong; I feel bad that I did this …’) and the differential impact this content may have on self-reported and behavioral forgiveness among young adults. Seven different apologies were designed and tested for effectiveness within an experimentally created transgression. Undergraduate students (N = 199) completed a distribution of resources task in which the researchers simulated a transgression experience without the students’ knowledge. Following the transgression, students received one of the seven apologies. Results indicate that receiving an apology that expressed a desire to compensate for wrongdoing appeared to be the most effective apology in terms of promoting both self-reported and behavioral forgiveness.     

The Art Type Theory of Art

Abstract

The theory I present and defend in this paper—what I term the art type theory— holds that something is a work of art iff it belongs to an established art type. Something is an established art type, in turn, either because its paradigmatic instances standardly satisfy eight art-making conditions, or because the art world has seen fit to enfranchise it as such. It follows that the art status of certain objects is independent of what any individual or culture might say about it, while the art status of others fundamentally depends on the judgment of the art world. Because of the theory's quasi-institutional component, I conclude by defending it against four objections that have been raised against institutional definitions.     

Free Will, Art and Morality

The discussion in this paper begins with some observations regarding a number of structural similarities between art and morality as it involves human agency. On the basis of these observations we may ask whether or not incompatibilist worries about free will are relevant to both art and morality. One approach is to claim that libertarian free will is essential to our evaluations of merit and desert in both spheres. An alternative approach, is to claim that free will is required only in the sphere of morality—and that to this extent the art/morality analogy breaks down. I argue that both these incompatibilist approaches encounter significant problems and difficulties—and that incompatibilist have paid insufficient attention to these issues. However, although the analogy between art and morality may be welcomed by compatibilists, it does not pave the way for an easy or facile optimism on this subject. On the contrary, while the art/morality analogy may lend support to compatibilism it also serves to show that some worries of incompatibilism relating to the role of luck in human life cannot be easily set aside, which denies compatibilism any basis for complacent optimism on this subject.     

Failed-Art and Failed Art-Theory

An object being non-art appears only trivially informative. Some non-art objects, however, could be saliently ‘almost’ art, and therefore objects for which being non-art is non-trivially informative. I call these kinds of non-art objects ‘failed-art’ objects—non-art objects aetiologically similar to art-objects, diverging only in virtue of some relevant failure. I take failed-art to be the right sort of thing, to result from the right sort of action, and to have the right sort of history required to be art, but to be non-art by having failure where being art requires success. I assume that for something to be art that thing must be the product of intention-directed action. I then offer an account of attempts that captures the success conditions governing the relationship between intention-directed actions and their products. From this, I claim that to be failed-art is to be the product of a failed art-attempt, i.e., to be non-art as the result of the particular way in which that art-attempt failed. An art-attempt I take to be an attempt with success conditions, that, if satisfied, entail the satisfaction of the conditions for being art—whatever those may be. To be art, then, is to be the product of a successful art-attempt. As such, any art theory incompatible with my account of failed-art is an art theory for which the notions of success and failure do not matter, and therefore an art theory for which being art needn't be substantively intention-dependent. So, any theory of art unable to accommodate my account of failed-art is ipso facto false.     

A functional view of artistic evaluation

I develop and defend the following functional view of art: a work of art typically possesses as an essential feature one or more points, purposes, or ends with reference to the satisfaction of which that work can be appropriately evaluated. This way of seeing a work’s artistic value as dependent on its particular artistic ends (whatever they may be) suggests an answer to a longstanding question of what sort of internal relation, if any, exists between the wide variety of values (moral, cognitive, aesthetic, etc.) that may be possessed by works of art and their value qua works of art.     

Transgression and altruism: A case for hedonism

A model to account for the positive relationship between transgression and altruism was proposed and tested against three alternative formulations—Guilt, Social Justice, and Self-esteem Bolstering. The proposed model, Negative State Relief, asserts that people in a transgression situation behave charitably in order to reduce a general, negative affective state which is induced by exposure to harm-doing and that if the negative state is relieved by some other means, benevolent activity will be rendered unnecessary. All of the experimental subjects were exposed to an act of transgression; half performed the act themselves while half only witnessed it. In one set of experimental conditions (the relief conditions), a positive event—the receipt of either money or approval—was interposed between the harmful act and a fellow-student's request for aid. In another set of experimental conditions (the norelief conditions), no such positive event occurred. It was found, as predicted, that subjects who received a positive event were significantly less helpful than those who did not, but were not different from a control group which had never been exposed to the transgression. It was also found that harm-doers and harm-witnesses were identical in benevolent tendency. The results were interpreted as favoring a hedonistic conception of the nature of altruism. Finally, it was contended that a U-shaped relationship exists between mood state and helping tendency.     

Hegel,Danto, Adorno,and the end and after of art

In this paper, I consider Adorno's claim that art is at, or is coming to, an ‘end’. I consider Adorno's account in relation to the work of Arthur Danto and G. W. F. Hegel. I employ Danto's account, together with two distinct interpretive glosses of Hegel's account, as heuristic devices in order to clarify both Adorno's own arguments, and the context within which they are being advanced. I argue that while Danto and Hegel see art as coming to an end autonomously, owing to art's successful realization of its governing principle, Adorno by contrast sees art as coming to an end heteronomously. Art's narrative is forcibly broken off, rather than completed. Adorno's account, indebted to Hegel, of art's commitment both to autonomy and the realization of ‘spiritual needs’ is explored in order to clarify how, on Adorno's view, this has happened to art; and why, precisely, he believes art is coming to an end.     

Well,I feel differently: The importance of considering affective patterns in groups

While it is widely recognized that groups represent strong contexts that influence the affective states of their members, this convergent framing has resulted in the neglect of the systematic study of what occurs when group members' affective states differ. This is an unfortunate oversight. The study of how group members' qualitatively different affective states influence their mindsets and behaviors and interact to drive collective group processes and has the potential to greatly inform broader theory on affective and social influence in groups. To address group affective divergence in the context of established convergence processes, I reframe the consideration of group affect around group affective patterns. Then, I draw on the broader group's literature to set a research agenda for the study of group affective patterns. This agenda allows for the more nuanced examination of how multiple discrete affective states influence each other and align with other group member attributes (e.g., personality, attitudes) to impact group processes and outcomes.     

The affective consequences of artistic and scientific problem solving

Abstract

Although the influence of affect on creativity has received some theoretical and empirical attention, the role of affect as a consequence of creative problem solving has been neglected. This study is the one of the first to examine empirically the affect that results from creative problem solving. In a 2 (group) × 3 (time period) × 2 (task) factorial design, 122 art and science students were randomly assigned to complete an art or science task and to report on the kind and intensity of affect before, during, and after creative problem solving. It was predicted that art and science students would report different levels of affect only after the insight, not before or during, and that the effects of task, not just group, would contribute to affective variability between art and science students. Science students reported similar levels of (positive) affective intensity before and during creative insight as art students. It was only after the insight that art students reported more intense affective experiences than science students. Task differences accounted for a significant amount of variance in affective intensities, but primarily for art-oriented subjects. These findings suggest that viewing affect as a dependent variable of cognition, rather than primarily as an independent variable, is a direction that would benefit the field of empirical work on cognition and emotion. Current cognitive theories of emotion offer much potential in understanding the affective consequences of creative problem solving.     

Enthusiasm Versus Self-Possession: The Art of Psychological Science

In this article, I propose that psychology is an art, and that it can be so without forfeiting its identity as a developing science. In support of this proposal, I outline the ways in which art and science unnecessarily have become dichotomized, and I suggest a framework for integrating art and science. This integration is based on reframing the art versus science tension as a vehicle through which the basic human dynamic of "enthusiasm versus self-possession" is expressed. I apply this new framework to the field of psychology and outline ways in which research and practice in psychology can be unified to produce an integrated, dynamic, and creative field.     

Guilt and self-concept in ‘secondary psychopaths’

Thirty-two male and 25 female ‘secondary psychopaths’ and 24 male and 24 female ‘normal’ subjects filled in semantic differential scales relating to the concepts: Myself as I am, Myself when I lie, Myself if I were to steal, Myself as I would like to be, People who lie and People who steal. The Mosher Morality-Conscience Guilt scale and the Eysenck Personality Inventories were also administered. The psychopaths exhibited significantly higher Guilt scores than the normal subjects and had very poor self-image which was reflected in a constant feeling of guilt, regardless of whether or not they were rating transgression. Normal subjects, on the other hand, only rated themselves as feeling guilty when they violated acceptable norms. The findings suggest that guilt in ‘secondary psychopaths’ is partly related to their high level of trait anxiety and partly to their poor self-concept which may be a reflection of their disturbed family background and the constant disapproval that their behaviour creates. Since guilt in the psychopaths did not markedly increase with transgression it is argued that this may explain why guilt fails to inhibit unacceptable behaviour in some psychopaths.     

Rumination, fear, and cortisol: an in vivo study of interpersonal transgressions.

The authors sought to examine whether rumination about psychologically painful, though nontraumatic, interpersonal transgressions is associated with increased salivary cortisol. They measured salivary cortisol, rumination about a transgression, fear and anger regarding the transgressor, perceived painfulness of the transgression, and positive and negative mood in 115 undergraduates who had experienced an interpersonal transgression during the previous 7 days. They obtained measurements on as many as 5 occasions separated by approximately 14 days each. On occasions when participants reported that they had been ruminating to a degree that was greater than was typical for them, they had higher levels of salivary cortisol than was typical for them. The rumination- cortisol association appeared to be mediated by fear of the transgressor. Rumination about even moderately painful but nontraumatic life events and associated emotions are related to biological changes that may subserve social goals such as avoiding social threats. Items from the rumination scale are appended.     

Moral Responsibility as Guiltworthiness

It is often alleged that an agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression just in case s/he deserves a negative interpersonal response for that transgression, blaming responses such as resentment and indignation being paradigms. Aside from a few exceptions, guilt is cited in recent discussions of moral responsibility, if at all, as merely an effect of being blamed, or as a reliable indicator of moral responsibility, but not itself an explanation of moral responsibility. In this paper, I argue that an agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression just in case s/he deserves to feel moral guilt for that transgression. I argue that this alternative view offers all that the predominant blame-focused view offers, while also solving some puzzling features of moral responsibility. Specifically, it offers a compelling way to reconcile conflicting intuitions about the suberogatory, and allows those who do not understand what Darwall calls ‘second-personal’ reasons to be morally responsible for their immoral acts.