Vocational Choices in College

Our society presses unreasonably on students to “know” what they want to do vocationally. The pressure is unreasonable, especially when applied to high school seniors and college freshmen, because most of them have not yet learned enough about themselves or about occupations to be able to make a first, satisfying choice. And especially they have not learned enough about the nature of their limitations in college-level work. As a result, many students commit themselves to vocational choices prematurely and then perceive the experience as a “failure.” Students should be encouraged to consider any early decision as tentative, a choice to be tested, confirmed, or disconfirmed. They should be relieved of pressure to “know” what they want to do, and helped to see their task as one of confirming or discovering what they want to do by way of a process of exploration, experimentation, and personal development that may go on through their lifetime.     

高校心理咨询师多重关系情境与决策类型的研究

为探索高校咨询师面临的多重关系伦理情境、决策过程,对访谈17名高校心理咨询师的资料进行分析。结果：常见情境主要包括接送礼物承载的新关系、来访者和咨询师除咨询关系外的师生关系、咨询师与和来访者有关的第三人有关系、咨询师在咨询室之外的场所偶遇来访者、来访者有咨询师的联系方式、来访者和咨询师有身体接触等。决策表现为两种：经验主导型,决策时未意识到处于伦理情境只凭经验决策;伦理主导型,决策时意识到处在伦理情境。结论：高校心理咨询存在一些特殊多重关系,心理咨询师需增加具有伦理意识的决策。     

Rationalizing flow: agency in skilled unreflective action

In recent work, Peter Railton, Julia Annas, and David Velleman aim to reconcile the phenomenon of “flow”—broadly understood as describing the “unreflective” aspect of skilled action—with one or another familiar conception of agency. While there are important differences between their arguments, Railton, Annas, and Velleman all make, or are committed to, at least one similar pivotal claim. Each argues, directly or indirectly, that agents who perform skilled unreflective actions can, in principle, accurately answer “Anscombean” questions—”what” and “why” questions— about what they do. I argue against this claim and explore the ramifications for theories of skilled action and agency.     

Counselor Predictive Skill and Rated Counselor Effectiveness

Prediction is a fundamental part of counseling. Although counselors differ in their ability to predict accurately, there is no evidence that those who predict most accurately do the best job of counseling. Using 3 different sets of case data, 14 counselors predicted whether students would graduate and whether they would keep the “major” program selected at the time of admission. 3 supervisors agreed on the counselors rated “most” or “least” effective in their work with students. Although the amount of case data available to the counselors was unrelated to predictive accuracy, the counselors rated “most” effective predicted significantly better than those rated “moderately” or “least” effective.     

Compunction,Second-Personal Morality,and Moral Reasons

In The Second-Person Standpoint and subsequent essays, Stephen Darwall develops an account of morality that is “second-personal” in virtue of holding that what we are morally obligated to do is what others can legitimately demand that we do, i.e., what they can hold us accountable for doing through moral reactive attitudes like blame. Similarly, what it would be wrong for us to do is what others can legitimately demand that we abstain from doing. As part of this account, Darwall argues for the proposition that we have a distinctive “second-personal reason” to fulfill all of our obligations and to avoid all wrong-actions, an “authority-regarding” reason that derives from the legitimate demands the “moral community” makes of us. I show that Darwall offers an insufficient case for this proposition. My criticism of this aspect of Darwall’s account turns in part on the fact that we have compunction-based or “compunctive” reasons to fulfill all of our obligations and to avoid all wrong actions, a type of reason that Darwall seemingly overlooks.     

Predictability in Testing and Counseling

The concept of predictability is examined and its relevance for testing and counseling is assessed. Two types of studies, those designed to evaluate the concept, and research on deviant achievement suggest its potential value for test research and practice. Predictability, as such, has not been investigated in counseling, although many counselors realize that while some counselees move in expected directions (not necessarily “good”), others do not. To better understand the factors involved, counselors could make predictions and later compare them with actual results. Ethical problems arise, however, when “no help” or “harm” is predicted. Several types of research having implications for prediction of predictability are reviewed.     

Is Objective Consequentialism Compatible with the Principle that “Ought” Implies “Can”?

Some philosophers hold that objective consequentialism is false because it is incompatible with the principle that “ought” implies “can”. Roughly speaking, objective consequentialism is the doctrine that you always ought to do what will in fact have the best consequences. According to the principle that “ought” implies “can”, you have a moral obligation to do something only if you can do that thing. Frances Howard-Snyder has used an innovative thought experiment to argue that sometimes you cannot do what will in fact have the best consequences because you do not know what will in fact have the best consequences. Erik Carlson has raised two objections against Howard-Snyder’s argument. This paper examines Howard-Snyder’s argument as well as Carlson’s objections, arguing that Carlson’s objections do not go through but Howard-Snyder’s argument fails nonetheless. Moreover, this paper attempts to show that objective consequentialism and other objectivist moral theories are compatible with the principle that “ought” implies “can”. Finally, this paper analyses a special kind of inability: ignorance-induced inability.     

Counseling Outcomes: Counselor Characteristics and Client Results

Eighteen counselors in one of the administrative areas of the California Department of Human Resources and 697 of their closed cases were studied in order to discover whether differences in employability outcomes did exist. The study attempted to answer the following questions: (a) How many clients achieve employability during their relationships with employment counselors? (b) What is the final disposition of cases that are closed other than employable? and (c) To what degree do counselors engage in placement activities and what influence do these activities have on employable closures? The study provides evidence that some counselors had significantly more clients achieve employable status than did other counselors.     

ANIMAL PASSIONS AND BEASTLY VIRTUES: COGNITIVE ETHOLOGY AS THE UNIFYING SCIENCE FOR UNDERSTANDING THE SUBJECTIVE,EMOTIONAL, EMPATHIC,AND MORAL LIVES OF ANIMALS

Abstract. In this essay, my response to four papers that were presented at the 2004 annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion in a session devoted to my research on animal behavior and cognitive ethology, I stress the importance of interdisciplinary research and collaboration for coming to terms with various aspects of animal behavior and animal cognition. I argue that we have much to learn from other animals concerning a set of “big” questions including who we are in the grand scheme of things, the role science (“science sense”) plays in our understanding of the world in which we live, what it means to “know” something, what some other ways of knowing are and how they compare to what we call “science,” and the use of anecdotes and anthropomorphism to inform studies of animal behavior. I ask, Are other minds really all that private and inaccessible? Can a nonhuman animal be called a person? What does the future hold if we continue to dismantle the only planet we live on and persecute the other animal beings with whom we are supposed to coexist? I argue that cognitive ethology is the unifying science for understanding the subjective, emotional, empathic, and moral lives of animals, because it is essential to know what animals do, think, and feel as they go about their daily routines in the company of their friends and when they are alone. It is also important to learn why both the similarities and differences between humans and other animals have evolved. The more we come to understand other animals, the more we will appreciate them as the amazing beings they are, and the more we will come to understand ourselves.     

Studies on spontaneous attention to number (SAN) are based on spontaneous focusing on numerosity (SFON)

Li and Baroody presented a study in which they investigate children’ spontaneous attention to exact quantity without acknowledging how previous studies of spontaneous focusing on numerosity (SFON) are related to their concept and methods. The authors’ reaction to our pointing this out makes it is clear that SFON research has had foundational role in the development of Baroody and his colleagues spontaneous attention to number (SAN) idea. Thus the authors must acknowledge the SFON literature as the substantial part of their theoretical and methodological construct. The latest definition of SAN states this undeniably. “SAN is the attentional process that underlies exact number recognition initiated by the mathematical thinking triggered by SFON (e.g., attention to “threeness” directed by conceptual knowledge of “three” activated by SFON).” Furthermore, in their response, Dr Baroody and Dr Li admit that “An awareness of the SFON literature did help us explicitly recognize that, given the ambiguous instructions that do not explicitly direct a child’s attention to number, both the nonverbal production and matching tasks were useful in assessing unguided or spontaneous attention to a number.” It is surprising that in their response to the European Journal of Educational Psychology, the authors maintain their claim that they have cited the SFON literature adequately in their study about SAN.     

Best Practices for Counselors Who Treat Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

Counselors in settings as diverse as schools, corporations, and community agencies are well aware of the numbers of people in the United States who daily come in contact with stressors that are extreme and potentially traumatic. Automobile accidents, disasters, or encounters with interpersonal violence are ubiquitous. Professional counselors, regardless of their professional identification or the settings in which they work, are very likely providing services to many people who are in distress after traumatic exposures. These counselors would benefit from knowing what other mental health professionals consider to be best practices for preventing and treating posttraumatic stress disorders (PTSDs). The purpose of this article is to summarize for counselors those best practices that have been recently developed and published by a multidisciplinary expert group (E. B. Foa, J. R. T. Davidson, & A. Frances, 1999) in their article “Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.”     

The Sexual Identity Timeline: A Reflection Tool for Developing Competence in Counseling

Greater attention to sexual identity development from an inclusive and affirmative perspective must be incorporated into counselor education training. Counselors are well positioned to address issues related to human sexuality; however, without reflection across the spectrum of sexuality-related issues, counselors may rely on personal bias, or they may choose to avoid the topic altogether. In order to adequately train counselors, it is important to identify learning activities that counselor educators can utilize. Given the significance of sexuality across the lifespan, we propose that counselor educators actively guide their students through reflection about their own sexual identity development. This article presents the Sexual Identity Timeline (SIT) as a reflective learning activity to incorporate into the counseling curriculum.     

That “Ought” Does Not Imply “Right”: Why It Matters for Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethicists sometimes say that a right action is what a virtuous person would do, characteristically, in the circumstances. But some have objected recently that right action cannot be defined as what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances because there are circumstances in which a right action is possible but in which no virtuous person would be found. This objection moves from the premise that a given person ought to do an action that no virtuous person would do, to the conclusion that the action is a right action. I demon‐strate that virtue ethicists distinguish “ought” from “right” and reject the assumption that “ought” implies “right.” I then show how their rejection of that assumption blocks this “right but not virtuous” objection. I conclude by showing how the thesis that “ought” does not imply “right” can clarify a further dispute in virtue ethics regarding whether “ought” implies “can.”     

The Counselor as an Applied Behavioral Scientist

The swirl of change—instant history—coupled with contemporary human problems makes it imperative that counselors shed their complacencies and “truths” in order to doubt, question, and examine all that they now do. Counseling viewed as a highly complex, social-psychological phenomenon demands counselors who are applied behavioral scientists. Our outrageous wordology and one-method-one-technique orientation, along with confused “scientific-versus-humanistic” thinking, has severely impeded progress. Counseling should follow from client problems rather than be a predetermined, prescribed, and stylized activity. Social modeling in groups, systematic desensitization, and contingency management techniques are illustrative of how counselors can function as applied behavioral scientists.     

Empathy and a Life of Moral Endeavor

Over the course of her career, Jean Harvey contributed many invaluable insights that help to make sense of both injustice and resistance. Specifically, she developed an account of what she called “civilized oppression,” which is pernicious in part because it can be difficult to perceive. One way that we ought to pursue what she calls a “life of moral endeavor” is by increasing our perceptual awareness of civilized oppression and ourselves as its agents. In this article I argue that one noxious form of civilized oppression is what Miranda Fricker calls “testimonial injustice.” I then follow Harvey in arguing that one of the methods by which we should work to avoid perpetrating testimonial injustice is by empathizing with others. This is true for two reasons. The first is that in order to manifest what Fricker calls the virtue of testimonial justice, we must have a method by which we “correct” our prejudices or implicit biases, and empathy serves as such a corrective. The second is that there are cases where the virtue of testimonial justice wouldn't in fact correct for testimonial injustice in the way that Fricker suggests, but that actively working to empathize would.     

Inviting complementary perspectives on situated normativity in everyday life

In everyday life, situations in which we act adequately yet entirely without deliberation are ubiquitous. We use the term “situated normativity” for the normative aspect of embodied cognition in skillful action. Wittgenstein’s notion of “directed discontent” refers to a context-sensitive reaction of appreciation in skillful action. Extending this notion from the domain of expertise to that of adequate everyday action, we examine phenomenologically the question of what happens when skilled individuals act correctly with instinctive ease. This question invites exploratory contributions from a variety of perspectives complementary to the philosophical/ phenomenological one, including cognitive neuroscience, neurodynamics and psychology. Along such lines we try to make the normative aspect of adequate immediate action better accessible to empirical research. After introducing the idea that “valence” is a forerunner of directed discontent, we propose to make progress on this by first pursuing a more restricted exploratory question, namely, ‘what happens in the first few hundred milliseconds of the development of directed discontent?’     

Hard Determinism,Humeanism, and Virtue Ethics

Hard determinists hold that we never have alternative possibilities of action—that we only can do what we actually do. This means that if hard determinists accept the “ought implies can” principle, they must accept that it is never the case that we ought to do anything we do not do. In other words, they must reject the view that there can be “ought”‐based moral reasons to do things we do not do. Hard determinists who wish to accommodate moral reasons to do things we do not do can instead appeal to Humean moral reasons that are based on desires to be virtuous. Moral reasons grounded on desires to be virtuous do not depend on our being able to act on those reasons in the way that “ought”‐based moral reasons do.     

An emperor without clothes: The Church's views about treatment of domestic violence

Once upon a time there was an emperor who was very vain about his elegant clothing. Two swindlers convinced him that they could make him the finest clothes he ever had, and set to work on an empty loom. Rumors of their fame began to spread, and even the emperor's high officials were convinced that the invisible garments were the finest they had ever seen. One minister even decided, “I know I'm not stupid, so it must be my fine position I'm not fit for. Some people might think that rather funny, but I must take good care they don't get to hear of it.” And then he praised the material which he couldn't see and assured them of his delight in its charming shades and its beautiful design. The emperor finally went on parade with his new garments. Crowds gathered, and they all said how magnificently clad he was. No one dared admit they couldn't see the clothes, and many concluded there was simply something wrong with them that he appeared naked. Finally a little child said, “But he hasn't got anything on!” “Goodness gracious, do you hear what the little innocent says?” one whispered to another, until finally everyone shouted at last, “He hasn't got anything on!” The emperor was embarrassed, but he drew himself up and went on with the procession still more proudly, while his chamberlains walked after him carrying the train that wasn't there.     

Longer,smaller, faster,stronger: On skills and intelligence

ABSTRACT

How does practice change our behaviors such that they go from being awkward, unskilled actions to elegant, skilled performances? This is the question that I wish to explore in this paper. In the first section of the paper, I will defend the tight connection between practice and skill and then go on to make precise how we ought to construe the concept of practice. In the second section, I will suggest that practice contributes to skill by structuring and automatizing the motor routines constitutive of skilled actions. I will cite how this fact about skilled action has misled many philosophers to conclude that skills are mindless or bodily. In the third section of the paper, I will challenge this common misconception about automaticity by appealing to empirical evidence of motor chunking. This evidence reveals that there are two opposing processes involved in the automaticity of skilled action: one process that is largely associative, which I will call “concatenation,” and a second which is a controlled cognitive process, which I will call “segmentation.” As a result of this evidence, we will be in a position to see clearly why skills are minded and intelligent not merely during their acquisition and not simply in virtue of their connection to intentional states but, rather, in their very nature. I will end by reflecting on some theoretical reasons for why this is exactly what we should expect to be the case when it comes to skilled action.