共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
R. Lanier Anderson 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):91-108
Martin offers an intriguing account of nineteenth century challenges to the traditional theory of judgment as a synthesis
of subject and predicate (the synthesis theory)—criticisms motivated largely by the problem posed by existential judgments,
which need not have two terms at all. Such judgments led to a theory of “thetic” judgments, whose essential feature is to
“posit” something, rather than to combine terms (as in synthetic judgment). I argue, however, that Kant’s official definition
of judgment already implicitly recognizes the importance of positing, and that its (otherwise confusing) abstract generality
actually affords Kant’s own logic an adequate way to accommodate existential judgments within the traditional synthesis theory.
Preservation of a synthetic account of judgment is also found to be independently important for Kant’s larger aims in the
theory of cognition.
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R. Lanier AndersonEmail: |
2.
Craig Reeves 《Res Publica》2009,15(2):137-164
In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt struggled to defend the possibility of judgment against the obvious problems encountered in attempts to offer
legally valid and morally meaningful judgments of those who had committed crimes in morally bankrupt communities. Following
Norrie, this article argues that Arendt’s conclusions in Eichmann are equivocal and incoherent. Exploring her perspectival
theory of judgment, the article suggests that Arendt remains trapped within certain Kantian assumptions in her philosophy
of history, and as such sees the question of freedom in a binary way. The article argues that Adorno’s philosophy of freedom
provides the resources to diagnose and overcome Arendt’s shortcomings. Adorno’s position provides a way of embracing the antinomical
character of judgment, by emphasising the need for elements of reason and nature in the phenomenon of freedom. In Adorno’s
lights, judgment becomes an attempt to express a ‘spirit of solidarity’ with the tragic status of the potentially free but
actually unfree subject of modernity.
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Craig ReevesEmail: |
3.
The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments.
Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons.
We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of
moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature indicates a complex interplay between automatic and deliberative
mental processes in moral judgment formation, with the latter constraining the expression and influence of moral intuitions.
We therefore conclude that the psychological literature supports a normative conception of agency.
相似文献
Jeanette KennettEmail: |
4.
M. S. Bedke 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(2):189-209
Consider orthodox motivational judgment internalism: necessarily, A’s sincere moral judgment that he or she ought to φ motivates
A to φ. Such principles fail because they cannot accommodate the amoralist, or one who renders moral judgments without any
corresponding motivation. The orthodox alternative, externalism, posits only contingent relations between moral judgment and
motivation. In response I first revive conceptual internalism by offering some modifications on the amoralist case to show
that certain community-wide motivational failures are not conceptually possible. Second, I introduce a theory of moral motivation
that supplements the intuitive responses to different amoralist cases. According to moral judgment purposivism (MJP), in rough
approximation, a purpose of moral judgments is to motivate corresponding behaviors such that a mental state without this purpose
is not a moral judgment. MJP is consistent with conceptual desiderata, provides an illuminating analysis of amoralist cases,
and offers a step forward in the internalist-externalist debates.
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M. S. BedkeEmail: |
5.
Jonathan Ichikawa 《Philosophical Studies》2009,146(3):435-443
I criticize Timothy Williamson’s characterization of thought experiments on which the central judgments are judgments of contingent
counterfactuals. The fragility of these counterfactuals makes them too easily false, and too difficult to know.
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Jonathan IchikawaEmail: |
6.
Martin Montminy 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(3):341-356
Some authors have recently claimed that relativism about knowledge sentences accommodates the context sensitivity of our use
of such sentences as well as contextualism, while avoiding the counterintuitive consequences of contextualism regarding our
inter-contextual judgments, that is, our judgments about knowledge claims made in other contexts. I argue that relativism,
like contextualism, involves an error theory regarding a certain class of inter-contextual judgments.
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Martin MontminyEmail: |
7.
Patrick Hutchings 《Sophia》2007,46(1):79-89
A review of Peter Steele’s Plenty, a book in which each poem is faced by a colour plate of the painting or object which sparked it off. Hollander’s ecphrasis
and Krieger’s ekphrasis are held in – possibly unresolvable – dialectic by Steele’s poems. The only resolution which one can
find is one of wit rather than of philosophy.
相似文献
Patrick HutchingsEmail: |
8.
Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of
a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that
people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition,
and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model
has been forcefully defended by Jonathan Haidt. One important implication of Haidt’s model is that in giving reasons for their
moral judgments people tend to confabulate – the reasons they give in attempting to explain their moral judgments are not
really operative in producing those judgments. Moral reason-giving on Haidt’s view is generally a matter of post hoc confabulation.
Against Haidt, we argue for a version of rationalism that we call ‘morphological rationalism.’ We label our version ‘morphological’
because according to it, the information contained in moral principles is embodied in the standing structure of a typical
individual’s cognitive system, and this morphologically embodied information plays a causal role in the generation of particular
moral judgments. The manner in which the principles play this role is via ‘proceduralization’ – such principles operate automatically.
In contrast to Haidt’s intuitionism, then, our view does not imply that people’s moral reason-giving practices are matters
of confabulation. In defense of our view, we appeal to what we call the ‘nonjarring’ character of the phenomenology of making
moral judgments and of giving reasons for those judgments.
相似文献
Mark TimmonsEmail: |
9.
John Martin Fischer 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):15-20
I explore a key feature of Robert Kane’s libertarianism (about which I have been puzzled for some time). Kane claims that
we should separate issues of alternative possibilities from issues of ultimacy, but he further argues that they are connected
in a certain way. I call into question this connection, and I continue to argue for a strict separation of considerations
pertaining to alternative possibilities and “actual-sequence” considerations.
相似文献
John Martin FischerEmail: |
10.
Daniel Martin Varisco 《Contemporary Islam》2007,1(3):207-230
Christian Fundamentalists used to read the apocalyptic scenario through the “red” filter of communism, but since the 1980s
the target has shifted to the “green tide” of Islam. One of the more colorful Fundamentalist diatribes against Islam is cartoon
evangelist Jack Chick’s The Prophet, a comic book that calls Islam a Satanic plot hatched by the Catholic church. This article examines the rhetoric of Christian
Fundamentalist diatribe against Islam in light of apocalyptic scenarios drawn out of biblical prophecy. Chick’s comic and
the millenarian Hal Lindsay’s The Late Great Planet Earth are placed in the context of doctrinal attacks on Islam in medieval Christendom. In tracing the usage of “Islamic fundamentalism,”
I argue that the term “fundamentalism” is problematic for cross-cultural studies of religious expression and movements.
相似文献
Daniel Martin VariscoEmail: |
11.
Rebecca Roman Hanrahan 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):281-306
David Chalmers supports his contention that there is a possible world populated by our zombie twins by arguing for the assumption
that conceivability entails possibility. But, I argue, the modal epistemology he sets forth, ‘modal rationalism,’ ignores
the problem of incompleteness and relies on an idealized notion of conceivability. As a consequence, this epistemology can’t
justify our quotidian judgments of possibility, let alone those judgments that concern the mind/body connection. Working from
the analogy that the imagination is to the possible as perception is to the actual, I set forth a competing epistemology,
‘modal empiricism.’ This epistemology survives the incompleteness objection and allows some of our everyday modal judgments
to be justified. But this epistemology can’t justify the claim that Zombie World is possible, which leaves Chalmers’s property
dualism without the support it needs.
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Rebecca Roman HanrahanEmail: |
12.
Erin Eaker 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):455-457
This paper raises questions concerning Ted Morris’ interpretation of Hume’s notion of meaning and investigates the private
and public aspects of Hume’s notion of meaning.
相似文献
Erin EakerEmail: |
13.
Michael McKenna 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(1):29-37
In “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment” Angela Smith defends her nonvoluntarist theory of moral responsibility
against the charge that any such view is shallow because it cannot capture the depth of judgments of responsibility. Only
voluntarist positions can do this since only voluntarist positions allow for control. I argue that Smith is able to deflect
the voluntarists’ criticism, but only with further resources. As a voluntarist, I also concede that Smith’s thesis has force,
and I close with a compromise position, one that allows for direct moral responsibility for the nonvoluntary, but also incorporates
a reasonable control condition.
相似文献
Michael McKennaEmail: |
14.
Shannon Vallor 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(1):1-15
Dennett’s recent defense in this journal of the heterophenomenological method and its supposed advantages over Husserlian
phenomenology is premised on his problematic account of the epistemological and ontological status of phenomenological states.
By employing Husserl’s philosophy of science to clarify the relationship between phenomenology and evidence and the implications
of this relationship for the empirical identification of ‘real’ conscious states, I argue that the naturalistic account of
consciousness Dennett hopes for could be authoritative as a science only by virtue of the very phenomenological evidences
Dennett’s method consigns to the realm of fiction. Thus heterophenomenology, qua scientific method, is incoherent.
相似文献
Shannon VallorEmail: |
15.
Yujin Nagasawa 《Sophia》2007,46(1):65-67
I provide a further response to Jason A. Beyer’s objections to the alleged inconsistency between God’s omniscience and His
other attributes.
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Yujin NagasawaEmail: |
16.
Per Albert Ilsaas 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):313-316
The article is a brief response to Jacob Blair’s critique of David Rodin’s argument in War and Self-Defense that there are circumstances in which war conceivably could be justified not as self-defence, but as law enforcement or punishment.
It argues that while Rodin’s position potentially is less dilemmatic than Blair suggests, Blair nevertheless usefully highlights
tensions within it. Blair’s own argument in favour of ar as law-enforcement is suggestive, but in no way conclusive.
相似文献
Per Albert IlsaasEmail: |
17.
Maxine Haire 《Sophia》2007,46(3):305-311
Robert Preece’s The Psychology of Buddhist Tantra and Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche’s Everyday Consciousness and Primordial Awareness are reviewed. Both books address Tibetan Buddhism, and their common threads underscore this discussion. Even when separated
from their original contexts, the Tibetan Buddhist teachings offer understandings about a common human nature and a method
of transforming consciousness through awareness.
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Maxine HaireEmail: |
18.
Daniel E. Flage 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):379-380
This note is a reply to some of Giovanni Grandi’s comments on my paper “Berkeley’s Contingent Necessities.”
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Daniel E. FlageEmail: |
19.
Manfred Kupffer 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):225-238
Markus Werning attempts to refute Quine’s thesis that meaning is indeterminate. To this purpose he employs Hodges’ theorem
about extensions of cofinal meaning functions. But the theorem does neither suffice to solve Quine’s problem nor the problem
Werning mistakenly identifies with Quine’s. Nevertheless it makes sense to employ the methods used in Werning’s paper with
regard to Quine’s thesis, only that they tell in favour of the thesis instead of against it.
相似文献
Manfred KupfferEmail: |
20.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):1-19
The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents
any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities – a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could
have avoided doing it – to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van Inwagen’s version of the Direct
Argument. I then comment on David Widerker’s recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument by constructing
counterexamples to a rule of inference it invokes.
相似文献
Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |