Evidence for the underestimation of implicit in-group favoritism among low-status groups

We question the evidence and the reasoning underlying recent research suggesting that members of low-status groups often fail to show in-group favoritism at the implicit level. Specifically, we argue the predominant measure revealing this pattern of group attitudes (the IAT) is influenced by extrapersonal associations, just the sort of information that would lead low-status groups to appear not to prefer their in-group. In the research reported here, respondents from low-status groups (African-Americans in Study 1 and homosexual males in Study 2) exhibited no in-group favoritism on the standard IAT, replicating previous research. However, reliable in-group favoritism by members of both groups was revealed on a personalized IAT [Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2004). Reducing the influence of extrapersonal associations on the Implicit Association Test: Personalizing the IAT. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 653-667] that reduces extrapersonal influences. We also rule out the possibility that differential error rates can account for the different patterns observed on the two versions of the IAT.     

公平规范执行中内群体偏爱的心理发展机制

如何揭示群体规范和公平价值在个体心理发展中的作用机理, 提升儿童-青少年在群际互动当中的公平感知与规范执行, 是教育心理领域的关键问题。公平规范执行中内群体偏爱现象是近年来的研究热点之一, 然而先前研究存在以下不足：1)大多采用问卷法, 易受社会赞许性的影响, 存在言行不一致的情况; 2)大多采用情景实验, 聚焦社会互动的最终行为输出端, 无法实时有效地把握社会决策的动态进程; 3)脑成像研究仍以fMRI技术为主, 侧重于评估认知加工潜在的脑区激活模式及各脑区间的功能连接, 缺乏对群际公平规范执行中大脑激活动态模式的精确把握。针对这些不足, 本项目从资产分配情景出发, 以儿童和青少年为研究对象, 联合运用认知、行为、眼动和电生理等多层次测评手段, 对公平规范执行中内群体偏爱的发生过程进行认知解析, 探讨认知控制和心智化在其间的关键作用机制及其心理发展轨迹。研究结果将服务于中小学管理中的德育教育, 引导与培养学生的公正感与行为。     

Perspective-taking: decreasing stereotype expression, stereotype accessibility, and in-group favoritism

Using 3 experiments, the authors explored the role of perspective-taking in debiasing social thought. In the 1st 2 experiments, perspective-taking was contrasted with stereotype suppression as a possible strategy for achieving stereotype control. In Experiment 1, perspective-taking decreased stereotypic biases on both a conscious and a nonconscious task. In Experiment 2, perspective-taking led to both decreased stereotyping and increased overlap between representations of the self and representations of the elderly, suggesting activation and application of the self-concept in judgments of the elderly. In Experiment 3, perspective-taking reduced evidence of in-group bias in the minimal group paradigm by increasing evaluations of the out-group. The role of self-other overlap in producing prosocial outcomes and the separation of the conscious, explicit effects from the nonconscious, implicit effects of perspective-taking are discussed.     

The development of in-group favoritism: between social reality and group identity

This study examined how social reality restricts children's tendency for in-group favoritism in group evaluations. Children were faced with social reality considerations and with group identity concerns. Using short stories, in this experimental study, conducted among 3 age groups (6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds), the authors examined the trait attribution effects of reality constraints on eye-color differences and national group differences. The results show that the trait attributions of all age groups were restricted by the acceptance of socially defined reality. In addition, when the information about reality was not considered accurate, only the youngest children showed positive in-group favoritism. It is argued that these findings are useful in trying to reconcile some of the divergent and contrasting findings in the developmental literature on children's intergroup perceptions and evaluations.     

Relations of self-esteem concerns, group identification, and self-stereotyping to in-group favoritism

In 2 studies, the author examined the effect of collective self-esteem (CSE; J. Crocker & R. Luhtanen, 1993) on people's willingness to display in-group favoritism. To test that self-esteem hypothesis, he measured public CSE, rather than private CSE, because the former parallels a threat to social identity, a state believed to motivate in-group favoritism. Furthermore, the author explored whether group identification and self-stereotyping moderated the effect of public CSE on in-group favoritism. The participants were 92 British and Dutch university employees. As expected, participants high in public CSE displayed more in-group favoritism than did those low in public CSE. Moreover, group identification and self-stereotyping appeared to moderate the effect of CSE.     

In my mind, we all smile: A case of in-group favoritism

The goal of the present study was to examine whether a highly valued social behavior—the smile—is attributed more frequently to in-group than to out-group members. For this, participants were asked to read a vignette describing a protagonist in a non-emotional situation, and to choose a facial expression that would be appropriate to the context. For Study 1 the vignette depicted a potentially social context, whereas for Study 2, the context was strictly non-social. In both studies, participants of European descent attributed smiles more often to members of their in-group, whereas they attributed a larger number of neutral faces to out-group members. In a third study the same pattern of attributions was found for recent immigrants from French speaking African countries and from Asian countries. These results suggest the presence of an in-group bias in the attribution of smiles.     

In-group favoritism among Native and immigrant Turkish Cypriots: trait evaluations of in-group and out-group targets

The authors investigated whether in-group favoritism manifests itself as praise for the in-group- or as denigration of the out-group. A total of 450 Turkish Cypriots (248 native, 202 immigrant) judged the applicability of positive and negative trait words to in-group and out-group targets. Both the native and the immigrant groups judged the positive traits as more applicable to their respective in-groups than to the out-group. The native group evaluated the negative social traits as more applicable to the immigrant group. The immigrant group also judged the negative social traits as more applicable to themselves. The two groups did not differ in their judgments for more personal negative traits.     

Us without them: evidence for an intragroup origin of positive in-group regard

Four experiments examined whether group formation and positive in-group regard require interaggregate comparison as the in-group-requires-an-out-group assumption of the metacontrast principle implies. The authors fostered novel social aggregates with or without a contrasting aggregate with which members could compare and varied intra-aggregate factors (interaction or interdependence). Regardless of whether interaggregate comparison was feasible, the intra-aggregate factors increased the perceived entitativity of the aggregate and positive regard toward the aggregate (i.e., social attraction and cooperation among members). Mediation analyses were consistent with the possibility that the intra-aggregate factors promoted entitativity, which in turn promoted in-group regard. These data suggest that group formation and in-group regard have intragroup origins and do not require comparison with a contrasting social aggregate.     

Temporal averaging across multiple response options: insight into the mechanisms underlying integration

Rats trained on a dual-duration, dual-modality peak-interval procedure (e.g., tone = 10 s/light = 20 s) often show unimodal response distributions with peaks that fall in between the anchor durations when both cues are presented as a simultaneous compound. Two hypotheses can explain this finding. According to the averaging hypothesis, rats integrate the anchor durations into an average during compound trials, with each duration being weighted by its respective reinforcement probability. According to the simultaneous temporal processing hypothesis, rats time both durations veridically and simultaneously during compound trials and respond continuously across both durations, thereby producing a unimodal response distribution with a peak falling in between the anchor durations. In the present compounding experiment, rats were trained to associate a tone and light with two different durations (e.g., 5 and 20 s, respectively). However, in contrast to previous experiments, each cue was also associated with a distinct response requirement (e.g., left nosepoke for tone/right nosepoke for light). On the majority of compound trials, responding on a given nosepoke fell close to its respective duration, but was shifted in the direction of the other cue’s duration, suggesting rats timed an average of the two durations. However, more weight appeared to be given to the duration associated with the manipulandum on which the rat responded, rather than the duration associated with a higher reinforcement probability as predicted by the averaging hypothesis. Group differences were also observed, with rats trained to associate the tone and light with the short and long durations, respectively, being more likely to show these shifts than the counterbalanced modality–duration group (i.e., light-short/tone-long). This parallels group differences observed in past studies and suggest that cue weighting in response to stimulus compounds is influenced by the modality–duration relationship of the anchor cues. The current results suggest that temporal averaging is a more flexible process than previously theorized and provide novel insight into the mechanisms that affect cue weighting.     

The mechanisms underlying attributive projection1

The experiment investigated the validity of the cognitive dissonance reduction and stimulus generalization explanations of attributive projection. Subjects in a high dissonance condition were informed that they possessed considerable hostility (a negative trait), while those in a low dissonance condition were told that they possessed a great deal of assertiveness (a desirable trait). The dissonance mechanism received support in that (a) subjects' reports of their anxiety indicated that an ego threat was produced only in the high dissonance condition, as expected; and (b) hostility was projected onto others to a significantly greater degree than was assertiveness. The existence of only a weak relationship between degree of ego threat produced by the personality feedback and subsequent amount of projection, however, throws into question the validity of the hypothesized defensive function of projection. No support for the generalization mechanism was obtained since the subjects did not project a greater amount of either trait onto the similar targets (college students) than onto the relatively dissimilar targets (middleaged lawyers); possible reasons for this negative result were discussed, as well as suggestions for future research.     

Decision mechanisms underlying mood-congruent emotional classification

There is great interest in understanding whether and how mood influences affective processing. Results in the literature have been mixed: some studies show mood-congruent processing but others do not. One limitation of previous work is that decision components for affective processing and responses biases are not dissociated. The present study explored the roles of affective processing and response biases using a drift-diffusion model (DDM) of simple choice. In two experiments, participants decided if words were emotionally positive or negative while listening to music that induced positive or negative mood. The behavioural results showed weak, inconsistent mood-congruency effects. In contrast, the DDM showed consistent effects that were selectively driven by an a-priori bias in response expectation, suggesting that music-induced mood influences expectations about the emotionality of upcoming stimuli, but not the emotionality of the stimuli themselves. Implications for future studies of emotional classification and mood are subsequently discussed.     

Holistic processing is tuned for in-group faces

Past research has found that mere in-group/out-group categorizations are sufficient to elicit biases in face memory. The current research yields novel evidence that mere social categorization is also sufficient to modulate processes underlying face perception, even for faces for which we have strong perceptual expertise: same-race (SR) faces. Using the composite face paradigm, we find that SR faces categorized as in-group members (i.e., fellow university students) are processed more holistically than are SR faces categorized as out-group members (i.e., students at another university). Hence, holding perceptual expertise with faces constant, categorizing an SR target as an out-group member debilitates the strong holistic processing typically observed for SR faces.     

Evaluating the evidence for multiple realization

Consider what the brain-state theorist has to do to make good his claims. He has to specify a physical–chemical state such that any organism (not just a mammal) is in pain if and only if (a) it possesses a brain of suitable physical–chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that physical–chemical state. This means that the physical–chemical state in question must be a possible state of a mammalian brain, a reptilian brain, a mollusc’s brain (octopuses are mollusca, and certainly feel pain), etc. At the same time, it must not be a possible (physically possible) state of the brain of any physically possible creature that cannot feel pain. Even if such a state can be found, it must be nomologically certain that it will also be a state of the brain of any extraterrestrial life that may be found that will be capable of feeling pain before we can even entertain the supposition that it may be pain. It is not altogether impossible that such a state will be found... . But this is certainly an ambitious hypothesis. (Putnam 1967/1975, p. 436)

The belief that mental states are multiply realized is now nearly universal among philosophers, as is the belief that this fact decisively refutes the identity theory. I argue that the empirical support for multiple realization does not justify the confidence that has been placed in it. In order for multiple realization of mental states to be an objection to the identity theory, the neurological differences among pains, for example, must be such as to guarantee that they are of distinct neurological kinds. But the phenomena traditionally cited do not provide evidence of that sort of variation. In particular, examples of neural plasticity do not provide such evidence.     

Visual aftereffects for walking actions reveal underlying neural mechanisms for action recognition

The results of this study illustrate a new high-level visual aftereffect: Observing actors walking forward, without horizontal translation, makes subsequent actors appear to walk backward, and the opposite effect is obtained after observing backward walking. We used this aftereffect, which cannot be explained by simple low-level adaptation to motion direction, to investigate the properties of neural mechanisms underlying recognition of walking actions. Our results suggest that the perception of walking and the perception of static images of actors in walking postures rely on common brain mechanisms that are primarily object centered, rather than viewer centered, and that are blind to the identity of the actor. These results, obtained with human psychophysical adaptation techniques, support previous evidence accumulated using single-unit recording in nonhuman primates. In addition, these results provide evidence that current models of human action recognition require an object-centered processing stage.     

Neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the experience of flow

Recent theoretical and empirical work in cognitive science and neuroscience is brought into contact with the concept of the flow experience. After a brief exposition of brain function, the explicit-implicit distinction is applied to the effortless information processing that is so characteristic of the flow state. The explicit system is associated with the higher cognitive functions of the frontal lobe and medial temporal lobe structures and has evolved to increase cognitive flexibility. In contrast, the implicit system is associated with the skill-based knowledge supported primarily by the basal ganglia and has the advantage of being more efficient. From the analysis of this flexibility/efficiency trade-off emerges a thesis that identifies the flow state as a period during which a highly practiced skill that is represented in the implicit system's knowledge base is implemented without interference from the explicit system. It is proposed that a necessary prerequisite to the experience of flow is a state of transient hypofrontality that enables the temporary suppression of the analytical and meta-conscious capacities of the explicit system. Examining sensory-motor integration skills that seem to typify flow such as athletic performance, writing, and free-jazz improvisation, the new framework clarifies how this concept relates to creativity and opens new avenues of research.     

Potential underlying mechanisms for greater weight gain in massaged preterm infants

In this paper, potential underlying mechanisms for massage therapy effects on preterm infant weight gain are reviewed. Path analyses are presented suggesting that: (1) increased vagal activity was associated with (2) increased gastric motility, which, in turn, was related to (3) greater weight gain; and (4) increased IGF-1 was related to greater weight gain. The change in vagal activity during the massage explained 49% of the variance in the change in gastric activity. And, the change in vagal activity during the massage explained 62% of the variance in the change in insulin. That the change in gastric activity was not related to the change in insulin suggests two parallel pathways via which massage therapy leads to increased weight gain: (1) insulin release via the celiac branch of the vagus; and (2) increased gastric activity via the gastric branch of the vagus.     

Three-month-olds' visual preference for faces and its underlying visual processing mechanisms

This study was aimed at investigating the face preference phenomenon and its underlying mechanisms at 3 months of age. Using an eye-tracker apparatus, Experiment 1 demonstrated that 3-month-olds prefer natural face images to unnatural ones, replicating and extending previous evidence obtained with schematic facelike stimuli. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that the general mechanisms that induce face preference in newborns could not explain the same phenomenon at 3 months of age, when infants are attracted by perceptual cues more specific to faces. This suggests that signs of a process of cognitive specialization are already present in 3-month-olds' visual behavior toward faces.