Does causal knowledge help us be faster and more frugal in our decisions?

One challenge that has to be addressed by the fast and frugal heuristics program is how people manage to select, from the abundance of cues that exist in the environment, those to rely on when making decisions. We hypothesize that causal knowledge helps people target particular cues and estimate their validities. This hypothesis was tested in three experiments. Results show that when causal information about some cues was available (Experiment 1), participants preferred to search for these cues first and to base their decisions on them. When allowed to learn cue validities in addition to causal information (Experiment 2), participants also became more frugal (i.e., they searched fewer of the available cues), made more accurate decisions, and were more precise in estimating cue validities than was a control group that did not receive causal information. These results can be attributed to the causal relation between the cues and the criterion, rather than to greater saliency of the causal cues (Experiment 3). Overall, our results support the hypothesis that causal knowledge aids in the learning of cue validities and is treated as a meta-cue for identifying highly valid cues.     

Choice-supportive source monitoring: do our decisions seem better to us as we age?

Participants were given several 2-option choices and then asked to review how they felt about their decisions, to review the details of their decisions, or to do an unrelated task. When later asked to attribute features to the previous options, in each condition older adults (64-83 years) attributed significantly more positive and fewer negative features to their chosen options than to foregone options. Younger adults' (18-22 years) attributions were as choice-supportive as those of older adults in the affective review condition but were less so in the other conditions. The age difference was present even when older and younger adults were equated for source identification and recognition accuracy. This study suggests that as people age, their tendency to distort memory in favor of the options they chose increases. In addition, it suggests that affectively reviewing choices increases younger adults' tendency toward choice-supportive memory.     

Public decisions or private decisions? When the specific case guides public decisions

Educators' differential decisions towards identified single students as compared with unidentified students, or a group of identified students, were examined by presenting educators with educational scenarios describing actual dilemmas from the three different perspectives. The first two studies indicate that willingness to change the existing policy and to [bend the rule] is greater when a dilemma is presented from the specific identified student's perspective than when presented as a general dilemma. The results of the third study suggest that in their decisions regarding an identified individual student, educators allow more changes in school regulations and give less weight to the school needs as compared with their decisions regarding an unidentified student or a group of students. Implications for policy making are discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are perceptuo-motor decisions really more optimal than cognitive decisions?

Human high-level cognitive decisions appear sub-optimal (Kahneman and Slovic, 1982, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Paradoxically, perceptuo-motor decisions appear optimal, or nearly optimal (Trommershäuser, Maloney, & Landy, 2008). Here, we highlight limitations to the comparison of performance between and within domains. These limitations are illustrated by means of two perceptuo-motor decision-making experiments. The results indicate that participants did not optimize fundamental performance-related factors (precision and time usage), even though standard analyses may have classed participants as ‘optimal’. Moreover, simulations and comparisons across our studies demonstrate that optimality depends on task difficulty. Thus, it seems that a standard model of perceptuo-motor decision-making fails to provide an absolute standard of performance. Importantly, this appears to be a limitation of optimal models of human behaviour in general. This, in conjunction with non-trivial evaluative- and methodological differences, suggests that verdicts favouring perceptuo-motor, or perceptual, systems over higher-level cognitive systems in terms of level of performance are premature.     

How readers experience characters’ decisions

When people read narratives, they have ample opportunities to encode mental preferences about characters’ decisions. In our present project, we examined how readers’ preferences for characters’ decisions structure their experiences of story outcomes. In Experiment 1, participants read brief stories and explicitly rated which of two potential decisions they thought the characters should make. The actual decision that each character made was either preferred or nonpreferred by readers. By the end of each story, readers learned whether there was a positive or negative outcome to these decisions. Decisions and outcomes either matched (e.g., a preferred decision followed by a positive outcome) or did not match (e.g., a nonpreferred decision followed by a negative outcome). Participants took longer to read outcome sentences when there was a mismatch. In Experiment 2, we replicated this finding with a task that allowed more natural reading. These results provide converging evidence that readers encode responses to characters’ decisions and that these responses affect the time course with which they assimilate story outcomes.     

Are Newcomb problems really decisions?

Richard Jeffrey long held that decision theory should be formulated without recourse to explicitly causal notions. Newcomb problems stand out as putative counterexamples to this ‘evidential’ decision theory. Jeffrey initially sought to defuse Newcomb problems via recourse to the doctrine of ratificationism, but later came to see this as problematic. We will see that Jeffrey’s worries about ratificationism were not compelling, but that valid ratificationist arguments implicitly presuppose causal decision theory. In later work, Jeffrey argued that Newcomb problems are not decisions at all because agents who face them possess so much evidence about correlations between their actions and states of the world that they are unable to regard their deliberate choices as causes of outcomes, and so cannot see themselves as making free choices. Jeffrey’s reasoning goes wrong because it fails to recognize that an agent’s beliefs about her immediately available acts are so closely tied to the immediate causes of these actions that she can create evidence that outweighs any antecedent correlations between acts and states. Once we recognize that deliberating agents are free to believe what they want about their own actions, it will be clear that Newcomb problems are indeed counterexamples to evidential decision theory.     

“Decisions,decisions, decisions”: transfer and specificity of decision-making skill between sports

The concept of transfer of learning holds that previous practice or experience in one task or domain will enable successful performance in another related task or domain. In contrast, specificity of learning holds that previous practice or experience in one task or domain does not transfer to other related tasks or domains. The aim of the current study is to examine whether decision-making skill transfers between sports that share similar elements, or whether it is specific to a sport. Participants (n = 205) completed a video-based temporal occlusion decision-making test in which they were required to decide on which action to execute across a series of 4 versus 4 soccer game situations. A sport engagement questionnaire was used to identify 106 soccer players, 43 other invasion sport players and 58 other sport players. Positive transfer of decision-making skill occurred between soccer and other invasion sports, which are related and have similar elements, but not from volleyball, supporting the concept of transfer of learning.     

Should we design our descendants?

Rapid breakthroughs in genetic research spurred by the Human Genome Project, advances in molecular biology, and new reproductive technologies are raising the prospect that we may eventually have the technical capacity to modify genes that are transmitted to future generations not only to treat or eliminate diseases but also to "enhance" normal human characteristics beyond what is necessary to sustain or restore good health. This paper explores the ethical and justice implications of such genetic modifications. It argues against developing these technologies primarily because it will not be possible to counter the deleterious justice impacts. It recommends the need for public education and public discussion, preferably with the religious community taking an active role, to shape decisions about future genetic research and applications, and for better regulation of genetic technologies with the potential for inheritable genetic alterations.     

Are we losing our mind?

The individual mind of the patient, and how it works, are the central topics of this plenary address. In psychoanalysis we are always dealing with a mind--a mind with its own particular structure--and this is a fact of singular importance in how we listen to, understand, and communicate with patients. Techniques geared to this view are presented. The author reflects on and challenges some contrasting current views of psychoanalysis as primarily coconstructed or as a relational matrix. Technique according to this view highlights the analyst's subjectivity and actions as central to treatment.     

Are most of our concepts innate?

Fodor has argued that, because concept acquisition relies on the use of concepts already possessed by the learner, all concepts that cannot be definitionally reduced are innate. Since very few reductive definitions are available, it appears that most concepts are innate. After noting the reasons why we find such radical concept nativism implausible, I explicate Fodor's argument, showing that anyone who is committed to mentalistic explanation should take it seriously. Three attempts at avoiding the conclusion are examined and found to be unsuccessful. I then present an alternative way around Fodor's nativism; I maintain that concepts at a given level of explanation can be semantically primitive, yet at least partially acquired if some of the conditions at a lower level of explanation that are responsible for the concept's presence are themselves acquired.Thanks are due to Jerry Samet and to Bob Shope for detailed and very helpful comments. I am also indebted to Ned Block, Susan Carey, Noam Chomsky, Jerry Fodor, Thomas Kuhn, Georges Rey, and Bob Stalnaker for their comments, criticisms, and suggestions on an earlier work, out of which this essay evolved.     

Do looks constitute our perceptual evidence?

Many philosophers take experience to be an essential aspect of perceptual justification. I argue against a specific variety of such an experientialist view, namely, the Looks View of perceptual justification, according to which our visual beliefs are mediately justified by beliefs about the way things look. I describe three types of cases that put pressure on the idea that perceptual justification is always related to looks‐related reasons: unsophisticated cognizers, multimodal identification, and amodal completion. I then provide a tentative diagnosis of what goes wrong in the Looks View: it ascribes a specific epistemic role to beliefs about looks that is actually fulfilled by subpersonal perceptual processes.     

Gender differences in students’ rational decisions to cheat

Few rational choice studies of deviant behavior have reported statistical tests of difference in the effects of explanatory variables between men and women. Using scenario‐based survey data from a sample of 330 university students (171 women and 159 men), this study examined gender differences in levels and effects of explanatory variables on intentions to cheat on exams. Findings showed significant gender differences in mean scores of low self‐control, anticipated shame states, perceived external sanctions, grade point average, and reported test‐cheating intentions. Regression analyses showed that the effects of moral beliefs and perceived pleasure of cheating were significantly more pronounced in predicting women's cheating intentions, whereas men were more affected by prior cheating experiences and friends’ cheating behavior. Findings also indicated that anticipated shame states accounted for the association between gender and cheating intentions. These results are consistent with recent studies dealing with gender‐related developmental differences regarding deviant propensities.     

School in our memory: do we remember our time in middle and high school differently?

ABSTRACT

The present study investigated autobiographical memories of school. While previous works have shown that most memories relating to school are social as opposed to academic, there are still strong theoretical arguments for the presumed prevalence of educationally oriented memories from at least some parts of the school period. The goal of the study was to replicate previous studies while addressing some of their limitations. In our study, only memories of high school were more socially and less educationally oriented. Also, memories of high school were more positive and emotionally intense. We discuss the further implications of these effects.     

Analyzing drivers’ crossing decisions at unsignalized intersections in China

In China, when two vehicle drivers encounter at an unsignalized intersection, almost neither of them completely stops the vehicle. Instead, one gradually approaches and dynamically makes a decision to either yield or preempt by gaming with the other vehicle. This process generates traffic conflicts and increases the probability of accidents. In this study, we aimed to study how straight-moving drivers made preemptive/yielding decisions when they encountered other drivers straight-moving across at unsignalized intersections. A total of 150 crossing cases were collected at an unsignalized intersection in Kunming City, China. By using detection program we made, motion parameters of the vehicles were extracted. Classification tree analysis was used to identify the decision moment of drivers and the major motion parameters that affected their decisions. Results showed that for crossing processes at unsignalized intersections in China, straight-moving drivers from the right side made preemptive/yielding decisions from 0.9 s to 1.3 s before reaching the crossing point. However, straight-moving drivers from the left side made decisions from 0.9 s to 1.2 s before reaching the crossing point. The speed difference between the two vehicles was the most important factor that affected a driver’s decision-making. If the vehicle driver from the right side drove significantly slower than that from the left, then most drivers from the right side would yield to those from the left. On the contrary, if the vehicle driver from the right side drove significantly faster than that from the left, then most drivers from the right side would preempt those from the left. The findings of this study will help understand the decision-making patterns of drivers under crossing conditions, and thus provide suggestions to improve drivers’ behavior at unsignalized intersections in China.