Negotiating international bioethics: a response to Tom Beauchamp and Ruth Macklin

Can the bioethical theories that have served American bioethics so well, serve international bioethics as well? In two papers in the previous issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, I contend that the form of principlist fundamentalism endorsed by American bioethicists like Tom Beauchamp and Ruth Macklin will not play on an international stage. Deploying techniques of postmodern scholarship, I argue that principlist fundamentalism justifies neither the condemnation of the Nazi doctors at Nuremberg, nor, as the Report of the Advisory Committee on the Human Radiation Experiments (ACHRE) demonstrates, condemnation of Cold War radiation researchers. Principlist fundamentalism thus appears to be philosophy bankrupt. In this issue of the Journal, Beauchamp and Macklin reject this claim, arguing that I have misread the ACHRE report and misunderstood Nazism. They also argue that the form of post-postmodern negotiated human rights theory that I proffer is adequate only insofar as it is itself really fundamentalist; insofar as I take postmodernism seriously, however, I mire international bioethics in relativism. In this response, I reaffirm my anti-fundamentalism, provide further evidence in support of my reading of the ACHRE report, and defend my post-postmodern version of rights theory. I also develop criteria for a minimally adequate theoretical framework for international bioethics.     

A theory of international bioethics: multiculturalism, postmodernism, and the bankruptcy of fundamentalism

The first of two articles analyzing the justifiability of international bioethical codes and of cross-cultural moral judgments reviews "moral fundamentalism," the theory that cross-cultural moral judgments and international bioethical codes are justified by certain "basic" or "fundamental" moral priniciples that are universally accepted in all cultures and eras. Initially propounded by the judges at the 1947 Nuremberg Tribunal, moral fundamentalism has become the received justification of international bioethics, and of cross-temporal and cross-cultural moral judgments. Yet today we are said to live in a multicultural and postmodern world. This article assesses the challenges that multiculturalism and postmodernism pose to fundamentalism and concludes that these challenges render the position philosophically untenable, thereby undermining the received conception of the foundations of international bioethics. The second article, which follows, offers an alternative model -- a model of negotiated moral order -- as a viable justification for international bioethics and for transcultural and transtemporal moral judgments.     

Perceptions of Religious and Nonreligious Targets: Exploring the Effects of Perceivers' Religious Fundamentalism

While research has shown that religious individuals are perceived as being more moral than the nonreligious, the present studies suggest that these findings are affected by in‐group bias. Participants low and high in religious fundamentalism (RF) were asked to form an impression of a target's moral and social dimensions. The target's religious identity was presented either explicitly (in Studies 1 and 2) or implicitly (Study 3). Participants high in RF consistently rated the religious target more favorably than the nonreligious target on both dimensions. In contrast, LF individuals' morality ratings did not differ as a function of target religiosity across all 3 studies. Our results suggest that future research exploring the religion–morality link must control for perceiver religiosity.     

Moral Representativeness and Satisfaction with One’s Religious Community

Belonging to a community of believers represents a basic component of most religions. According to a social-functional account of religion, a primary function of religious belief is to bind individuals to these types of cooperative, moral groups. However, this framework has yet to investigate what factors are associated with being more or less “bound” to a particular community. Although previous research has found that being very representative of the congregation in terms of religious belief (e.g., fundamentalism) is an important factor, the social-functional account suggests that being representative of the binding moral beliefs of the community should mediate this effect. In this study, participants from 23 churches completed measures assessing religious and moral beliefs. Analyses revealed that moral representativeness was associated with greater satisfaction with one’s faith community, above and beyond theological belief. Moreover, representativeness in terms of binding moral foundations mediated the relationship between satisfaction and representativeness in terms of religious fundamentalism.     

Right-wing authoritarianism,fundamentalism and prejudice revisited: Removing suppression and statistical artefact

This paper challenges a finding reported by several researchers, that fundamentalism could be associated with a reduction in racial prejudice after controlling for authoritarianism (RWA). We argue that the presence of fundamentalism in the construct definition of the conventionalism cluster of RWA leads to higher associations between fundamentalism and conventionalism than with other aspects of RWA. This creates a statistical artefact that distorts the results of multiple regression analyses that include both fundamentalism and RWA as independent variables. To test this hypothesis, 299 participants completed measures of prejudice as well as fundamentalism and the three RWA clusters (conventionalism, authoritarian aggression, and submission). In regression analyses using fundamentalism and the combined RWA scale we replicate previous findings that when RWA is controlled, higher fundamentalism leads to lower prejudice. After removing the overlapping method variance in the scales, this pattern is eliminated and the commonly observed positive relationship between fundamentalism and prejudice is found. We describe the statistical artefact, its antecedents, and its theoretical implications, and outline how investigations in this important area should proceed.     

Toward a psychoanalytic theory of violence,fundamentalism and terrorism

Abstract

Why would a group of people behave in ways that appear to us as moral nihilism, such as the events of 9/11? One cause is an affective one that underlies all violent behavior, namely, narcissistic injuries severe enough to threaten the survival of the self or of the group with which the self identifies, in the absence of non-violent means of maintaining or restoring individual or collective self-esteem. But there is also a uniquely modern cognitive reason for this uniquely modern form of violence, and of the apocalyptic fundamentalism that legitimizes it: namely, that terrorists see themselves as destroying the nihilism that they perceive as coming from us, that is, from the modern Western scientific mentality that destroys the credibility of the traditional sources of moral, legal and political authority and legitimacy, God and religion. Fundamentalism originated in the United States and has spread throughout the world as a rebellion against modernity. This suggests means of curing it: by facilitating access to modern education, psychological awareness, socio-economic equality and political democracy, to help protect all societies from the affective threats of shame and humiliation, and the cognitive threats of nihilism, anomie and anarchy (and their alternatives, nationalism, dogmatism and theocracy).     

A theory of international bioethics: the negotiable and the non-negotiable

The preceding article in this issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal presents the argument that "moral fundamentalism," the position that international bioethics rests on "basic" or "fundamental" moral prinicples that are universally accepted in all eras and cultures, collapses under a variety of multicultural and postmodern critiques. The present article looks to the contractarian tradition of Hobbes and Locke -- as reinterpreted by David Gauthier, Robert Nozick, and John Rawls -- for an alternative justification for international bioethics. Drawing on the central themes of this tradition, it is argued that international bioethics can be rationally reconstructed as a negotiated moral order that respects culturally and individually defined areas of nonnegotiability. Further, the theory of a negotiated moral order is consistent with traditional ideals about human rights, is flexible enough to absorb the genuine insights of multiculturalism and postmodernism, and yet is strong enough to justify transcultural and transtemporal moral judgments, including the condemnation of the Nazi doctors at Nuremberg. This theory also is consistent with the history of the ethics of human subjects experimentation and offers insights into current controversies such as the controversy over changing the consent rule for experiments in emergency medicine and the controversy over exempting certain clinical trials of inexpensive treatments for preventing the perinatal transmission of AIDS from the ethical standards of the sponsoring country.     

Muslim fundamentalism: Something to be understood or to be explained away?∗

This article surveys various attempts to make sociological sense of the diverse Muslim movements often lumped together under the label of fundamentalism. Explanations of fundamentalism as a form of resistance to modernization or those reducing it to social and economic discontent may have some prima facie plausibility but fail to explain why this protest takes a religious form. Orientalist studies emphasizing the theological dimension, on the other hand, do not even attempt to explain why certain religious ideas rather than others can inspire social movements. Not all fundamentalist movements, in fact, are inspired by the same or even similar theological ideas; besides puritan fundamentalist movements we also find many that are strongly influenced by Süfism. Empirical studies of Islamic militants in several different countries indicate that they are not, as is often assumed, marginalized and alienated but relatively well‐integrated and successful persons. Muslim fundamentalist movements have perhaps more in common with Protestant sects in pre‐modern European history than with present Christian fundamentalism. Like those sects, they may perform a stimulating role as critics in the margin and contribute to enriching the discourse of the mainstream; once they achieve power, their practical failures will gradually undermine the claims of fundamentalist ideologues.     

Contra Cartwright: Structural Realism, Ontological Pluralism and Fundamentalism About Laws

In this paper I argue against Nancy Cartwright’s claim that we ought to abandon what she calls “fundamentalism” about the laws of nature and adopt instead her “dappled world” hypothesis. According to Cartwright we ought to abandon the notion that fundamental laws (even potentially) apply universally, instead we should consider the law-like statements of science to apply in highly qualified ways within narrow, non-overlapping and ontologically diverse domains, including the laws of fundamental physics. For Cartwright, “laws” are just locally applicable refinements of a more open-ended concept of capacities. By providing a critique of the dappled world approach’s central notion of open ended capacities and substituting this concept with an account of properties drawn from recent writing on the subject of structural realism I show that a form of fundamentalism is viable. I proceed from this conclusion to show that this form of fundamentalism provides a superior reading of case studies, such as the effective field theory program (EFT) in quantum field theory, than the “dappled world” view. The case study of the EFT program demonstrates that ontological variability between theoretical domains can be accounted for without altogether abandoning fundamentalism or adopting Cartwright’s more implausible theses.     

The Perspective of Islamic Fundamentalists and the Limits of Rational Choice Theory

How can we best understand Islamic fundamentalism? As fundamentalism has become an increasingly significant political force, many different interpretations have been offered, with fundamentalism explained as both a rational reaction against modernity and as a pathological retreat from reality. We argue here that part of the scholarly failure to understand and deal with the growth of religious fundamentalism results from a failure to recognize the importance of cognitive differences in worldviews held by fundamentalists. By providing an empirical analysis of how fundamentalists see the world—what we identify as a fundamentalist perspective—we hope to supply an important missing piece in the literature on fundamentalism. To do so, we utilized a narrative and survey interview technique to contrast the worldviews of fundamentalists with those of comparable Muslims who are not fundamentalists. Our analysis suggests Islamic fundamentalism attracts because it provides a basic identity, an identity which in turn provides the foundation for daily living. The fundamentalist perspective itself is best understood through reference to a worldview which makes no distinction between public and private, in which truth is revealed by revelation, and reason is subservient to religious doctrine. Religious dictates dominate on all basic issues, and only within the confines of the fundamentalist identity are choices decided by a cost/benefit calculus.     

Fundamentalism,Radicalization and Terrorism. Part 1: terrorism as dissolution in a complex system

In the first of two papers in this Special Issue, Lord Alderdice draws on his personal experience of living and working in Northern Ireland and other countries that have suffered from terrorism, and describes from a psychoanalytic and systemic perspective the history of national, cultural and political conflicts which form the backdrop to the struggles against fundamentalism, radicalization and terrorism in current times. By examining and understanding the group dynamics and collective experiences of minority populations that have suffered generations of subjugation, humiliation and injustice at the hands of others, Lord Alderdice demonstrates how terrorism is not an individual but a group phenomenon and that any successful intervention aimed at reducing fundamentalism, radicalization and terrorism needs to identify and take into account the complex relational processes and experiences in all parties involved in the current global conflict.     

Islam,the Divine Command Theory,and Religious Fundamentalism

ABSTRACT

In 1980, George F. Hourani and, more recently in 2010, Mariam al-Attar argued that Islam is not compatible with divine command theory. They rehearsed some standard objections (namely the objectivity of morality, divine goodness, moral knowledge) targeted against meta-ethical divine command theory taking the Qur’an into consideration, and argued that it should be discarded from an Islamic point of view. In addition, they criticized divine command theory since it involves obedience to God and, therefore, does not allow moral reasoning but rather is the source of religious fundamentalism and violence. Although these objections are powerful when applied to the early Ash?arite version of divine command theory, they are not powerful against recent formulations of it presented by Christian philosophers. For example, a divine command theory like that of Robert Merrihew Adams is well suited to respond to these objections. Thus, divine command theory, in its recent formulations, is a genuine option for Muslims and should be given due consideration.     

Fundamental laws and the completeness of physics 1

The status of fundamental laws is an important issue when deciding between the three broad ontological options of fundamentalism (of which the thesis that physics is complete is typically a subtype), emergentism, and disorder or promiscuous realism. Cartwright's assault on fundamental laws which argues that such laws do not, and cannot, typically state the facts, and hence cannot be used to support belief in a fundamental ontological order, is discussed in this context. A case is made in defence of a moderate form of fundamentalism, which leaves open the possibility of emergentism, but sets itself against the view that our best ontology is disordered. The argument, taking its cue from Bhaskar, relies on a consideration of the epistemic status of experiments, and the question of the possible generality of knowledge gained in unusual or controlled environments.     

A re-examination of religious fundamentalism: positive implications for coping

The majority of the research on religious fundamentalism explores its negative implications. Religious coping theory provides an opportunity to examine both positive and negative implications of fundamentalism. The present study incorporated various advanced methodologies utilised in the religious coping literature (mediation analyses, hierarchical regression procedures, and longitudinal design) to assess the relationship between religious fundamentalism and religious coping in 723 American college students. Religious fundamentalism was associated with a number of religious coping strategies that have positive implications and inversely related to religious coping with negative associations. Fundamentalism predicted religious coping over and above right-wing authoritarianism and religious orthodoxy. The religious coping methods mediated the relationship between religious fundamentalism and adjustment to stress both concurrently and over time. Limitations of the current study and suggestions for future research are offered.     

Social Group and Moral Orientation Factors as Mediators of Religiosity and Multiple Attitude Targets

Although there is a tradition of examining generalized discrimination against multiple targets, recent studies have tended to consider race and homosexuality as separate targets without considering their relationship with each other. Recent studies have also argued for a moral dimension in attitudes to homosexuality, but this has not yet been explicitly modeled as an explanation for patterns of social attitudes. In a questionnaire study of practicing Australian Christians (N= 143), we examined the relationship of religious orientation and ideology (intrinsic, extrinsic, fundamentalism, orthodoxy, and quest) with four attitude targets (Aboriginal Australians, women, homosexual persons, and abortion). Using structural equation modeling (SEM), we develop a two‐factor model, incorporating group and moral orientation factors, which completely mediates the relationships between the religiosity variables and the social attitudes. Religiosity variables exhibit different patterns of correlation with the two factors. The two‐factor model provides a useful framework for further exploration of socially and politically contested attitudes.     

The Role of Social Cognition in the Religious Fundamentalism‐Prejudice Relationship

The study examines the indirect effects of religious fundamentalism on prejudice through cognitive style and fear of invalidity. Undergraduates (n= 199) completed measures of religious fundamentalism, homophobia, modern racism, hostile and benevolent sexism, need for cognition, need for structure, preference for consistency, and fear of invalidity. Need for cognition partially mediated the relationship between religious fundamentalism and both homophobia and benevolent sexism. Preference for consistency partially mediated the relationship between religious fundamentalism and hostile sexism. The indirect effect of religious fundamentalism on modern racism through preference for consistency approached statistical significance. The interaction between need for structure and fear of invalidity partially mediated the relationship between religious fundamentalism and both homophobia and hostile sexism, with individuals high in need for structure and low in fear of invalidity having higher religious fundamentalism and prejudice.     

Prodigal Sons: Dual Abrahamic Categorization Mediates the Detrimental Effects of Religious Fundamentalism on Christian–Muslim Relations

Religious fundamentalism is associated with Christian–Islamic conflicts globally, but the psychological reasons remain unexplored. Here, we show that fundamentalism is detrimental to interreligious relations because it makes Christians and Muslims alike reject common theological grounds and Abrahamic origins. Specifically, Study 1 demonstrated that such dual Abrahamic categories mediated the negative effects of fundamentalism on real monetary donations to outgroup children desperately in need (i.e., Save the Children Syria) among Christians but not Atheists. Of importance, this was the case only to the degree that Syrian children were perceived as Muslims and, hence, as part of an Abrahamic outgroup. Using a double-randomized experimental design, Study 2 demonstrated the causal effects of religious fundamentalism on Abrahamic categorization and of Abrahamic categorization on mutual resource distribution bias among Muslims and Christians. Together, these studies suggest that religious fundamentalism fuels interreligious conflicts because it crucially impacts basic categorization processes, with subsequent negative effects on intergroup relations.     

To Love or Hate Thy Neighbor: The Role of Authoritarianism and Traditionalism in Explaining the Link Between Fundamentalism and Racial Prejudice

Fundamentalism is consistently related to racial prejudice (Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010), yet the mechanisms for this relationship are unclear. We identify two core values of fundamentalism, authoritarianism and traditionalism, that independently contribute to the fundamentalism‐racial prejudice relationship. We also contextualize the fundamentalism‐racial prejudice relationship by suggesting that fundamentalists may show prejudice based on conceptions of African Americans as violating values but show tolerance when prejudice is less justifiable. These ideas are tested and confirmed using three data sets from the American National Election Studies. Across all three samples, fundamentalism is related to increases in symbolic racism but decreases in negative affect towards African Americans, and these relationships are mediated by both authoritarianism and traditionalism.     

Fundamentalism

We should never assume that moral outrage provoked by the violation of traditional religious values is a mere reflection of secular grievances of some kind, but we should recognize that such outrage is often meshed with nationalistic and social grievances. If we take the religious Zionist militancy of some Israeli settlers (who do not see themselves as settlers), their political activities have focussed primarily on settling, and opposing the withdrawal from, the territories that Israel occupied in 1967 rather than on moral issues like abortion, homosexuality and pornography. Militant Islamic movements often stress their opposition to Western domination as much moral issues concerning personal conduct. The Shas movement in Israel is fueled in part by the resentment of Israeli Jews of Middle Eastern origin (the Mizrahim or Sephardim) towards Jews of European origin. All these movements can be said to have a ‘fundamentalist’ dimension insofar as they insist on strict conformity to sacred texts and on a moral code based on them, but focus exclusively or even primarily on this dimension of these movements is to ignore some of the crucial sources of their political appeal. With respect to the much discussed issue of bias in the comparative study of ‘fundamentalism’, it is important to avoid idealization as well as demonization. While it is important to correct popular stereotypes about religious conservatives, it is also important not to gloss over the very real problems associated with movements that demand that civil law be based on sacred law.