Mirror Self‐Recognition and Self‐Identification

That great apes are the only primates to recognise their reflections is often taken to show that they are self‐aware—however, there has been much recent debate about whether the self‐awareness in question is psychological or bodily self‐awareness. This paper argues that whilst self‐recognition does not require psychological self‐awareness, to claim that it requires only bodily self‐awareness would leave something out. That is that self‐recognition requires ‘objective self‐awareness’—the capacity for first person thoughts like ‘that's me’, which involve self‐identification and so are vulnerable to error through misidentification. This objective self‐awareness is distinct from bodily or psychological self‐awareness, requires cognitive sophistication and provides the beginnings of a more conceptual self‐representation which might play a role in planning, mental time travel and theory of mind.     

Self‐Compassion,Self‐Esteem,and Well‐Being

This article focuses on the construct of self‐compassion and how it differs from self‐esteem. First, it discusses the fact that while self‐esteem is related to psychological well‐being, the pursuit of high self‐esteem can be problematic. Next it presents another way to feel good about oneself: self‐compassion. Self‐compassion entails treating oneself with kindness, recognizing one’s shared humanity, and being mindful when considering negative aspects of oneself. Finally, this article suggests that self‐compassion may offer similar mental health benefits as self‐esteem, but with fewer downsides. Research is presented which shows that self‐compassion provides greater emotional resilience and stability than self‐esteem, but involves less self‐evaluation, ego‐defensiveness, and self‐enhancement than self‐esteem. Whereas self‐esteem entails evaluating oneself positively and often involves the need to be special and above average, self‐compassion does not entail self‐evaluation or comparisons with others. Rather, it is a kind, connected, and clear‐sighted way of relating to ourselves even in instances of failure, perceived inadequacy, and imperfection.     

Self‐Legislation and Self‐Command in Kant's Ethics

In his later writings, Kant distinguishes between autonomy and self‐mastery or self‐command. My article explains the relation between these two ideas, both of which are integral to his understanding of moral agency and the pursuit of virtue. I point to problems with other interpretations of this relation and offer an alternative. On my view, self‐command is a condition or state achieved by those agents who become proficient at solving problems presented by the passions. Such agents are able to stick to the results of self‐legislation over time and thereby achieve a form of temporally extended freedom.     

Self‐Doubt

The need for understanding serves as a theme throughout social and personality psychology. It is reflected in people’s striving toward a shared, social construction of reality (e.g., conformity, uniformity) that runs through so much of the history of theory and research in the field. Stemming from this core motivation, the literature is peppered with illustrations of the preeminence of certainty as a goal (e.g., clarity, consistency, consonance, and related constructs) and the ultimate objective of cultural consensus. Yet, the role of doubt in the form of shaky certainty about the basis for beliefs in attitudes – or doubts about one’s self‐esteem or self‐concept – has increasingly taken center stage. This review takes the self‐competence element (vs. self‐liking element) of self‐worth judgments as its focus and provides an integration of individual difference approaches and experimental investigations of self‐doubt. Long neglected, self‐doubt increasingly appears critical for understanding some of the surprising, ironic, and self‐defeating cognitive, emotional, and behavioral findings seen in the achievement realm.     

Self‐Improvement

This article approaches the topic of improvement from a self‐evaluation perspective, namely the interplay between the self‐improvement motive and social or evaluative feedback. The self‐improvement motive is reflected in conscious desire. It is also reflected in preferences for continuous upward feedback trajectories, upward comparison feedback, and feedback that may be self‐threatening in the present but is likely to be useful in the future. The last type of feedback preference is stronger following a resource‐bolstering experience (e.g., good mood, success feedback, self‐affirmation). Moreover, both direct and indirect activation of the self‐improvement motive facilitates recall of improvement‐oriented feedback. Such feedback is associated with increased satisfaction or positive affect, a pattern qualified by individual differences (e.g., self‐esteem, self‐theories). Finally, improvement‐oriented feedback yields better performance, a pattern also qualified by individual differences (e.g., self‐enhancement, self‐appraisal) as well as feedback attributes (gradual versus sudden). This territory‐mapping review will hopefully prove useful to future theorizing and research.     

Skill Level,Self‐Views and Self‐Theories as Sources of Error in Self‐Assessment

People's impressions of the quality of their performances are often surprisingly inaccurate. In this paper, I discuss three specific factors that contribute to error in self‐assessment. First, at a most basic level, individuals must possess a certain level of knowledge to simply distinguish weak from strong performances. Thus, a lack of skill can contribute to erroneous self‐assessments. Second, even those who possess skill might rely on the wrong information to evaluate their performances. I discuss how relying on preexisting self‐views can lead estimates of one's performance astray. Third, I discuss how motivational forces can play an indirect role in overconfidence. In particular, theories of intelligence that inspire people to think well of themselves also inspire behaviors that contribute to overconfident impressions of how well one has performed on a task. Finally, I discuss how we can draw on this research to improve accuracy in self‐assessments.     

Nonsuicidal Self‐Injury,Stress, and Self‐Differentiation

The authors surveyed 458 young adults and examined the relationships among stress, self‐differentiation, and nonsuicidal self‐injury (NSSI). They conducted multiple regression analyses to explore whether characteristics of self‐differentiation (i.e., emotional reactivity and “I position”) were related to NSSI after controlling for the effects of stress, as well as whether emotional reactivity and I position served as mediators in the stress–NSSI relationship. I position and emotional reactivity both contributed statistically significant variance to NSSI after accounting for stress. Moreover, both I position and emotional reactivity served as partial mediators in the stress–NSSI relationship. The authors discuss counseling and research implications.     

Self‐Protective Altruism

Prosocial behavior accentuates the tension between two conflicting human motivations, self‐interest and belongingness. Responding to the needs of others may compromise self‐interest. Acting callously, however, may lead to social disproval. These antagonistic responses are existentially meaningful as belongingness and self‐esteem have been found to regulate death anxiety. In this paper I critically examine three possible hypotheses concerning the tension between egotism and prosociality from a terror management perspective. The first hypothesis, the carpe diem hypothesis, suggests that when death is salient egotistic self‐interest overrides other‐oriented responses. The second hypothesis, the norm salience hypothesis, suggests that when death is salient people will respond according to the momentarily accessible social norm. The third hypothesis, the self‐protective altruism hypothesis, argues that when the prosocial cause reminds people of their fragile, mortal nature people will turn away from helping when death is salient, but when the prosocial cause is benign death salience will increase prosocial responding.     

Basic Self‐Awareness

Basic self‐awareness is the kind of self‐awareness reflected in our standard use of the first‐person. Patients suffering from severe forms of depersonalization often feel reluctant to use the first‐person and can even, in delusional cases, avoid it altogether, systematically referring to themselves in the third‐person. Even though it has been neglected since then, depersonalization has been extensively studied, more than a century ago, and used as probe for understanding the nature and the causal mechanisms of basic self‐awareness. In this paper, I argue that depersonalized patients indeed have an impaired basic self‐awareness, and that their study allows us both to favor one specific theory of basic self‐awareness and to understand what is wrong with its rivals. According to the favored theory, which I call Cartesian, we are basically self‐aware in virtue of being acquainted with ourselves through introspection.     

In Eating‐Disordered Inpatient Adolescents,Self‐Criticism Predicts Nonsuicidal Self‐Injury

We examined the role of depressive traits—self‐criticism and dependency—in nonsuicidal self‐injury (NSSI) and suicidal ideation among inpatient adolescents with eating disorders. In two studies (N = 103 and 55), inpatients were assessed for depressive traits, suicidal ideations, and NSSI. In Study 2, motivation for carrying out NSSI was also assessed. In both studies, depression predicted suicidal ideation and self‐criticism predicted NSSI. In Study 2, depression and suicidal ideation also predicted NSSI. The automatic positive motivation for NSSI was predicted by dependency and depressive symptoms, and by a two‐way interaction between self‐criticism and dependency. Consistent with the “self‐punishment model,” self‐criticism appears to constitute a dimension of vulnerability for NSSI.     

Stability and Change in Domain‐specific Self‐esteem and Global Self‐esteem

A notable uptick of interest in the stability of self‐esteem has been observed over the past few years. Most researchers, however, have focused on unidimensional rather than multidimensional conceptualizations of self‐esteem. The paucity of empirical research is surprising given conflicting theoretical perspectives on the stability of self‐esteem. The goal of the present study was to thoroughly disentangle different conceptualizations of self‐esteem and test opposing classical theories on (i) the stability and (ii) the direction of mutual influence of these different forms of self‐esteem. We analysed two‐year longitudinal data from participants (N = 644 at T1, N = 241 at T2) with an average age of 47.0 years (SD = 12.4). Analyses using a latent variable approach revealed that the domains of self‐esteem were relatively stable in terms of rank order and mean levels. In fact, the size of the stability coefficients was comparable to that of other trait measures that have been reported in the literature and paralleled the stability observed for global self‐esteem. Results did not provide support for either top‐down or bottom‐up effects between domain‐specific and global self‐esteem. These findings have important theoretical and practical implications regarding the stability and development of self‐esteem in adulthood and advance the understanding of self‐esteem in personality theory. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Predicting Self‐Confident Behaviour with Implicit and Explicit Self‐Esteem Measures

The present research compared the validity of popular direct and indirect measures of self‐esteem in predicting self‐confident behaviour in different social situations. In line with behavioural dual‐process models, both implicit and explicit self‐esteem were hypothesized to be related to appearing self‐confident to unacquainted others. A total of 127 participants responded to the Rosenberg Self‐Esteem Scale, the Multidimensional Self‐Esteem Scale, and an adjective scale for measuring explicit self‐esteem (ESE). Participants' implicit self‐esteem (ISE) was assessed with four indirect measures: the Implicit Association Test (IAT), the name‐letter task (NLT), and two variants of an affective priming task, the reaction‐time affective priming task (RT‐APT) and the error‐based affective priming task (EB‐APT). Self‐confident behaviour was observed in four different social situations: (i) self‐introduction to a group; (ii) an ostracism experience; (iii) an interview about the ostracism experience; and (iv) an interview about one's personal life. In general, appearing self‐confident to unknown others was independently predicted by ESE and ISE. The indirect measures of self‐esteem were, as expected, not correlated, and only the self‐esteem APTs—but not the self‐esteem IAT or the NLT—predicted self‐confident behaviours. It is important to note that in particular the predictive power of the self‐esteem EB‐APT pertained to all four criteria and was incremental to the ESE measures. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Reflective Self‐Control in Self‐Control Scholarship: A Peircean Analysis

Vosgerau, Scopelliti, and Huh (this issue) present an important critique of much self‐control research, highlighting some of the ways that our customary operationalizations and methods may have created more confusion than clarity. Their insights, rooted in past literature and new data, offer recommendations that will undoubtedly help us improve our research in consumption self‐control. In this commentary, I frame their work using the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce, a philosopher, mathematician, and logician whose frustration with the management of the self‐control construct and subsequent revision parallels Vosgerau et al's in many ways. Further, his thought proposes that their thought traces the boundary of another type of self‐control problem, which I'll refer to as “reflective self‐control.” Taking together consumption self‐control and reflective self‐control, we're able to address a wide range of human experiences and connect self‐control to ethics, consistent with a long tradition bridging the two. Perhaps most importantly, though, a Peircean analysis suggests that Vosgerau et al's paper—whether we agree or disagree with its conclusions—exemplifies the kind of scholarly self‐control we need to display to make scientific progress, regardless of our specific domain of study.     

Addiction and Self‐Deception: A Method for Self‐Control?

Neil Levy argues that while addicts who believe they are not addicts are self‐deceived, addicts who believe they are addicts are just as self‐deceived. Such persons accept a false belief that their addictive behaviour involves a loss of control. This paper examines two implications of Levy's discussion: that accurate self‐knowledge may be particularly difficult for addicts; and that an addict's self‐deceived belief that they cannot control themselves may aid their attempts at self‐control. I argue that the self‐deceived beliefs of addicts in denial and of self‐described addicts differ in kind. Unlike the self‐deception of an addict in denial, that of the self‐described addict allows them to acknowledge their behaviour. As such, it may aid an addict to develop more self‐control. A paradoxical implication is that this self‐deception may allow an addict more self‐knowledge.     

Self‐Handicapping: On the Self‐Perpetuating Nature of Defensive Behavior

The term self‐handicapping was introduced by Jones and Berglas (1978 ) to refer to the creation of barriers to successful performance for the purpose of controlling attributions about the self. In the event of failure, attributions to lack of ability are diminished or discounted because of the handicap and, in the event of success, attributions to ability are enhanced or augmented because of the handicap. This article reviews over 25 years of research on self‐handicapping. A process model is presented in which individual differences in goals and concerns dynamically interact with situational threats to elicit self‐handicapping behavior which produces consequences that perpetuate the use of the behavior in future situations.