School shootings: Making sense of the senseless

School shootings have altered the patina of seclusion and safety that once characterized public and higher education. Callous and brutal, school shootings seem to make no sense. However, case comparisons and anecdotal reports are beginning to show patterns that provide clues for understanding both the individual factors motivating shooting events and the characteristics of schools where shootings have occurred. We describe these factors and characteristics as the bases for six prevention strategies: (a) strengthening school attachment, (b) reducing social aggression, (c) breaking down codes of silence, (d) establishing screening and intervention protocols for troubled and rejected students, (e) bolstering human and physical security, and (6) increasing communication within educational facilities and between educational facilities and local resources.     

Making sense of recommendations

Computer algorithms are increasingly being used to predict people's preferences and make recommendations. Although people frequently encounter these algorithms because they are cheap to scale, we do not know how they compare to human judgment. Here, we compare computer recommender systems to human recommenders in a domain that affords humans many advantages: predicting which jokes people will find funny. We find that recommender systems outperform humans, whether strangers, friends, or family. Yet people are averse to relying on these recommender systems. This aversion partly stems from the fact that people believe the human recommendation process is easier to understand. It is not enough for recommender systems to be accurate, they must also be understood.     

Making sense of risk

Although actuarial risk prediction tools are widely used in the American criminal justice system, the lawyers, judges, and correctional workers who consult these products in making decisions often misunderstand fundamental aspects of how they work and what information they provide. This article suggests that the best way to ensure risk assessment tools are being used in ways that are just and equitable is to ensure that those who use them better understand three key aspects of what information they do – and do not – reveal. Doing so requires clarifying what risk is being predicted, explaining what risk levels signify, and enumerating how risk-related information is and is not relevant to specific criminal justice decisions.     

Making sense of akrasia

There are two extreme poles in the literature on akrasia. Internalists hold that it’s impossible to act intentionally against your better judgment, because there’s a necessary internal relation between judgment and intentional action. To the contrary, externalists maintain that we can act intentionally against our better judgment, because the will operates independently of judgment. Critics of internalism argue that it fails a realism test—most people seem to think that we can and do act intentionally against our better judgment. And critics of externalism argue that it flirts with incoherence by severing the intimate link between judgment and action. Drawing on resources from phenomenology, the cognitive sciences, analytic action theory, and recent “hybrid models” of skilled action, I argue that one route beyond this theoretical impasse is to understand akrasia as a form of skillful pre-reflective intentional action. This strategy, I argue, preserves the internalist insight that there is indeed an intimate relation between judgment and intentional action; and it also confirms the externalist claim that this relation is defeasible, but it does so without falling into incoherence.     

Common sense epidemiology: self-based judgments from laypersons and physicians

This article reports two studies on a neglected aspect of common sense epidemiology: subjective estimates of the prevalence of symptoms and diseases. Based on social-psychological research on the false-consensus effect, it was hypothesized that subjects who had a history of a condition would estimate its prevalence to be greater than would subjects who did not have a history of that condition. This hypothesis was supported across several different symptoms and diseases. Expertise did not confer protection from the effect. It occurred among 110 college students in Study 1 as well as among 65 practicing physicians in Study 2. In addition, college students who estimated the prevalence of a condition as relatively high rated that condition as less life-threatening than did other students, and students who had a history of a condition rated it as less life-threatening than did their counterparts without such a history. The discussion focuses on (a) explanations of differences in prevalence estimates as a function of personal health history, (b) implications for laypersons' judgments of seriousness, their emotional reactions to illness threats, and their illness behavior, and (c) implications for physicians' diagnostic behavior.     

Making sense of word senses: the comprehension of polysemy depends on sense overlap

Studies of polysemy are few in number and are contradictory. Some have found differences between polysemy and homonymy (L. Frazier & K. Rayner, 1990), and others have found similarities (D. K. Klein & G. Murphy, 2001). The authors investigated this issue using the methods of D. K. Klein and G. Murphy (2001), in whose study participants judged whether ambiguous words embedded in word pairs (e.g., tasty chicken) made sense as a function of a cooperating, conflicting, or neutral context. The ambiguous words were independently rated as having low, moderate, or highly overlapping senses to approximate a continuum from homonymy to metonymic polysemy. The effects of meaning dominance were examined. Words with highly overlapping meanings (e.g., metonymy) showed reduced effects of context and dominance compared with words with moderately or low overlapping meanings (e.g., metaphorical polysemy and homonymy). These results suggest that the comprehension of ambiguous words is mediated by the semantic overlap of alternative senses/meanings.     

When grammar wins over sense: Children's judgments of extraposed relatives

A sentence judgment task was used to test 4-to 5-year-old children's knowledge of coreference possibilities for extraposed relatives. The overall pattern of children's performance in the first experiment reported here is similar to that of a control group of adult subjects and is consistent with knowledge of the linguistic constraints that restrict extraposition in the adult grammar. Performance on a follow-up experiment argues against a nongrammatical explanation of the results of the first experiment. Children's performance on the judgment task shows, that they are capable of abstracting away from the pragmatics of the immediate situation in making judgments and can be construed as evidence that children construct mental representations for the sentences they judge in which an NP over NP S structure is constructed for relative clauses at a level distinct from the surface structure string. The comparative lack of response patterns found in some previous work is discussed in the context of models of sentence processing.     

Making sense of mirror neurons

The discovery of mirror neurons has been hailed as one of the most exciting developments in neuroscience in the past few decades. These neurons discharge in response to the observation of others’ actions. But how are we to understand the function of these neurons? In this paper I defend the idea that mirror neurons are best conceived as components of a sensory system that has the function to perceive action. In short, mirror neurons are part of a hitherto unrecognized “sixth sense”. In this spirit, research should move toward developing a psychophysics of mirror neurons.     

Making sense: The work of Eugene Gendlin

This and the following papers were presented at a symposium organized by David M. Levin honoring the work of Eugene Gendlin at meetings of the Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences, Boston, October, 1992.     

Making sense of memory.

The current work explores how people make recognition and belief judgments in the presence of obvious repetition primes. In two experiments, subjects received a 200-ms prime ("cheetah"), either before or after reading a trivia question ("What is the fastest animal?") but always before being presented with the target answer ("cheetah"). Results showed that repetition priming decreased "old" claims (Recognition--Experiment 1), while it increased truth claims (Belief--Experiment 2). Furthermore, repetition prime placement affected recognition but not belief. Combined, these results suggest that dissociations in memory performance are a natural outcome of task and processing demands and reflect the dynamic, flexible nature of memory.     

Making sense of divorce grief

The various models of divorce recovery put forward by researchers have previously been divided into two general categories. The first focuses on emotional or affective stages, while the second describes the recovery in terms of behavior/event dimensions. These two approaches are now integrated by recognizing that the behavior/event stages represent specific psycho/social losses in the life of the divorcing person. Stages of grief, therefore, may arise repeatedly in response to the different losses. These emotional stages may reappear with varying intensity, depending on the varying amount of importance of each loss to the individual. The complex interaction between sequential losses and responding emotional stages is described. Erikson's thematic theory of development and the Tennessee Self Concept Scale are offered as helpful tools for clarifying the meaning of emotions and needs which appear to spiral back and forth within the individual's experience.Mr. Hagemeyer is co-author, with Sue Richards, ofMinistry to the Divorced, to be released by Zondervan in June, 1986, and is a D.Min. candidate at Western Theological Seminary, Holland, MI. He is the former Director of Good News Community, a ministry to single adults in Grand Rapids. He may be addressed at 2377 Post Drive, Belmont, MI 49306.     

Harm inflation: Making sense of concept creep

ABSTRACT

“Concept creep” is the gradual semantic expansion of harm-related concepts such as bullying, mental disorder, prejudice, and trauma. This review presents a synopsis of relevant theoretical advances and empirical research findings on the phenomenon. It addresses three fundamental questions. First, it clarifies the characterisation of concept creep by refining its theoretical and historical dimensions and presenting studies investigating the change in harm-related concepts using computational linguistics. Second, it examines factors that have caused concept creep, including cultural shifts in sensitivity to harm, societal changes in the prevalence of harm, and intentional meaning changes engineered for political ends. Third, the paper develops an account of the consequences of concept creep, including social conflict, political polarisation, speech restrictions, victim identities, and progressive social change. This extended analysis of concept creep helps to understand its mixed implications and sets a multi-pronged agenda for future research on the topic.     

Making sense of powerful qualities

According to the powerful qualities view, properties are both powerful and qualitative. Indeed, on this view the powerfulness of a property is identical to its qualitativity. Proponents claim that this view provides an attractive alternative to both the view that properties are pure powers and the view that they are pure qualities. It remains unclear, however, whether the claimed identity between powerfulness and qualitativity can be made coherent in a way that allows the powerful qualities view to constitute this sort of alternative. I argue here that this can be done, given a particular conception of both the qualitativity and powerfulness of properties. On this conception, a property is qualitative just in the sense that its essence is fixed independently of any distinct properties, and it is powerful just if its essence grounds its dispositional role.

     

An investigation of factors influencing accountability and performance ratings

The authors explored whether accountability has implications for performance ratings and investigated factors that may influence both accountability and performance ratings. Specifically, they investigated (a) whether feelings of accountability are directly related to performance ratings, (b) whether experimental manipulations that have been proposed to manipulate accountability in fact do so, and (c) the role of motivation-related constructs. They developed and tested a model of factors proposed to influence accountability and performance ratings. Results from 334 raters in an upward feedback situation in a classroom context provide empirical support that feelings of accountability influence rating level, as do perceptions of anonymity and the importance raters place on their jobs. However, neither anonymity nor importance perceptions were related to feelings of accountability.     

Making causal judgments from the proportion of confirming instances: the pCI rule

It is proposed that causal judgments about contingency information are derived from the proportion of confirmatory instances (pCI) that are evaluated as confirmatory for the causal candidate. In 6 experiments, pCI values were manipulated independently of objective contingencies assessed by the deltaP rule. Significant effects of the pCI manipulations were found in all cases, but causal judgments did not vary significantly with objective contingencies when pCI was held constant. The experiments used a variety of stimulus presentation procedures and different dependent measures. The power PC theory, a weighted version of the deltaP rule, the Rescorla-Wagner associative learning model (R. A. Rescorla & A. R Wagner, 1972), and the deltaD rule, which is the frequency-based version of the pCI rule, were unable to account for the significant effects of the pCI manipulations. These results are consistent with a general explanatory approach to causal judgment involving the evaluation of evidence and updating of beliefs with regard to causal hypotheses.     

Taken by surprise: The paradox of the surprise test revisited

A teacher announced to his pupils that on exactly one of the days of the following school week (Monday through Friday) he would give them a test. But it would be a surprise test; on the evening before the test they would not know that the test would take place the next day. One of the brighter students in the class then argued that the teacher could never give them the test. It can't be Friday, she said, since in that case we'll expect it on Thurday evening. But then it can't be Thursday, since having already eliminated Friday we'll know Wednesday evening that it has to be Thursday. And by similar reasoning we can also eliminate Wednesday, Tuesday, and Monday. So there can't be a test!The students were somewhat baffled by the situation. The teacher was well-known to be truthful, so if he said there would be a test, then it was safe to assume that there would be one. On the other hand, he also said that the test would be a surprise. But it seemed that whenever he gave the test, it wouldn't be a surprise.Well, the teacher gave the test on Tuesday, and, sure enough, the students were surprised.