Young children can tell strategic lies after committing a transgression

This study investigated whether young children make strategic decisions about whether to lie to conceal a transgression based on the lie recipient's knowledge. In Experiment 1, 168 3- to 5-year-olds were asked not to peek at the toy in the experimenter's absence, and the majority of children peeked. Children were questioned about their transgression in either the presence or absence of an eyewitness of their transgression. Whereas 4- and 5-year-olds were able to adjust their decisions of whether to lie based on the presence or absence of the eyewitness, 3-year-olds did not. Experiments 2 and 3 manipulated whether the lie recipient appeared to have learned information about children's peeking from an eyewitness or was merely bluffing. Results revealed that when the lie recipient appeared to be genuinely knowledgeable about their transgression, even 3-year-olds were significantly less likely to lie compared with when the lie recipient appeared to be bluffing. Thus, preschool children are able to make strategic decisions about whether to lie or tell the truth based on whether the lie recipient is genuinely knowledgeable about the true state of affairs.     

Lying in the elementary school years: verbal deception and its relation to second-order belief understanding

The development of lying to conceal one's own transgression was examined in school-age children. Children (N=172) between 6 and 11 years of age were asked not to peek at the answer to a trivia question while left alone in a room. Half of the children could not resist temptation and peeked at the answer. When the experimenter asked them whether they had peeked, the majority of children lied. However, children's subsequent verbal statements, made in response to follow-up questioning, were not always consistent with their initial denial and, hence, leaked critical information to reveal their deceit. Children's ability to maintain consistency between their initial lie and subsequent verbal statements increased with age. This ability is also positively correlated with children's 2nd-order belief scores, suggesting that theory of mind understanding plays an important role in children's ability to lie consistently.     

Long-term memory and retrieval at ages 2, 3, 4

Two experiments are reported examining the contents and accessibility of a subset of the knowledge represented in long-term memory by very young children. In Experiment 1, children aged 2 to 4 were asked in a production task to name items commonly found in particular rooms in a house, and then to verify the appropriate locations of a set of miniature replicas of household items in a dollhouse. In Experiment 2, object context was manipulated to observe if further external context improves or changes production. Children 3 and 4 years old were asked to produce appropriate room items under one of three conditons: either presented no room objects as in the first experiment, or given room objects highly- or less-frequently associated in the first study.Very young children revealed considerable knowledge in this domain, and even at the youngest ages, core defining information was retrieved. It was equally clear, however, that young children know much more than they can produce, that there is noticeable improvement in ability to retrieve information over this age range, and that additional external object context does not necessarily facilitate retrieval from long-term memory.     

Promising to tell the truth makes 8‐ to 16‐year‐olds more honest

Techniques commonly used to increase truth‐telling in most North American jurisdiction courts include requiring witnesses to discuss the morality of truth‐ and lie‐telling and to promise to tell the truth prior to testifying. While promising to tell the truth successfully decreases younger children's lie‐telling, the influence of discussing the morality of honesty and promising to tell the truth on adolescents' statements has remained unexamined. In Experiment 1, 108 youngsters, aged 8–16 years, were left alone in the room and asked not to peek at the answers to a test. The majority of participants peeked at the test answers and then lied about their transgression. More importantly, participants were eight times more likely to change their response from a lie to the truth after promising to tell the truth. Experiment 2 confirmed that the results of Experiment 1 were not solely due to repeated questioning or the moral discussion of truth‐ and lie‐telling. These results suggest that, while promising to tell the truth influences the truth‐telling behaviors of adolescents, a moral discussion of truth and lies does not. Legal implications are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Early understanding of perception as a source of knowledge

Two studies investigated preschool children's ability to infer another person's knowledge or ignorance on the basis of that person's recent perceptual experience. In Experiment 1 children were questioned about their own and a puppet's knowledge of a hidden object's color and about their own and the puppet's ability to see the hidden object. Three- and 4-year-olds attributed knowledge and perceptual experience to the person (either themselves or the puppet) who had viewed the hidden object, but not to the person who did not view it. Experiment 2 further investigated 3-year-olds understanding of perception as a source of knowledge. Children were asked to indicate which of two puppets, one who had viewed a hidden object and one who had not, would be able to tell them the object's color. Children chose the correct puppet more often than would be predicted by chance. The results of these experiments suggest that understanding of perception as a source of knowledge is present by the age of 3 years.     

心理理论对幼儿白谎行为的影响：认知移情的部分中介作用

采用失望礼物研究范式考察心理理论与幼儿白谎行为的关系,及认知移情和情绪移情在其中的中介作用。结果发现：（1）幼儿的白谎行为发生率、心理理论、认知移情和情绪移情能力随年龄的增长而提高;（2）控制年龄与言语能力后,幼儿的心理理论与认知移情呈显著正相关、与白谎行为也呈显著正相关,且认知移情与白谎行为呈显著正相关;（3）幼儿的认知移情在心理理论和白谎行为间起部分中介的作用。结果表明：幼儿的心理理论可直接影响其白谎行为,也可通过认知移情的中介作用间接影响其白谎行为。     

Sex differences in the relationship of height to children's actual and attributed social and cognitive competencies

In three studies, the relationship of children's height to both (a) adults' attributions regarding the children and (b) preschoolers' social and cognitive competencies were examined. Sex differences were consistent with stereotypic conceptions. In the first two studies, mothers of preschool children rated photographs of toddlers varying in height on a variety of social and cognitive abilities. The mothers also assigned punishment to the children for hypothetical transgressions. In Experiment 1, mothers rated the large boys as more competent than the average-sized and small boys (even when effects of mothers' perceptions of the children's ages were covaried). In Experiment 2, involving female stimuli, mothers rated small girls as being less able (especially less independent) than average-sized or tall girls. While the effect of height on mothers' attributions was still evident when the effects of perceived age of the children were covaried, the pattern of results was less clear. Mothers assigned more punishment to tall girls (but not tall boys) than to small girls regardless of perceptions of age. In Experiment 3, height was associated with boys', but not girls', competence on tasks of logical ability and boys' sociometric nominations of whom they prefer to play with (significant for girls, marginally significant for boys). Height was not highly correlated with peers' perceptions of competence. The implications of the research for the socialization process are discussed.The authors wish to express their gratitude to the parents, teachers, and children at the Child Study Laboratory, Students' Child Center, Palo Alto Preschools, and Tempe Preschool. The authors would also like to thank Michael Gunzelman, Michelle White, Julie Mankowski, Marsha Kaplan, and Melissa Rook for their able assistance in data collection.     

Adults' ability to detect children's lying

Adults are poor deception detectors when examining lies told by adults, on average. However, there are some adults who are better at detecting lies than others. Children learn to lie at a very young age, a behavior that is socialized by parents. Yet, less is known about the ability to detect children's lies, particularly with regard to individual differences in the ability to detect this deception. The current study explored adult raters' ability to discern honesty in children who lied or told the truth about committing a misdeed. Results showed that adults are no better at detecting children's lies than they are with adult lies. In particular, adults were very poor at identifying children's honest statements. However, individual differences did emerge, suggesting that the ability to detect lying in children might be facilitated by relevant experience working with children. Implications for legal and mental health contexts are discussed.     

Children's mappings of large number words to numerosities

Previous studies have suggested that children's learning of the relation between number words and approximate numerosities depends on their verbal counting ability, and that children exhibit no knowledge of mappings between number words and approximate numerical magnitudes for number words outside their productive verbal counting range. In the present study we used a numerical estimation task to explore children's knowledge of these mappings. We classified children as Level 1 counters (those unable to produce a verbal count list up to 35), Level 2 counters (those who were able to count to 35 but not 60) and Level 3 counters (those who counted to 60 or above) and asked children to estimate the number of items on a card. Although the accuracy of children's estimates depended on counting ability, children at all counting skill levels produced estimates that increased linearly in proportion to the target number, for numerosities both within and beyond their counting range. This result was obtained at the group level (Experiment 1) and at the level of individual children (Experiment 2). These findings provide evidence that even the least skilled counters do exhibit some knowledge of the form of the mapping between large number words and approximate numerosities.     

How special are objects? Children's reasoning about objects, parts, and holes

Discrete physical objects have a special status in cognitive and linguistic development. Infants track and enumerate objects, young children are biased to construe novel words as referring to objects, and, when asked to count an array of items, preschool children tend to count the discrete objects, even if explicitly asked to do otherwise. We address here the question of whether discrete physical objects are the only entities that have this special status, or whether other individuals are salient as well. In two experiments, we found that 3-year-olds are just as good at identifying, tracking, and counting certain nonobject entities (holes in Experiment 1; holes and parts in Experiment 2) as they are with objects. These results are discussed in light of different theories of the nature and development of children's object bias.     

A New Look at Gaze: Preschool Children's Understanding of Eye-Direction

This study challenges the consensus view that children can judge what someone is looking at from infancy. In the first experiment 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children were asked to judge what a person in a drawing was looking at and which of two people was “looking at” them. Only 6% of 2-year-olds and young 3-year-olds passed both gaze-direction tasks, but over 70% passed an analogous point-direction task. Most older 3-year-olds and 4-year-olds passed all three tasks. Experiment 2 compared children's ability to judge what the experimenter was looking at with performance on the picture tasks. Three-year-olds performed significantly worse than 4-year-olds on the real life and picture gaze tasks. Performances on the two types of gaze task were highly correlated. Experiment 3 included stimuli with the additional cue of head-direction. Even the younger children performed well on these stimuli. These results suggest that, regardless of task format, children cannot judge what someone is looking at from eye-direction alone until the age of 3 years. Weaknesses in the evidence supporting the consensus view are highlighted and discussed.     

Children's perception of the Thatcher illusion: Evidence for development in configural face processing

The present study reports the ability of young children to detect the Thatcher illusion. Participants were asked to detect the “unusual” face in a two-alternative forced-choice version of the Thatcher illusion with greyscale (Experiment 1) and monochrome “Mooney” face images (Experiment 2). The results of Experiment 1 showed that all groups of children could see the Thatcher illusion. When processing demands were increased (Experiment 2) sensitivity to the Thatcher task increased with age and was absent for 6-year-olds. The results are discussed in terms of differential task demands determining whether evidence for or against the development of configural face processing is found.     

Children perseverate to a human's actions but not to a robot's actions

Previous research has shown that young children commit perseverative errors from their observation of another person's actions. The present study examined how social observation would lead children to perseverative tendencies, using a robot. In Experiment 1, preschoolers watched either a human model or a robot sorting cards according to one dimension (e.g. shape), after which they were asked to sort according to a different dimension (e.g. colour). The results showed that children's behaviours in the task were significantly influenced by the human model's actions but not by the robot's actions. Experiment 2 excluded the possibility that children's behaviours were not affected by the robot's actions because they did not observe its actions. We concluded that children's perseverative errors from social observation resulted, in part, from their socio-cognitive ability.     

Development of the concept of family in elementary school children

Two studies were conducted to examine the relation of age, gender, and family structure to children's understanding of the concept of family. In Study 1,387 children in Grades 1 through 6 were asked to classify various groupings of individuals as constituting or not constituting a family. Results showed both age and gender differences in children's conceptions of families: Younger children, especially boys, generally used concrete, absolute criteria for defining a family; younger girls were similar to older children in that they were more likely to employ abstract, relational criteria for family definition. Results also showed that children's own family structure was not related to their family definitions. In Study 2, 64 children from the original sample were given a measure of cognitive ability to examine whether differences in cognitive development or differences in socialization were a likely source of younger girls' more advanced understanding. Gender differences in cognitive ability did not emerge, suggesting that the gender effects in Study 1 reflected differences in the socialization of boys and girls. Implications of the findings for understanding children's reactions to family disruption are discussed.     

Causal learning across domains

Five studies investigated (a) children's ability to use the dependent and independent probabilities of events to make causal inferences and (b) the interaction between such inferences and domain-specific knowledge. In Experiment 1, preschoolers used patterns of dependence and independence to make accurate causal inferences in the domains of biology and psychology. Experiment 2 replicated the results in the domain of biology with a more complex pattern of conditional dependencies. In Experiment 3, children used evidence about patterns of dependence and independence to craft novel interventions across domains. In Experiments 4 and 5, children's sensitivity to patterns of dependence was pitted against their domain-specific knowledge. Children used conditional probabilities to make accurate causal inferences even when asked to violate domain boundaries.     

Examining the efficacy of truth/lie discussions in predicting and increasing the veracity of children's reports

This study investigated whether children's ability to reason about truths and lies influenced their truth-telling behavior. Four-six-year-old children (n=118) played a game that was intended to motivate children to use deception to hide a minor transgression. Next, an interviewer gave children one of four preliminary discussions. Children received a typical forensic truth/lie discussion (TLD), a developmentally appropriate and more elaborate TLD, or one of two discussions that controlled for the time spent conversing with children. Children were interviewed about the event. The results revealed that children's performance on the truth/lie questions did not predict their truth-telling behavior. Regardless of their performance on truth/lie questions, children who received TLD's gave more honest reports than children who did not receive TLD's. These results suggest that discussing truths and lies with children may promote truth-telling behavior. However, the results cast doubt on the validity of using children's performance on truth/lie questions as a measure of competency.     

Early syntactic productivity: evidence from dative shift

The abstractness of children's early syntactic representations has been questioned in the recent acquisition literature. While some research has suggested that children's knowledge of basic constructions such as the transitive is robust and abstract at a very young age, other work has proposed that young children only have constructions that are specific to individual lexical items. The present paper seeks to resolve this discrepancy by examining children's abstract knowledge of the English dative alternation via a production study. The studies ask whether young children who hear a sentence like I pilked the cup to Petey know that the same meaning can be expressed with the sentence I pilked Petey the cup. This generalization is well-attested in the language that children hear and represents a strong test-case for determining the nature of children's early syntactic representations. The results indicate that three-year-old children have productive knowledge of the English dative alternation, but that their performance can be influenced by small changes in the nature of the task. A preference for the prepositional dative form is also found and the possible reasons for this preference are discussed.     

Experiences of longing in Norwegian and Swedish 4- and 5-year-old children

Longing can be defined as a blend of the primary emotions of happiness and sadness. These primary emotions are experienced very early by children, and the meanings of the words happiness and sadness are also known by children early in their verbal development. To find out at what age children are able to understand and use the more developed concept of longing, the authors interviewed 74 preschoolers (4- and 5-year-olds) in Norway and Sweden about their experiences of longing. Chi-square analyses showed age and sex differences in knowledge of the concept, and some differences between categories of longing were also significant. Results showed that young children's ability to understand and use the concept of longing appears to be limited and that girls seem to mature earlier in this respect than boys do.     

The influence of facial characteristics on children's age perceptions

To examine the impact of age-related variations in facial characteristics on children's age judgments, two experiments were conducted in which craniofacial shape and facial wrinkling were independently manipulated in stimulus faces as sources of age information. Using a paired-comparisons task, children between the ages of 2 1/2 and 6 were asked to make age category as well as relative age judgments of stimulus faces. Preschool-aged children were able to use variations in craniofacial profile shape, frontal face feature vertical placement, or facial wrinkling to identify the age category of a stimulus person. Children were also able to identify the older, but not the younger, of two faces on the basis of facial wrinkling, a finding consistent with previously demonstrated limitations in young children's use of relative age terms. The results were discussed in the context of research which reveals parallel effects of craniofacial shape and wrinkling on the age judgments of adults.     

Learning through observing: Effects of modeling truth‐ and lie‐telling on children’s honesty

The current study examined the influence of observing another's lie‐ or truth‐telling – and its consequences – on children's own honesty about a transgression. Children (N = 224, 5–8 years of age) observed an experimenter (E) tell the truth or lie about a minor transgression in one of five conditions: (a) Truth‐Positive Outcome – E told the truth with a positive outcome; (b) Truth‐Negative Outcome – E told the truth with a negative outcome; (c) Lie‐Positive Outcome – E lied with a positive outcome; (d) Lie‐Negative Outcome – E lied with a negative outcome; (e) Control – E did not tell a lie or tell the truth. Later, to examine children's truth‐ or lie‐telling behavior, children participated in a temptation resistance paradigm where they were told not to peek at a trivia question answer. They either peeked or not, and subsequently lied or told the truth about that behavior. Additionally, children were asked to give moral evaluations of different truth‐ and lie‐telling vignettes. Overall, 85% of children lied. Children were less likely to lie about their own transgression in the TRP when they had previously witnessed the experimenter tell the truth with a positive outcome or tell a lie with a negative outcome.