Principled and statistical connections in common sense conception

Nominal concepts represent things as tokens of types. We report six experiments that investigate the nature of the relations we represent between the type of thing something is (e.g. DOG) and its other properties. The experiments provide evidence that we represent principled connections between the type of thing something is (e.g. DOG) and some of its properties (k-properties; e.g. having four legs for dogs), but not other properties (t-properties; e.g. being brown for dogs). Principled connections are different from logical, statistical, and causal connections. Principled connections, (i) license the expectation that tokens of the type will generally possess the k-property, (ii) license explanation of the presence of k-properties in tokens of a type by reference to the type of thing it is, and (iii) license normative expectations concerning the presence of the k-property in tokens of the type. The experiments provide evidence for all three of these aspects of principled connections. The experiments also demonstrate that principled connections must be distinguished from merely strong statistical connections. We suggest that principled connections are one of the fundamental types of relations (in addition to logical, statistical, and causal relations) in terms of which our conceptual knowledge is structured. We argue that principled connections reveal a formal mode of understanding and explanation. This mode of understanding complements other modes of understanding that have been studied within the theory-based approach to conceptual representation. Finally, we suggest that kind representations are distinguished from representations of mere types by the representation of principled connections to k-properties.     

When do ratings implicate perception versus judgment? The “overgeneralization test” for top-down effects

ABSTRACT

When looking at an object—say, a banana—we can both directly perceive its visual qualities (e.g., its size) and also make higher-level judgments about its visual and non-visual properties (e.g., not only its size, but also its cost). Suppose you obtain a rating of a property such as size. Does that rating implicate seeing or merely higher-level judgment? The answer often matters a great deal -- e.g., determining whether such ratings imply “top-down” effects of cognition on perception. Too often, however, this distinction is ignored in empirical investigations of such effects. Here we suggest a simple test for when such ratings can be used to implicate perception: whenever the very same experiment “overgeneralizes” to an unambiguously non-perceptual factor, the results cannot be used to draw implications about perception, per se. As a case study, we investigate an empirical report alleging that conservatives perceive Barack Obama as darker skinned than liberals do. Two simple experiments show that the very same effects, measured via the same “representativeness” ratings, obtain with unambiguously non-perceptual and even silly factors (involving bright red horns vs. halos, rather than brightness differences). We suggest that this renders such methods unable to implicate visual processing and we recommend that “overgeneralization tests” of this type always be conducted in such contexts.     

The importance of the peritraumatic experience in defining traumatic stress

In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text rev., DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000), posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) Criterion A2 stipulates that an individual must experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror during an event that threatened the life or physical integrity of oneself or others to be eligible for the PTSD diagnosis. In considering this criterion, we describe its origins, review studies that have examined its predictive validity, and reflect on the intended purpose of the criterion and how it complements the mission of the DSM. We then assert that the predictive validity of Criterion A2 may not be an appropriate metric for evaluating its worth. We also note that the current Criterion A2 may not fully capture all the salient aspects of the traumatic stress response. To support this claim, we review empirical research showing that individuals adapt to extreme environmental events by responding in a complex and coordinated manner. This complex response set involves an individual's appraisal regarding the degree to which the event taxes his or her resources, as well as a range of other cognitions (e.g., dissociation), felt emotions (e.g., fear), physiological reactions (e.g., heart rate increase), and behaviors (e.g., tonic immobility). We provide evidence that these response components may be associated with the subsequent development of PTSD. We then describe the challenges associated with accurately assessing an individual's traumatic stress response. We conclude with a discussion of the need to consider the individual's immediate response when defining a traumatic stressor.     

Self-interest and fairness in coalition formation: A social utility approach to understanding partner selection and payoff allocations in groups

In this chapter we present a social utility approach to coalition formation. The central tenet of our approach is that outcome allocations and partner selection in multiparty situations are affected by self-interest and fairness. Inspired by the social utility model we argue that the relative weight assigned to both components is affected by structural aspects of the situation and individual characteristics of the negotiators. We first investigate how coalition bargainers substantiate their coalition demands. We show that bargainers are self-serving in their choice of allocation rules, indicating that perceptions of fairness can be coloured by self-interest. Second, we investigate how the alignment of self-interest and fairness fosters the formation of coalitions that maximise the payoffs of its members. Finally, we present a series of experiments that expands the notion of being fair to those who are excluded from a coalition. We show that bargainers are reluctant to benefit themselves when this harms the outcomes of others and that this is dependent on personal factors (e.g., social value orientations), situational factors (e.g., the valence of outcomes), and whether bargainers negotiate in an interindividual or in an intergroup setting.     

The Effect of Evidential Impact on Perceptual Probabilistic Judgments

In a series of three behavioral experiments, we found a systematic distortion of probability judgments concerning elementary visual stimuli. Participants were briefly shown a set of figures that had two features (e.g., a geometric shape and a color) with two possible values each (e.g., triangle or circle and black or white). A figure was then drawn, and participants were informed about the value of one of its features (e.g., that the figure was a “circle”) and had to predict the value of the other feature (e.g., whether the figure was “black” or “white”). We repeated this procedure for various sets of figures and, by varying the statistical association between features in the sets, we manipulated the probability of a feature given the evidence of another (e.g., the posterior probability of hypothesis “black” given the evidence “circle”) as well as the support provided by a feature to another (e.g., the impact, or confirmation, of evidence “circle” on the hypothesis “black”). Results indicated that participants’ judgments were deeply affected by impact, although they only should have depended on the probability distributions over the features, and that the dissociation between evidential impact and posterior probability increased the number of errors. The implications of these findings for lower and higher level cognitive models are discussed.     

The world is a market-place

Conclusion Uwa bu afia, the world is a market-place, is far more than an ordinary statement to be taken on its face value. It is fully loaded and tightly packed in meaning at its deeper layers. While analysis of lexical and syntactic meaning within such metaphorical expressions is necessary for a thorough understanding of the statements' multi-level meaning, the discourse and pragmatic aspects of their use bring heavy accretions to their meaning.Thus, by studying the way meaning inheres in the expression, we are opening the way for incorporation of the world-view of a people in their use of language, since every language has a hidden code.Consequently, uwa bu afia, is a reminder that the world is not a permanent place of abode just as a market is not. It draws attention to the fact that the only permanent phenomenon is temporality. It is a warning against the mindless monuments which we erect as a consequence of insensitivity to our otherness.     

Bidirectional links in the network of multiplication facts

In three experiments, we tested the hypothesis that activation of multiplication operand nodes (e.g., 3 and 8) can occur through presentation of their product (e.g., 24). In Experiments 1 and 2 we found activation of the operands when the product was presented as a cue in a number-matching task. In Experiment 3, activation also occurred in a parity-matching task, where the product (24) was not relevant to the parity matching on its operands (3 and 8). We concluded that bidirectional links exist among the operands and their product for multiplication problems and these links can be activated in a purely stimulus-driven manner. We suggest this may constitute the basis for the solution of simple divisions by mediation through the complementary multiplication facts.     

Managing diversity in organizations: An integrative model and agenda for future research

The literature on policies, procedures, and practices of diversity management in organizations is currently fragmented and often contradictory in highlighting what is effective diversity management, and which organizational and societal factors facilitate or hinder its implementation. In order to provide a comprehensive and cohesive view of diversity management in organizations, we develop a multilevel model informed by the social identity approach that explains, on the basis of a work motivation logic, the processes by, and the conditions under which employee dissimilarity within diverse work groups is related to innovation, effectiveness, and well-being. Building on this new model, we then identify those work group factors (e.g., climate for inclusion and supervisory leadership), organizational factors (e.g., diversity management policies and procedures, and top management's diversity beliefs), and societal factors (e.g., legislation, socioeconomic situation, and culture) that are likely to contribute to the effective management of diversity in organizations. In our discussion of the theoretical implications of the proposed model, we offer a set of propositions to serve as a guide for future research. We conclude with a discussion of possible limitations of the model and practical implications for managing diversity in organizations.     

Where and Why g Matters:Not a Mystery

g is a highly general capability for processing complex information of any type. This explains its great value in predicting job performance. Complexity is the major distinction among jobs, which explains why g is more important further up the occupational hierarchy. The predictive validities of g are moderated by the criteria and other predictors considered in selection research, but the resulting gradients of g's effects are systematic. The pattern provides personnel psychologists a road map for how to design better selection batteries. Despite much literature on the meaning and impact of g, there nonetheless remains an aura of mystery about where and why g cognitive tests might be useful in selection. The aura of mystery encourages false beliefs and false hopes about how we might reduce disparate impact in employee selection. It is also used to justify new testing techniques whose major effect, witting or not, is to reduce the validity of selection in the service of racial goals.     

I Can't Get You Out of My Head: The Influence of Secrecy on Consumers’ Self‐Brand Connections

Although research provides anecdotal evidence of consumers keeping their brand consumption a secret, there is little empirical corroboration to justify its study or illuminate the resulting consequences. The goals of this research are to provide evidence for the prevalence of keeping brand consumption a secret and to understand the resulting cognitive processing and consequences. Specifically, we first explore the occurrence of secrecy in the context of brand consumption, its types, and its motivations, underscoring the need for further investigation. Then, through a series of three subsequent studies, we demonstrate that keeping brand consumption a secret can lead to enhanced self‐brand connections through the underlying processes of thought suppression and thought intrusion. We rule out alternative explanations and enhance generalizability through the examination of passive (e.g., avoiding) versus active (e.g., lying) secrecy and variations in agency (i.e., instructed vs. voluntary secrecy).     

Concepts dissolve artificial boundaries in the study of emotion and cognition,uniting body,brain, and mind

ABSTRACT

Theories of emotion have often maintained artificial boundaries: for instance, that cognition and emotion are separable, and that an emotion concept is separable from the emotional events that comprise its category (e.g. “fear” is distinct from instances of fear). Over the past several years, research has dissolved these artificial boundaries, suggesting instead that conceptual construction is a domain-general process—a process by which the brain makes meaning of the world. The brain constructs emotion concepts, but also cognitions and perceptions, all in the service of guiding action. In this view, concepts are multimodal constructions, dynamically prepared from a set of highly variable instances. This approach obviates old questions (e.g. how does cognition regulate emotion?) but generates new ones (e.g. how does a brain learn emotion concepts?). In this paper, we review this constructionist, predictive coding account of emotion, considering its implications for health and well-being, culture and development.     

Moral realism and reliance on moral testimony

Philosophical Studies - Moral realism and some of its constitutive theses, e.g., cognitivism, face the following challenge. If they are true, then it seems that we should predict that deference to...     

If the real world were irrelevant, so to speak: The role of propositional truth-value in counterfactual sentence comprehension

Propositional truth-value can be a defining feature of a sentence's relevance to the unfolding discourse, and establishing propositional truth-value in context can be key to successful interpretation. In the current study, we investigate its role in the comprehension of counterfactual conditionals, which describe imaginary consequences of hypothetical events, and are thought to require keeping in mind both what is true and what is false. Pre-stored real-world knowledge may therefore intrude upon and delay counterfactual comprehension, which is predicted by some accounts of discourse comprehension, and has been observed during online comprehension. The impact of propositional truth-value may thus be delayed in counterfactual conditionals, as also claimed for sentences containing other types of logical operators (e.g., negation, scalar quantifiers). In an event-related potential (ERP) experiment, we investigated the impact of propositional truth-value when described consequences are both true and predictable given the counterfactual premise. False words elicited larger N400 ERPs than true words, in negated counterfactual sentences (e.g., "If N.A.S.A. had not developed its Apollo Project, the first country to land on the moon would have been Russia/America") and real-world sentences (e.g., "Because N.A.S.A. developed its Apollo Project, the first country to land on the moon was America/Russia") alike. These indistinguishable N400 effects of propositional truth-value, elicited by opposite word pairs, argue against disruptions by real-world knowledge during counterfactual comprehension, and suggest that incoming words are mapped onto the counterfactual context without any delay. Thus, provided a sufficiently constraining context, propositional truth-value rapidly impacts ongoing semantic processing, be the proposition factual or counterfactual.     

A template model of embodiment while dreaming: Proposal of a mini-me

Dreams are usually centered around a dream self capable of tasks generally impossible in waking, e.g. flying or walking through walls. Moreover, the bodily dream self appears relatively stable and insensitive to changes of the embodied wake self, raising the question of whether and to what extent the dream self is embodied. To further explore its determinants, we tested whether the dream self would be affected by either pre-sleep focused attention to a body part or by its experimental alteration during the day. Choosing a repeated-measures design, we analyzed how often key words reflecting the experimental manipulations appeared in the dream reports. Results suggest that the dream self is not affected by these manipulations, strengthening the hypothesis that, in the majority of dreams, the dream self is only weakly embodied, utilizing a standard template of embodiment akin to a prototype of self operating independently from the physical waking self.     

Biculturalism Unpacked: Components, Measurement, Individual Differences, and Outcomes

Cultural contact due to migration, globalization, travel, and the resulting cultural diversity, has led to growing numbers of bicultural individuals, which demands further research on this group. In this article, we introduce the concept of biculturalism and provide the foundation necessary for understanding literature on this topic, beginning research in this area, and recognizing biculturalism in everyday life. In unpacking the construct of biculturalism, we first define it along with its components and related constructs (e.g. acculturation strategies). Second, we compare and discuss various ways of measuring biculturalism (e.g. unidimensional versus bidimensional models). Third, we organize and summarize the limited literature on individual differences in bicultural identity, focusing on the construct of Bicultural Identity Integration ( Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005 ). Lastly, we review the possible outcomes resulting from biculturalism.     

The effect of generic statements on children's causal attributions: questions of mechanism

Generic statements, or generics, express generalizations about entire kinds (e.g., "Girls are good at a game called 'tooki'"). In contrast, nongeneric statements express facts about specific (sets of) individuals (e.g., "Jane is good at tooki"). Aside from simply conveying information, generics and nongenerics also instill different causal perspectives on the facts expressed, implying that these facts stem from deep, inherent causes (e.g., talent) or from external, mechanistic causes (e.g., instruction), respectively. In the present research (with samples of 4- to 7-year-olds and undergraduates, N = 220), we proposed that children's causal attributions for the facts learned through these statements are determined not by the generic/nongeneric format of the statements themselves but rather by the generic/nongeneric format of the beliefs relevant to these statements. This proposal led to two specific predictions. First, the influence of the generic belief induced by a novel generic statement should be detected in any subsequent context that falls under its scope--even in circumstances that involve particular individuals. Confirming this prediction, participants often attributed a fact conveyed in a nongeneric statement (e.g., a particular girl's tooki ability) to deep, inherent causes if they had previously formed a relevant generic belief (e.g., by hearing that girls are good at tooki). Second, we predicted that nongeneric statements such as "Most girls are good at tooki" should also promote attributions to deep causes because they often ultimately give rise to generic beliefs, as suggested by recent evidence. This prediction was confirmed as well. These results clarify and expand our knowledge of the influence of language on children's understanding of the world.     

Errors of Omission in English-Speaking Children's Production of Plurals and the Past Tense: The Effects of Frequency, Phonology, and Competition

How do English‐speaking children inflect nouns for plurality and verbs for the past tense? We assess theoretical answers to this question by considering errors of omission, which occur when children produce a stem in place of its inflected counterpart (e.g., saying “dress” to refer to 5 dresses). A total of 307 children (aged 3;11–9;9) participated in 3 inflection studies. In Study 1, we show that errors of omission occur until the age of 7 and are more likely with both sibilant regular nouns (e.g., dress) and irregular nouns (e.g., man) than regular nouns (e.g., dog). Sibilant nouns are more likely to be inflected if they are high frequency. In Studies 2 and 3, we show that similar effects apply to the inflection of verbs and that there is an advantage for “regular‐like” irregulars whose inflected form, but not stem form, ends in d/t. The results imply that (a) stems and inflected forms compete for production and (b) children generalize both product‐oriented and source‐oriented schemas when learning about inflectional morphology.     

Comparative Mental Development

To reconstruct the evolution of human cognitive development we are studying its comparative ontogeny in primate phylogeny (i.e., two monkey species, two chimpanzee species, and humans). The research has discovered primate conceptual universals including logical (e.g., classifying), arithmetic (e.g., quantitative substituting), and physical (e.g., causal) cognitions. But the ontogenetic covariation between these conceptual universals is progressively displaced or heterochronic in primate phylogeny. Heterochronic evolution produced the most synchronic and widest ontogenetic window for progressive cognitive development in humans.     

Can conceptual congruency effects between number,time, and space be accounted for by polarity correspondence?

Conceptual congruency effects have been interpreted as evidence for the idea that the representations of abstract conceptual dimensions (e.g., power, affective valence, time, number, importance) rest on more concrete dimensions (e.g., space, brightness, weight). However, an alternative theoretical explanation based on the notion of polarity correspondence has recently received empirical support in the domains of valence and morality, which are related to vertical space (e.g., good things are up). In the present study we provide empirical arguments against the applicability of the polarity correspondence account to congruency effects in two conceptual domains related to lateral space: number and time. Following earlier research, we varied the polarity of the response dimension (left-right) by manipulating keyboard eccentricity. In a first experiment we successfully replicated the congruency effect between vertical and lateral space and its interaction with response eccentricity. We then examined whether this modulation of a concrete-concrete congruency effect can be extended to two types of concrete-abstract effects, those between left-right space and number (in both parity and magnitude judgment tasks), and temporal reference. In all three tasks response eccentricity failed to modulate the congruency effects. We conclude that polarity correspondence does not provide an adequate explanation of conceptual congruency effects in the domains of number and time.