Primate cognition: from 'what now?' to 'what if?'

The 'social brain' hypothesis has had a major impact on the study of comparative cognition. However, despite a strong sense, gained from both experimental and observational work, that monkeys and apes differ from each other, we are still no closer to understanding exactly how they differ. We hypothesize that the dispersed social systems characteristic of ape societies explains why monkeys and apes should differ cognitively. The increased cognitive control and analogical reasoning ability needed to cope with life in dispersed societies also suggests a possible route for human cognitive evolution. This hypothesis is supported by behavioural and neurobiological data, but we need more of both if we are to fully understand how our primate cousins see the world.     

Universal Selection Theory: Implications for multidisciplinary approaches to clinical psychology and psychiatry

Universal Selection Theory claims that the increases in the fit of a system to its environment are achieved through a process of blind variation and cumulative selection that is analogous to evolution by natural selection. The process is proposed to occur in many domains, including the gene, behavior, cognition, and culture (meme). This paper reviews the background for the theory and explains how it may contribute to clinical psychology and psychiatry. It is suggested that the theory provides: A framework for integrating biological, psychological and cultural perspectives; an account for why problem-solving and cognitive reappraisal prove to be effective interventions; and an understanding of why psychological disorders can be resistant to change. Implications for psychological treatments, theoretical integration, and future research are discussed.     

“A Matter of Life and Death”: Kawabata on the Value of Art after the Atomic Bombings

This article explores the possible interpretations—and the implications of those interpretations—of a comment about the importance of art made by Yasunari Kawabata (1899–1972), later the first Japanese Nobel laureate for literature: that “looking at old works of art is a matter of life and death.” (In 1949, Kawabata visited Hiroshima in his capacity as president of the Japan literary society P.E.N. to inspect the damage caused by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima that helped end World War II. On his way back to his home in Kamakura, he stopped in Kyoto. He came under severe criticism for “sightseeing” at such a time. This comment was his response.) The introduction explains why we should take him seriously as a commentator on art. The body of the article examines why our looking at art might be more, not less, important after the post‐War situation, the kinds of art Kawabata might have meant, why some possibilities are more likely than others, and how they differ in what they offer us and the value of art under conditions of trauma and mass trauma.     

Pastors,parishioners, and pets

Case examples of how three parishioners in one congregation dealt with pet loss are examined. Each person discusses reasons for owning a pet, relates personal reactions to the loss, explains who was and who would have been supportive during the grief process, and illustrates why such support was needed. Suggestions for how a local minister might provide outreach to parishioners dealing with grief over a pet's death are presented.     

Was Wittgenstein an Anti-Realist?

William Child has said that Wittgenstein is an anti-realist with respect to a person's dreams, recent thoughts that he has consciously entertained and other things. I discuss Wittgenstein's comments about these matters in order to show that they do not commit him to an anti-realist view or a realist view. He wished to discredit the idea that when a person reports his dream or his thoughts, or past intentions, the person is reading off the contents of his mind or memory. Reporting what one dreamt or recently thought is not like reporting what one has just read. The language is different, and the criterion of truth is different.
The anti-realist is able to explain why the reports of thoughts, for instance, are "guaranteed" to be true (PI II, 222) by stipulating that the character and existence of the past thought is constituted by an inclination to assert that one had that past thought so the assertion could not be false. This could not be Wittgenstein's view. What does "guarantee" the truth of such an assertion is the fact that the person himself is the principle authority on what he dreamt, thought, and intended, something which "stands fast" for us.
I next consider Crispin Wright's account of Wittgenstein's ideas about intentions and point out that his assumption that person always makes a judgement as to whether his action conforms to his intention is clearly false. And he is wrong in attributing to Wittgenstein the idea that an intention does not have a determinate content prior to its author's judgement about whether the action conforms to the intention, an idea that is obscure. If this were accurate, it would be a mystery why we do anything, or, at least, why our actions ever conform to our intentions.     

How to Know That Time Travel Is Unlikely Without Knowing Why

What's the point of time travel? Not to change the past; no matter how carefully a time traveler plans, all of her attempts to change the past end in failure. Paul Horwich has argued that the implausibility of such failures gives us reason to doubt that there will be frequent time travel to the local past. I defend a modified version of Horwich's argument and show how we might gain evidence about the chance of there being frequent time travel in the future without having any information that explains why that chance value obtains.     

From deception trials to control reagents. The introduction of the control group about a century ago

This is the story of the remarkable psychologist John E. Coover, who, in the early 1900s, was the first to advocate the comparison of experimental and control groups as a methodological necessity. Moreover, the author raises the issue of why control groups were launched about a century ago, and why psychology was comparatively early in codifying group comparison as a methodological routine. In dealing with these questions, the author discusses the relations between turn-of-the-century science and society as well as between psychophysical research and educational experimentation. Furthermore, the mystery is solved of how Coover's rightful place in the received history of experimental controls could be taken by precisely the authors whom he criticized for the lack of controls.     

Modeling the Practical Effects of Applicant Reactions: Subgroup Differences in Test‐Taking Motivation,Test Performance,and Selection Rates

Research suggests that Black–White differences in test‐taking motivation may be related to subgroup test score differences, but this research has not shown the extent to which minimizing subgroup motivation differences will reduce subgroup differences in selection rates and adverse impact. This Monte Carlo study examined how enhancing Blacks' test‐taking motivation for cognitive ability tests might reduce adverse impact across a range of (a) subgroup test differences, (b) selection ratios, (c) subgroup differences in test‐taking motivation, and (d) relationships between motivation and test scores. The results suggest that although enhancing test‐taking motivation will consistently reduce subgroup differences in test performance and adverse impact, the effect is often small and will not eliminate adverse impact for any condition we examine. However, under some conditions the reduction may be important, and the discussion considers conditions where even these minimal reductions may be practically helpful.     

Rethinking the Ontology of Cartesian Essences

The old and recent debates on Cartesian essences have focused on the question of whether Descartes is a Platonist or a conceptualist about essences. I argue that this is a false dichotomy. An adequate account of Cartesian essences must accommodate and reconcile two central doctrines and texts in Descartes' philosophy. I will argue that recent conceptualist and Platonist interpretations neither accommodate these doctrines nor reconcile these texts. Such failures are not accidental since Descartes' doctrines of divine creation and simplicity render it impossible for Descartes to be either a conceptualist or a Platonist. Failure to notice this fact explains why there has been no progress on this exegetical issue.     

Explaining the impact of policy information on policy-making

This article has called past studies into question as they relate to describing and explaining the impact of information on policy-making. More specifically, it attempts to empirically investigate the causality of the factors involved in the impact of information on governmental decision-making. Based on an integrated conceptual framework for when and how information helps to make policy decisions, a path model (or a covariance structure model without latent variables) is built and tested against the data in two areas of mental health policy (i.e., service provision and financing). Findings of the study demonstrate that how and when information influences governmental decision-making is directly and indirectly affected by a variety of factors and their linkages, not dominated by one set of factors (e.g., trustworthiness of information source or format of reports) defined by a single perspective (e.g., the organizational interest or the communications perspective). The most important paths in the model are those between factors related to information (e.g., the amount of information received or its use) and the impact of information on policy-making. Interestingly, these factors also play a major role in linking other variables (e.g., demographics or decision makers’ distrust of information) to the impact of information on policy-making. Furthermore, the general pattern of the findings indicates that policy areas make a difference in accounting for the impact of information on policy-making. Overall, the single most important lesson is that past perspectives are not alternative or competing tools for understanding the phenomena, and, thus, the theoretical and/or empirical task of explaining when and why information affects policy-making is equivalent to explaining why a certain set of factors is not appropriate or appropriate for a particular context and to identifying such a context.     

Análisis factorial de ítems de respuesta forzada: una revisión y un ejemplo

Forced-choice tests are widely used in order to reduce the impact of different response set biases typically associated to psychological tests (e.g. acquiescence or social desirability). However, these tests produce ipsative data which have undesirable properties, thereby making an inappropriate application of classical factor analysis techniques for psychometric evaluation commonly used by researchers. This paper explains the analytical properties of forced-choice tests, along with an example that illustrates how these properties have an impact on the application of conventional statistical techniques and produce improper results. Additionally, one of the current proposals is presented in order to analyze these data based on the comparative judgment model by Thurstone, along with the results of a simulation study which illustrates its implementation and effectiveness in recovering the original factor structure.     

Religion and cognitive control: An event-coding approach

Religion is playing an important role in our lives, be it from a personal perspective as member of a particular congregation or as an agnostic living among believers. What impact has religion on our decision-making and action? Two kinds of impact have been considered: religious goals are likely to constrain and color our behavior, but religion may also strengthen cognitive control in a more generic sense. While evidence supports both considerations, it remains a mystery how that works, that is, which mechanisms underlie the impact of religion on our decisions and action control. Here I suggest a preliminary mechanistic model accounting for this impact. It is based on the Theory of Event Coding (TEC), a general theory of human perception, attention, and action control, and the assumptions that goals are represented in a distributed fashion (as selection criteria) and that their impact is moderated by metacontrol, the current control style that varies between persistence and flexibility. The model is parsimonious (i.e., not religion-specific) and mechanistically transparent, and thus provides a solid basis for more systematic experimentation and theorizing.     

True and false memory for colour names versus actual colours: Support for the visual distinctiveness heuristic in memory for colour information

In a colour variation of the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) false memory paradigm, participants studied lists of words critically related to a nonstudied colour name (e.g., “blood, cherry, scarlet, rouge … ”); they later showed false memory for the critical colour name (e.g., “red”). Two additional experiments suggest that participants generate colour imagery in response to such colour-related DRM lists. First, participants claim to experience colour imagery more often following colour-related than standard non-colour-related DRM lists; they also rate their colour imagery as more vivid following colour-related lists. Second, participants exhibit facilitative priming for critical colours in a dot selection task that follows words in the colour-related DRM list, suggesting that colour-related DRM lists prime participants for the actual critical colours themselves. Despite these findings, false memory for critical colour names does not extend to the actual colours themselves (font colours). Rather than leading to source confusion about which colours were self-generated and which were studied, presenting the study lists in varied font colours actually worked to reduce false memory overall. Results are interpreted within the framework of the visual distinctiveness hypothesis.     

Physical imagery: kinematic versus dynamic models.

Physical imagery occurs when people imagine one object causing a change to a second object. To make inferences through physical imagery, people must represent information that coordinates the interactions among the imagined objects. The current research contrasts two proposals for how this coordinating information is realized in physical imagery. In the traditional kinematic formulation, imagery transformations are coordinated by geometric information in analog spatial representations. In the dynamic formulation, transformations may also be regulated by analog representations of force and resistance. Four experiments support the dynamic formulation. They show, for example, that without making changes to the spatial properties of a problem, dynamic perceptual information (e.g., torque) and beliefs about physical properties (e. g., viscosity) affect the inferences that people draw through imagery. The studies suggest that physical imagery is not so much an analog of visual perception as it is an analog of physical action. A simple model that represents force as a rate helps explain why inferences can emerge through imagined actions even though people may not know the answer explicitly. It also explains how and when perception, beliefs, and learning can influence physical imagery.     

The Mystery Man Can Help Reduce False Identification for Child Witnesses: Evidence from Video Line‐ups

It is well established that children (as young as 5 years) can correctly identify a target from a target present (TP) line‐up as accurately as adults; however, when shown a target absent (TA) line‐up, children make more false identifications. In the present study, children aged 5–7 and 8–11 years viewed a film of a staged theft, then 1–2 days later were shown either a TP or TA video line‐up. Half of the witnesses viewed line‐ups that included a ‘mystery man’ (a black silhouette with a white question mark), which they could select if they did not recognise anyone from the line‐up. When the ‘mystery man’ was present in the line‐up, there were significantly fewer false identifications for the TA line‐ups. This study shows that including a silhouette in a video line‐up can help reduce false identifications for children as young as 5 years of age, without reducing correct identifications. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Understanding Applicant Reactions to Credit Checks: Uncertainty,information effects and individual differences

Credit checks are an increasingly common selection procedure for American jobs, and they are distinct in a number of ways from the selection tests typically studied by researchers. With a credit check, applicants do not actually take a test or answer questions, and most will be uncertain about what information a credit report contains, why one is being requested, and how it will be evaluated. In two experiments we assess the effects of explanations and individual differences. Experiment 1 used a sample of 408 undergraduate business students to examine reaction dimensions relevant to credit checks, and found perceptions to be mainly negative. The type of explanation read, however, interacted with perceived credit report impact to influence reactions. Results of Experiment 2 , with a sample of students from a more non‐traditional population, were similar, but age was associated with greater skepticism of credit report accuracy. Privacy perceptions were the strongest predictor of intention to withdraw from the selection process.     

THE FRESHMAN OBJECTION TO EXPRESSIVISM AND WHAT TO MAKE OF IT

Cognitivism is the view that the primary function of moral judgements is to express beliefs that purport to say how things are; expressivism is the contrasting view that their primary function is to express some desire-like state of mind. I shall consider what I call the freshman objection to expressivism. It is pretty uncontroversial that this objection rests on simple misunderstandings. There are nevertheless interesting metaethical lessons to learn from the fact that the freshman objection is prevalent among undergraduates and non-philosophers. It leaves for expressivists two awkward explanatory tasks. Number one is that of explaining why natural selection – which, by expressivism's own lights, favoured moral thought and talk because of their socially useful regulative and coordinating functions – did not favour a stance that would make moral thought and talk more effective in fulfilling these functions. Number two is that of explaining how moral thought and talk survive in cultural evolution, despite the prevalence of the freshman objection and related worries. I conclude that expressivism as a theory of actual moral discourse rather than a revisionist theory is either false or committed to an implausible error theory, according to which ordinary speakers are systematically mistaken about what they are up to when they make moral judgements.     

Anxiety and perceptual-motor performance: toward an integrated model of concepts, mechanisms, and processes

Under anxiety, people sometimes perform poorly. This concerns cognitive performance (e.g., taking an important exam) as well as perceptual-motor performance (e.g., picking up a cup from a table). There is still much debate about how anxiety affects perceptual-motor performance. In the current paper we review the experimental literature on anxiety and perceptual-motor performance, thereby focusing on how anxiety affects the perception, selection, and realization of action possibilities. Based on this review we discuss the merits of two opposing theoretical explanations and build on existing frameworks of anxiety and cognitive performance to develop an integrated model that explains the various ways in which anxiety may specifically affect perceptual-motor performance. This model distinguishes between positive and negative effects of anxiety and, moving beyond previous approaches, recognizes three operational levels (i.e., attentional, interpretational, and behavioral) at which anxiety may affect different aspects of goal-directed action. Finally, predictions are formulated and directions for future research suggested.     

Sonu Shamdasani interviewed by Ann Casement

Abstract :  Sonu Shamdasani interviewed by Ann Casement about Jung's  The Red Book: Liber Novus  in the course of which they range over issues to do with what drew Shamdasani to Jung; how he came to be involved in editing, translating and publishing  Liber Novus ; why he is so passionate about it; where it stands in relation to Jung's other work; some of the central figures that appear in the book such as  Philemon  and  Izdubar ; what  Liber Novus  might offer training candidates and succeeding generations of Jungians; how it has changed Shamdasani's own impression of Jung and what he hopes this enormous project will achieve; why Jung did not publish it in his own lifetime and whether he was mistaken in not doing so; and what impact the publication of  Liber Novus  will have on Jung's reputation worldwide as well as within the Jungian community.     

Negative Theology and Meaningless Suffering

This article attempts an exploration of the limits of our capacity to weave suffering into patterns of meaning. I try to show that something like an apophatic moment in our response to some kinds of suffering is both necessary and difficult to sustain. From this emerges a question about the relationship between this ‘something like apophasis’ before suffering, on the one hand, and unknowing in face of the mystery of God, on the other. I argue against a tendency in some modern theology to elide one into the other – against a tendency to absorb the ‘mystery of suffering’ into the ‘mystery of God.’ The article concludes with the suggestion that in order to avoid such an elision, and other forms of false reconciliation with suffering, Christian theology needs to maintain a commitment to a future-oriented eschatology, a real – if unimaginable – eschatological hope.